Hard figures on the fighting in the East during WWII are hard to find. I have posted figures about manpower strength and losses for both Soviet and Axis side here.
In this post I will take a look at Luftwaffe and Red Airforce strength and losses during 1941-45.My source for Luftwaffe strength is the ‘Luftwaffe Data Book’ by Alfred Price. I calculated the data for Luftlotte 1,6 and 4. For Soviet operational strength I’ve used this post in Axis History Forum which lists ‘Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voina 1941-45. Dejstvuyushchaya Armiya’ as the source.
For Luftwaffe losses I used this post in Axis History Forum by
Richard
Anderson, author and former researcher of the Dupuy Institute (data probably comes from site ‘The Luftwaffe 1933-45’). For Soviet figures I used ‘Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century’ by Krivosheev.
For both sides the losses refer only to Combat incidents. Losses due to accidents are NOT included (the reason being that I don’t have that data for the Luftwaffe).Comparison of strength:
Luftwaffe:
Jun-41
|
Jul-42
|
May-43
|
May-44
|
Jan-45
| ||
Fighters
|
782
|
659
|
454
|
390
|
383
| |
Long Range Fighters
|
78
|
70
|
52
| |||
Night-fighters
|
0
|
0
|
9
|
104
|
94
| |
Medium Bombers
|
893
|
829
|
509
|
427
|
101
| |
Ground Attack
|
474
|
336
|
574
|
650
|
601
| |
Night Harasment
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
276
|
225
| |
Coastal
|
27
|
22
|
38
|
30
|
57
| |
Recon
|
Short Range
|
325
|
90
|
91
|
126
|
215
|
Long Range
|
303
|
350
|
313
|
198
|
253
| |
Transport
|
212
|
440
|
93
|
182
|
151
| |
Combat
|
2,227
|
1,894
|
1,598
|
1,847
|
1,404
| |
Total
|
3,094
|
2,796
|
2,133
|
2,383
|
2,080
| |
Soviet Airforce:
Year 1941
|
Year 1942
|
Year 1943
|
Year 1944
|
Year 1945
| |||
Aircraft
|
1-Dec-41
|
1-May-42
|
1-Nov-42
|
1-Jul-43
|
1-Jan-44
|
1-Jun-44
|
1-Jan-45
|
Fighters
|
2,589
|
3,468
|
4,569
|
6,777
|
6,211
|
7,342
|
8,078
|
Ground Attack
|
154
|
331
|
1,915
|
3,505
|
2,751
|
4,066
|
4,991
|
Bombers
|
1,058
|
1,170
|
1,941
|
2,667
|
2,145
|
3,407
|
4,878
|
Recon
|
378
|
544
|
380
|
542
|
650
|
622
|
876
|
Others
|
219
|
1,349
|
2,805
|
3,166
|
4,197
|
4,519
|
3,798
|
Total
|
4,398
|
6,862
|
11,610
|
16,657
|
15,954
|
19,956
|
22,621
|
Luftwaffe vs Soviet Airforce:
By taking the data from the tables presented so far we get the following table:
I have lumped all Luftwaffe fighters together and also added night harassment aircraft in the ground attack category. For 1941 Soviet strength I’ve used article ‘Summer 1941’ by Frankson from the Journal of Slavic Military Studies.
Comparison of losses:
Year
|
Luftwaffe
|
SU Airforce
|
Ratio
|
1941
|
2,800
|
10,300
|
3.68
|
1942
|
2,299
|
7,800
|
3.39
|
1943
|
3,128
|
11,200
|
3.58
|
1944
|
2,913
|
9,700
|
3.33
|
Totals
|
11,140
|
39,000
|
3.50
|
Luftwaffe strength in 1941-42 stays close to 3,000 but in 1943-44 it goes down to ~2,200. This decrease in size is due to the withdrawal of units to serve In the West against the Anglo-American bomber offensive. At the same time the Soviet airforce manages to increase its strength by a huge factor.
The composition of the LW fleet also changes during the war. Early on the bombers make up a large part of the Eastern fleet but in 1943-45 their numbers are constantly decreasing while the ground attack aircraft make up the largest part of the overall force. Fighter strength also decreases each year.
For the Soviet force the huge numerical increase is concentrated on ground attack aircraft and fighters.
Regarding losses there is always a striking difference between the LW and the SU. The Soviet force always suffers more losses despite having a large numerical advantage in the period 1943-45. For both forces 1943 is the year of worst losses.
What is missing on the losses part is the losses per sortie statistic. Unfortunately I don’t have data for sorties in the East, with one exception. Historian Gröhler in "Stärke, Verteilung und Verluste der deutschen Luftwaffe im zweiten Weltkrieg" gives for the Eastern front in 1944 0,00703 losses per sortie with the equivalent number in the West being 0.0537.
Usually a loss rate over 5% means an airforce cannot continue to operate efficiently. On the other hand a rate of ~1% in 1944 when the Soviet airforce had such a quantitative advantage is very low. It definitely doesn’t paint a very good picture of the Soviet pilots.
Finally a word should be said about aircraft types. In 1941 the Soviet force is operating obsolete types like the I-16 fighter. However by 1943 the new fighter models Yakovlev 1,7,9 and Lavochkin 5 are able to fight well against the German Bf-109 and Fw-190 at least at low altitude.
For anyone who wants to learn more about the airwar in the East I can recommend the books of Christer Bergström.
US Defence MappingThanks for taking the time to discuss this, I feel strongly about it and love learning more on this topic. If possible, as you gain expertise, would you mind updating your blog with more information? It is extremely helpful for me.
ReplyDeletenice site man!
ReplyDeletehowdy, I am researching into the German use of Russian flyers in the Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front. One of the commanding officers was a Col. Walter Holters who had been a combat flyer as well in WWone. Any help where I might search to seek his units and more about this man...? Thank you.....
ReplyDeleteSorry, I don’t know anything about this case. As far as I know apart from the Germans their minor allies (Finns, Italians, Rumanians and Hungarians) had a small number of aircraft in the East.
DeleteLosses per sorties could be also higher if aircraft were obsolete. The range of sorties should be mentioned. Are those figures combat sorties to/cross frontline or do they include backline transport sorties too?
ReplyDeletePercentage of Lufwaffe losses in east and west caused by AA-fire?. Any information? Finns have their own statistics of combat losses (1941-44). About 42% shot down by enemy fighters and 33% by enemy AA-guns, rest of combat losses airbase strikes, accidents, crush landings, weather, technical issues or just "unknown".
ReplyDeleteHere're Luftwaffe combat + non-combat losses with half-year period:
ReplyDeleteMay-Dec 1940: combat 2 572 + non-combat 1 379= 3 951
I/1941: 1 189 + 954 = 2 143
II/1941: 1 908 + 1 248 = 3 156 (1941:5 299)
I/1942: 1 816 + 1460 = 3 276
II/1942: 2 496 + 1 726= 4 222 (1942: 7 498)
I/1943: 3 117 + 2 589 = 7 706
II/1943: 4 302 + 3 475 = 7 777 (1943: 15 483)
I/1944: 6 295 + 3 608 = 9 903
II/1944: over 10 000 (1944: over 20 000)
-----------------------------
May 1940 - June 1944: 21 123 combat and 15 060 non-combat losses. Total 36 183 lost aircraft and over 10 000 during 2nd half of 1944.
Losses in Eastern Front have been about 24% of all Luftwaffe losses.
Before Operation Barbarossa Luftwaffe has already lost 6 732 aircraft (operational and non operational losses). Until 1 Jan 1944 these losses had mounted to 30 067. Share of Eastern Front in this point was 33.08% ( 9 948 aircraft). However RAF/USAAF played in 1944 even much bigger role decimating Luftwaffe. In last quarter of 1943 share was 75%. First quarter of 1944 it was 79% and in 2nd quarter of 1944 amazingly 81% (of combat losses even 83%). Share of Eastern Front increased again to 25% in 3rd quarter of 1944. However in this stage none could be sure where Luftwaffe aircraft in eastern part of Germany destroyed by VVS or USAAF/RAF.
ReplyDeleteSource: Dan Zamansky: "How were German air force resources distributed between different fronts in the years 1941 to 1943 and what are the implications of this case study for understanding the political economy of the period?"
and his table of source: Source: BArch RL 2-III/944, BArch RL 2-III/945 and BArch RL 2-III/946
The Luftwaffe distribution was one of the main problems of German forces since German military tactics relied heavily on close combat air support and air superiority. The V2 rocket program hampered the potential of the Luftwaffe even further as each of the 5200 V2 rockets built was worth as much as 2,5-3 fighter planes or 1,5-2 close air support aircrafts.
DeleteThen there was also the atlantic wall with its 1,2 million tons of steel, an equivalent of 30.000 panther tanks, the U boot fleet with its 1500 commissioned U boots, each worth as much as 5-10 panthers depending on the type of U boot, defence of Germany with its fighters and countless flaks against allied bombings (and their effect on the German industry), and ofc other theatres of war like Africa, where Germans had to use many supply vehicles.
Despite the high industrial potential Germany had, the distribution of German ressources greatly affected the tactical effectiveness of German forces, and I believe the distribution of the Luftwaffe hurt them the most, because it was the key actor in Blitzkrieg tactics as it is today in modern military tactics.
In fact the cost of V-2 project has been wildly minimized. The price of late period V-2 was some 250 000 - 300 000 RM but the first series had price of some 1 million RM per V-2. Total cost of whole project has been higher than 2 billion RM. There are many reasons. The company producing V-2 confirmed after the war that not just over 5 000 V-2 but over 7 000 was produced until allied captured those factories. Also innovation, developing, test, planning costs and rebuilding (bombing) were incredible high. The 3 billion RM cost is more likely than just 2 billion.
DeleteGerman generally used average 42-44% for building just aircraft (excluding V-1/V-2 which were "army" projects though actually targeting strategic air war against western allied). For instance in top producing month, July 1944 48.3% of German munition production was aircraft while AFV got 7.8% and vehicles 2.3%.
''However by 1943 the new fighter models Yakovlev 1,7,9 and Lavochkin 5 are able to fight well against the German Bf-109 and Fw-190 at least at low altitude. ''
ReplyDeleteI just wanted to add that the reason why Soviets were able to use such planes was among others the high-octane fuel and aluminium from America and octane boosters from Great Britain they received trough Lend-Lease. Without the anti-knock fuel it would have been impossible for them to use such engines and one of UdSSR's notorious weaknesses was the lack of means to produce it.
Germany used majority of munitions to air was. Biggest surprise for those who have studied German munition production is the fact that army got less than Luftwaffe. The share of air war (including AA-production) was 55-58%, Kriegsmarine got average 12%-and land war (army) just about 30-33%.
ReplyDeleteThere are interesting facts like AFV-production having share less than 4% until very late 1942. Even its highest point (fall of 1944) it got 8% of munitions or less. Average share of AFV production was between 6.5% and 7%. Almost half of production of weapons went either Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine or AA-units.Army got 65-67% of ammunition production.
Aircraft production was average 6 times bigger than that of AFV production.