Friday, November 4, 2011

Strength and loss data Eastern Front – part 1

I have the following table from Axis History forum user Qvist :


Quarter
German Istarke
Soviet Fronts
Ratio
1941
3q41
2,800,000
3,334,000
1.2
4q41
2,675,000
2,818,500
1.1
1942
1q42
2,525,000
4,186,000
1.7
2q42
2,600,000
5,060,300
1.9
3q42
2,825,000
5,664,600
2.0
4q42
2,900,000
6,343,600
2.2
1943
1q43
2,800,000
5,892,800
2.1
2q43
2,850,000
6,459,800
2.3
3q43
2,850,000
6,816,800
2.4
4q43
2,575,000
6,387,200
2.5
1944
1q44
2,406,750
6,268,600
2.6
2q44
2,409,750
6,447,000
2.7
3q44
2,076,250
6,714,300
3.2
4q44
1,900,800
6,770,100
3.6
1945
1q45
1,800,000
6,461,100
3.6
2q45
6,135,300


Explanation for Iststarke :Actual strength, includes all men that are part of the unit's composition. Men on leave or temporarily detached to other units are included. Also men sick or wounded are included if they are assumed to return to service within eight weeks. Thus, despite its name, this strength category does not give the actual number of men available for service with the unit at the given time.

The data for the Soviet Forces comes from Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century..

More data for German forces can be found in Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis ,by Zetterling and Frankson.Specifically pages 2 and 5:
On 1 July 1942 German forces in the East were 2.635.000 plus 150.000 in Finland and 212.000 in rear occupied areas of Eastern Europe.Total 2.997.000.

On 1 July 1943 German forces in the East were 3.138.000(Waffen SS and ground combat units of the Luftwaffe are included) plus 80.000 on Finnish front.Total 3.218.000.
The same authors in ‘’Analyzing World War II Eastern front battles’’ give for 1 June 1944 a German Istarke of 2.089.559 in the East. This figure does not include non-combat GHQ units and units directly under command of OKH (which were quite numerous).If those units are included the total is 2.557.000

At the start of Barbarossa the German had 2.5 mln troops in action and 500.000 as reinforcements .Also ~150.000 were based in the Far North theater .So total ~3.2mln.This is mentioned by many authors,including Ziemke.

What about casualties? Here is a table using Krivosheev for Soviet forces and Axis History Forum for German losses ( both sets of data refer only to only KIA,MIA,WIA ):

East Front Casualties
Losses By quarter
Quarter
German
Soviet
Ratio
1941
3q41
551,189
2,795,638
5.07
4q41
279,861
1,598,456
5.71
1942
1q42
280,238
1,686,355
6.02
2q42
220,291
1,395,335
6.33
3q42
383,750
2,371,162
6.18
4q42
177,050
1,281,085
7.24
1943
1q43
498,795
1,908,052
3.83
2q43
110,139
444,858
4.04
3q43
533,025
2,633,522
4.94
4q43
381,725
1,939,845
5.08
1944
1q44
423,715
1,859,810
4.39
2q44
352,831
1,021,576
2.90
3q44
879,127
1,771,879
2.02
4q44
297,782
1,086,807
3.65





















Author Zetterling in ‘’Normandy 1944’’ gives slightly higher losses for the Germans :

German Losses -Zetterling
1941
831,050
1942
1,080,950
1943
1,601,445
1944
1,947,106

Accurate data on German losses are not available for 1945.

In order to make this comparison complete we should include the strength and losses of the German allies.
From various sources I have the following strength data at the start of Barbarossa campaign (all approximate):

Rumanian 340.000 , Finnish 250.000 , Italian 60.000 , Hungarian 44.000 , Slovak 45.000 .
Sum : 739.000 .Not all participants joined combat at the start of the campaign though.

From ‘’Kursk 1943’’ : 1 July 1942 – German satellites 648.000 , Finnish forces 210.000

1 July 1943 -German satellites 225.000 , Finnish forces 230.000.
Finally regarding losses ,this thread in AHF has information .

Using various sources I made this table :

Axis Allies Casualties Eastern Front
KIA
MIA
WIA
Total
Rumania 1941-August 1944
71,000
163,000
243,000
477,000
Don Battles
155,000
Italy
30,000
54,000
34,000
118,000
Finland Continuation War
52,554
2,377
161,217
216,148
Hungary 41-5/45
120,000
200,000
320,000
Don Battles
8,718
79,870
16,497
105,085
Blue Division
3,938
300
8,466
12,704
Slovakia 41-March 44
1,235
2,537
3,198
6,970
Division Wallonien
2,500
2,500


















All this information is valuable for assessing the true nature of the war in the East.

47 comments:

  1. Do not you think that with such a loss ratio of the Red Army would never have gained the victory over Germany.

    ReplyDelete
  2. Nope, since the SU could focus all its manpower against Germany while the opposite was not true. IF the Germans were able to transfer all their forces East then the exchange ratio might have changed the outcome of the war.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. In my opinion SU won just because they recruited much more than the huge losses they suffered. So even such high loss ratio was not able to prevent them to increase their force year after year.
      the great and besr part of german forces was in the east ...
      even concentrating the residual part could have provided little change. Their only winning hope was on 41, but SU knowing their resources would never yield so easly as Hitler hoped

      Delete
    2. SU benefited from having to fight on one front against an enemy that had to divert more and more resources against other fronts from 1942 onwards. They also benefited from Lend Lease while Germany lost production due the bomber offensive. One on one it is difficult to see how the SU could have survived as shown by the exchange ratios in manpower, tanks and aircraft of the period 1941-44.

      Delete
  3. Yes, SU had such benefits, but in my opinion they were not the main winning key of est front.
    Consider that the resources employed in Africa (42-43) and Italy (43) were negligible respect to the russian front. By the end of 43 germans was already doomed in the est. Also the US bombing in 42-43 was not such effective as was in 44 due to the lack of long range fighter.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Negligible? Please study WWII in more detail. Maybe in your country there is an emphasis on the Soviet contribution and in theory there is nothing wrong with that provided one does not take it too far.

      Delete
    2. I meant negligible as in my opinion not sufficient to change the force ratio in the east.
      I'm from Italy and I know the African and Italian front ... Some of my parents were there.
      Thanks for all interesting information yoi collected

      Delete
    3. I would suggest you have a look at the resources spent by the Germans in the Luftwaffe, the Navy, their AA defenses and the share of ammunition production allocated to air defense. Apart from the Luftwaffe the other categories were used almost exclusively in the West. As for the Luftwaffe in summer ’42 roughly less than 50% of combat aircraft are in the East, slightly more in other theatres. From then on Eastern forces are heavily downsized to provide for units in Germany and Med.
      So it is definitely not negligible. As for ‘sufficient to change the force ratio in the east’ I don’t know what exactly you mean or about ‘what if’ scenarios. For example in the second half of 1942 how would things have changed in the East if the Germans had Rommel’s two armored divisions plus an entire air fleet? What about the other forces they had to keep in the west? See it’s not that simple.

      Delete
    4. First off the Germans were on a retreat a whole year before D-day. Only a few divisions can't make a big difference as you think. One of the main reasons the Soviets won was because of manpower. Not only did they have the army that was twice the size of the German one, but they had a lot of reserves, Germany in 1943 only had 10 reserve divisions, that's way way too little considering the fact that the eastern front was huge. The Germans only had a few divisions west. In fact the Germans actually moved divisions from France to help them with the USSR but instead failed, in Italy the Germans only had a few panzer divisions commanded by Rommel and only a few infantry divisions, in fact even when the Allies landed in 1943 in Italy, the Germans only transported about 20 divisions from the east, which is about 500,000 men. By the way, the bombings made no difference whatsoever in 42-43, the real bombings began in 1944 when the Allies got the P51 Mustang, before that they couldn't do it properly as their aircraft were annihilated by the German Luftwaffe. I think the Soviets had too many advantages against the Third Reich. First off, they had way more tanks, the Soviets produced around 100,000 tanks during the war, to the German's 30,000-50,000. They produced 158,000 aircraft during the war to Germany's 110,000 etc. and since you mentioned the lend-lease let's see did it make a difference. Aircraft produced during the war by the Soviets 158,000, aircraft received 11,000, tanks produced 100,000 tanks received 7,000. I think that you're overestimating the lend-lease a bit friend. Cheers.

      Delete
    5. I don't know where you are getting your data from but from 1943 onward the Germans were only able to deploy about 60% of their strength to the Eastern front. All the rest were tied down defending France & the Low-countries, Norway, Italy, the Balkans, Tunisia. So yes all holding all these other fronts made a big difference. The Soviets might have been able to outproduce them but the Germans were also destroying Soviet tanks at a ratio roughly 3 to 1, if they had been able to throw their full strength on that one front the greater Soviet production simply would not have been sufficient to cover the losses.

      Delete
    6. Unfortunately, you're wrong, German resources and troops spent in African and Italian front were definitely not negligible at all. It's true that Rommel didn't command many troops before the end of 1942, but Hitler reinforced more troops and deployed much more resurces to North African front after the catastrophe of El Alamein. He transferred a large % of aircrafts from east to Africa, and he also transferred the 5th Panzer army to Tunisia in November and December of 1942, so actually German strength in Med/Africa front was much stronger and more powerful than before, there were 4 Panzer divisions (HG,10, 15, 21), 2 motorised divisions (90 and Broich),3 infantry divisions, 2 Flak divisions, 1 Heavy Panzer battalion (501st battalion with dozens of new Tiger Tanks), and 1,800 aircrafts (incl. 400 Ju52s while there were only about 300 Ju 52 were despatched to supply for Stalingrad pocket at that time so that Goering had to use bomber troops to continue the airlift in Stalingrad; and German fighter strength in the Med/Africa front was also comparable to the eastern front, there was 26% of fighters was concentrated in Med front at that time while there were ony about 28% in east). So these forces plus the 4 elite Panzer divisions which were diverted in west at that time (1 SS, 2 SS, 3 SS, and 7th Panzer division) were quite powerful enough to change the situation in the east if they could be sent to Stalingrad and Caucasus and instead of Africa at the end of 1942. And... I also need to remind you that Luftwaffe aircraft losses in Mediterranean front was actually outnumbered their losses in the east in 1943. From November 1942 to May 1943, Luftwaffe lost 2,422 aircrafts in Med/Africa while they only lost 2,119 aircrafts in East at the same period.At the time of summer 1943, there were only about less than 39% of total Luftwaffe aerial strength was concentrated in East (incl.84.5 percent of all dive bombers, 27 percent of all fighters, and 33 percent of all bombers)when they launched Kursk offensive.During the period of Battle of Kursk (July and August 43), Luftwaffe only lost 1,030 aircrafts (incl.351 fighters) in east while they lost 2,183 aircrafts (incl.952 fighters) in mediterranean and west against USAAF and RAF.Although Allied bomber offensive was not effective in destruction of German industry at the time of 42-43, but they are still capable to attract and pin down the main force of luftwaffe strengths (including the most of German fighters and AA guns), Luftwaffe had concentrated nearly 70% of fighters and 85% of AA guns against Allied bomber offensive by the time of August 1943. And...Germany deployed roughly 2 million people against Allied air offensive, so the air offensive also occupied a considerable part of German manpower resources.

      And...the land forces Hitler transferred to Italy during the war was also considerable. The peak strength of German land forces in Italy were 27 divisions (incl. 7 panzergrenadier divisions, 2 Panzer divisions, and 2 Paratroop divisions) at the beginning of 1944.

      Delete
    7. As to the lend-lease, its major effect and contribution is not reflected in how many tanks, guns and aircrafts Allied sent to Russians, indeed the Lend-Lease provided large quantity of precious industrial raw materials and equipments, and Soviet tanks, guns and aircrafts production were largely relying on the industrial raw materials (e.g. nonferrous metal, rubber, armor steel, and chemical raw materials) and equipments (e.g. machine tools) provided by the Lend-Lease cuz they lost too many industries and equipments at the beginning of the war. Therefore, Lend Lease improved the efficiency of USSR military industry and improved the productivity of weapons and ordnance goods dramatically (e.g. Lend-lease provided ordnance goods (like ammunition, artillery shells, mines, and assorted explosives) amounted to 53 percent of total USSR domestic production). Without lend-lease, USSR couldn't produce so many aircrafts, tanks, shells, bombs, and guns during the war.

      And...I don't need to say that Allied supplied vehicles and rail tracks are the key for the USSR to proceed their counteroffensives during 1943-1945 (e.g. there were 2 American trucks in every 3 trucks Red Army kept at the end of the war)because they improved the logistics and mobility of Red Army greatly.

      Delete
    8. This comment has been removed by the author.

      Delete
    9. This comment has been removed by the author.

      Delete
    10. Well, actually USSR received 18,753 aircraft from Anglo-America, not 11,000, the data which "Unknown" provided is flawed and only includes the aircraft provided by American. Almost all of these aircrafts are fighters and bombers. The amount of fighters provided by Anglo-america is equal to 23.01% of USSR's production of fighters during the war while the amount of bombers provided by allies is equal to 20.66% of USSR's production. On the other hand, USSR received not 7,000 tanks ,but more than 12,000 tanks from Allies (7,000 American tanks plus 5,200 British and Canadian tanks), which equals to about 15% of USSR's production of tanks.USSR also received 8,600 AA guns from Anglo-America which equals to more than 25% of USSR's production of AA guns during the war. More than half of the trucks and lorries Red Army received during the war are from Anglo-America.

      However, the most important role which lend-lease played is not the weapons and trucks which they supplied to USSR, but their aids on USSR's industry, actually there were only about 1/5 of the materials which USSR received from Lend-lease were directly related to the military use, the rest 4/5 of the materials were related to the USSR's military industrial production, that's why Lend-Lease is key to the survival of USSR.That's also a reason why the importance of lend-lease is often understated by people.

      Actually u guys can check the official website of "Central Archives of the Russian Ministry of Defence " on Internet if u wanna learn more about the history and the importance of lend lease.Central Archives of the Russian Ministry of Defence has revealed almost all of the USSR's secret official archives since 2007. If u wanna find out military data and files about Soviet Union, then u should search on ЦАМОРФ; if u wanna find out more information about the wartime economy of USSR, u should definitely search on РГАЭ. Trust me, u would have a much more complete understanding and recognition of the role of Lend-lease played and the situation of USSR's military industry during the war after studying the these archives.

      Delete
    11. During the Patriotic War (1941.6.22-1945.5.8),the overall Soviet military expenditure was about 400 billion SUR (http://www.mnstarfire.com/ww2/history/countries/soviet.html the military expenditure data for 1941 should be divided by 2, which means 30.9 billion SUR; and the data for 1945.1.1-5.8 is equal to 1/3 of Soviet military expenditure in 1944 I suppose, which means about 40 billion SUR),which equals to 75.5 billion USD according to the official exchange rate between USD and SUR in 1937 (1 USD for 5.3 SUR). The overall value of Anglo-American lend-lease was about 13.8 billion USD (USA provided 11.3 billion USD of aids, plus the £500 million provided by British Commenwealth which equals to about 2.5 billion USD at that time),which equals to 18.3% of USSR's total military expenditure during the war against Nazi Germany, so this proportion to USSR's military expenditure is already been quite considerable, right? However the true proportion is even much higher than the 18% I calculated.
      In fact, the official exchange rate of SUR to other currencies was quiet different with the true exchange rate, actually USSR government had realized that the official rate for SUR was overrated, so the USSR government set a special preferential treatment to the staffs of Foreign embassies in USSR:they can use 1 USD in exchange for 12 SUR in USSR. Well, we can find out that the overall USSR's military expenditure during the war against Nazis was about 3.33 billion USD if we use the 1/12 exchange rate to make a calculation, which means that the overall value of anglo-American Lend-lease is equal to about 41.4% of USSR's total military expenditure during the war!The military expenditures of USSR would be 41.4% higher without Lend-lease, so it's another strong evidence to prove that the the“4% ”USSR government claimed during the cold war is a completely pathetic and crappy lie, and it's just a myth of USSR's political propaganda, so the "4% data" which USSR claimed is worthless and false.

      In conclusion, we can also find out the importance of Lend-lease by comparing its value to USSR's military expenditure during the war. The help of lend-lease provided to USSR during the war was certainly neither minimal nor dispensable, indeed it is quite important and indispensable to the survival of USSR and the final victory in Eastern Front, so it should never be underrated or ignored by people!

      Delete
    12. Let's take a look at how the USSR's leaders think of the significance of lend-lease,the excerpts below are from "Lend-lease" part on wikipedia:
      “Nikita Khrushchev, having served as a military commissar and intermediary between Stalin and his generals during the war, addressed directly the significance of Lend-lease aid in his memoirs:

      I would like to express my candid opinion about Stalin's views on whether the Red Army and the Soviet Union could have coped with Nazi Germany and survived the war without aid from the United States and Britain. First, I would like to tell about some remarks Stalin made and repeated several times when we were "discussing freely" among ourselves. He stated bluntly that if the United States had not helped us, we would not have won the war. If we had had to fight Nazi Germany one on one, we could not have stood up against Germany's pressure, and we would have lost the war. No one ever discussed this subject officially, and I don't think Stalin left any written evidence of his opinion, but I will state here that several times in conversations with me he noted that these were the actual circumstances. He never made a special point of holding a conversation on the subject, but when we were engaged in some kind of relaxed conversation, going over international questions of the past and present, and when we would return to the subject of the path we had traveled during the war, that is what he said. When I listened to his remarks, I was fully in agreement with him, and today I am even more so.[30]

      Joseph Stalin, during the Tehran Conference during 1943, acknowledged publicly the importance of American efforts during a dinner at the conference: "Without American production the United Nations [the Allies] could never have won the war."[31][32]

      In a confidential interview with the wartime correspondent Konstantin Simonov, the Soviet Marshal Georgy Zhukov is quoted as saying:

      Today [1963] some say the Allies didn't really help us… But listen, one cannot deny that the Americans shipped over to us material without which we could not have equipped our armies held in reserve or been able to continue the war.[33]”

      Well, I think Stalin, Khrushchev, and Zhukov's comments on Lend-lease are the most powerful and convincing viewpoints (conclusions) toward the significance of lend-lease cuz they are representatives of the authority of USSR during wartime and I think no one is qualified to say that he/she knows the true strength and economy condition of USSR during WW2 better than them

      Delete
    13. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend-Lease#Significance

      Delete
    14. Sorry, there are several typing errors in my comment, it's "33.3 billion USD", not "3.33 billion", it's "Central Archives of the Russian Ministry of Defence has disclosed" not "revealed", it's "aircraft" not "aircrafts", and it's "equipment" not "equipments". I apologize for this inconvenience, I typed too fast and English is not my first language, next time I will check my words more carefully and make sure that there will be no such mistakes

      Delete
  4. I agree with your anaylis about Luftwaffe.
    In my opinion east war was essentially a infantry attrition war. In such kind of war the winner is the one who has more cannon fodder.
    At the end of 42 SU had 6 milion man (better trained and commanded respect 41 period) vs about 3 milion germans. I don't think that adding rommel panzer division and remaining air force would avoid the stalingrad catastrophe.
    Anyway as we say in Italy history is not done with "if" and "but" so no one can know the outcame of such scenario

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. 'history is not done with "if" and "but"'

      I will agree with you but I think that the addition of even a few units could have led to radically different outcomes due to the difference in quality between German and Soviet units. In second half ’42 the Germans were able to deal with operation ‘Mars’ against AGC but failed against the Soviet attack in the South. With a few more units they could have dealt with the Soviet offensive.
      By the way you are forgetting German units that had to be moved West due to the anticipation of Allied landings (Dieppe raid) and then were brought back to the East.

      Delete
  5. As I know dieppe had a low impact on east front.
    What units had been removed from east during 42 summer attack?

    My personal opionion is a small amount of units more could have been decisive in 41 ... especially in winter.
    but from end of 42 nothing could have avoided the axis defeat

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. SS units ‘Das Reich’, ‘Adolf Hitler’ and ‘Totenkopf’ were in France in 1942 (first two for a long time) and were brought to the East in early 1943. These units allowed Manstein to defeat the Soviets in the Ukraine. I think that it is reasonable to assume that they could have been moved earlier had there been no opponent in the west.

      Delete
  6. Yes those divisions were in france but to be re-organized and re-equipped after the losses they suffered in russia. Totenpof and das reich in particular suffered very high losses during soviet 41 winter offensive.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. If there was no threat from the west these units would have been moved to the East sooner. The same units 1 and 2 SS took part in the Normandy battles without 6 months rest and refitting. So just by counting units that ‘could’ have been used in the East it’s 5 armored divisions and one air fleet and that’s simply what I can think of at the top of my head. Plus infantry units from Med and Western Europe etc etc
      That’s quite an impressive alternative for ’42 and surely not negligible. If you look at what if scenarios where from the start the Germans only fight against the SU they would have had much more resources to invest in land combat systems. Combined with the kill/loss ratio it’s difficult to see how the SU could have coped!

      Delete
    2. Exactly, even with western subsidy to SU, if Germans could concentrate their efforts entirely on the east I don't see how the Soviets could win, the best they can get would be a stalemate. Leaving production efforts aside, placing the entire Luftwaffe in the east in 41 and 42 would have crushed the SU, at the very least would have kept their counterattacks at bay.

      Delete
  7. Have you information about the total number of german troops deployed on the eastern front throughout the whole war?

    ReplyDelete
  8. Do the numbers of wounded men only contain permanently wounded people or also temporary wounded ones?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. what do you mean by permanently wounded? disabled ?

      wounded means they can't be at the unit because they had to be hospitalized.

      Delete
  9. Do your numbers about German strength and losses include Soviet volonteers who helped the Germans ?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Did hiwis normally take part in combat operations? I'm not sure about their role in combat operations. Regarding strength:

      http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=181007

      Delete
  10. I see you have used axis history forum for the German casualties, but whose numbers did they use? Overman, Müller- hildebrand, or another researcher?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Qvist used the actual reports of the German Army found in the German archives.

      Delete
    2. Do you mean he has done his own research based on German military reports? And do you also have more exact data about German casualties, how many of them were Kia, how many mia and how many wia?

      Delete
    3. Yep, he did his own research. His numbers are accurate since they are similar to the ones published by Zetterling and Frankson in their article 'Analyzing World War II eastern front battles’ and book ‘Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis’.

      For a breakdown between wounded, missing and killed you can use 'Waffen und Geheimwaffen des deutschen Heeres 1933-45'.

      Delete
    4. And isn't your source for Kia , mia and wia a book about regular and secret German weapons?

      Delete
    5. 'Waffen und Geheimwaffen des deutschen Heeres 1933-45' has information from German archival documents not only on German weapon systems but also about casualties. The figures are similar to those posted by Qvist and Zetterling and Frankson.

      Delete
  11. Definition "Killed in action" is little bit complex and it doesn't actually mean all battle deats. For instance Finnish losses during Continuation War 1941-44 (until 14th of Sept 1944) were:

    37 666 killed in action
    12 841 died in wounds
    3 486 missing in action and later confirmed deceased
    505 died in captivity
    8 470 non combat deaths

    (armistice 5th of Sept 1944, some 2 000 Finnish military persons in captivity, some 46 000 Soviet POWs in Finland)

    During the next 3 years (until sept 1947) there were 152 deaths of POWs (less than 10 in German captivity)

    Wounded in action is also complex. In some countries they include soldiers with diseases. The rate of KIA and WIA seems to have been some 1:3,5 among German and Finnish forces in 1941 but later little bit higher especially in summer but lower in winter. Trench warfare seemed to have highest rate.

    There is also danger to double count those who died in wounds when calculating total losses.

    ReplyDelete
  12. One should never trust too much on loss figures given by Krivosheev. Battle of Karelian Isthmus is one example among others. He gave Soviet loss figures of 30 000. Actually, as Glantz found he counted only the period of Operation Vyborg (June 9 - June 20 1944). There is one brilliant Finnish study of that Battle (which ended actually in 18th of July). Study made by Dr. Tapio Tiihonen. He studied over 10 years checking all available new documents, reports of Soviet units of Leningrad front. He found serious mistakes on data Krivosheev was using.

    Divisions had mostly 3 regiments, regiments mostly 3 battalions + support units. Tiihonen counted loss reports of battalions, regiments, reinforments and found their losses didn't match at all with loss reports of that division. Same with level of Corps and Armies. The gap was huge. After combing all availabe date Tiihonen estimated that forces under command of General Govorov had lost 52 000 soldiers + 8 000 reinforcements, total 60 000. And this was his moderate estimate (the maximum, highest possible was 75 000).

    Then Tiihonen checked reports of units after 20th of June, 1944 (Operation Kotka, Soviet aim to penerate deep west to Finland). Tiihonen estimated Soviet losses been at least 129 000. So total losses of Soviet forces in both Operation Vyborg and Operation Kotka - The Battle of Karelian Isthmus June 9 - July 18 were 189 000. 10 divisions of Leningrad Front had less than 2 000 soldiers (hardly no combat soldiers at all, rest of others had lost 50-90% of combat forces).

    Tiihonen also debunked common Soviet claim that "best troops were sent to other fronts" from Karelian Isthmus. Actually there wasn't any kind of "first class soldiers" left. They all had deceased or wounded in very sad way north from Vyborg and in Äyräpää-Vuosalmi bridgehead. Their reserve forces were amazingly bad compared those in 10th of June. There were too much minorities, old, sick, at least once wounded, troops very poorly trained.

    General Govorov wanted two extra corps from Stalin. He miscalculated again. Actually he would have needed atleast three. Stalin didn't give him more - Govorov had already squandered his 5 extra reinforcement divisions.

    The reason why Krivosheev don't have loss figures after Vyborg (20th of June) in pretty interesting. Operation Kotka was another bloody failure for Red Army and that part of the story - the real one - disappeared to huge memory hole of Great Patriotic War. Besides - as Tiihonen found - his loss figures of Operation Vyborg were absolute too low. 2 +3+2 is 7 not 3 or 4 as Krivosheev is suggesting.

    We don't know really the final figure of butcher's bill in Great Patriotic War. But atleast historians should check, check and once again check both strenghts and losses of forces before doing any conclusions. I have to quote this study:

    "“We established the number of irreplaceable losses of our Armed Forces at the time of the Great Patriotic War of about 13,850,000. A more recent compilation made in March 2008 of the individuals listed in the card files puts total dead and missing at 14,241,000 (13,271,269 enlisted men and 970,000 officers) This database is incomplete and does not include all men killed in the war; currently graves registration teams in Russia are identifying war dead that are not currently included in the database”

    Sergey Aleksandrovich Il’enkov – Graduated from the Kalinnin Suvorov Military Academy, the Higher Military Academy, the Moscow State Historical-Archival Institute. Assistant chief for scientific work of the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Co author of many scientific works on the history of the Great Patriotic War.
    Voennno-Istoricheskiy Arkhiv
    No. 7(22), 2001, pp. 73-80″ "

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Well, Krivosheev's figures don't include the casualties of reservists, NKVD, border forces, partisans, and militias units

      Delete
  13. Hi, I was wondering do you know how many new men both sides recruited each year?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. No, I don’t have that information

      Delete
    2. Hi,

      Will Jessop, if you want to find out more about the number of men recruited each year in Germany you should read Germany and the Second World War Volume V and V2. Two books The first one is about ''Organization and Mobilization of the German Sphere of Power: Wartime Administration, Economy, and Manpower Resources'' in the years 1939 till 1941 and the second one covers the years 1942 - 1945. It was recently translated from German. Germany and the Second World War is 13-volume work published by the Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt (DVA), that has taken many academics from the military history centre of the German armed forces 30 years to finish. The sheer number of details and sources used in this work is overwhelming.

      Delete
  14. Also people dont forget that the TOTAL numebr of soldiers is not equivalent to the total of soldiers EMPLOYED in a certain operation. Glantz has better statistics comparing forces facing off in each battles. Is it true that the Soviets had large reserves, but on the tactical level the Germans had the advantage untill 1943 and even after in Kursk for exemple in the first days.

    ReplyDelete
  15. Don't know figures of Hungarian and Romanian losses of 1941-45 but Finnish losses where not 250 000 but close to 210 000 when having 157 000 wounded. Let's not doublecount died in wounds and wounded. Red Army captured only 3 500 Finnish soldiers and never managed to encircle and destroy a single battalion in Stalingrad/Bagration way.

    ReplyDelete
  16. Anyways,I just found an interesting and detailed research about the allocation and losses Luftwaffe between 22 June 1941 and the end of 1943, so I wanna share it here http://www.ww2.dk/Dan%20Zamansky%20-%20The%20Study.pdf

    ReplyDelete