Interesting report on Luftwaffe operations 1941-43

‘How were German air force resources distributed between different fronts in the years 1941 to 1943 and what are the implications of this case study for understanding the political economy of the period?’ by Dan Zamansky.

War Over the Steppes - The Air Campaigns on the Eastern Front 1941-45

The war between Nazi German and the Soviet Union was the largest land campaign of WWII and it involved millions of troops and tens of thousands of tanks and warplanes.

In the East the Luftwaffe played a vital role by establishing air superiority, supporting the ground troops at the front, bombing important targets deep behind enemy lines and keeping the enemy under constant observation with its recon planes.

The Red Air force suffered great losses in 1941-42 but in the period 1943-45 it was rebuilt and it managed to play an important role in the actual fighting.

Until recently studies of the air war in the Eastern front were hampered by the lack of adequate sources for both participants. Authors either had to rely on the surviving Luftwaffe records, which meant they would have to use German estimates of Soviet strength and losses instead of the actual data, or they were forced to use the official Soviet post war histories, which downplayed Soviet defeats and exaggerated German strength and losses.

Author E. R. Hooton has written several books on the Luftwaffe, specifically ‘Phoenix Triumphant: The Rise and Rise of the Luftwaffe’, ‘Eagle in Flames: The Fall of the Luftwaffe’ and ‘The Luftwaffe: A Complete History 1933-1945’.

Hooton’s books are different from other similar works due to their emphasis on statistical analysis of the Luftwaffe operations.

His new book ‘War over the Steppes: The air campaigns on the Eastern Front 1941–45’ covers the air war in the Eastern front and the main battles between the Luftwaffe and the Red Air force.

The book has the following chapters:

1. From friends to foes: Russian and German air power 1924 to 1941.

2. Invasion and retreat: June 1941 to April 1942.

3. The tide turns: May 1942 to February 1943.

4. The Russian advance: March 1943 to April 1944.

5. Red Star triumphant: May 1944 to May 1945.

The main strength of the book is the addition of detailed tables on the strength, loss and sortie statistics for both sides. After the fall of the Soviet Union the government archives were opened to researchers and new material on WWII has became widely available. Hooton was able to take this data and incorporate it into his book, thus offering detailed and most of all reliable information for both air forces.  

I consider this book to be on the same level as ‘Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler's Defeat in the East, 1942-1943’, meaning it is essential reading for anyone interested in military aviation history. 

Book review – Luftwaffe test pilot

During WWII both the Allies and the Axis were able to capture equipment used by the other side. This equipment (tanks, planes, artillery, rifles etc) was thoroughly tested in order to ascertain its performance and weak points.

Captured Allied planes were tested by a special unit of the Luftwaffe at Rechlin airport.

One of the test pilots was Hans-Werner Lerche and in his memoirs ‘Luftwaffe Test Pilot: Flying Captured Allied Aircraft of World War 2’ he writes about the planes he tested and their operational characteristics.

Lerche became interested in aviation at a young age, reading aviation magazines and building model planes. He wanted to learn how to fly a glider and in 1931 was accepted to a gliding training school. In the same course he met ‘a pleasant young lady… her name was Hanna Reitsch’. Lerche got his A, B and C-certificates of flying and later became a glider instructor, while at the same time studying engineering.

 

During the 1930’s he learned how to fly powered aircraft and when he was inducted for military service in the late 30’s he got himself assigned to the Luftwaffe. After passing another pilots course he was promoted to non-commisioned officer and was transferred to the ‘German aviation experimental establishment’. At the Rechlin center German and foreign planes were thoroughly tested.

Overall Lerche flew 125 different aircraft types during his career!

Each chapter of the book deals with specific Allied aircraft. The book covers the British Lancaster, Spitfire and Tempest, the US P-39, P-47, P-51 fighters and the B-17,B-24 bombers, the Soviet planes La-5, Yak-3, the German Ju 290 and Do 335 and several Italian types like the SM.82, SM.91, G.55, Cant 1018, Cant 1007, Ca 133.

For WWII aviation enthusiasts the book has very interesting information regarding the performance and peculiarities of various well known aircraft. For example:

Lancaster bomber  

The Lancaster was the main 4-engine bomber of the RAF’s Bomber Command.

In August ’44 a Lancaster was test flown by the author who evaluated the flying characteristics. The plane was also used in tests of electronic equipment installed in German nightfighters.

Spitfire

The famous Spitfire is an icon of the RAF’s Fighter Command. During WWII it was the premier British fighter plane.

A Spitfire IIA (1.200hp engine) was tested by Lerche who considered it a dangerous opponent due to its armament and low wing loading. A negative point was that when taxiing ‘the field of vision was not as good as in the Bf 109 because of the ‘wide shoulders’ of the 12-cylinder upright-V engine’.

B-17 ‘Flying Fortress’

In October ’43 a USAAF B-17 landed intact in Denmark. The plane made a forced landing but had only superficial damage. After removing ‘dead weight’ like armor and ammunition it was possible to fly it to German territory. According to Lerche the most interesting part of the aircraft were its supercharged engines.

During one of the test flights the B-17 demonstrated its ability to fly home with one or more engines out of action! At roughly 9.000 feet one of the engines malfunctioned. The crew got ready to abandon the plane at the pilot’s command but this was not necessary in the end. Even with 3 engines the plane made a safe landing.

The B-17 was flown to airbases so that German pilots would familiarize themselves with this type and even mock attacks were flown.

The only negative remarks on the B-17 were that the ‘forces acting on the ailerons were relatively high’ and the rudder was very heavy.

B-24 ‘Liberator’

In spring ’43 a B-24D landed by mistake in Sicily and was then flown by an Italian crew to Rechlin so that the Germans could test it. In the fuselage it had the title ‘Blonde Bomber II’.

According to the author the B-24 ‘felt rather unstable longitudinally’ and ‘showed quite high control forces when gliding’. The nose wheel was also a weak point as it required a concrete runway and it collapsed during one of the landings at Rechlin.

P-47 ‘Thunderbolt’

In November ’43 a P-47 had landed intact near Caen, France.

Contrary to orders Lerche had to share this aircraft with a fighter ace of the nearby unit who also wanted to fly it. In the end they agreed that Lerche would fly close by in order to ensure that the plane was operational and then the ace would fly it from Caen to Cormeilles.

 

The P-47 was a very heavy plane and its performance at low level was poor at ~500km/h. However at high altitude its performance was impressive reaching roughly 640 km/h at 29.500 feet.

According to the author the P-47 was not a good plane for dogfighting or low level attacks but it was ‘excellent in higher altitudes, in diving attacks and flying at maximum boost’.

P-51 ‘Mustang’

The famous P-51 ‘Mustang’ is one of the most iconic WWII aircraft. It had extraordinary long range for a single engine aircraft and it successfully escorted US bombers in Axis controlled territory.

In June ’44 a P-51B landed at Cambrai-South airfield during the Normandy invasion. Getting so close to the front was dangerous for Lerche so everything had to be done fast. A Ju 188 fast bomber was used for transport and the P-51 was quickly set up and flown by him.

 

The Mustang was tested extensively and Lerche calls it a ‘truly unique aircraft’. It was very fast at all heights and the performance was very good in all aspects. At an altitude of 23.000 feet it had a speed of ~670km/h.

The negative aspects were: lack of longitudinal stability when the fuel tanks filled to a certain extent, at full throttle it stalled ‘even in a sharp turn’ and the engine required careful handling as ‘when revving up it reacted very sensitively to the correct operating temperatures and, if handled roughly, it countered with unsteady running.’

Lavochkin La-5

The Soviet Lavochkin La-5 fighter was introduced in large numbers in 1943 and it was substantially better than the previous fighter planes of the Red AF.

In September ’44 a La-FN was captured at Gross-Schimanen, East Prussia. This plane was tested and the author found it to be a dangerous opponent at low altitudes.

His final report said that the La-5 had noteworthy performance below 3.000m but top speed was below that of German fighters. Range was short with roughly 40min of flight at the rated power, less with supercharger engaged.

The main problems identified were that fumes from the engine entered the cockpit and the engine was excessively noisy: ‘by no means pleasant was the noisy running of the La-5 engine, which had deafened me by the evening. On later flights I always tried to remember bringing along some cotton wool to plug my ears’.

Yakovlev Yak-3

The Yak-3 was introduced in 1944 and due to its light weight had impressive performance characteristics.

In January ’45 a Yak landed intact at Gross-Schimanen airfield, the same one that Lerche had visited recently. After an inspection it was flown back to Rechlin.

The Yak-3 weighed roughly 2.500 (5.512) kg and had a power loading of 4.5 lb/hp. Speed and acceleration were very good but performance at altitude was poor.

This plane was used not only for testing but was also ordered to Oranienburg airport to take part in an exhibition for Field Marshal Goering. Lerche flew the plane there and had to stand attention during the presentation. Then Goering asked him questions on the performance of the Yak.  

WWII Myths – The Me262 jet fighter and the dumb Fuehrer

One WWII myth that still endures to this day is that the production of the revolutionary Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter was fatally delayed by Hitler’s insistence that it be modified to carry bombs.

The Me262 was the first operational jet fighter and its engines gave it a massive advantage in speed versus the propeller driven aircraft used in WWII. This miracle weapon was expected to turn the tides of the war in the air. However according to the standard accounts Hitler instead wanted to use it as a bomber. This meant that lengthy modifications had to be made and so much time was lost than when it finally went into mass production the war was almost over.

 

For example Field Marshall Erhard Milch who was in charge of aircraft production says in his memoirs ‘The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe: The Life of Field Marshall Erhard Milch’, p316 ‘In desperation the field marshal appealed to Hitler to think again, but he was subjected to a torrent of abuse; and before he could control himself he shouted back, ‘Mein Führer, the smallest infant can see that this is a fighter, not a bomber aircraft!’

This story is satisfying on an emotional level as it has the dumb dictator who doesn’t listen to anyone and a miracle weapon that could have changed the outcome of the war. However both parts are wrong.  

According to ‘The Last Year Of The Luftwaffe: May 1944-May 1945’ by aviation historian Alfred Price, p147-8:

There can be no doubt that if it had gone into action in sufficient numbers in the fighter role, the Me 262 could have brought to a halt the daylight attacks on German industry by B-17s and B-24s. In May 1944 it had seemed that the large-scale operational use of the Me 262 was imminent. Components for airframes were being turned out in large numbers at numerous small factories dispersed throughout the country, and final assembly of Me 262s was moving ahead rapidly. The restricting factor was the Jumo 004 engine that powered the new fighter. The 004 was the first turbojet engine in the world to enter pilot production and initially its average running life was only about 10hr. That was too low for general service use, and until it was improved the design could not be frozen for mass production to begin. When engineers face technical problems never previously encountered, it is impossible to predict how long it will take to find a solution - hence the over-optimistic noises being made in May 1944 on when the 004 would be ready for mass production……………………………………………. It has become part of the accepted wisdom about the Luftwaffe that Hitler's decision was instrumental in preventing the large-scale deployment of the Me 262 in the fighter force. In fact his edict was not the main reason, or even a major reason, for the failure to deploy the fighter in the hoped-for numbers. Not until August 1944 was the average running life of the 004 jet engine raised to 25hr; that was still a very low figure, but it meant that the design could be frozen and mass production could begin. In September Hitler rescinded his order that all new Me 262s be delivered as fighter-bombers. By then more than a hundred fighter airframes were sitting around without engines, and as soon as 004s became available these aircraft were completed and delivered to the Luftwaffe. In fact Hitler's order delayed the introduction of the Me 262 into service in the fighter role by only about three weeks. For the real reason for the failure to deploy the fighter in large numbers, we must look elsewhere.

As a completely new combat aircraft, the Me 262 suffered its share of teething troubles when it entered service. Despite energetic efforts to eradicate these, serviceability was poor and its sortie rate was correspondingly low during the latter part of 1944.

The author also finds Hitler’s idea to turn the Me262 into a fast bomber reasonable:

Much has been written about the delay to the Me 262 programme supposedly imposed by Hitler's edict that initially the aircraft be used as a fighter-bomber rather than an air defence fighter. Few commentators have considered the possibility that Hitler's edict might have been correct in military terms, and this author believes it was. If the Allied landings in Normandy had run into serious difficulties - as actually happened to American troops coming ashore at Omaha Beach on D-Day - repeated bombing and strafing attacks from a few score Me 262s could have tipped the balance and changed the operation from one that just succeeded to one that failed with heavy loss of life. If the jet aircraft were available only in small numbers they were better employed as fighter-bombers against the beach-head than in high-altitude jousts with Allied fighters aloof from the troops coming ashore. Yet the point is purely academic, for in June 1944 the Me 262 was quite unready for operations in any role.

For comparison’s sake an Arado Ar 234 prototype was able to penetrate Allied fighter defenses and take detailed pictures of the Normandy beaches on August 2^nd 1944, thus performing a task that the entire recon force in the West was not capable of.

Note: Me262 picture available from Wikipedia Commons user Softeis

Book Review - Stopped at Stalingrad

The Luftwaffe was one of the most interesting aspects of the German war machine. Built from the ground up in the 1930’s it dominated the skies over Europe in the first half of the war. Even in the latter part, when it was grossly outnumbered by the Allies, it continued to fight on till the last day of the war.

In the East the Luftwaffe played a vital role by establishing air superiority, supporting the ground troops at the front, bombing important targets deep behind enemy lines and keeping the enemy under constant observation with its recon planes.

Unfortunately the full effects of the Luftwaffe’s efforts in the East are not usually mentioned in most books.

Stopped at Stalingrad closes this gap by covering, in great detail, the operations of the Luftwaffe in the summer campaign of 1942. The author Joel Hayward is an expert on Luftwaffe history and operations.

 

 

The first chapters cover the German conquest of the Crimea in the summer of ’42 and show the great contribution made by the Luftwaffe.  Using airfields in the Crimea aircraft could operate throughout the day on one fuel load and only landed to reequip with bombs. Thanks to massive air support the Soviet forces in the Kerch peninsula were defeated and Sevastopol leveled.

In May ’42 a surprise Soviet attack in the Ukraine using their armored forces was soundly defeated thanks to swift Luftwaffe intervention.

The rest of the book deals with the German attack on the Caucasus and details the countless missions that the Luftwaffe had to perform every day.

When the Soviets counterattacked at Staligrad and the 6^th Army was surrounded, it was up to the Airforce to provide supplies. Hayward is one of the few authors who cover the Stalingrad supply missions in detail.

Finally the book ends with the German counterattack in the Ukraine in early 1943. The ground troops again received outstanding support from their Airforce.

In all these operations the Luftwaffe played a vital role thanks to its ability to generate a very large number of sorties from forward airfields. Especially the ground attack units under General Wolfram von Richthofen acted as flying artillery.

The book was a best seller for a reason. It is highly recommended for anyone interested in the Luftwaffe and/or the Eastern Front.

WWII Myths - Luftwaffe the tactical airforce part 2

The Luftwaffe was supposed to be a ‘tactical’ airforce that failed to invest resources in ‘strategic’ aircraft that could have won the war.

I’ve already criticized that opinion here. Throughout the 1930’s and 40’s the Luftwaffe spent the majority of its resources on the bomber arm. The best pilots were selected for the bombers.

Compared to the Allied airforces the Germans had superiority in technology and numbers at the start of the war. No other airforce had radio beam systems (like Knickebein and X-Gerat) for guiding bombers.

The Luftwaffe’s emphasis on the bomber force is mentioned in a postwar British study called AIR 41/10 ‘The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force (1933 to 1945)’

In pages 86-7 it says:

'The foregoing account of the Battle of Britain throws light on the main factors which contributed to the defeat of the Luftwaffe. It is as well, however, to enumerate those factors and to examine to what extent and to what degree each was responsible. The main factors may be summarized as follows:

(a) A fundamental failure in German air strategy and policy, which concentrated on the doctrine of attack, and thereby led to a disproportionate weakness of the fighter arm as opposed to the strength of the bomber and dive bomber forces. The armament of the German He 111, Do. 17 and Ju.88 bombers which, in conjunction with their speed, had been relied upon in part to offset the deficiency of fighters, proved inadequate and led to a wasteful use of the limited strength of the fighter escort and to disastrous quarrels at a crucial point in the Battle.'

While it is true that in the second half of the war the Anglo-Americans fielded large 4-engine bomber forces it needs to be remembered that the Strategic^TM RAF only started getting its new 4-engine models in late 1941 and up to mid 1943 the operational numbers were between 200-300 planes.

So if the Luftwaffe was a ‘tactical’ airforce then that can only be true for the period 1943-45. This is understandable since from 1941 the Germans were involved in a life and death struggle in the East and had to spend huge resources on their land forces. Under these circumstances the Luftwaffe could not get the resources it needed nor could production facilities be allocated for aircraft that would take years to build and field in numbers.

Think about that next time someone says the Luftwaffe was a tactical airforce.

RAF Fighter Command strength 1939-45

The British RAF was organized in specialized commands. Fighter Command’s role was to protect Britain from the enemy’s bomber force.

Let’s have a look at the Fighter Command strength from AIR 22 - 'Air Ministry: Periodical Returns, Intelligence Summaries and Bulletins':

Op.: Aircraft in operational units.

Est.: Establishment strength in operational units.

Serv.: Serviceable aircraft in operational units.

Crews: Aircraft with crews in operational units.

Some comments:

1).Numerical strength of FC goes up in the period 1939-42, stabilizes in 1943 at a high level and starts going down in 1944-45.

2).Regarding the types of aircraft, initially it is the Hawker Hurricane that is the main fighter but from late ’41 the Supermarine Spitfire takes the lead.

3).Standardization doesn’t seem to be high on FC priorities since many different types are used concurrently. This is understandable in the case of two engine aircraft that are used as night-fighters, such as the Beaufighter and Mosquito.

However when it comes to day-fighters we get in May ’41: Spit, Hurricane, Westland Whirlwind and Boulton Paul Defiant.

Things start to change in the second half of the war. In May ’43 we have the Spit, Hawker Typhoon and Whirlwind.

Only in 1945 does standardization win since there are just two types, the Spit and the P-51 Mustang.

4).In 1941-42 it’s hard to justify the large number of Spitfires kept in the UK since the Germans have a very small airforce in Western Europe. Meanwhile the RAF in N.Africa has to use the outdated Hurricane and the American P-40 Warhawk.

5).Despite all the talk about the Spitfire being the best fighter of the war It is interesting to note that even though FC has numerical superiority it is still beaten in the Channel battles of 1941-42 by the Luftwaffe’s Channel-Geschwader JG2 and JG26. The Germans used the Bf-109F and FW-190 that had superior performance compared to the British types. [Sources: ‘The right of the line: the Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945’, p285 and 561 and ‘Jagdwaffe Volume 4, Section 1: Holding the West 1941-1943’]

6).Throughout the war the main problem for FC is that their ‘star’ aircraft lacks the range to take the fight into Germany.

7).Lend Lease aircraft only appear in large numbers in 1945, when the P-51 Mustang makes up 48% of FC in April ’45. Prior to ’45 only the Boston night-fighter is used in small numbers.

Eastern Front Aircraft Strength and Losses 1941-45

Hard figures on the fighting in the East during WWII are hard to find. I have posted figures about manpower strength and losses for both Soviet and Axis side here.

In this post I will take a look at Luftwaffe and Red Airforce strength and losses during 1941-45.

My source for Luftwaffe strength is the ‘Luftwaffe Data Book’ by Alfred Price. I calculated the data for Luftlotte 1,6 and 4. For Soviet operational strength I’ve used this post in Axis History Forum which lists ‘Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voina 1941-45. Dejstvuyushchaya Armiya’ as the source.

For Luftwaffe losses I used this post in Axis History Forum by Richard Anderson, author and former researcher of the Dupuy Institute (data probably comes from site ‘The Luftwaffe 1933-45’). For Soviet figures I used ‘Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century’ by Krivosheev.

For both sides the losses refer only to Combat incidents. Losses due to accidents are NOT included (the reason being that I don’t have that data for the Luftwaffe).

Comparison of strength:

Luftwaffe:

		Jun-41	Jul-42	May-43	May-44	Jan-45
Fighters		782	659	454	390	383
Long Range Fighters		78	70	52
Night-fighters		0	0	9	104	94
Medium Bombers		893	829	509	427	101
Ground Attack		474	336	574	650	601
Night Harasment		0	0	0	276	225
Coastal		27	22	38	30	57
Recon	Short Range	325	90	91	126	215
	Long Range	303	350	313	198	253
Transport		212	440	93	182	151
Combat		2,227	1,894	1,598	1,847	1,404
Total		3,094	2,796	2,133	2,383	2,080

Soviet Airforce:

	Year 1941	Year 1942		Year 1943	Year 1944		Year 1945
Aircraft	1-Dec-41	1-May-42	1-Nov-42	1-Jul-43	1-Jan-44	1-Jun-44	1-Jan-45
Fighters	2,589	3,468	4,569	6,777	6,211	7,342	8,078
Ground Attack	154	331	1,915	3,505	2,751	4,066	4,991
Bombers	1,058	1,170	1,941	2,667	2,145	3,407	4,878
Recon	378	544	380	542	650	622	876
Others	219	1,349	2,805	3,166	4,197	4,519	3,798
Total	4,398	6,862	11,610	16,657	15,954	19,956	22,621

 

Luftwaffe vs Soviet Airforce:

By  taking the data from the tables presented so far we get the following table:

I have lumped all Luftwaffe fighters together and also added night harassment aircraft in the ground attack category. For 1941 Soviet strength I’ve used article ‘Summer 1941’ by Frankson from the Journal of Slavic Military Studies.

Comparison of losses:

Year	Luftwaffe	SU Airforce	Ratio
1941	2,800	10,300	3.68
1942	2,299	7,800	3.39
1943	3,128	11,200	3.58
1944	2,913	9,700	3.33
Totals	11,140	39,000	3.50

Comments:

Luftwaffe strength in 1941-42 stays close to 3,000 but in 1943-44 it goes down to ~2,200. This decrease in size is due to the withdrawal of units to serve In the West against the Anglo-American bomber offensive. At the same time the Soviet airforce manages to increase its strength by a huge factor.

The composition of the LW fleet also changes during the war. Early on the bombers make up a large part of the Eastern fleet but in 1943-45 their numbers are constantly decreasing while the ground attack aircraft make up the largest part of the overall force. Fighter strength also decreases each year.

For the Soviet force the huge numerical increase is concentrated on ground attack aircraft and fighters.

Regarding losses there is always a striking difference between the LW and the SU. The Soviet force always suffers more losses despite having a large numerical advantage in the period 1943-45. For both forces 1943 is the year of worst losses.

What is missing on the losses part is the losses per sortie statistic. Unfortunately I don’t have data for sorties in the East, with one exception. Historian Gröhler in "Stärke, Verteilung und Verluste der deutschen Luftwaffe im zweiten Weltkrieg" gives for the Eastern front in 1944 0,00703 losses per sortie with the equivalent number in the West being 0.0537.

Usually a loss rate over 5% means an airforce cannot continue to operate efficiently. On the other hand a rate of ~1% in 1944 when the Soviet airforce had such a quantitative advantage is very low. It definitely doesn’t paint a very good picture of the Soviet pilots.

Finally a word should be said about aircraft types. In 1941 the Soviet force is operating obsolete types like the I-16 fighter. However by 1943 the new fighter models Yakovlev 1,7,9 and Lavochkin 5 are able to fight well against the German Bf-109 and Fw-190 at least at low altitude.

For anyone who wants to learn more about the airwar in the East I can recommend the books of Christer Bergström.