‘A Hard Way to Make a War: The Allied Campaign
in Italy in the Second World War’ is a single volume history of the Italian campaign by Ian Gooderson who
also wrote ‘Air Power at the Battlefront’.
This book covers the fighting in Sicily, the invasion of mainland Italy
and all the major battles (Salerno, Gustav line, Anzio, Gothic line). In
addition there is analysis of the political and strategic situation guiding the
Allies and the Axis leaderships, the tactics that both sides developed and the
overall cost of the campaign.
After defeating the Axis forces in Tunisia in May 1943 the
Anglo-Americans were faced with the difficult choice of what to do next. The
British favored a peripheral strategy with the aim of attacking the soft
underbelly of the Axis but the Americans did not want to invest resources in a
secondary theatre, especially since they had to prepare for the invasion of
France.
In the end there was a compromise
whereby powerful forces would invade Italy in order to force Italy out of the
war and draw German units from Western Europe. However these operations were
not to interfere with the planning of operation ‘Overlord’.
In July 1943 the Allies landed in Sicily and after hard fighting moved
inland and took over the island. The German forces in Gela put a fight and came
close to overrunning the invasion beaches. It took massive aerial and naval
support to throw them back.
After the loss of Sicily the Italian Army and the King had decided to
exit the war but the secret negotiations that followed were inconclusive.
Unfortunately the Germans came to realize that the Italians were double
crossing them and started moving units into Italy. When the Italians finally
announced their surrender in September 1943 the Germans were ready to pounce
and they quickly disarmed the Italian formations.
The Allies landed again in Salerno and this operation was heavily opposed
by German units forcing the Allies to once again rely on airpower and naval fire
in order to keep the Germans from overrunning their forces.
Once this operation succeeded the Allies expected the Germans to evacuate
their forces from Southern Italy. In this aspect the Allies were betrayed by
their faith in signals intelligence. Through diplomatic and military decrypts
they learned that once the Italian mainland had been invaded the Germans would
retreat to the north of the country. This was actually Hitler’s first response.
However General Kesselring was
determined to fight the Allies in the south and he did not want to give up
ground without a fight. Obviously this was a strategy that appealed to Hitler
and when the German strategy changed this caused a crisis for the Allied
planners. As the author puts it ‘had the
Germans been working to an elaborate deception scheme they could not have
better misled the Allies and set them up for a complete and unexpected
overturning of their strategic hopes in Italy’.
The fighting in Italy was hard for the Allies since the terrain did not
favor mobile operations. This meant that their superiority in tanks and
vehicles could not be brought to bear. Instead the Germans were able to dictate
their rate of advance through demolition of roads and bridges and heavy mining
of the roads.
Under the command of General Kesselring the German forces established
defensive positions in the South and blocked the Allied advance. The Allies tried to bypass the Gustav line by
landing in Anzio. Their plan did not work since the Germans rushed units to the
area and were able to contain the bridgehead for several months. Eventually
attrition from the Anzio battle and the Allied offensives against the Gustav
line forced the Germans to retreat farther north.
After mid ‘44 many Allied formations were withdrawn for operation Dragoon and
the fighting slowed down. In April 1945 the German forces in Italy surrendered.
In the end the fighting in Italy was hard both for the Allies and the
Germans.
For the Allies the Italian geography negated their advantage in mobile
warfare and forced them to advance slowly. Efforts to bypass the German defenses
with naval landings were only partially successful due to lack of landing ships
and troops, as they were needed for the invasion of France.
The Germans engaged in one of the most successful defensive campaigns in
history but on the other hand the whole theatre was a drain on their limited
resources.
In June-November 1943 Luftwaffe lost more aircraft in Mediterranean than in Eastern Front (2 000 vs. 1 841).
ReplyDeletehttp://postimg.org/image/83o5vui4n/
(Phillips Payson O'Brien: "How The War Was Won - Allied air and sea power")