Tank strength and losses – Eastern Front

After examining the manpower and aircraft strength and loss statistics in the Eastern front it’s time to take a look at the tank situation.

Both sides built large numbers of tracked armored vehicles and their armored divisions spearheaded major operations. All history books mention the hordes of T-34 tanks attacking German positions and the Tiger and Panther tanks fighting against superior forces. However the truth is that the war in the East was an infantry war. Armored units were always a minority. Even so it is important to have accurate numbers about both sides.

Production

Production statistics are available from  Waffen und Geheimwaffen des deutschen Heeres 1933 – 1945’, vol2:

German AFV production
Types	1941	1942	1943	1944
Tank	3,166	4,269	6,240	8,888
SPG	570	1,753	4,517	8,696
SPA	0	36	1,471	2,081
Total	3,736	6,058	12,228	19,665

In addition to these numbers the Germans built more than 20.000 APC’s (armored personnel carriers) of the Sdfkz 250-251 types. The Soviet Union did not produce a similar vehicle but received through Lend Lease over 3.000 US halftracks and British Bren Carriers.
 

 

	1940/41	1942	1943	1944
le.SPW - 250	1,030	1,337	2,895	1,701
m.SPW - 251	868	1,190	4,258	7,785
Sum	1,898	2,527	7,153	9,486

Soviet AFV production
Types	1941	1942	1943	1944
Tank	5,971	24,043	19,811	15,801
Heavy	1,353	2,533	656	2,252
Medium	2,800	12,553	15,812	13,949
Light	1,907	9,553	3,343	0
SPG	0	26	2,678	8,955
SPA	0	25	1,369	3,003
Total	5,971	24,094	23,858	27,759

Soviet production numbers are impressive (note that ‘Accounting for War: Soviet Production, Employment, and the Defence Burden, 1940-1945’ has slightly higher numbers for the SU- 1941/6.590, 1942/24.719, 1943/24.006, 1944/28.983). but they are focused on only a handful of types (T-60/70, T-34, KV/IS). As the war went on the light tanks proved to be poorly suited for frontline duties and even the T-34 lost its theoretical superiority over the German tanks. In addition to these numbers the SU received roughly 11.000 AFV’s through Lend Lease.

Strength at the front

Data for the German side comes from several sources including: Panzertruppen, Sturmgeschutz & Its Variants, Kursk 1943: A statistical analysis and AHF threads (here and here). Unfortunately it is very difficult to find reliable data for the number of self-propelled A/T guns in the East, so I include estimates with a question mark.

German strength EF
Type	22-Jun-41	June-42	July-43	May-44
Tanks	3,600	2,400	2,500	~1,500
StuG/StuH	272	~400	1,000	~1,500
SP A/T and Artillery	135	?200?	?800?	?1,200?
Sum	4,007	3,000	4,300	4,200

In the East the Germans manage to keep their AFV strength constant at roughly 4.000 with the exception of summer ’42. However the numbers show an emphasis on SPG’s in the period 1943-44.

Data for the Soviets comes from this AHF thread [Source given is ‘Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voina 1941-45. Dejstvuyushchaya Armiya’]. These numbers do not include the STAVKA reserve. In the summer of 1941 there were about 12.000 tanks in the Western military districts. For the rest of the war:

Soviet AFV strength at the front
	Year 1941	Year 1942		Year 1943	Year 1944		Year 1945
AFV	1-Dec-41	1-May-42	1-Nov-42	1-Jul-43	1-Jan-44	1-Jun-44	1-Jan-45
Tanks
Heavy	212	660	922	893	349	467	976
Medium	322	1,291	2,714	5,492	2,609	3,766	6,059
Light	1,393	2,025	3,542	3,447	1,438	1,147	564
Sum	1,927	3,976	7,178	9,832	4,396	5,380	7,599
SPG
Heavy				104	139	314	504
Medium				174	244	152	758
Light				86	523	1,565	3,399
Sum	0	0	0	364	906	2,031	4,661
Total  AFV	1,927	3,976	7,178	10,196	5,302	7,411	12,260

There is no doubt that the Soviet forces had a significant numerical advantage over the Germans. This is natural since the Germans had to also fight against the Anglo-Americans while the SU could concentrate all of its resources against Germany.

Regarding AFV types it is interesting to note the role played by the light tanks T-60/70 and SU-76 SPG throughout the war. Most authors do not mention them at all.

Losses

Data for the Soviet side comes from Krivosheev’s ‘Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century’.

		Soviet AFV Losses
	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1941-45
Types
Tank
Heavy	900	1,200	1,300	900	900	5,200
Medium	2,300	6,600	14,700	13,800	7,500	44,900
Light	17,300	7,200	6,400	2,300	300	33,500
SPG	0	100	1,100	6,800	5,000	13,000
Total	20,500	15,100	23,500	23,800	13,700	96,600

The Soviets build lots of tanks but they also lose staggering numbers.

For the German side I have several reports that give total losses (here and here) but only one report from AHF that states losses in the East.

German AFV losses Eastern Front
	1941	1942	1943	1944	Total
Tanks	2,403	3,195	5,637	4,438	15,673
Stug	85	219	1,459	3,468	5,231
SP A/T guns	27	91	1,111	1,669	2,898
Total	2,515	3,505	8,207	9,575	23,802

A direct comparison between the two sides shows the Soviet Union losing 3.5 vehicles, in the period 1941-44, for every German AFV. This analysis however is flawed since AFV’s were also destroyed by towed A/T guns, hand held weapons, artillery, mines and airpower.

Despite that I do believe that tank for tank the German vehicles were better and that the T-34 was a poor weapon system.

Another way to look at losses is to calculate what percentage of production they represent.

Losses as % of AFV production
Germany	1941	1942	1943	1944
Production	3,736	6,058	12,228	19,665
Losses	2,515	3,505	8,207	9,575
%	0.67	0.58	0.67	0.49
SU
Production	5,971	24,094	23,858	27,759
Losses	20,500	15,100	23,500	23,800
%	3.43	0.63	0.98	0.86

I think the numbers speak for themselves. Without Anglo-American interference the Soviet losses in 1943-44 are unsustainable.
 

[Note that there are the following ‘issues’ with the German report:

1).The losses for 1942 include December 1941. According to Foreign Military Studies P-059 ‘Tank Losses’ by Generalmajor Burkhart Mueiler-Hillebrand total losses on all fronts for December 1941 comes to 525 Tanks and SPG’s but not all were lost in the East since at the same time there was heavy fighting in N.Africa during the British operation ’Crusader’. This could increase the 1941 percentage significantly.

2). February 1943 total losses show a huge spike at 2.069 vehicles. It seems reasonable to assume that these are vehicles heavily damaged/destroyed in late 1942 but officially written off in 1943. This would take the 1943 percentage down by a few points while raising the 1942 percentage.

3). For 1944 it says ‘December incomplete’. According to FMS P-059 total losses during the month were 677 Tanks, SPG’s and self-propelled artillery. A lot would be against the Western Allies during the Battle of the Bulge. In any case the number is so small that it can only raise the percentage by a few points.]

Some comments

1). The production difference in AFV’s for 1941-44 is 2-1 in favor of the Soviets (slightly higher if we add Lend Lease) but the exchange ratio is 3.5-1 in favor of the Germans. This means that if the Germans could concentrate all their production in the East the Soviets would run out of tanks.

2). Soviet forces benefit from Lend Lease supplies of tanks and other vehicles while the Germans had no such source of free vehicles but instead had to supply tanks and SPG’s to their allies and trade partners. Also in 1943-44 German production is affected by the Combined Bomber offensive, while the SU can utilize Lend Lease supplies of machinery and raw materials.

3). I often see the argument that the Soviet war economy out produced the German one. This is ‘proven’ by comparing either tank production between the two countries or total tank and SPG production. Things change if we have a look at each category separately. In the period 1941-44 we have:

Tanks: 3-1 advantage for the SU,

SPG’s and SP artillery: 1.2-1 advantage for the Germans,

Infantry vehicles (halftracks): …. SU produced zero while Germany built tens of thousands of Sdkfz 250/251. So who out produced whom?

4). Looking at tank types we see that the Germans constantly upgraded their fleet:

In 1941 they invaded with roughly 3.600 tanks of which only ~40% belong to the modern Pz III and PZ IV types. From these the Pz III had only 30mm frontal armor (some had extra 30mm bolted on) and roughly 28% had the outdated 37mm gun, the rest the 50mm L42. The Pz IV was armed with a low velocity 75mm gun ineffective against tanks and its armor was only 30mm (a small number had 50mm)

The new versions introduced in 1942 had updated guns and armor. The Pz III received the long 50mm L/60 and additional armor (50mm basic and 20mm bolted on). The Pz IV got the long 75mm KwK40 L/43 that had excellent antitank performance and its armor was increased to 50mm basic plus 30mm bolted on. In the summer of ’42 the Pz III and Pz IV comprise ~67% of German tank strength and out of these 45% have the new tank guns. The new guns meant that the German tanks could destroy the T-34 frontally (the L/60 at less than 500m the L/43 from over 1km) and the extra armor (assuming they had the bolted on part) protected them from the 76mm F-34 (using the standard A/T round) at ranges over 500m (for the Pz III hull and turret front) or point blank range (for the Pz IV front hull).

In the summer of 1943 the improved PzIV (KwK40 L/48 and 80mm standard armor plus sideskirts) together with the new Tiger and Panther tanks make up 49% of German tank strength. With these vehicles the Germans pulled ahead in tank warfare. This was acknowledged by a Soviet study conducted after the battle of Kursk. This showed that German and Soviet vehicles had the following combat values compared to the PzIII: Pz III -1.0, T-34- 1.16, Pz IV-1.27, PzV- 2.27 .

In 1944 the Germans rely exclusively on the PzIV, Tiger and Panther tanks. They had a rough 1-1 ratio between Pz IV and Panther in their tank units but this was not felt in the East during the summer battles as the best mobile divisions were in France.

Meanwhile the SU uses the same tank throughout the war, with the only important difference being a new turret and gun in 1944 (T34/85). The superiority of the upgunned German tanks and the new Panther and Tiger forced the Soviets to finally upgrade the T-34. However the T34-85 continued to have the same hull armor and its gun, although of a large caliber, had the same A/T performance as the Pz IV’s KwK40. The new 85mm ammo was heavier and only 56 rounds were carried (compared to 77 for the 76mm version). The T-34 was also the last main tank to get a 3-man turret.

German exploitation of US Diplomatic strip cipher in 1944

By 1944 the Germans were retreating on all fronts. They were pushed back by the Allies not only on the battlefields but also in the field of cryptology.

The introduction of new secure procedures and cipher machines by US and British forces hindered their efforts in the West and in the East the use of one time pad for enciphering important messages forced them to concentrate on lower level traffic.

Still even this late in the war they could exploit some high level enemy systems.

Against the Anglo-Americans their high level success was the exploitation of the State Departments strip cipher. An OKW/Chi activity report for the first half of ’44 says:

 ‘Government codes and ciphers of 33 European and extra-European States and agents lines were worked on and deciphered. 17.792 VN were produced including 6.000 agents messages. From point of view of numbers the list was headed by Government reports of the USA, Poland and Turkey.’

‘A number of complicated recipherings, principally American (USA) and Polish, have been broken.’

This is a clear reference to the M-138-A strip cipher. The Polish system was the codebook enciphered with a stencil.

Source: TICOM DF-9 ‘Activity report of OKW/Chi. 1/1/44-25/6/44.’

Update

Time for some new TICOM reports:

DF-9 ‘Captured Wehrmacht Sigint Document: Translation of Activity Report of OKW/Chi for the Period 1st January, 1944 to 25th June, 1944’

I-128 ‘Deciphering Achievements of  In 7/VI and OKW/Chi’

Available from Google docs and Scribd.

State Department’s Security Bureau official history

Here is a link to the ‘History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State’. This book covers the history of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and its predecessors – the Office of Security and the Office of the Chief Special Agent of the U.S. Department of State – from the inception in 1916 up to the present.

Chapter 2 deals with developments during WWII and the major effort to upgrade security in foreign missions. Security in most embassies was lamentable, especially in Moscow.

Unfortunately there is only passing mention of the State Department codes Gray, Brown and M-138 strip as the book mainly deals with general security measures.

Codebreaking and the Stalingrad pocket battles

In the summer of ’42 the German forces in the East managed to surprise the Soviet High Command by attacking in the area of Army Group South. The Germans together with their Rumanian, Hungarian and Italian Allies overwhelmed the Soviet troops and advanced far in the Soviet South towards the oil producing areas of Baku.

However their efforts to clear the western part of the Volga were checked by the Soviet forces defending Stalingrad.

In November ’42 the Soviets, after secretly massing their forces, counterattacked and used their mobile forces against the flanks of the German front that were defended by the German Allied nations. The result was the collapse of the front and the encirclement of the Stalingrad troops.

The siege of Stalingrad started again but this time it was the Germans that were defending. Outmaneuvered and outnumbered they did however manage to hold on and occupy significant Soviet forces till early ’43. This allowed the rest of Army Group South to extract its units and avoid an even worse disaster.

Were the Germans able to prolong the Stalingrad battle through superior intelligence? It seems so according to Foreign Military studies D-271 ‘The Battle of Stalingrad. Signal Communications in the Pocket of Stalingrad and Communications with the Outside’ by Generalmajor Wilhelm Arnold-1947.

 

By reading Soviet encoded messages their plans could be ascertained and the limited units available were moved to the threatened sectors in advance.

The report says:

‘III. Radio Intercept 

The intercept companies, consisting of an evaluation section and three platoons, were at the disposal of Sixth Army in the pocket of STALINGRAD. In addition to these units we had two intercept platoons of Fourth Panzer Army, thus a total of five intercept platoons. During the entire period of the encirclement the work of this reinforced intercept company was of the utmost importance to Sixth Army. The surrounded Army had no other means of collecting information about the enemy. A desperate attempt to send the three fighters in the pocket on a reconnaissance mission had failed. As a result, Army G-2 moved his entire section into the bunker of the intercept company's evaluation detachment. Fortunately, a large group of Russian interpreters had been assigned to the intercept company for some time. After the intercept stations had been installed, and the company had acquainted itself with the new assignment, we were able to determine the organization and approximate strength of the opposing Russian forces within a relatively short time. At first, Russian radio discipline was poor which enabled us to intercept and evaluate a series of clear radio messages. In the north-east sector, at least, this condition changed only when a new, apparently strict Russian signal officer was assigned there. He repeatedly prohibited all transmission of uncoded messages under threat of immediate execution of violators. However, even most of the coded Russian radio messages were deciphered by the intercept company quickly enough to be fully exploited. During the preceding year we had sent many specialists of the intercept company to Army Group or to the ZY for thorough training in deciphering the Russian three-, four-, and five-figure codes. That measure now yielded good results.

The well-coordinated employment of the five intercept platoons enabled us to present Field Marshal Paulus almost nightly with a complete picture of the changes that had occurred in the Russian lines during the day. In most instances we were able to determine the Russians’ intentions for the following day. We could then rush the few tanks that were still maneuverable to the threatened points in time. In the south and west it was even possible to intercept regularly the exact Russian tank status reports.

On 12 December 1942, when General Raus began his relief thrust from the south through the Kirgize Steppe on STALINGRAD, with his very strong 6th Panzer Division (200 tanks and assault guns) and the very weak 17th and 23d Panzer Divisions (with only few tanks), several radio sets of the signal company, and a few sets of the intercept company were tuned in on the frequency channels of this relief force. General Raus' command channel, the channels of the forward divisions and the regiment in the main effort were monitored, and as the relief force continued its advance the voice communications of the armored spearheads also became audible. Simultaneously, the intercept companies monitored the command channels of the Russian forces (primarily that of General Popov) which faced the forces of General Raus. This method of intercepting messages from both friendly and hostile forces provided us continuously with a fairly clear picture of the situation. Intercepted reports of particular importance were passed on to General Raus by radio. Thus, the German signal units performed their duty at STALINGRAD even under the most trying conditions. Field Marshal Paulus told me several times that their achievements helped us materially to endure in the long and bitter struggle.’

 

 

 

Note: Gerlach could be Wilhelm Gerlich, a member of NAAS 1 (Nachrichten Aufklärung Auswertestelle - Signal Intelligence Evaluation Center), the cryptanalytic centre of KONA 1 (Kommandeur der Nachrichtenaufklärung - Signals Intelligence Regiment) covering Army Group South.