Both sides
built large numbers of tracked armored vehicles and their armored divisions
spearheaded major operations. All history books mention the hordes of T-34 tanks
attacking German positions and the Tiger and Panther tanks fighting against
superior forces. However the truth is that the war in the East was an infantry
war. Armored units were always a minority. Even so it is important to have
accurate numbers about both sides.
Production
Production
statistics are available from
Waffen und Geheimwaffen des deutschen Heeres 1933 – 1945’, vol2:
German
AFV production
|
||||
Types
|
1941
|
1942
|
1943
|
1944
|
Tank
|
3,166
|
4,269
|
6,240
|
8,888
|
SPG
|
570
|
1,753
|
4,517
|
8,696
|
SPA
|
0
|
36
|
1,471
|
2,081
|
Total
|
3,736
|
6,058
|
12,228
|
19,665
|
In addition
to these numbers the Germans built more than 20.000 APC’s (armored personnel
carriers) of the Sdfkz 250-251 types. The Soviet Union did not produce a
similar vehicle but received through Lend Lease over 3.000 US halftracks and
British Bren Carriers.
1940/41
|
1942
|
1943
|
1944
|
|
le.SPW - 250
|
1,030
|
1,337
|
2,895
|
1,701
|
m.SPW - 251
|
868
|
1,190
|
4,258
|
7,785
|
Sum
|
1,898
|
2,527
|
7,153
|
9,486
|
Soviet
AFV production
|
||||
Types
|
1941
|
1942
|
1943
|
1944
|
Tank
|
5,971
|
24,043
|
19,811
|
15,801
|
Heavy
|
1,353
|
2,533
|
656
|
2,252
|
Medium
|
2,800
|
12,553
|
15,812
|
13,949
|
Light
|
1,907
|
9,553
|
3,343
|
0
|
SPG
|
0
|
26
|
2,678
|
8,955
|
SPA
|
0
|
25
|
1,369
|
3,003
|
Total
|
5,971
|
24,094
|
23,858
|
27,759
|
Soviet
production numbers are impressive (note that ‘Accounting for War: Soviet Production, Employment, and the Defence Burden, 1940-1945’ has slightly higher numbers for the SU- 1941/6.590, 1942/24.719, 1943/24.006, 1944/28.983). but they are focused on only a handful of
types (T-60/70, T-34, KV/IS). As the war went on the light tanks proved to be
poorly suited for frontline duties and even the T-34 lost its theoretical
superiority over the German tanks. In addition to these numbers the SU received
roughly 11.000 AFV’s through Lend Lease.
Strength at the front
Data for the
German side comes from several sources including: Panzertruppen,
Sturmgeschutz & Its Variants, Kursk
1943: A statistical analysis and AHF threads (here
and here).
Unfortunately it is very difficult to find reliable data for the number of self-propelled
A/T guns in the East, so I include estimates with a question mark.
German
strength EF
|
||||
Type
|
22-Jun-41
|
June-42
|
July-43
|
May-44
|
Tanks
|
3,600
|
2,400
|
2,500
|
~1,500
|
StuG/StuH
|
272
|
~400
|
1,000
|
~1,500
|
SP A/T and Artillery
|
135
|
?200?
|
?800?
|
?1,200?
|
Sum
|
4,007
|
3,000
|
4,300
|
4,200
|
In the East
the Germans manage to keep their AFV strength constant at roughly 4.000 with
the exception of summer ’42. However the numbers show an emphasis on SPG’s in
the period 1943-44.
Data for the
Soviets comes from this AHF
thread [Source given is ‘Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voina 1941-45.
Dejstvuyushchaya Armiya’]. These numbers do not include the STAVKA reserve. In
the summer of 1941 there were about 12.000 tanks in the Western military
districts. For the rest of the war:
Soviet
AFV strength at the front
|
|||||||
Year 1941
|
Year 1942
|
Year 1943
|
Year 1944
|
Year 1945
|
|||
AFV
|
1-Dec-41
|
1-May-42
|
1-Nov-42
|
1-Jul-43
|
1-Jan-44
|
1-Jun-44
|
1-Jan-45
|
Tanks
|
|||||||
Heavy
|
212
|
660
|
922
|
893
|
349
|
467
|
976
|
Medium
|
322
|
1,291
|
2,714
|
5,492
|
2,609
|
3,766
|
6,059
|
Light
|
1,393
|
2,025
|
3,542
|
3,447
|
1,438
|
1,147
|
564
|
Sum
|
1,927
|
3,976
|
7,178
|
9,832
|
4,396
|
5,380
|
7,599
|
SPG
|
|||||||
Heavy
|
104
|
139
|
314
|
504
|
|||
Medium
|
174
|
244
|
152
|
758
|
|||
Light
|
86
|
523
|
1,565
|
3,399
|
|||
Sum
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
364
|
906
|
2,031
|
4,661
|
Total AFV
|
1,927
|
3,976
|
7,178
|
10,196
|
5,302
|
7,411
|
12,260
|
There is no
doubt that the Soviet forces had a significant numerical advantage over the
Germans. This is natural since the Germans had to also fight against the
Anglo-Americans while the SU could concentrate all of its resources against
Germany.
Regarding AFV
types it is interesting to note the role played by the light tanks T-60/70 and
SU-76 SPG throughout the war. Most authors do not mention them at all.
Losses
Data for the
Soviet side comes from Krivosheev’s ‘Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the
Twentieth Century’.
Soviet
AFV Losses
|
||||||
1941
|
1942
|
1943
|
1944
|
1945
|
1941-45
|
|
Types
|
||||||
Tank
|
||||||
Heavy
|
900
|
1,200
|
1,300
|
900
|
900
|
5,200
|
Medium
|
2,300
|
6,600
|
14,700
|
13,800
|
7,500
|
44,900
|
Light
|
17,300
|
7,200
|
6,400
|
2,300
|
300
|
33,500
|
SPG
|
0
|
100
|
1,100
|
6,800
|
5,000
|
13,000
|
Total
|
20,500
|
15,100
|
23,500
|
23,800
|
13,700
|
96,600
|
The Soviets
build lots of tanks but they also lose staggering numbers.
For the
German side I have several reports that give total losses (here
and here)
but only one report
from AHF that states losses in the East.
German
AFV losses Eastern Front
|
|||||
1941
|
1942
|
1943
|
1944
|
Total
|
|
Tanks
|
2,403
|
3,195
|
5,637
|
4,438
|
15,673
|
Stug
|
85
|
219
|
1,459
|
3,468
|
5,231
|
SP A/T guns
|
27
|
91
|
1,111
|
1,669
|
2,898
|
Total
|
2,515
|
3,505
|
8,207
|
9,575
|
23,802
|
A direct
comparison between the two sides shows the Soviet Union losing 3.5 vehicles, in
the period 1941-44, for every German AFV. This analysis however is flawed since
AFV’s were also destroyed by towed A/T guns, hand held weapons, artillery,
mines and airpower.
Despite that
I do believe that tank for tank the German vehicles were better and that the
T-34 was a poor weapon system.
Another way
to look at losses is to calculate what percentage of production they represent.
Losses as % of AFV
production
|
||||
Germany
|
1941
|
1942
|
1943
|
1944
|
Production
|
3,736
|
6,058
|
12,228
|
19,665
|
Losses
|
2,515
|
3,505
|
8,207
|
9,575
|
%
|
0.67
|
0.58
|
0.67
|
0.49
|
SU
|
||||
Production
|
5,971
|
24,094
|
23,858
|
27,759
|
Losses
|
20,500
|
15,100
|
23,500
|
23,800
|
%
|
3.43
|
0.63
|
0.98
|
0.86
|
I think the
numbers speak for themselves. Without Anglo-American interference the Soviet
losses in 1943-44 are unsustainable.
[Note that
there are the following ‘issues’ with the German report:
1).The losses
for 1942 include December 1941. According to Foreign Military Studies P-059 ‘Tank Losses’ by Generalmajor Burkhart Mueiler-Hillebrand total
losses on all fronts for December 1941 comes to 525 Tanks and SPG’s but not all
were lost in the East since at the same time there was heavy fighting in
N.Africa during the British operation ’Crusader’. This could increase the 1941
percentage significantly.
2). February
1943 total losses show a huge spike at 2.069 vehicles. It seems reasonable to
assume that these are vehicles heavily damaged/destroyed in late 1942 but
officially written off in 1943. This would take the 1943 percentage down by a
few points while raising the 1942 percentage.
3). For 1944
it says ‘December incomplete’. According to FMS P-059 total losses during the
month were 677 Tanks, SPG’s and self-propelled artillery. A lot would be
against the Western Allies during the Battle of the Bulge. In any case the
number is so small that it can only raise the percentage by a few points.]
Some
comments
1). The
production difference in AFV’s for 1941-44 is 2-1 in favor of the Soviets (slightly
higher if we add Lend Lease) but the exchange ratio is 3.5-1 in favor of the
Germans. This means that if the Germans could concentrate all their production
in the East the Soviets would run out of tanks.
2). Soviet
forces benefit from Lend Lease supplies of tanks and other vehicles while the
Germans had no such source of free vehicles but instead had to supply tanks and
SPG’s to their allies and trade partners. Also in 1943-44 German production is affected by the Combined Bomber
offensive, while the SU can utilize Lend Lease supplies of machinery and raw
materials.
3). I often
see the argument that the Soviet war economy out produced the German one. This
is ‘proven’ by comparing either tank production between the two countries or
total tank and SPG production. Things change if we have a look at each category
separately. In the period 1941-44 we have:
Tanks: 3-1 advantage for the SU,
SPG’s and SP artillery: 1.2-1 advantage for the Germans,
Infantry vehicles (halftracks): …. SU produced zero
while Germany built tens of thousands of Sdkfz 250/251. So who out produced
whom?
4). Looking
at tank types we see that the Germans constantly upgraded their fleet:
In 1941 they
invaded with roughly 3.600 tanks of which only ~40% belong to the modern Pz III
and PZ IV types. From these the Pz III had only 30mm frontal armor (some had
extra 30mm bolted on) and roughly 28% had the outdated 37mm gun, the rest the
50mm L42. The Pz IV was armed with a low velocity 75mm gun ineffective against
tanks and its armor was only 30mm (a small number had 50mm)
The new
versions introduced in 1942 had updated guns and armor. The Pz III received the
long 50mm L/60 and additional armor (50mm basic and 20mm bolted on). The Pz IV
got the long 75mm KwK40 L/43 that had excellent antitank performance and its
armor was increased to 50mm basic plus 30mm bolted on. In the summer of ’42 the
Pz III and Pz IV comprise ~67% of German tank strength and out of these 45%
have the new tank guns. The new guns meant that the German tanks could destroy
the T-34 frontally (the L/60 at less than 500m the L/43 from over 1km) and the
extra armor (assuming they had the bolted on part) protected them from the 76mm
F-34 (using the standard A/T round) at ranges over 500m (for the Pz III hull
and turret front) or point blank range (for the Pz IV front hull).
In the summer
of 1943 the improved PzIV (KwK40 L/48 and 80mm standard armor plus sideskirts) together
with the new Tiger and Panther tanks make up 49% of German tank strength. With
these vehicles the Germans pulled ahead in tank warfare. This was acknowledged
by a Soviet study conducted after the battle of Kursk. This showed that German
and Soviet vehicles had the following combat values compared to the PzIII: Pz
III -1.0, T-34- 1.16, Pz IV-1.27, PzV- 2.27 .
In 1944 the
Germans rely exclusively on the PzIV, Tiger and Panther tanks. They had a rough
1-1 ratio between Pz IV and Panther in their tank units but this was not felt
in the East during the summer battles as the best mobile divisions were in
France.
Meanwhile the
SU uses the same tank throughout the war, with the only important difference
being a new turret and gun in 1944 (T34/85). The superiority of the upgunned
German tanks and the new Panther and Tiger forced the Soviets to finally
upgrade the T-34. However the T34-85 continued to have the same hull armor and
its gun, although of a large caliber, had the same A/T performance as the Pz
IV’s KwK40. The new 85mm ammo was heavier and only 56 rounds were carried
(compared to 77 for the 76mm version). The T-34 was also
the last main tank to get a 3-man turret.
An excellent and informative piece. The first time I have seen all such data collated together in one article.
ReplyDeleteI also have a question if I may ask it here... Do you have any idea how much percentage of the german tank production 1941-45 was actually being sent to the eastern front and how much sent elsewhere (this would vary year on year I guess)?
ReplyDeleteFrom my notes from 'Panzertruppen' I see that in 1941-42 Rommel’s tank strength fluctuated between 314 in mid '41 to 363 in mid '42 to 269 in October ’42. So apart from training units almost everything else would be in the East.
DeleteThis changed in summer 1944 when there were more tanks in the West (France+Germany) at ~ 1.500-1.600 compared to 1.400-1.500 in the East.
This comment has been removed by the author.
Delete"This showed that German and Soviet vehicles had the following combat values compared to the PzIII: Pz III -1.0, T-34- 1.16, Pz IV-1.27, PzV- 2.27."
ReplyDeleteDo you know where I can find more on this and similar soviet studies?
Source is Zaloga’s ‘T-34-85 vs M26 Pershing’, p10:
Delete‘Following Kursk, an assessment by the main Soviet tank research institute compared the combat effectiveness of the T-34 against its German opponents, assigning the baseline value of 1.0 to the current production version of the PzKpfw III. In this assessment, the T-34 rated at only 1.16, the Pzkpfw IV at 1.27, and the Panther at 2.37. While the T-34 had been equivalent or superior to most German armored vehicles on the battlefield in 1942, this was no longer the case by mid-1943’
I don’t know of any similar Soviet studies.
Nice info, Christos. Very well done.
ReplyDeleteI have a question about German AFV strength. In 1942, the german AFV strength is around 3000, while in the other years it's about 4000. Has the battle of stalingrad influenced the relative low AFV strength in 1942, because I have read somewhere that the soviets had captured a large amount of tanks during this battle.
ReplyDeleteMy estimate was for summer 1942 using ‘Panzertruppen’ as the source for tank strength. Compared to 1941 the difference is that the Pz I and Pz 35 are no longer used plus Pz II and Pz 38 are only available in small numbers.
DeleteI noticed that total German AFV strength vs total AFV losses don't match up at all. For example, 1943 total strength is 4300 but 1943 losses are 8207. How is that possible?
DeleteDear anonymous friend. Next time check the tables CAREFULLY.
DeleteProduction and loss statistics are for the entire year.
The German strength estimate is for the Eastern front at a specific point in time (summer 1943).
The losses were made up thanks to increased production at 12,228 vehicles. I can’t say I understood your reasoning.
According to the figures, Soviet heavy tank strength in 1st Januari 1944 was 349, heavy tank losses in 1944 were 900, heavy tank production was 2252, but soviet heavy tank strength in 1st Januari 1945 was less than 1000, why? Was it due to mechanical failure and the red army seeing heavy tanks as less important than other afv's or something else? Or am I now just thinking too exact?
ReplyDeleteBe careful. What did i write about Soviet strength at the front?
Delete'Data for the Soviets comes from this AHF thread [Source given is ‘Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voina 1941-45. Dejstvuyushchaya Armiya’]. These numbers do not include the STAVKA reserve.'
In your article, you show the results of a soviet research which gives the values of several german tanks and the T-34 based on performance. How exactly did they do their research?
ReplyDeleteI don't know how they evaluated each vehicle. The report is mentioned in ‘T-34-85 vs M26 Pershing’, p10
Deletehttp://www.amazon.com/T-34-85-M26-Pershing-Korea-1950-ebook/dp/B0064158EW
How about British studies showing that Stug III/tank destroyers caused 24% of British armour losses in 1944, mines 22% but tanks just 14%?
ReplyDeleteAny edtimates of battle value of too often forgotten assault guns? There was also Canadian data claiming that 25-40% of their tank losses were not combat. British study concentrated only those lost by enemy Action.
Depends on if they faced equal number of StuGs/TD and Tanks. StuGs were mostly concentrated in the east.
ReplyDeleteGermans held onto using Tanks as offensive weapons. They would lose them for small gains.
I would think that the numbers, if limited to June/July?august might be slightly shifted towards the tanks.
The huge discrepancies in losses of Soviet tanks are due to many factors. The training give to German crews was superb whilst Russians didn't even train in a rather obselete tanks than t34s and one report I saw said they didnt even teach how to fire the guns to save ammo.
ReplyDeleteIt was like sending amateurs against professionals. Only the lead tank even had a working radio against German nets which could call in air and infantry support.
The Russians lacked radios & basic training or tactics in the effective use of tanks. No combined air or ground support until 1943 on plus using flags instead of German highly developed use of these. The Russians might as well dragged guys off the street. Training was with obsolete tanks which had totally differnt characteristics plus they didn't even get to fire guns until they had to do it for real. Soviet planning if you could call it that was to send I'll trained troops piecemeal without proper air or infantry support or even reconnaissance and employed blocking troops to ensure compliance. The results were the high loss rates until 1943 onwards.
ReplyDeleteWhere can I find monthly operational tank statistics for the German Army from Poland to the end of the war?
ReplyDeleteI know of the following:
DeletePanzer lage ost (Nach Gen. Qu), BA-MA RH 10/61 , Stug-Lage Ost (Nach Gen Qu), BA-MA RH 10/62
This is from ‘Kursk 1943 A statistical analysis’
I wonder how much of the factory assets were provided by the Ford company, I have never found any reliable data on that
ReplyDeleteI read that Germans counted damaged vehicles as losses whereas allies didnt, some people claim therefore that German tank losses should be counted twice. Personally, I believe it would be wrong to do so considering that from mid 1943 till 45 Germans were constantly under artillery fire, lost air superiority and the enemy was constantly advancing, leaving damaged vehicles hardly recovable. Do you know where I can find something about it?
ReplyDeleteAll countries counted losses in the same way. For a summary of the German strength and loss statistics check the book ‘Kursk 1943: A statistical analysis’.
DeleteWhat was the percentage of german-built AFV's deployed to the eastern front? I assume it was the majority, right? I'm currently working on something and need that info.
ReplyDeleteI don’t have that number available. In the period 1941-43 the majority of German afv’s were used against the SU.
DeleteIn 1944 it’s roughly 50-50.