Many authors
claim that Stalin trusted Hitler or that he refused to read the reports of his
spies claiming they were provocations.
The truth is
a little more complex than that. During the period 1939-41 the Soviet Union had
greatly expanded its military forces and had introduced modern weapon systems
like the T-34 and KV tanks and the Yak and MiG fighters. The Soviet leadership
definitely expected a conflict with Nazi Germany however the question was when
and where.
In 1941 the
Germans were already fighting against the British so Stalin reasonably assumed
that they would not be able to start a conflict in the East. However the
Soviets also knew that the German economy desperately needed raw materials and
agricultural products. The area that could provide them with all their needs
was the Ukraine, so they understandably expected a German attack in that area.
Germany
depended on Soviet exports of oil and other raw materials but by 1941 both
sides were withholding products and arguing over prices.
The German
intelligence service Abwehr was able to take advantage of this conflict in
order to convince the Soviets that the units being moved to the East would take
part in a border incident followed by economic demands. They could execute such
a plan because they already had agents working inside Soviet intelligence and
their message matched the Soviet appreciation of the situation.
According to
Soviet interrogations of German personnel the Berlin Abwehrstelle had under its
control the Latvian journalist Orest Berlinks. This person was considered to be
a most reliable source by the Berlin rezident (chief of intelligence) Amayak
Kobulov with the result that the German disinformation passed directly to
Moscow. Berlinks claimed that the movement of troops to the East was a gigantic
bluff.
At the same
time the Abwehr used other channels to give the impression that a military
action against the Soviet Union would be preceded by economic demands in the
Ukraine. Arvid Harnack, head of the CORSICAN spy network in Berlin, reported to
his controller in April ‘41: ‘The USSR
will be asked to join the Axis and attack England. As a guarantee, the Ukraine
will be occupied and possibly the Baltic states also.’
From the
SENIOR spy network came a similar message in May ‘41: ‘First Germany will present an ultimatum to the Soviet Union claiming
wider export privileges as a reprisal for Communist propaganda. As a guarantee
of these claims, German emissaries must be stationed in industrial and economic
centers and the factories of the Ukraine. Certain Ukrainian regions are to be
occupied by the German army. The delivery of this ultimatum will be preceded by
a war of nerves whose object will be to demoralize the Soviet Union.’
The German
deception was reinforced by Soviet intelligence errors, specifically the fact
that they overestimated the size of the German Army.
Their
estimate on the German divisions in the East in May ’41 was 114-116 while the
real number was 117 in June. For the
Soviet leadership this was a dangerous concentration of enemy strength but it
did not necessarily mean war because these forces represented only ~42% of
German army strength. If Hitler was serious about war he would have sent his
entire army to the East.
What they
didn’t know was that they had overestimated the size of the German army. Their
figures showed 286-296 divisions while the real number was 209. Using this
number the percentage grew to 58%.
This mistake
reinforced their belief that the Germans would instigate a border incident but
not a full scale war.
The elaborate
German deception shows that even a country with good intelligence resources can
be tricked by a skillful opponent. Mixing truths with lies and playing on the
Soviet preconceptions the Germans were able to keep the Soviet leadership
guessing.
Sources: ‘Deadly illusions’ by Costello and Tsarev, ‘Thunder in the East’ by
Mawdsley
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