The NSA has
declassified the TICOM report I-170 ‘Report on French and Greek Systems by
Oberwachtmeister Dr. Otto Karl Winkler of OKH/FNAST 4’ (dated January 1946).
I’ll probably
write a more detailed essay on the compromise of Greek military, diplomatic and
partisan codes in WWII.
Some
interesting excerpts from the report:
My first employment was on the
breaking and translating of Greek Air Force messages in Spring 1941. The unit
was in BUCHAREST at that time and later it was at BANJA KOSTENIC in Bulgaria.
C.O. was Hptm. SCHMIDT, head of the cryptography and translation department
from then until Autumn 1944 was Prof. Alfred KNESCHKE, a Professor of
Mathematics from Saxony.
……………………………………………………………
Greek Army and Navy messages were not
broken until after the conquest of Greece, when captured ‘Codes’ were read
during the attack on Crete.
……………………………………………………………
In May 1941 the unit moved to ATHENS.
In the autumn of that year the De Gaulle troops in Syria began to send cipher
messages. ………………………………………………… Practically the whole Syrian WT traffic was read
and a complete picture obtained of the build-up, strength, composition and
Organization of the French armed forces, of the political administration and
the names of all important personalities, as well as all changes and troops
movements. In charge of evaluation of French material at this time was Wm. KÜHNAPFEL
(from KONIGSBERG).
As the French used also to refer to
British troop movements and officer personalities from time to time, such
pointers were of considerable use to our English evaluation section, as the
British ciphers could not as a rule be broken by German Sigint.
……………………………………………………………
The unit moved to BELGRADE in Autumn
1943, thence, in August 1944 to PERNITZ near WIENER NEUSTADT, However, I
received a new task in Spring 1944 with the appearance of Greek messages sent
by ELAS. In the course of our two year stay in Athens I had been able to learn
modern Greek almost perfectly, on the basis of a knowledge of classical Greek
and spurred on by love for and interest in Greece. In addition my duties had
provided me with a certain experience of cryptography and a good translation
technique. Thus I was put in charge of Greek cryptography and was assisted in
the actual cryptographic work by Uffz. Diether STROBL from BERLIN, an English
interpreter and technical student. I had held the rank of Wachtmeister since
Christmas 1943.
……………………………………………………………
Double transpositions are regarded as
a secure type of cipher and are therefore used by many British agents. To the
best of my knowledge the unit never succeeded in breaking one and only
occasional captured material has rendered it possible to read some traffic
retrospectively. For the sake of security it is essential to avoid using
complete or even square boxes, typical beginnings or endings of messages and
constantly recurring addresses and signatures, to use each key as little as
possible and as far as possible to have different keys for each box of the
pairs The Greeks overlooked all these rules right up to the end, with the
result that messages in the same setting and with the same number of groups
(Elementeanzahl) cropped up.
……………………………………………………………
In any case we succeeded in breaking 50 – 60% of
the traffic tackled and as important messages were always retransmitted on
several links with different keys, we were able to build up an almost complete
picture of the build-up, organization and composition of EAM and ELAS, to
compile lists of their leading personalities and officers and to inform the
competent German political and military authorities in good time about many
planned military and political actions, acts of sabotage, ambushes,
dynamitings, etc. I can only remember a few details and cannot reproduce
examples systematically as the evaluation of the material wan not my job, which
consisted only of deciphering, decoding and translating the available material.
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