In The British Interdepartmental Cypher I’ve added the following pic from GCHQ’s twitter account:
Monday, January 29, 2018
Recently I posted reports on OSS codes and ciphers from 1943 and 1944.
Another document that has information on the OSS crypto systems is ‘Staff Study on OSS Cryptographic Plan’, available from the US National Archives - collection RG457- Entry 9032 - NR 3280 ‘Staff Study on OSS Cryptographic Plan’.
The report is also available from the journal ‘Cryptologia’, vol13, no.3:
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
SPSIC-6 8 January 1945
MEMORANDUM for Assistant. Chief of Staff, G-2
Subject: Staff Study on OSS Cryptographic Plan
The enclosed staff study is forwarded for your consideration and comment,
For the Chief Signal Officer:
W, Preston Corderman
Colonel, Signal Corps
Chiefs Signal Security Branch
Study on OSS Cryptographic Plan
STAFF STUDY ON OSS CRYPTOGRAPHIC PLAN
1. How may the need of OSS for a high grade, high speed cryptographic system be satisfied?
FACTS BEARING ON THE CASE
2. OSS has a requirement for a high grade, high speed cryptographic system for the encipherment and decipherment of secret traffic.
3. At the present time OSS is using the Converter M-134-A (short title SIGMYC) to satisfy this requirement.
4. Prior to 5 April 1944, eight (8) SIGMYC were issued to OSS.
5. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, authorized the issue of twenty-six (26) SIGMYC to OSS by memorandum for Col. Corderman from Col. Clarke dated 5 April 1944, to meet the expanding needs of that organization.
6. Since 5 April 1944, twenty-one (21) SIGMYC have been delivered to OSS. That organization now holds twenty-nine (29) machines; five more are available for issue.
7. In the past OSS has used one universal set of rotors with SIGMYC. These rotors were replaced once.
8. In September 1944 OSS requested two new sets of rotors, one set to be used in Europe and the other set in the Far East. Thirty-eight (38) sets of rotors SIGRHAT (for use in the Far East) have been issued in compliance with that request.
9. Twenty-five (25) sets of rotors SIGSAAD (for use in Europe) have also been issued.
10. Instructional documents associated with SIGMYC are "Operating Instructions for Converter M-134 and M-134-A (Short title SIGKOC and ‘photographs and Drawings of Converter M-134-A (short title SIGVYJ). No copies of these publications are available for issue. This situation was caused by the destruction of the instructional documents when Converters M-134-A were turned in by Army holders.
11. Requests are received for spare parts with each request for the issue of a SIGMYC. The spare parts list always include rotor stepping solenoids. There are no rotor stepping solenoids on hand in this agency. Three requests for these items have not been fulfilled.
12. In accordance with authorization of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 27 July 1944, one SIGTOT room circuit was furnished OSS in Washington. Authorization did not extend to the issuance of tapes for use with this equipment. Additional SIGTOT circuits have been made available to OSS in Europe. That organization is procuring additional tape punching equipment to meet the increased demand for tape. OSS requested the loan of such equipment until they are prepared to fulfill their own needs for tape. This branch is supplying OSS with sufficient tape until that organization is self-supporting in this respect.
13. Four (4) SIGCUM have been issued to OSS with the approval of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 28 April 1944. These machines were sent to OSS in North Africa to replace four (4) SlGCUM which were loaned to OSS by NATO and subsequently recalled by the latter organization.
14. Within the past six (6) months the communications requirements of OSS have markedly increased. The cryptographic requirements have expanded proportionately. The rapid expansion is vividly illustrated by the strip cipher requirements of that organization. In June 1944 SSA requested OSS to furnish a monthly quota of desired material in order to adjust production schedules here. The monthly quota of strip cipher systems needed is now larger than the total number of strip systems issued to OSS over a period of twenty (20) months.
15. It is believed that the OSS will request the five (5) remaining SIGMYC of the authorized allotment of twenty-six (26) machines. Instructional documents are not available for issue with these converters. The reprinting of these documents presents a major reproduction job.
16. OSS encounters an ever present maintenance problem since the machines are constantly breaking down. It is believed that the time is not far distant when it will be impossible to maintain the machines adequately,
17. In order to provide new rotors in the future it will be necessary to have rotors returned from the field by OSS for rewiring. Thus, a rotation process will be established to meet new demands for rotors which will result in the wearing out of the rotors within a relatively short time. It is noted that it would take between one to two years to procure new rotors.
18. OSS is now trying out a modification of the standard --text deleted -- device, which utilizes -*- --text deleted--. That organization is contemplating an increase in the distribution of these --text deleted – to include the standard --text deleted – held by OSS, thus, permitting inter-communication between the two machines. The cryptographic principle involved his been approved by the Signal Security Agency. OSS plans to utilize the -*- --text deleted-- for secret radio transmissions.
19. The question arises as to what other means are available. The following items of equipment are considered:
This system provides adequate security but the scarcity of equipment and the difficultly of providing sufficient quantities of one-time tape render its use impracticable. In addition SIGTOT is not at present adapted to multi-holders of a common system, which is an operational requirement
Under present policy, it would be necessary to assign a crypt team with each machine in order to make them available to OSS. This presents a problem of securing sufficient personnel which appears insurmountable at the present time. Furthermore, the use of SIGABA as a solution to this problem is not generally regarded with favor.
The communications and cryptographic problems of OSS are developing rapidly in the Far East where traffic is transmitted largely by radio. Since SIGCUM may not be employed for secret traffic transmitted by means of radio the use of this machine would not provide a solution to the problem, Although SIGCUM would be a satisfactory substitute for SIGMYC in Europe, a revision of the cryptographic facilities of OSS in that area is not considered feasible at this time.
This converter provides adequate security to fulfill the need for a high grade cryptographic system and is well adapted to multiple holders of a common system. Since it is not a high speed system, it would not fulfill this requirement.
This system would provide adequate security and speed to meet the outlined requirements. However, since SIGLASE is still in the development stage and the expected date of issue is unknown it is not the immediate answer to the OSS problem.
20. From the point of view of this branch the problem could be most acceptably solved by making Army facilities available to OSS. It is realized that the latter organization would probably not be favorably disposed toward such a solution,
21. The continued use of SIGMYC by OSS in the Far East will present maintenance and
distribution problems which will be virtually impossible to solve.
22. A replacement for SIGMYC is needed.
23. SIGABA, SIGCUM and SIGTOT are not completely acceptable substitutes.
24. SIGFOY and SIGLASE would be a solution to the problem but since it will require from six to nine months to manufacture the SIGLASE, it cannot be considered an immediate solution.
25. It appears that the only immediate solution to the problem is for OSS traffic to be handled by Army cryptographic facilities.
26. That OSS be requested to utilize Army cryptographic communications facilities where such exist.
27. That OSS use its own cryptographic communications facilities where Army facilities do not exist.
28. That, at such time as the equipment referred to in paragraph 27 becomes unserviceable, service be maintained by those Army cryptographic facilities and/or equipments as may then be available.
Wednesday, January 24, 2018
The interesting article ‘The U.S. Army Security Agency in Early Cold War Germany’ is available in the latest issue of Army History Magazine.
Sunday, January 14, 2018
In 1943 and 1944 the US Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluated the cryptosystems used by the various US government agencies.
For example the report on State Department codes and ciphers for 1943 can be found in the NSA website and the report of 1944 is in the US national archives, in collection RG 457- Entry 9032- box 1384 - 'JCS Ad hoc committee report on cryptographic security of government communications'.
The ciphers of the Office of Strategic Services were also evaluated and there is some information on this topic in the US national archives, specifically Record Group 226 - Series: Correspondence Files, 1942 – 1946 - File Unit: 17) Cryptographic Security:
Unfortunately there are no detailed reports on the subject but from the information presented above it seems that even as late as 1944 OSS communications were sent on vulnerable cryptosystems (double transposition and M-138-A cipher).
Monday, January 1, 2018
As I said in a previous essay I started this site because I wanted to move away from history forums and create my own space in the internet.
Since then I think that I have written many essays of real historical value, especially in the field of cryptology. I am satisfied that I’ve covered in detail all the cases that interested me, whether they dealt with general military history, performance of weapon systems, wartime economic history or spies and cryptology.
I did this on my own without support from a university, think tank or government organization.
The remaining cases that I am going to pursue in 2018 are the following:
1). Carlson-Goldsberry report: I am waiting for the NSA to declassify this document. Once they do I’ll add the information in my essays on State department codes and the Finnish codebreakers.
2). Remaining freedom of information act cases: I have to wait for the declassification of TICOM reports I-40 and DF-196. Once I received them I will upload them to my Google drive and Scribd accounts but I doubt they will have any new information not already mentioned in the other TICOM reports.
3). Files in the US National archives: During the year I will check again with NARA’s research department regarding the NSA files that I was unable to locate in 2017. Specifically the TICOM report ‘Interrogation of mr Hayashi’ and the two German reports ‘E-Bericht der NAAst 5’ for second half 1944. Unfortunately there are no guarantees that these files will be located.
Apart from that I’ll also keep an eye out for anything interesting like academic articles, release of new material to the archives, new books etc. I am especially interested in the following topics:
1). Office of Strategic Services codes and ciphers, especially any postwar evaluation of their cipher security.
2). The wartime achievements of the Soviet codebreakers and the codes and ciphers of the Red Army.
3). The Soviet cryptosystems solved by the Anglo-Americans in the period 1945-48. Unfortunately the NSA history BOURBON to Black Friday: The Allied Collaborative COMINT Effort against the Soviet Union, 1945-1948 has many chapters deleted.