Operation Overlord 70th anniversary

On 6 June 1944 the Anglo-Americans landed in Normandy, France and proceeded to liberate Nazi occupied Europe.

The anniversary of this operation will undoubtedly lead to statements in magazines and newspapers attributing the success of ‘Overlord’ to a disinformation campaign. According to this view the Germans could have defeated the landings but they were tricked into holding most of their forces in reserve so they could be used against the ‘real’ landings expected near Pas de Calais.

For an opposing view read the following essays:

1). Normandy 1944 - Allied estimates of German power

2). Normandy 1944 – What-if scenarios and the Fortitude deception

3). German intelligence on operation Overlord

4). The Jellyfish radio-teletype link

5). German fuel reserve - Normandy 1944

6). Book review – Normandy 1944

Interesting WWII documentary

Best seen under the influence of hallucinogenic drugs.

Naval Enigma compromise and the spy in the United States Department of the Navy

Signals intelligence and codebreaking played an important role in WWII. British and American codebreakers solved many important Axis crypto systems, such as the German Enigma machine and the Japanese Navy’s code JN25. 

The solution of the German military’s plugboard Enigma was mostly carried out at Bletchley Park with Hut 6 attacking Army and Airforce ‘keys’, while Hut 8 worked on the naval traffic. During the Battle of the Atlantic the German U-boats relied mostly on the Enigma for their communications with U-boat Command, so the solution of these messages was a top priority for the Allied codebreakers.

Unfortunately the fact that the Navy used stricter procedures than the Army and Airforce plus their introduction of a separate 4-rotor Enigma machine in 1942 meant that in the period March 1941- September ‘43 the successes of Bletchley Park were spasmodic and suffered from time lag. Things changed in September since the new 4-rotor ‘Bombes’ built by the Americans were introduced and they could solve the Enigma settings reliably and in a timely manner (at least until the introduction of individual Enigma keys for U-boats in late 1944).

According to several books and articles the Germans never suspected that their codes were being read and they thought that the Enigma was unbreakable. The reality was a slightly more complex than that as can be seen from the numerous security measures they implemented during the war. Would they have taken so many precautions if they considered Enigma unbreakable?

Since the Enigma was used in huge numbers it was accepted that during the war both cipher machines and valid keylists had fallen into Allied hands. Thus current traffic could be compromised but only until new settings were introduced.

Another question is whether the Germans considered the Enigma to be vulnerable to cryptanalysis. After all it wasn’t every day that Enigma machines and keylists would fall into enemy hands. Here the story diverges since the different codebreaking departments in the Army (Inspectorate 7/VI), Navy (B-Dienst), Airforce (Chi Stelle) and Armed Forces High Command (OKW/Chi) had different opinions on the matter. Unfortunately we don’t know the full story of their security investigations as the relevant files have not been studied in detail but it is clear that they constantly researched ways of solving the Enigma.

In this area the Army codebreakers proved more suspicious than their counterparts in other departments and they always worried about the possibility of solution of the machine by the enemy. During the war they not only studied the Enigma but also interrogated Polish personnel regarding their solution of the prewar Enigma, known to the Germans as case ‘Wicher’.

The analysts of the naval cipher security department on the other hand seems to have shown a lack of imagination when it came to researching the Enigma. For some reason they constantly downplayed the possibility of cryptanalytic solution and attributed enemy successes to captured cipher material.

This can be seen from one of their reports found in NARA-RG 457- Entry 9032- box 1279 – NR 3775 ‘German Navy U-boat logs’. In the summer of 1943 the military intelligence service Abwehr learned from a Swiss-American working in the US Department of the Navy that the operational orders to U-boats were decoded by the Allies and all messages read.

According to google translate:

At 10.8. received the following message via KO Switzerland :

‘‘For several months, deciphering German naval codes with regard to operating Uboat commands succeeded. All commands are read.

Additional: Source Swiss-American secretary in high position in the U.S. Navy Department.‘’

It is not clear if this person was an Abwehr agent or someone who revealed this information to Swiss diplomatic or intelligence authorities and they in turn shared this information with the Germans.

The response of the security department was that the continuous reading of their communications by the Allies was out of the question. There was however the possibility of losing cipher material in one of the sunken U-boats. For that reason they instituted a change of the Enigma settings using the keyword ‘Andromeda’.

The emergency key-‘Stichwort’, worked on the following system according to the study ‘Cryptographic History of Work on the German Naval Enigma’, p6:

"Stichwort".

19. The "Stichwort" was a device used when the enemy suspected that the keys had been captured, or wished to protect himself from the danger of this happening. An example will make its nature and method of use clear.

20. All holders of the machine (at the time of this example) held a sealed envelope labelled PERSEUS. An order was sent out "STICHWORTHEFEHL PERSEUS". The holders opened their envelopes and found the word DANZIG inside (the "Kennwort"). They then "applied" DANZIG to the key as follows (1) D = 4 was added to the number of each wheel in the W.O. (2) A, N, Z respectively were added to the three letters of the Ringstellung. (3) I = 9 was added to each letter in the Stecker. This change was applied to all keys until further notice.

21. Suppose for instance the key for the day had been W.O. 275, Rings. BYL, Stecker A/F, B/J, D/X.... . The modified key would then be W.O. 631, Ring. CML, Stecker J/O, K/S, M/G .... .

22. This is a security measure with some "nuisance value" but is clearly not equivalent to a new key. Given that a key has been captured (the assumption on which the Stichwort is based) then - once we have discovered what is happening - there are 8 W.O.'s and 26 sets of Stecker to try; this might certainly be tiresome but does not compare with the 336 W.O.'s and 140 million million stecker on a completely unknown key.

The naval codebreakers would change their minds regarding the theoretical solution of their 4-rotor Enigma in late 1944 when one of their analysts named Hans-Joachim Frowein showed that it could be solved on a ‘crib’ of 25 letters (suspected plaintext in the ciphertext).

 

This report is TICOM I-38 and is available from Ticom Archive.

General Onodera’s intelligence bazaar

In the course of WWII all the participants tried to gather secret intelligence using spies.

For example the Brits had their Secret Intelligence Service and the Special Operations Executive plus they worked together with the Polish, French and Czech intelligence services. The Germans had their Abwehr and Sicherheitsdienst. The Americans created the Office of Strategic Services etc etc

Spying was a hard business. Recruiting trustworthy individuals, training them, providing them with false identities, necessary paperwork and foreign currency was not easy. Inserting them into an enemy country was difficult with the majority being caught in a relatively short time. Even those that survived could usually only gather information of limited value.

The Germans built up large spy networks in neutral countries like Spain, Turkey, Sweden and Switzerland but they did not have similar successes in the US and the UK.

Prior to WWII they had compromised the USAAF’s most advanced bombsight but during the war their attempts to insert agents all (?) failed.

In the UK their attempts were so clumsy that the Brits not only captured the spies but in many cases convinced them to change sides and send false information to the Germans.

Does that mean that the Germans failed to get any useful information from these countries during the war? Not quite. Although the Germans didn’t have spy networks in the US and UK they were able to acquire some accurate information on Allied war production (and possibly other areas).

How could they have done so? Although they didn’t have spy nets that doesn’t mean that there weren’t other countries that did. Diplomats and businessmen of neutral countries learned a great deal by talking to Allied officials and some of this information was leaked or sold to the Germans. At the same time there was an exchange of information between Germans, Italians, Japanese and Hungarians.

For example in Sweden Karl-Heinz Kraemer, secretary of the German legation in Stockholm, was able to gather valuable information on US and UK war production mainly through his contacts in business and government circles. In 1944 the Allies considered Kraemer to be one of the most dangerous German agents and they were worried that he might compromise the security of operation ‘Overlord’.

One of Kraemer’s best sources was the Japanese military attaché in Sweden, general Makoto Onodera. In 1944-45 they regularly met and exchanged information.

General Onodera

In Europe one of the top officials of the Japanese intelligence service was the military attaché in Sweden, general Makoto Onodera.

 

 

 

Book review - Red Storm Rising

Since author Tom Clancy passed away this month it is only fitting that I review one of his books.

Red Storm Rising was his second published book, way back in 1986. At that time the Soviet Union ruled over a large part of the planet and its military forces were equipped with modern equipment.  Although the ‘evil empire’ was close to collapse nobody knew it at the time.

 

After the defeat of the USA in the Vietnam War, the late 1970’s –early 1980’s saw a resurgence of Soviet influence in global politics. US president Ronald Reagan countered the Soviets by starting an arms race and by supporting anti-Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and in Afghanistan.

In that sense Clancy’s book is a product of the Reagan militarism of the 1980’s. The roles are clearly defined with the Soviets being evil and trying to conquer the world while the Americans are the force of democracy and freedom. The Soviets have numbers on their side, while the Americans have to rely on technology and initiative. It sounds a bit simplistic but I think that in this book it works out.

The story starts in the Soviet Union when a group of Afghan ‘freedom fighters’ attacks an important Soviet oil facility and manages to blow it up. The shortfall in oil production has catastrophic consequences for the already faltering Soviet economy and thus the Soviet leadership decides to conquer the Middle Eastern oil fields. Since this action will lead to a global war the KGB carries out an attack against the Kremlin that leads to the death of schoolchildren and pins the blame on a West German national. This gives them an excuse to attack West Germany for supposedly organizing this attack.

Initially the NATO forces are caught by surprise and suffer serious reverses. Soviet naval troops manage to occupy Iceland and the fighting in Germany is going badly for the Western side.

The Soviet goal in the Atlantic is to shut down the transfer of troops and munitions from the US to Europe. In order to achieve that goal they rely on long range bombers equipped with cruise missiles. Their first attack against a US convoy leads to heavy losses for the US side and even carriers are sunk. The Americans then respond by attacking the bomber bases and retake Iceland.

In Germany the fighting is costly for both sides but the NATO countries use their superior airforces to stop the Soviet attack and a surprise counterattack by the new M1 Abrams tanks breaches the Soviet front and dismantles their rear positions.

With their conventional attack defeated the Soviet leadership is ready to authorize the use of nuclear weapons. This disastrous scenario forces General Alekseyev (commander of the Soviet forces in the West) to take matters into his own hands and using a loyal division he storms the Politburo and arrests the communist leadership.

The book ends with both sides coming to the negotiating table but with NATO having the upper hand militarily.

It should be noted that although the Soviets are the bad guys they are not all evil. The communist politicians and the KGB are shown to be duplicitous and amoral but the military officers are brave, honorable and willing to sacrifice themselves in order to achieve victory.

One thing that can be held against Clancy is that in order for the good guys to win some weapon systems do things that they were not designed to do in real life! For example the US forces use the stealth aircraft F-117 (called F-19 in the book) to take out Soviet long range radar planes. The problem is that this plane was not designed for aerial warfare but for ground attack missions. In another part of the book the naval F-14 fighters use their long range missiles in order to shoot down Soviet bombers. First of all long range missiles of that era had a very poor record. In this specific case things would be even worse since the F-14’s did not use their radar for guidance but instead relied on the onboard optical system…

Overall this is an enjoyable novel, although a bit dated. You will get most out of it if you are already interested in the military equipment of that era.

Internet throwdown - Fred Reed vs ‘the Fighter Mafia’

An interesting article with the title Pay Attention and Think Fast was posted recently at takimag by Fred Reed.

Mr Reed attacks the so called ‘Fighter Mafia’, a group of US officers and civilian analysts that gained fame in the 1970’s and 1980’s by arguing that the US military and its procurement program were in dire need of reforms.

Led by Colonel John Boyd the group promoted several scientific theories such as the Energy–maneuverability theory and the OODA (observe, orient, decide, and act) loop. In terms of weapon systems they were critical of overdependence on ‘magical’ technologic solutions and instead they wanted cheaper, more reliable and more numerous weapons.

At the time they had the facts on their side since overreliance on technology had led to poor performance of the US military in the Vietnam War. The USAF had invested in radar and long range missiles for its fighters expecting them to destroy enemy aircraft at long ranges. They even went so far as to remove the guns from their fighters as dead weight. Unfortunately the ‘miracle’ weapons did not work as expected in battle conditions and the USAF had to hastily reintroduce guns and the necessary training for its pilots.

Now to every point there is a counterpoint. Here are some interesting quotes from the article:

'Their song was, and is, that America needed simple, robust, reliable weaponry such as the Soviet Union was said to have, instead of the over-technologized equipment that the US favored. The M1 tank “wouldn’t work,” they said, because sand would destroy its turbine engine, because it would be helpless if its electronics failed, and because the driver’s compartment was so small that only a midget could fit in it. (So help me, they said this.) The F15 fighter was too big, too heavy, too lacking in maneuverability for air-to-air combat, and its use of radar and BVR missiles—Beyond Visual Range—was flatly unworkable. (I hear eyes glazing over, but military guys will be interested.) In particular, the AIM-7 Sparrow radar-guided missile “wouldn’t work.”

‘The Reformers were, except for Lind, con men. They were also spectacularly wrong, as the Gulf War was to prove. More of this shortly.’

Here is another quote that will probably anger fans of Russian tanks!

‘Covering them was fascinating if depressing. They said that Soviet armor was “simple and robust.” I went to Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland and talked to the enlisted men who worked with captured Soviet tanks. Yes, they said, the Russian tanks were simple, but robust? They broke down constantly and were exhausting to drive because of stiff manual transmissions.’

‘They regularly (and, I think, deliberately) confused complex with unreliable.’

‘Long-range missiles were in their infancy and did not work terribly well. Ignoring the common experience that what works sort of today will work a lot better tomorrow and like gangbusters by next Thursday, Boyd and the Fighter Mafia wanted a philosophical Sopwith Camel.’

Quoting from Air Force Magazine:

‘What really took the ginger out of the Reform movement was the Gulf War. In that war, high technology undeniably worked. Its star performers included the much-maligned F-15 and all of the other systems that had been attacked by the Reformers.

Of the 40 USAF aerial victories, 33 were by F-15s. As for weapons used, 23 of the victories were by AIM-7Ms, five were by AIM-9Ms, and only two were with guns.’

These are interesting arguments and although I haven’t read extensively on the ‘Fighter Mafia’ I do understand some of the concepts they introduced.

For example their opposition to the F-15 was due to the cost of the aircraft and the fact that the USAF was constantly building heavy planes with a low ratio of power/weight. Such planes suffered in terms of maneuverability and acceleration compared to the more lightweight Soviet fighters.

As for the criticism on radar and long range missiles it is still valid today. A plane that has stealthy exterior but a powerful radar will be like a flashlight in a dark room. If it uses it will signal its position to the enemy. If it doesn’t then it will be flying in the dark. Also long range missiles like the AIM-7 had a poor record in combat. The AIM-120 is supposed to be lethal but it has only been used against opponents like Iraq and Serbia…

Moreover one should be careful in evaluating complex weapon systems based on their performance against a developing country. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq did not have the military equipment or the training to go head to head with the US. (However he did have equipment that was quite good for the time, including T-72 tanks and Mig-29 fighters. I am also skeptical of the counterargument that Iraqi forces had ‘monkey’ models of Soviet weapons. Those are Russian excuses for the poor performance of their weapon systems)

In any case I think both sides have valid arguments.

For those who want to read more on the Fighter Mafia’s arguments there is the ebook ‘America’s Defence Meltdown’, this interview of Winslow Wheeler at C-Span and an interview of Pierre Sprey at youtube.

German signals intelligence and the Stalingrad offensive

In the summer of 1942 the German forces in the East managed to surprise the Soviet High Command by attacking in the area of Army Group South. The Germans together with their Rumanian, Hungarian and Italian Allies overwhelmed the Soviet troops and advanced far in the Soviet South towards the oil producing areas of Baku.

However their efforts to clear the western part of the Volga were checked by the Soviet forces defending Stalingrad.

In November ’42 the Soviets, after secretly massing their forces, counterattacked and used their mobile forces against the flanks of the German front that were defended by the German Allied nations. The result was the collapse of the front and the encirclement of the Stalingrad troops.

How were the Soviets able to surprise their enemies? Didn’t German intelligence have any indication that powerful enemy forces were being moved close to the front?

It seems that through signals intelligence the Germans were able to identify major concentrations in the area. However this information was discounted by the analysts of the central evaluation department Fremde Heere Ost (Foreign Armies East) because it did not agree with their preconceived motions.

Let’s take a look at the relevant information.

The signal intelligence service of the Luftwaffe performed well in the Eastern front thanks to the low security of the Soviet AF cryptosystems. According to postwar reports they were also able to identify enemy concentrations faster than their Army counterparts because the aerial units assigned to ground troops could not hold radio silence.

Regarding the Stalingrad battle TICOM report I-41, p2 says: ‘Sigint units were the Cinderella of the GAF until the "STALINGRAD affair". III/LN. Rgt. 4 warned, and warned, that the Russians had assembled 5 Air Armies in the sector. After STALINGRAD, Sigint was held to be the main source of Intelligence.’

Army signal intelligence units were also able to detect new Soviet units close to Stalingrad. Alexis Dettmann, chief cryptanalyst at the Army’s cryptanalytic centre in the East HLS Ost (Intercept Control Station East) says in TICOM DF-112, p110:

 ‘3 .In the fall of 1942 the cryptanalytic section was able to determine the setting up of new Armies (62nd, 63rd, 64th, 65th… 69th) to the east of Stalingrad. Although these observations were constantly supplemented and confirmed, people at the highest level could not make up their minds to believe these reports. Only after the 64th army appeared in a sector of the front near Stalingrad was Foreign Armies East permitted to enter the other armies (with question marks!) on the chart of the Red Army and to present this at the discussion of the situation at the Fuhrer's headquarters without expecting to exposed to wild insults.’

Are these statements correct or were the Germans exaggerating?

David Thomas in ‘Foreign Armies East and German Military Intelligence in Russia 1941-45’ has tried to evaluate the performance of the FHO by looking at the reports they issued during the war.

According to that article, p269: ‘Nevertheless, signals intelligence was the basic source for most FHO estimates of the enemy situation. Unfortunately, when the results of signal reconnaissance consisted of tactical indicators that contradicted the strategic indicators of enemy intentions upon which FHO had already based its assumptions, FHO refused in some instances to modify its existing evaluation to accommodate the results of signal reconnaissance. Stalingrad is the locus classicus. On 11 October, the Leitstelle fur Nachrichtenaufklarung reported a comprehensive regroupment of Soviet forces between the Don and Volga, including the establishment of a new Soviet field headquarters, 'Don Front'. FHO evaluated the insertion of this headquarters, the regrouping of Soviet units in the zone of the Soviet Sixty-Third Army, and the enemy movements in front of Fourth Panzer Army as 'defensive enemy behaviour'. Another signal reconnaissance report submitted to FHO in November confirmed the existence of a large grouping of Soviet forces behind the bridgehead of Serafimovich and provided clear evidence that the Red Army had recognized the weaknesses of, and the boundary between, the Rumanian and Italian armies to the north of Stalingrad. However, this evaluation contradicted the forecast of Soviet intentions and fighting strength submitted by Gehlen in late August, 'Gedanken zur Weiterentwick-lung der Feindlage im Herbst und Winter'; specifically, the fundamental assumption that the Red Army would be unable to mount more than one winter offensive, because of insufficient manpower reserves after the summer campaign season.’

So if the Germans had more respect for their signal intelligence departments maybe history would be written differently…

Sources: TICOM reports DF-112 and I-41, Journal of Contemporary History article: ‘Foreign Armies East and German Military Intelligence in Russia 1941-45’.

Additional information: Interesting Der Spiegel article.

German intelligence on operation Overlord – more clues

In 1944 the German High Command knew that the Anglo-Americans would stage a cross channel landing into France. If they succeeded it would be the end of the German Reich. The area they considered to be most endangered was initially Pas de Calais.

However by April/May 1944 they started to move new units into Normandy and they positioned powerful armored divisions close by (21^st Panzer, 12 SS Hitlerjugend, Panzer Lehr).

Why did the Germans place new units in Normandy? Were they expecting the Normandy landings?

I’ve tried to look into all the available sources of information in my essay German intelligence on operation Overlord.

According to report FMS B-675 ‘Army Group B-Intelligence Estimate (1 Jun 1944)’ By Oberst i. G. Anton Staubwasser (head of intelligence for Army Group B in 1944-45) the German High Command became convinced that Normandy would be the site of Allied landings in April/May ’44:

It is important that - for the first time in April/May - Hitler informed OB West, through General O. JODEL, as follows: "The Fuehrer has definite information that Normandy is endangered." It has not become known from, what source this news originated. This message was immediately and also later repeatedly passed on to A Gp B and all armies of the west, that is, approximately 4 weeks before the beginning of the invasion. This is also the reason for the transfer of the 91 Luftwaffe Division, several armored battalions and antitank battalions to the COTENTIN peninsula and for the assembly by OKW of the Pz Lehr Division.

Here is another piece of the puzzle. The following episode is described by Albert Speer in his memoirs ‘Inside the Third Reich’, p479

On June 1, I was at the Berghof about ten o'clock in the morning when one of Hitler's military adjutants told me that the invasion had begun early that morning. "Has the Fuehrer been awakened?" I asked. He shook his head. "No, he receives the news after he has eaten breakfast."

In recent days Hitler had kept on saying that the enemy would probably begin with a feigned attack in order to draw our troops away from the ultimate invasion site. So no one wanted to awaken Hitler and be ranted at for having judged the situation wrongly.

At the situation conference in the Berghof salon a few hours later Hitler seemed more set than ever on his preconceived idea that the enemy was only trying to mislead him. "Do you recall? Among the many reports we've received there was one that exactly predicted the landing site and the day and hour. That only confirms my opinion that this is not the real invasion yet."

Hmm… What report was Hitler referring to?

Battle of Britain 1940 - Strength reports and What If scenarios

After the fall of France the Germans expected the British government to sue for peace. Unfortunately for them that did not happen. The only way forward for Hitler was to bomb Britain into submission .The Battle of Britain pitted the RAF against the Luftwaffe.

Numerically the Germans had the advantage. Their frontline combat strength in May  was ~4,000 planes   compared to ~1,800 for the RAF (Fighter,Bomber and Coastal Commands),[Source: AIR 22]. Things however changed after the Battle of France, as the LW lost a lot of planes in May.

According to report AIR 40/1207 on 29 June their total number of Bomber, Fighter and Ground attack aircraft was 3,552 . The RAF had  ~1,600 in Fighter, Bomber and Coastal Commands on 2 July . Ratio of 2.2 to 1.

It was the RAF’s Fighter Command which was going to bear the brunt of the offensive and here things were better in terms of ratios. File AIR 40/1207 (available in the Ticom folder) gives for the LW on   29 June 1,464 single and twin engine fighters versus the RAF’s 816 . However if we look only at SE fighters we have LW - 1,107 vs RAF – 672. A superiority of  1.65 to 1.

Keep in mind that not all the LW fighters were in the West.

The Battle of Britain officially lasted from 10 July to 31 October 1940. Here I’ve also included the strength returns for May and June but unfortunately I don’t have the figures for October.

Types	2-May-40		2-Jun-40		2-Jul-40		2-Aug-40		2-Sep-40
	Est	Serv	Est	Serv	Est	Serv	Est	Serv	Est	Serv
Spitfire	264	129	272	181	304	243	328	245	328	208
Hurricane	272	168	184	102	368	282	540	341	638	405
Blenheim	96	68	112	80	112	68	96	57	96	57
Defiant					32	25	32	21	32	24
Gladiator									8	7
Total	632	365	568	363	816	618	996	664	1,102	701

Est= Establishment , Serv= Serviceable , Source: AIR 22 - Air Ministry: Periodical Returns, Intelligence Summaries and Bulletins (available in the Ticom folder)

What do the numbers tell us? First of all the fighting in France was responsible for a reduction in the strength of FC . By July however production of new aircraft has raised FC strength by 44%. Despite the losses from the German fighters strength continues to rise in August and September.

The twin heroes for the British side are the Spitfire and the Hurricane fighters. Numerically it is the Hurricane that contributes more to FC but movies and books focus on the Spit.

Compared to the Bf-109 used by the Luftwaffe only the Spit is equal in performance. Each aircraft has its strong and weak side. The Bf-109 is better armed (20mm guns) and performs better in climb and dive maneuvers. The Spit is better in turn combat. Both are short ranged.

Looking at the numbers it is easy to see why the Germans failed. In order to defeat the RAF they would need a much larger fighter force. What-if scenarios that claim the Germans lost because they started bombing cities instead of airports are overlooking this fundamental problem.

By 7 September the LW fighter strength is 1,037 (S.E.-831, T.E.-206) [Source: Sturmvogel} versus 1,102 for the RAF .Game over!

It should be mentioned that by the end of the campaign both sides were running low on trained pilots. Unfortunately I don’t have data on this aspect.

The Brits have radar, AA defenses and fighter strength comparable to that of the Germans. They are also able to retrieve their shot down pilots and put them back to service. German pilots who parachute are captured and detained. The odds were simply impossible for the German side.

When the situation was reversed, it took the Allies years and a crushing numerical superiority in order to defeat the Luftwaffe in Western Europe.