More information on the Japanese codebreakers of WWII

The book ‘Mathematics and War’ has a small chapter on the Japanese codebreakers of WWII by Setsuo Fukutomi. The author was one of these codebreakers and he mentions his work on the US strip ciphers and the M-209 machine.

This part can be downloaded as a sample at the Springer site.

Solution of Dutch Hagelin cipher machine by US codebreakers

An interesting report of the Signal Security Agency is available from the wwiiarchives.net site. The title is ‘An Insecure Use of the Hagelin Cryptograph Leading to the Discovery of Messages in Depth and the Reconstruction of Base Settings - NEA’.

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Dienstelle Klatt – A case of Soviet deception

In their war against the Soviet Union the Germans were in need of reliable information on Soviet military capabilities and decisions. However before 1941 they were unable to organize an espionage network because the Soviet borders were hermetically sealed and the authorities kept a close eye on everyone.

After the objectives of the 1941 invasion were not realized the German intelligence agencies were ordered to work harder in order to recruit high level spies inside the SU. It was at this time that a great opportunity appeared.

A Viennese citizen named Richard Kauder (alias ‘Klatt’) who was half Jewish had agreed to spy for the Germans in order to protect himself and his family from persecution. Through his friend Joseph Schultz he met White Russian émigré General Anton Turkul who claimed that he could activate a network of spies inside the SU. This idea was presented to the head of the Vienna Abwehr station Count Marogna-Redwitz and he found it very interesting.

Kauder and his associates were allowed to organize a network and they were provided with funds and the necessary radio equipment. Their base was a villa in Sofia, Bulgaria and the group was called Dienstelle Klatt.

Their main radio agents were ‘MAX’ and ‘MORITZ’. Radio messages from various parts of the SU constantly came in and the majority concerned movements of troops. Some however had information from important meetings in Moscow that pointed to a high level spy. These reports were valued by the Luftwaffe and by the Foreign Armies East department.

General Gehlen mentions the ‘MAX’ spy in his memoirs ‘The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen’, p72

From one of the Abwehr's offices controlling agents in Moscow, I had received the following signal a few days earlier: An agent states: on 4 November Stalin presided over Council of War in Moscow, attended by twelve marshals and generals. Following basic principles were laid down at this council:

a) operations are to be executed cautiously to avoid heavy casualties;

b) loss of ground is unimportant;

c) it is vital to salvage industrial and public-utility installations in good time by evacuation, which explains orders issued for dispersal of refineries and machine-tool factories from Grozny and Makhachkala to New Baku, Orsk and Tashkent;

d) rely only on oneself, don't count on getting aid from allies;

e) take sharp measures to prevent desertion, either by better propaganda and rations or by firing-squads and tougher GPU supervision and;

f) all the planned attack-operations are to be executed before 15 November if possible, insofar as weather permits. These are primarily from Grozny towards Mozdok; at Nizhni-Mamon and Verkhni-Mamon in the Don basin; and at Voronezh, at Rzhev south of Lake Ilmen and at Leningrad. The necessary troops are to be brought out of reserve and up to the front line.

David Kahn in ‘Hitler’s spies’ pages 314-6 also has some of the ‘MAX’ messages:

On 4 June 1942, for example, MAX reported:

‘On 2 June one rifle division, one artillery regiment, one medium tank regiment coming out of Astrakhan arrived in Tikhoretsk, supposedly going towards Rostov. On 3 June one transport of 200 heavy and medium tanks arrived in Krasnodar out of Stalingrad, intended for the Taman peninsula.’

……………………………………………………………………………………………………..

But none came close to the speed and the precision of MAX'S astonishing message of 4 November 1942:

‘On 4 November war council in Moscow presided over by Stalin. Present 12 marshals and generals. In this war council the following principles were set down: a) Careful advance in all operations, to avoid heavy losses. b) Losses of ground are unimportant.... f) Carrying out all planned offensive takings, if possible, before 15 November, insofar as the weather situation permits. Mainly: from Grozny [out of the Caucasus] ; in the Don area at Voronezh; at Rzhev; south of Lake Ilmen and Leningrad. The troops for the front will be taken out of the reserves....’

The message on the war council on November 4 was particularly important to the Germans because it allowed them to prepare for the major Soviet attack against Army Group Centre.

Was the ’MAX’ network providing the Germans with high value intelligence or was something wrong?

The Klatt agency was not trusted by everyone in the German intelligence community. The head of Abwehr in Sofia was colonel Otto Wagner (alias ‘Delius’). He was certain that Klatt was a liar and was making up his information. In order to uncover him he tried to find out how the reports from the SU were sent to him and got the answer that the traffic was intercepted by the Bulgarian police on his behalf. When he contacted his friends in the police they told him that they had never heard of this. When he confronted Kauder a second time he was told that radio operators intercepted the traffic from fishing boats in the Bosporus and sent the transcripts to him. These bizarre statements did not satisfy Wagner but his superiors thought highly of the information flowing from Kauder and he was instructed not to interfere with him.

At the end of the war Kauder and his close associates Anton Turkul and Ira Longin were arrested by the Americans and interrogated at Camp King, a Luftwaffe interrogation centre that was now used against its former masters.

It did not take long for the Allied interrogators to get to the truth. Kauder did not have agents inside the SU, instead he relied on his friend Joseph Schultz for information. At the end of the war Schultz revealed to him that he had always been a Soviet agent and thus the entire operation was a deception. Kauder suspected as much but for his own preservation did not inform the Germans. According to him as long as the Abwehr was satisfied he was happy. It also seems that his associates were working for the SU either directly or passively.

Value of the ‘MAX’ network

As we’ve seen there can be no doubt that the Dienstelle Klatt did not have real spies inside the SU but was given reports prepared by the Soviet intelligence agencies. Obviously these reports would mix truths with lies in order to influence the decisions of the German leadership.

The question is how important was this traffic to the Germans and how much did it influence their strategic decisions? Walter Schellenberg, head of SD foreign intelligence, said in one of his postwar interrogations about Kauder: ’His reports on Russian Army matters were good and were classed as important to the Wehrmacht (Heereswichtig), and the General Staff ‘Fremde Heere Ost’ thought highly of him. On air matters they were weak, and on political questions sometimes good and sometimes bad.’

By looking at the Gehlen memoir the part about FHO seems to be true. If the Germans valued this traffic does this mean that the information on troop movements was correct? Without having access to the actual reports we have to resort to secondary sources.

In this case we are lucky since another agency was also interested on the reliability of the ‘MAX’ network. According to the official history ‘British Intelligence in the Second World War: Volume 4, Security and Counter-Intelligence’ in the winter of 1941-42 decrypts of Abwehr messages (the Brits called the hand ciphers ISOS) passing from Sofia to Vienna revealed reports from two networks. One called ‘MAX’ dealt with the Eastern front and the other called ‘MORITZ’ had information from the Middle East. In the period December ’41- March ’42 some 300 ‘MAX’ and 40 ‘MORITZ’ reports were intercepted.

The Brits assessed the reports and found them to be ‘up to date’ and ‘well arranged’. The first hypothesis was that this information was collected from high level spies inside the SU but considering the unlikelihood of a large spy ring operating inside the SU for so long it was suspected that this was a double cross. 

There was a detailed study of the reports by MI 14 in 1943 which concluded that they were truly valuable in anticipating Soviet moves and that there was practically nothing to support the theory of deliberate deception! Since this was judged to be a serious threat to the security of an Allied country the Soviets were officially informed in October 1943. However there was no reaction from the Soviets and the messages continued to flow until February 1945.

The Brits undertook another study of the messages in 1943, this time with help from MI 5. Their focus was on the ‘MORITZ’ messages since they dealt with operations and dispositions of British military forces in the Middle East and Mediterranean. The verdict was that they were generally inaccurate, for example out of 49 reports in June-July ’43 only 5 were rated as valuable. 

Still we know from the MI 14 evaluation that the messages dealing with the fighting in the East were valuable. If the ‘MAX’ messages were meant to deceive the Germans why did they contain good intelligence?

Operation Uranus and agent ‘MAX’

Perhaps the Soviet goal was to ensure that the reliable intelligence would convince the Germans that the spy network was real and thus get them to lower their guard. Then the Soviets could be reasonably certain that they could introduce disinformation without it being detected.

 In fact we know that in at least one case they were able to deceive the Germans (or help the Germans deceive themselves) regarding a major operation. The ‘MAX’ report giving details of the Moscow war council on November 4 1942 is mentioned by Gehlen as an example of valuable intelligence. This report says that the following major operations were scheduled for the first half of November ’42:

1). Attack from Grozny to Mozdok.

2). Effort to recapture Voronezh

3). Attack south of Voronezh (Nizhni-Mamon and Verkhni-Mamon)

4). Attack on the Rzhev salient

5). Leningrad operation

These operations made military sense and did not catch the Germans by surprise. Gehlen expected the main Soviet operation of the winter to be directed against Army Group Centre at Rzhev. The Soviets were constantly attacking this area because its proximity to Moscow made them uneasy. However the report says nothing about Stalingrad.

Can we conclude from this that the Germans were tricked into focusing all their attention at Rzhev and forgetting about Stalingrad? The report certainly reinforced Gehlen’s initial assessment but that doesn’t mean that the Foreign Armies East department was not aware of the vulnerability of their forces in Stalingrad. In August ’42 they had already written about the possibility of enemy operations in the South, either to relieve Stalingrad or to capture Rostov and thus cut off the German forces in the Caucasus.

What tipped the scales was Gehlen’s belief that the Soviets would be able to mount only one major operation and thus their forces in the area of Army Group South would be unable to mount 'far-reaching operations'.

Did the Soviet deception plan backfire?

If the report from ‘MAX’ drew German attention away from Stalingrad it also alerted them to the major attack on Rhzev. That operation resulted in very heavy Soviet losses, so did the double cross serve its purpose or did it lead to unintented consequences?

According to Soviet historiography the Mars operations was merely a diversion, meant to draw German forces away Army Group South. However Eastern front historian David Glantz says about the Mars operation in ‘Zhukov's Greatest Defeat’, p317: ‘Within the galaxy of operations that the Stavka launched in late 1942, those few who have mentioned it have dismissed Operation Mars as a skillful diversionary operation. The official line, as argued by Zhukov and most lower level Soviet commanders, is that Operation Mars was launched in late November or early December to prevent German reserves in the center from reinforcing German forces in the southern Soviet Union. Therefore, they argue, Operation Mars contributed to Soviet success in the Stalingrad victory and, thus, was justified. These arguments are at best disingenuous and at worst blatant lies. In terms of its timing, scale, scope, expectations, and consequences, the Stavka intended Operation Mars to be as significant, if not more so, than Operation Uranus.’

The goal of operations Mars and Jupiter (cancelled after the failure of Mars) was the destruction of the entire Army Group Centre! Such an operation could not be a diversion, so I think Glantz is close to the truth when he sarcastically says ‘Given these facts, in the unlikely event Zhukov was correct and Mars was really a diversion, there has never been one so ambitious, so large, so clumsily executed, or so costly.’

If the ‘MAX’ report played a role in the Soviet defeat then how can this be explained, considering that the report was prepared by Soviet intelligence? The report was sent on 4 November and the Mars operation began on 25 November ’42, so it gave the Germans roughly 20 days to prepare. On the other hand can we be sure that this report played a major role? It has already been shown that the Germans expected the major Soviet operation of the winter period to be against Army Group Centre and the area that appeared to be the best target was Rhzev. So ‘MAX’ did not tell the Germans something that they did not already believe to be true. Perhaps the people who prepared the report thought that by ‘exposing’ an operation that was already expected by the enemy they would not compromise security but only prove the reliability of their ‘spy’.

Another explanation is that the Soviet intelligence agencies did not have the means to check the German response to their messages so they included too much real information in their reports. A successful disinformation operation depends on the ability to check if the intelligence is accepted by the enemy as reliable or if it is rejected as false. For that reason spies are needed inside the enemy’s intelligence and military centers. Did the Soviets have such a capability in WWII?

At the start of the war they had an extensive espionage ring in Western Europe. Their Berlin networks had spies in the Luftwaffe intelligence staff and the Economics Ministry. However these groups sent their reports through the Soviet embassies and when these closed down they had to use radio which quickly alerted the Germans and led to arrests.

In 1941 one of the radio centers was raided in Brussels and many arrests followed. In summer ‘42 the Berlin networks were dismantled and by the end of the year the leaders of the Rote Kapelle were apprehended and used in radio games. There was also another spy group called the Rote Drei that operated in Switzerland and they were not caught but we do not know if their information was really valuable.

At the same time the Soviets were not very successful in other fields of intelligence like photo reconnaissance and signals intelligence. According to the Germans Soviet recon planes usually flew close to the front and thus did not keep the rear areas under observation. Regarding sigint, so far there is no indication that Soviet codebreakers could solve high level German crypto systems (like the Enigma machine).

We know that Soviet intelligence was not perfect because throughout the war their estimates of German strength and losses were wildly inaccurate.

So in the end it could be the case that despite its value as a conduit of disinformation the ‘MAX’ network also harmed the Soviet war effort. It is up to researchers to untangle this web!

Sources: ‘Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence In World War II’, Intelligence and National Security article: ‘Memories of Oberursel. Questions, Questions, Questions’, Journal of Contemporary History article: ‘Foreign Armies East and German Military Intelligence in Russia 1941-45’ ‘British Intelligence in the Second World War: Volume 4, Security and Counter-Intelligence’, ‘The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen’, ‘Hitler's Last Chief of Foreign Intelligence: Allied interrogations of Walter Schellenberg’, ‘Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games’, ‘Walter Schellenberg: The Memoirs of Hitler's Spymaster’, ‘Zhukov's Greatest Defeat: The Red Army's Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942’, SVR website: ‘Operation Monastery’, UK National archives Dienstelle Klatt page

A spy in the Kremlin

After the fall of the Tsarist Empire and the rise of the Communist regime the British intelligence service tried to recruit spies inside the new Soviet state.

Most of the books I’ve read claim that all those efforts resulted in failure and no important sources of information were available. However I noticed that in the book ‘Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer’ by Peter Wright (former Assistant Director of MI5) there is mention of a spy in the Kremlin.

In Chapter 15, p220 we get:
 
I switched back, and began to press his conscience. "Have you ever thought about the people who died?" Blunt feigned ignorance. "There were no deaths," he said smoothly, "I never had access to that type of thing . . ." "What about Gibby's spy?" I flashed, referring to an agent run inside the Kremlin by an MI6 officer named Harold Gibson. "Gibby's spy" provided MI6 with Politburo documents before the war, until he was betrayed by Blunt and subsequently executed. "He was a spy," said Blunt harshly, momentarily dropping his guard to reveal the KGB professional. "He knew the game; he knew the risks."

Who was this spy? What information did he give his controller and how did Blunt compromise him? Gibson was a longtime MI6 officer who served in Turkey and Czechoslovakia but I haven’t been able to find more information on his agent.

This spy must have been the person mentioned by Walter Krivitsky when he was interrogated by the British. Krivitsky was head of the Red Army’s foreign military intelligence network in Europe in the 1930’s but he defected and managed to get to the US. There he publicly attacked Stalin in a series of articles and in 1940 visited the UK and was interrogated by the British authorities. These reports refer to him as ‘mr Walter Thomas’.

In one of these he mentions how his chief Slutsky called him sometime in 1937 and showed him information from one of their spies in Britain. This person gave the Soviets copies of the proceedings of the Committee of Imperial Defense . One of these documents had information from a Politburo meeting that clearly showed that the British had a high level agent.

 I assume that this person was ‘Gibby's spy’.

A look into the reliability of the TICOM reports

The reports I’ve used to write about Axis signals intelligence in WWII are mainly those prepared under the TICOM program.

A few days ago Frode Weierud pointed out that ‘A more serious problem is the lack of good, verifiable sources. Good scientific and historical research mandates that one try to use multiple sources, but with cryptology one is often happy to have just one single written source. The TICOM documents fall into this category. A single document does not always tell the full story and sometimes the information is incomplete and sometimes even wrong. The TICOM documents should be looked upon more as research notes than final research reports.’

Now I agree with Frode that information from a single source cannot be thought to be 100% correct without further verification. However the TICOM reports seem to me to be both accurate and verifiable since different people, from different agencies, interrogated years apart give the same answers when asked about specific crypto systems. In many cases their reports can be crosschecked by using the captured German archives, decrypted German messages solved by Bletchley Park, Foreign Military Studies and/or various books and articles.

For example let’s have a look at some interesting cases:

1). Soviet 5-figure code. This was a codebook used at the highest level by the Soviet military. Its exploitation is mentioned by several people including Mettig, Huettenhain, Lingen, Dettman. All these people were high ranking officials and knew what they were talking about. Their reports range from 1945 to 1952, yet the details are the same.

TICOM reports DF-292 and DF-112 have a detailed overview of the operation and they give us the same story of significant success in 1941-42 but limited exploitation in 1943-45 due to the use of one time pad. The last two reports were written by Alexis Dettmann, head of cryptanalysis at the Army’s Intercept Control Station East and Edwin von Lingen, head of the Eastern cryptanalysis department of the Luftwaffe’s signal intelligence agency. These were the people in charge so I don’t see how their testimony could be discounted!

If someone is still not convinced there are statistics from the Finnish archives on their exploitation of the 5-figure code that show exactly the same picture (for example 36% success rate in June 1942 but roughly 1% in the period 1943-44). 

2). Soviet partisans. From summer 1943 the Germans were able to decode a part of the Soviet Partisan traffic. This was such an important task that an entire signals regiment (KONA 6) was assigned to handle this traffic.

The details we have come from reports written by several people such as Mettig (head of the Army’s signal intelligence agency in the period 1941-43), Schubert (head of the Russian section of the Army’s signal intelligence agency from 1943 onwards), Friedrichsohn (member of KONA 6). All three were part of this program and they give similar information even though their reports were written years apart (two in 1945 and one in 1947).

In addition we have a report by Abwehr personnel written in 1946 that points to considerable success by KONA 6: ‘Most successful in monitoring and decoding was Kdr der Nachrichten Aufklaerung 6, who furnished FAK III daily with decoded transcriptions of a major part of the W/T traffic between partisan and NKGB stations.’

3). Polish intelligence-Berne station. In 1943 the Germans were able to solve the traffic of the Polish military attaché in Berne that concerned intelligence operations in Europe. This is mentioned in EASI vol2 but the relevant TICOM reports (I-31 and I-118) are still classified. Still this incident is also mentioned in the book ‘War Secrets in the Ether’ by Wilhelm Flicke.

Flicke was a member of OKW/Chi (the agency that solved this traffic) and his book is based on the reports he wrote for the Americans after the end of the war (TICOM DF-116 to DF-116AL). He mentions the Polish attaché and the solution of his code in summer 1943 and in another page says that his name was Choynacki.

This information can be verified from two British sources. The recently published ‘MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949’ by Keith Jeffery mentions Major Szczesny Choynacki Polish deputy consul in Berne, whose radio traffic was compromised in summer 1943. This isn’t just another book on British intelligence but actually an authorized history, which means that the author had access to secret archives. The other document that fills the last piece of the puzzle is report DS/24/1556 which can be found in HW 40/222 ‘Poland: reports and correspondence relating to the security of Polish communications’. This report is a summary of the Polish decodes found in captured archives of OKW/Chi and reveals that some decodes were on the link London-Berne on a system identified as military attaché cypher Poldi 4. The report says ‘The Berne military attache traffic mostly dates back to June 1943..’

So by all accounts Flicke and reports I-31 and I-118 seem to be very accurate!

The real culprit

The main problem, as I see it, isn’t with the actual reports but with summaries such as the ‘European Axis Signal Intelligence in World War II’ volumes. These suffer from a number of flaws:

1). They were written in 1945-46 with the material that was available at that time. This means that they did not have access to files and personnel that were located at a later date. For example important reports by people like Dettmann, Luzius, Marquart, Fenner, Flicke, de Bary, Kroeger, Praun, Lingen and others were not available.

2). The people who wrote them do not seem to have had a well rounded understanding of Allied, Axis and Neutral cryptologic systems and their evolution during the war.

3). There is no volume for the B-Dienst.

4). The information on the Forschungsamt is very limited.

5). The EASI volumes are not thorough. Important cases such as the compromise of the A-3 speech scrambler, the diplomatic M-138-A, the OSS strip and others are not examined in detail. If I had to guess I’d say that the authors considered that these systems were ‘civilian’ and thus the responsibility of their parent organization.

These problems can be circumvented by reading the original reports (those that are publicly available) but here the researcher faces the problem of time. There are probably close to 200 TICOM reports available online plus several other files that also deal with Axis sigint. Some of these files are quite large with hundreds of pages. Obviously if someone wants to read them all it will take some time!

Misunderstandings and confusion

Then there is the question of understanding the information. Just reading the reports doesn’t give all the details. For example if you learn that the Germans solved the US TELWA code what can you infer from that? What was TELWA? Was it an important system? In order to learn more you’ll need to check several reports that mention it and discover that it was the ‘US Telegraph code’.  With more digging you’ll finally identify it as the US War Department Telegraph Code 1942 edition. This was used in administrative traffic so it wasn’t top level but still it was an important system. There are similar problems in all the reports.

Many authors who have written about WWII signals intelligence do not have a solid understanding of what crypto systems were used by each country and at what level. Instead they just refer to the Enigma cipher machine and if there is a comparison with Allied equivalents it is with cipher machines such as SIGABA and Typex.

That is a grievous error. The Enigma was built in huge numbers and used by the German armed forces as their main cipher system. This was not true for the Allies.

The Americans used a small number of SIGABA machines in the period 1941-43. According to the official history ‘The Achievements of the Signal Security Agency (SSA) in World War II’, p41 in late 1941 75 M-134/M-134-A and 45 M-134-C had been distributed to the Army. Another report SRH-360 ‘History of Invention and Development of the Mark II ECM’ says that in October 1943 4.550 machines had been delivered (3.370 for the Navy and 1.180 for the Army).

The British used the Typex for top level communications but never had a large number of these. At the start of WWII less than 300 were in service and by May 1944 5.016 had been produced.

The Germans in comparison had more than 10.000 Enigmas at the start of WWII and built about 30.000 more. So if an author wants to compare apples to apples he’ll have to read up on the British book cyphers and the US Strip ciphers, not just their cipher machines!

Conclusion

My conclusion is that the TICOM reports are reliable provided that all of them are examined and especially the ones written by high ranking personnel. However in order for the information contained in them to be fully understood it is important that the reader is acquainted with the main cipher systems used by the major participants and their operational use and security.

German AFV production 1939-45

Here are detailed production statistics for German armored vehicles. Source is ‘Waffen und Geheimwaffen des deutschen Heeres 1933 – 1945’.

	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	Sum
Mobelwagen 37mm						205	35	240
Wirbelwind 20mm						100	6	106
Ostwind 37mm						15	28	43
Kubelblitz 30mm							5	5
Stug III 75mm L/24		192	540	93				825
Stug III 75mm L/43				330				330
Stug III 75mm L/48				365	3,011	3,849	1,038	8,263
Stug III 105mm FH18				12	204	903	98	1,217
Stug III Gesch 33				24				24
Stu Flammwagen					10			10
Hummel					368	289	57	714
Nashorn					345	133	16	494
Stug IV 75mm L/48					30	1,006	127	1,163
Jagd IV 75mm L/48						769		769
Sturm IV 150mm					70	215	25	310
Pz IV/70 (V) Pak42						560	384	944
Pz IV/70 (A) Pak42						206	121	327
Tiger I				78	649	623		1,350
Ferdinand					90			90
Sturm Morser Tiger						18		18
Befehls Pz VI						84		84
Tiger II					1	376	112	489
Jagdtiger						51	28	79
Panther					1,848	3,777	507	6,132
Berge Panzer V					82	227	38	347
JagdPanther					1	226	198	425
Pz IV 75mm L/24	45	280	480	117				922
Pz IV 75mm L/43				877	598			1,475
Pz IV 75mm L/48					2,425	3,225	438	6,088
Berge Panzer IV						36	3	39
Beobachtungs Pz IV						96	31	127
Befehls-Panzer IV						97		97
Pz III 37mm	157	396						553
Pz III 50mm L/42		466	1,649	251				2,366
Pz III 50mm L/60			64	1,907	22			1,993
Pz III 75mm L/24				449	213			662
Pz III flammenwefer					100			100
Berge-Pz III						150		150
Beobachtungs Pz III					225	43		268
Tauch-Pz III		168						168
Pz 38	72	369	698	195				1,334
Pz 38 76.2mm				344	19			363
Pz 38 Marder III				110	799	308		1,217
Pz 38 Grille					224	138	17	379
Pz 38 Aufklarer						70		70
Pz 38 20mm Flak					87	54		141
JagdPz Hetzer						1,588	1,261	2,849
Berge Pz 38						77	63	140
Pz II	15	10	233	282				540
Pz II F		90	42	23				155
Pz II Luchs				20	77	7		104
Pz II Marder II				327	204			531
Pz II 76.2mm Pak				184	8			192
Pz II le.F.H Wespe					518	144		662
Pz I C				40				40
Pz I F				30				30
Pz I sJG 33		38						38
Pz 47mm Pak(t)		172	30					202
Sum	289	2,181	3,736	6,058	12,228	19,665	4,636	48,793