After the
objectives of the 1941 invasion were not realized the German intelligence
agencies were ordered to work harder in order to recruit high level spies
inside the SU. It was at this time that a great opportunity appeared.
A Viennese
citizen named Richard Kauder (alias ‘Klatt’)
who was half Jewish had agreed to spy for the Germans in order to protect himself
and his family from persecution. Through his friend Joseph Schultz he met White
Russian émigré General Anton Turkul who
claimed that he could activate a network of spies inside the SU. This idea was
presented to the head of the Vienna Abwehr station Count Marogna-Redwitz and he
found it very interesting.Kauder and his associates were allowed to organize a network and they were provided with funds and the necessary radio equipment. Their base was a villa in Sofia, Bulgaria and the group was called Dienstelle Klatt.
Their main radio agents were ‘MAX’ and ‘MORITZ’. Radio messages from various parts of
the SU constantly came in and the majority concerned movements of troops. Some
however had information from important meetings in Moscow that pointed to a
high level spy. These reports were valued by the Luftwaffe and by the Foreign Armies East
department.
General Gehlen mentions the
‘MAX’ spy in his memoirs ‘The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen’, p72
From one of the Abwehr's offices
controlling agents in Moscow, I had received the following signal a few days
earlier: An agent states: on 4 November Stalin presided over Council of War in
Moscow, attended by twelve marshals and generals. Following basic principles
were laid down at this council:
a) operations are to be executed
cautiously to avoid heavy casualties;
b) loss of ground is unimportant;
c) it is vital to salvage industrial
and public-utility installations in good time by evacuation, which explains
orders issued for dispersal of refineries and machine-tool factories from
Grozny and Makhachkala to New Baku, Orsk and Tashkent;
d) rely only on oneself, don't count
on getting aid from allies;
e) take sharp measures to prevent
desertion, either by better propaganda and rations or by firing-squads and
tougher GPU supervision and;
f) all the planned attack-operations
are to be executed before 15 November if possible, insofar as weather permits.
These are primarily from Grozny towards Mozdok; at Nizhni-Mamon and Verkhni-Mamon
in the Don basin; and at Voronezh, at Rzhev south of Lake Ilmen and at
Leningrad. The necessary troops are to be brought out of reserve and up to the
front line.
David Kahn in
‘Hitler’s spies’ pages 314-6 also has some of the ‘MAX’ messages:
On 4 June 1942, for example, MAX
reported:
‘On 2 June one rifle division, one artillery
regiment, one medium tank regiment coming out of Astrakhan arrived in
Tikhoretsk, supposedly going towards Rostov. On 3 June one transport of 200
heavy and medium tanks arrived in Krasnodar out of Stalingrad, intended for the
Taman peninsula.’
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
But none came close to the speed and
the precision of MAX'S astonishing message of 4 November 1942:
‘On 4 November war council in Moscow presided
over by Stalin. Present 12 marshals and generals. In this war council the
following principles were set down: a) Careful advance in all operations, to
avoid heavy losses. b) Losses of ground are unimportant.... f) Carrying out all
planned offensive takings, if possible, before 15 November, insofar as the
weather situation permits. Mainly: from Grozny [out of the Caucasus] ; in the
Don area at Voronezh; at Rzhev; south of Lake Ilmen and Leningrad. The troops
for the front will be taken out of the reserves....’
The message
on the war council on November 4 was particularly important to the Germans
because it allowed them to prepare for the major Soviet attack against Army
Group Centre.
Was the ’MAX’
network providing the Germans with high value intelligence or was something
wrong?
The Klatt
agency was not trusted by everyone in the German intelligence community. The
head of Abwehr in Sofia was colonel Otto Wagner (alias ‘Delius’). He was
certain that Klatt was a liar and was making up his information. In order to
uncover him he tried to find out how the reports from the SU were sent to him
and got the answer that the traffic was intercepted by the Bulgarian police on
his behalf. When he contacted his friends in the police they told him that they
had never heard of this. When he confronted Kauder a second time he was told
that radio operators intercepted the traffic from fishing boats in the Bosporus and sent the
transcripts to him. These bizarre statements did not satisfy Wagner but his
superiors thought highly of the information flowing from Kauder and he was
instructed not to interfere with him.
At the end of
the war Kauder and his close associates Anton Turkul and Ira Longin were
arrested by the Americans and interrogated at Camp King, a Luftwaffe
interrogation centre that was now used against its former masters.
It did not
take long for the Allied interrogators to get to the truth. Kauder did not have
agents inside the SU, instead he relied on his friend Joseph Schultz for
information. At the end of the war Schultz revealed to him that he had always
been a Soviet agent and thus the entire operation was a deception. Kauder
suspected as much but for his own preservation did not inform the Germans.
According to him as long as the Abwehr was satisfied he was happy. It also
seems that his associates were working for the SU either directly or passively.
Value of
the ‘MAX’ network
As we’ve seen
there can be no doubt that the Dienstelle
Klatt did not have real spies inside the SU but was given reports prepared by
the Soviet intelligence agencies. Obviously these reports would mix truths with
lies in order to influence the decisions of the German leadership.
The question is how important was this traffic to the Germans and how
much did it influence their strategic decisions? Walter Schellenberg, head of
SD foreign intelligence, said in one of his postwar interrogations about
Kauder: ’His reports on Russian Army
matters were good and were classed as important to the Wehrmacht
(Heereswichtig), and the General Staff ‘Fremde Heere Ost’ thought highly of him.
On air matters they were weak, and on
political questions sometimes good and sometimes bad.’
By looking at the Gehlen memoir the part about FHO seems to be true. If
the Germans valued this traffic does this mean that the information on troop
movements was correct? Without having access to the actual reports we have to
resort to secondary sources.
In this case we are lucky since another agency was also interested on the
reliability of the ‘MAX’ network. According to the official history ‘British
Intelligence in the Second World War: Volume 4, Security and
Counter-Intelligence’ in the winter of 1941-42 decrypts of Abwehr messages (the
Brits called the hand ciphers ISOS) passing from Sofia to Vienna revealed
reports from two networks. One called ‘MAX’ dealt with the Eastern front and
the other called ‘MORITZ’ had information from the Middle East. In the period
December ’41- March ’42 some 300 ‘MAX’ and 40 ‘MORITZ’ reports were
intercepted.
The Brits assessed the reports and found them to be ‘up to date’ and ‘well
arranged’. The first hypothesis was that this information was collected
from high level spies inside the SU but considering the unlikelihood of a large
spy ring operating inside the SU for so long it was suspected that this was a
double cross. There was a detailed study of the reports by MI 14 in 1943 which concluded that they were truly valuable in anticipating Soviet moves and that there was practically nothing to support the theory of deliberate deception! Since this was judged to be a serious threat to the security of an Allied country the Soviets were officially informed in October 1943. However there was no reaction from the Soviets and the messages continued to flow until February 1945.
The Brits undertook another study of the messages in 1943, this time with help from MI 5. Their focus was on the ‘MORITZ’ messages since they dealt with operations and dispositions of British military forces in the Middle East and Mediterranean. The verdict was that they were generally inaccurate, for example out of 49 reports in June-July ’43 only 5 were rated as valuable.
Still we know from the MI 14 evaluation that the messages dealing with the fighting in the East were valuable. If the ‘MAX’ messages were meant to deceive the Germans why did they contain good intelligence?
Operation
Uranus and agent ‘MAX’
Perhaps the Soviet goal was to ensure that the reliable intelligence
would convince the Germans that the spy network was real and thus get them to
lower their guard. Then the Soviets could be reasonably certain that they could
introduce disinformation without it being detected.
In fact we know that in 1942 and 1944 they were able to deceive the
Germans (or help the Germans deceive themselves) regarding major operations.
The ‘MAX’ report giving details of the Moscow war council on November 4 1942 is mentioned by Gehlen as an example of valuable intelligence. This
report says that the following major operations were scheduled for the first
half of November ’42:
1). Attack from Grozny to Mozdok.
2). Effort to recapture Voronezh
3). Attack south of Voronezh (Nizhni-Mamon and Verkhni-Mamon)
4). Attack on the Rzhev salient
5). Leningrad operation
These
operations made military sense and did not catch the Germans by surprise.
Gehlen expected the main Soviet operation of the winter to be directed against
Army Group Centre at Rzhev. The Soviets were constantly attacking
this area because its proximity to Moscow made them uneasy. However the report
says nothing about Stalingrad.
Can we
conclude from this that the Germans were tricked into focusing all their
attention at Rzhev and forgetting about Stalingrad? The report certainly
reinforced Gehlen’s initial assessment but that doesn’t mean that the Foreign
Armies East department was not aware of the vulnerability of their forces in
Stalingrad. In August ’42 they had already written about the possibility of
enemy operations in the South, either to relieve Stalingrad or to capture Rostov
and thus cut off the German forces in the Caucasus.
What tipped
the scales was Gehlen’s belief that the Soviets would be able to mount only one
major operation and thus their forces in the area of Army Group South would be
unable to mount 'far-reaching operations'.
The second case where ‘MAX’ influenced German strategic assessments was
in 1944. The Germans knew that major Soviet operations were planned for the
summer season and they expected that the main attack would come either in the
South towards the Balkans or in the Kovel area against Army Group North
Ukraine. A report from ‘MAX’ in April 1944 stated that in a conference at Red
Army headquarters attended by Stalin and the top generals the plan for the
summer offensive was decided. There were two competing plans
1). An attack against the Baltic states and Army Group North Ukraine with
the objective of Brest Litovsk.
2). An attack by the Soviet First, Second and Third Ukrainian fronts
towards the Balkans.
In the end the second plan was approved.
This report obviously influenced General Gehlen’s assessment of June 1944 which
concluded that the main effort of the Soviet army was expected to come between
Kovel and the Carpathian mountains. Gehlen called this the ‘Balkan solution’.
In reality the Soviets launched several major offensives all along the
front but their largest operation was directed against Army Group Center.
Did the
Soviet deception plan backfire?
If the report
from ‘MAX’ in November ’42 drew German attention away from Stalingrad it also
alerted them to the major attack on Rhzev. That operation resulted in very heavy Soviet losses,
so did the double cross serve its purpose or did it lead to unintended
consequences?
According to
Soviet historiography the Mars operations was merely a diversion, meant to draw
German forces away Army Group South. However Eastern front historian David
Glantz says about the Mars operation in ‘Zhukov's Greatest Defeat’, p317: ‘Within the galaxy of operations that the Stavka launched in late 1942, those few who have mentioned it
have dismissed Operation Mars as a skillful diversionary operation. The
official line, as argued by Zhukov and most lower level Soviet commanders, is
that Operation Mars was launched in late November or early December to prevent
German reserves in the center from reinforcing German forces in the southern
Soviet Union. Therefore, they argue, Operation Mars contributed to Soviet
success in the Stalingrad victory and, thus, was justified. These arguments are
at best disingenuous and at worst blatant lies. In terms of its timing, scale,
scope, expectations, and consequences, the Stavka intended Operation Mars to be as significant, if not more
so, than Operation Uranus.’
The goal of
operations Mars and Jupiter (cancelled after the failure of Mars) was the
destruction of the entire Army Group Centre! Such an operation could not be a
diversion, so I think Glantz is close to the truth when he sarcastically says ‘Given these facts, in the unlikely event
Zhukov was correct and Mars was really a diversion, there has never been one so
ambitious, so large, so clumsily executed, or so costly.’
If the ‘MAX’
report played a role in the Soviet defeat then how can this be explained,
considering that the report was prepared by Soviet intelligence? The report was
sent on 4 November and the Mars operation began on 25 November ’42, so it gave
the Germans roughly 20 days to prepare. On the other hand can we be sure that
this report played a major role? It has already been shown that the Germans
expected the major Soviet operation of the winter period to be against Army
Group Centre and the area that appeared to be the best target was Rhzev. So
‘MAX’ did not tell the Germans something that they did not already believe to
be true. Perhaps the people who prepared the report thought that by ‘exposing’
an operation that was already expected by the enemy they would not compromise
security but only prove the reliability of their ‘spy’.
Another
explanation is that the Soviet intelligence agencies did not have the means to
check the German response to their messages so they included too much real
information in their reports. A successful disinformation operation depends on
the ability to check if the intelligence is accepted by the enemy as reliable
or if it is rejected as false. For that reason spies are needed inside the enemy’s
intelligence and military centers. Did the Soviets have such a capability in
WWII?
At the start
of the war they had an extensive espionage ring in Western Europe. Their Berlin
networks had spies in the Luftwaffe intelligence staff and the Economics
Ministry. However these groups sent their reports through the Soviet embassies
and when these closed down they had to use radio which quickly alerted the
Germans and led to arrests.
In 1941 one
of the radio centers was raided in Brussels and many arrests followed. In
summer ‘42 the Berlin networks were dismantled and by the end of the year the
leaders of the Rote
Kapelle were apprehended and used in radio games. There was also another
spy group called the Rote Drei that operated in Switzerland and they were not
caught but we do not know if their information was really valuable.
At the same
time the Soviets were not very successful in other fields of intelligence like
photo reconnaissance and signals intelligence. According to the Germans Soviet
recon planes usually flew close to the front and thus did not keep the rear
areas under observation. Regarding sigint, so far there is no indication that
Soviet codebreakers could solve high level German crypto systems (like the
Enigma machine).
We know that
Soviet intelligence was not perfect because throughout the war their estimates
of German strength and losses were wildly inaccurate.
A
dissenting view
Another
explanation for the drawbacks of the ‘MAX’ deception is given in the book ‘The Crown Jewels: The British Secrets
at the Heart of the KGB Archives’. According to chapter 8 ‘The Klatt affair’ at
the end of the war the NKVD conducted a lengthy investigation of the Klatt
bureau, utilizing the interrogations of hundreds of captured Abwehr officers.
The report titled ‘Memorandum on the KLATT-MAX case’ was submitted to Stalin in
July 1947 and concluded that only ‘an
insignificant amount of MAX’s information was authentic’ and ‘only 8 per cent of the material was genuine’.
There were
inquiries on Kauder’s main informants, especially a supposed member of the
Soviet embassy in Sofia and communications personnel attached to Soviet front
line headquarters. These investigations failed to identify those individuals. In the end the NKVD
concluded that the information of the Klatt network came from Russian émigrés,
newspaper reports, German intelligence files, some diplomatic sources and
outright fabrications.
If this
version of events is correct then it would mean that the Klatt bureau was not
completely under the control of the Soviets.
In the end it
could be the case that despite its value as a conduit of disinformation the
‘MAX’ network also harmed the Soviet war effort. It is up to researchers to
untangle this web!
Sources: ‘Hitler's Spies: German Military
Intelligence In World War II’, Intelligence and National Security article: ‘Memories
of Oberursel. Questions, Questions, Questions’, Journal
of Contemporary History article: ‘Foreign Armies East and German Military
Intelligence in Russia 1941-45’ ‘British Intelligence in the Second World War:
Volume 4, Security and Counter-Intelligence’, ‘The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen’, ‘Hitler's Last Chief of Foreign
Intelligence: Allied interrogations of Walter Schellenberg’, ‘Spy Wars: Moles,
Mysteries, and Deadly Games’, ‘Walter Schellenberg: The Memoirs of Hitler's
Spymaster’, ‘Zhukov's Greatest Defeat: The Red Army's Epic Disaster in
Operation Mars, 1942’, SVR website: ‘Operation Monastery’, UK National archives Dienstelle Klatt page, ‘Foreign
intelligence literary scene’ article: The legend of Agent Max’, ‘The Crown Jewels: The British Secrets
at the Heart of the KGB Archives’
Thanks. An interesting article.
ReplyDeleteSurely the fact that the soviets investigated it and reported to Soso after the war shows a degree of discomfort - no ??
ReplyDeleteOr is that just higher degree misinformation to fool the likes of me 60 years on!
It could be that the people investigating were not told all the details of the operation, which were probably known only by a handful of people at the top of Soviet intelligence. However there can be no doubt that the Klatt bureau was not under the complete control of the Soviets.
DeleteThanks for the article. In The Secret War Against The Jews by John Loftus and Mark Aarons, 1994, it is claimed that Gehlen relied on the Max/Kauder network even after the war was finished and that Gehlen used it to bargain with OSS/Dulles.
ReplyDelete"Dulles had Gehlen set up in a secret compound in Pullach, West Germany, with orders to revive the Max network. When one of Gehlen's aides, Colonel Hermann Baun, insisted that the whole Max operation had been a Sovjet scam, Gehlen had him silenced." (p. 151)
The sovjets were delighted.