The Soviet T-34 tank is well known by anyone who has an interest in WWII history. Books, articles, documentaries present it in triumphant terms. It was superior to everything the Germans had, it had revolutionary sloped armor, unprecedented mobility and was one of the reasons the Soviet side won in the Eastern front.
How realistic are these statements? Was the T-34 really a war winning weapon? How did it compare to German and Western tanks? How did it perform during the war? If we try to answer these questions by looking at actual data then things start to change. Instead of a mechanical marvel we get a poorly designed and built combat system that suffered horrific losses against ‘inferior’ German tanks.
Let’s start with debunking some of the most common statements.
The revolutionary design of the T-34
The T-34 was supposed to be the first tank that employed sloped armor. This characteristic meant that the armor protection was significantly enhanced, compared to straight armor. However French tanks of that period like the SOMUA S35 and the Renault R35 also had sloped armor.
Moreover
there were several problems created by the sloped armor in the front, the rear
and the back of the vehicle. This choice seriously diminished the interior
space of the T-34. Tanks are always crowded on the inside. The T-34 however had
a huge problem when it came to interior space.
The limited space not only
affected crew performance but turned the T-34 into a deathtrap. A US study from
the Korean War (based on the T-34/85 that was roomier than the T-34/76) concluded that due to the limited
internal space a penetration by an A/T round usually led to the destruction of
the tank and loss of 75% of the crew. In the Sherman the figure was only 18%.
German tanks
like the Pz III and Pz IV had a conventional hull design but they also used
slope in the middle part of their front hull armor. The new Panther tank was
the first German tank to have a fully sloped hull front and sloped sides
however the armor layout did not limit interior space like in the T-34.
The turret also suffered from a lack of space. It was so cramped that it affected movement. American experts who examined a T-34 at the Aberdeen testing grounds in 1942 had this to say:
‘The main weakness is that it is very tight. The Americans couldn't understand how our tankers could fit inside during a winter, when they wear sheepskin jackets’
Serious design flaws
Apart from the limited internal space there were two more serious design flaws.
One was the lack of turret basket (a rotating floor that moves as the turret turns) for the loader. This meant that the person loading the shells had to follow the movement of the gun and at the same time keep an eye on the floor so he doesn’t trip on the spent casings.
The other major issue was the two-man turret which forced the commander to also act as the gunner. This drastically limited combat performance as the commander could not focus on leading the tank but instead had to engage targets.
A three-man turret was finally introduced with the T-34/85 in March ’44.
Automotive performance
Christie suspension
The Christie suspension
used on the T-34 had the advantage that it allowed for high speeds on road. Its
disadvantages were that it took a lot of internal space and it had poor stability
in rough terrain.
A German test of tank pitching motion at the Kummersdorf testing facility (1km undulated track) showed that the T-34 had the worst stability compared to the Pz IV, Tiger, Sherman and Panther.
The Christie
suspension was a technological dead-end and the Aberdeen evaluation says: ‘The Christie's suspension was tested long
time ago by the Americans, and unconditionally rejected’. It was replaced
in postwar Soviet tanks with the torsion bar system, same as the T-34M and T43 prototypes intended to
replace the T-34 during the war.
Problematic
gearbox
Another major
problem was the unwieldy gearbox. It had poor reliability and it needed
excessive force to change gears, leading to driver fatigue. An American study
of a captured T-34/85 from Korea noted:
'There is rough steering due to the use of
clutch and brake steering control and difficulty in shifting due to the use of
a spur gear clash-shift transmission and multi-disc dry-clutch, making driving
this tank a difficult and very fatiguing job.’
Initially the
powerful V-2 engine (500hp) could not be used to the fullest due to the 4-speed
gearbox. Changing gears required excessive force on behalf of the driver. The T-34 could use the 4th gear only on a paved
road, thus the max speed over cross-country was theoretically 25 km/h but in
practice it was only 15km/h because changing from 2nd gear to 3rd
required superhuman strength.
On later modifications there was a 5-speed gearbox which allowed for a
cross country speed of 30 km/h.
Powerful gun?
The T-34 had a large caliber gun. The initial version was the L-11 76mm of 30.5 calibers. This was quickly replaced with the F-34 76mm of 42 calibers and the T34/85 had the ZiS S-53 85mm of 54.6 calibers.
The caliber numbers look impressive. After all the main German tank of 1941-43 Pz III had a 50 mm gun and that of 1943-45 Pz IV had 75mm. However Soviet tank guns suffered from low velocity leading to poor penetration and accuracy at long ranges.
For example
the initial round velocity (m/s) for the Soviet guns (using the standard A/T
round) was: L-11 - 612, F-34 - 655 (a
German test with Pzgr39 ammo showed 625), ZiS S-53 - 792. The comparable German
stats were: KwK 38 L/42 - 685, Kwk 39 L/60 - 835, Kwk 40 L/43 - 740, Kwk 40
L/48 - 790, Kwk 42 – 925.
The KwK 40
75mm used by the Pz IV and Stug from mid 1942 had far better penetration
performance and accuracy than the F-34 and the Panther’s KwK 42 was also
superior to the ZiS S-53 85mm in the same areas.
Lack of radio
Initially only the unit commander’s tank had a radio. In the course of the war radio was used more widely but even in 1944 many tanks lacked a radio set. The lack of radio meant that Soviet tank units operated with little coordination.
Visibility problems
German combat reports show that T-34 tanks had serious difficulties in navigating terrain and identifying targets. The problem was that the vision devices made it hard for the driver and the gunner to see what was happening.
This problem was addressed during the war.
The T-34 ‘1941 version’ lacked the vision cupola found on German tanks. This equipment gave the commander a 360o view of his surroundings. Also the optics were of poor quality.
The T-34 ‘1943 version’ had a larger turret and a German style cupola.
The T-34/85, introduced in March ’44, had a new large turret and the German style cupola.
Reliability problems
The T-34 was supposed to be a simple and rugged vehicle that seldom broke down. Authors like to compare it to the more complex German tanks that supposedly broke down often. The concept of the T-34 as a reliable tank is another myth of WWII.
The majority of vehicles in 1941 were lost due to equipment malfunction. The same reliability problems continued during the period 1942-44. The evacuation and relocation of industrial facilities combined with the
loss of skilled workers could only lead to the fall of reliability.
There were constant problems with the gearbox and the engine filters. The Aberdeen evaluators noted:
‘On the T-34 the transmission is also very poor. When it was being operated, the cogs completely fell to pieces (on all the cogwheels). A chemical analysis of the cogs on the cogwheels showed that their thermal treatment is very poor and does not in any way meet American standards for such mechanisms.’
‘The deficiency of our diesels is the criminally poor air cleaners on the T-34. The Americans consider that only a saboteur could have constructed such a device’
Apparently
the air filter problem was never fixed. A US study of a captured T-34/85 from
the Korean War (built in 1945) noted ‘Wholly
inadequate engine intake air cleaners could be expected to allow early engine
failure due to dust intake and the resulting abrasive wear. Several hundred
miles in very dusty operation would probably be accompanied by severe engine
power loss.’
The mental image of the T-34 travelling hundreds of kilometers without stopping is fantasy.
The V-2
engine had serious reliability problems. Depending on the source in 1941 it supposedly
lasted for 100 hours on average. This figure went down in 1942 since some
T-34’s could not travel more then 30-35 km.
The T-34
tested at the Aberdeen centre was built at the best factory using materials of
superior quality but its engine stopped working after 72.5 hours. This was not
due to American interference as there was a Soviet mechanic (engineer Matveev)
charged with maintaining it. Still it was much better than the standard tanks
since it covered a distance of 343km.
According to the
head of the Armored Directorate of the Red Army N.Fedorenko, the average
mileage of the T-34 to overhaul during the war, did not exceed 200 kilometers. This
was considered adequate since the T-34’s service life at the front was
considerably less. For example in 1942 only 66km.
In that sense
the T-34 was indeed ‘reliable’ because it was destroyed before it had a chance
to break down on its own!
Still there are
examples of T-34’s breaking down during assaults even late in the war. For
instance the 5th Guards Tank army in 1943 lost as much as 15% of its tanks during its march to Prokhorovka. In August ’43 the 1st Tank army lost 50% of its tanks due to malfunction. As late as the second half of 1944 tank units tried to replace engines
with more than 30 hours of operation before a major attack.
All WWII tanks had a hard time when travelling and they needed repairs and maintenance or they broke down.
There is also the question of standardization. The T-34 was produced at several factories. Each factory produced a slightly different variant. Could spare parts from Nizhny Tagil be used on a T-34 from Gorky? Doubtful.
The cheap T-34
One of the major characteristics of the T-34 was its low cost. This supposedly was the reason the Russians were able to build so many, while the Germans insisted on building expensive and thus limited numbers of tanks. Let’s take a look at these two statements.
Price
The concept of ‘cheap’ or ‘expensive’ has no meaning in a command economy. The reason being that the pricing mechanism is controlled by the government. If Moscow wanted a weapon to cost x amount of roubles it would cost x amount. Command decisions were made at the top and did not take into consideration free market concepts like return on investment, opportunity cost etc etc
The same issues affected, in a lesser way, the German, US and British war economies.
This makes it impossible to directly compare weapon systems by looking at the official prices. In general trying to compare the costs of weapon systems built in different countries under a command economy is very hard and prone to errors. Even using other indicators such as man-hours and input of raw materials can be misleading.
Just to give an example the ‘cheap’ T-34 had an aluminum engine. The Germans with more industrial assets than the SU and significantly higher aluminum production reached the conclusion that they could not provide their own tanks with an aluminum engine. It was simply too costly for them. This shows the different capabilities and priorities that countries have.
A better way is to compare prices of products in the same economy. This shows that the T-34 was much cheaper than the KV-1 and IS-2 tanks.
Also production costs and man-hours went down during the war. In 1941 8.000 man hours were needed to produce one T-34, this was reduced to 3.700 in 1943. Price in rubles went from 430.000 in 1940 to 168.000 in 1944.
Mass Production
The second major issue is whether the mass production of the T-34 was due to its imaginary low cost.
The reality is that the T-34 was built in huge numbers because the SU had built (with American assistance prewar) huge production facilities. These gigantic facilities in the Urals were the reason for the mass production.
The Germans also took advantage of gigantism when they built the Nibelungenwerk factory in Sankt Valentin, Austria. This greatly expanded Pz IV production.
They also built the ‘expensive’ Panther in huge numbers (for their standards) in the period 1943-45. It was not the ‘cost’ of the Panther that allowed them to do so but the industrial assets assigned to it.
The Americans built staggering numbers of M4 tanks in their tank arsenals, not because the M4 was intrinsically cheap but because gigantic facilities were provided for its construction.
Quantity vs quality
When looking into whether a weapon system is cheap or expensive the price is only one factor. The other one and I think the more important one is its performance. Is it better to build 100 cheap tanks or 50 expensive ones? The price difference might be significant but that about the other costs?
100 cheap tanks will need twice the crews and twice the fuel as the 50 expensive ones. They will also need twice the spare parts. If 50 tanks require 25 supply trucks then the 100 will need 50. You get the idea.
Then there is the aspect of losses. A cheap but poorly designed tank system will suffer more losses than an expensive but well armed and armored one. Machines can be mass produced but what about trained crews? A tank force that has limited crew casualties will have many tank aces and even the rest will be able to perform well in combat. On the other hand a country that builds large numbers of inferior tanks will lose them quickly, together with their crews. This will create a downward spiral as inexperienced crews will make up the majority of crews and thus severely limit the capability of the armored force.
The endless stream of T-34 tanks
Another myth is that there were hordes of T-34’s attacking the German formations. A simple look at the Soviet tank strength at various points in the war shows that the T-34 was not the most important tank. The light tanks T-60 and T-70 and the tank-destroyer SU-76 made up the majority of AFV’s in 1941-42 and even in 1943-45 the T-34 comprised roughly half of the Soviet frontline AFV force. In summer 1941 there were only 967 T-34’s in the total strength of 22.000 tanks. For the rest of the war:
Operational forces
|
AFV
|
1-Dec-41
|
1-May-42
|
1-Nov-42
|
1-Jul-43
|
1-Jan-44
|
1-Jun-44
|
1-Jan-45
|
| | | | | | | |
Tanks
| | | | | | | |
Heavy
|
212
|
660
|
922
|
893
|
349
|
467
|
976
|
Medium
|
322
|
1,291
|
2,714
|
5,492
|
2,609
|
3,766
|
6,059
|
Light
|
1,393
|
2,025
|
3,542
|
3,447
|
1,438
|
1,147
|
564
|
Sum
|
1,927
|
3,976
|
7,178
|
9,832
|
4,396
|
5,380
|
7,599
|
| | | | | | | |
SPG
| | | | | | | |
Heavy
| | | |
104
|
139
|
314
|
504
|
Medium
| | | |
174
|
244
|
152
|
758
|
Light
| | | |
86
|
523
|
1,565
|
3,399
|
Sum
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
364
|
906
|
2,031
|
4,661
|
| | | | | | | |
Total AFV
|
1,927
|
3,976
|
7,178
|
10,196
|
5,302
|
7,411
|
12,260
|
| | | | | | | |
T-34 % of total
|
0.17
|
0.32
|
0.38
|
0.54
|
0.49
|
0.51
|
0.49
|
Production and losses during the war
T-34 production and losses
|
|
1941
|
1942
|
1943
|
1944
|
1945
|
Total
|
| | | | | | |
Production
|
2,800
|
12,553
|
15,812
|
13,949
|
12,110
|
57,224
|
Losses
|
2,300
|
6,600
|
14,700
|
13,800
|
7,500
|
44,900
|
Just a bit under 45.000 lost during the war! War-winning indeed…
Total Soviet AFV losses in 1941-45 were 96.600. That’s not a typo. Almost one hundred thousand vehicles.
For comparison’s sake a German document posted at AHF lists tank losses in the East from 1941-44 as 15.673 and total AFV losses (tanks, Stug, self-propeled guns etc) as 23.802.
Comparison with German and Western tanks
The German models Tiger and Panther were greatly superior to the T-34 in armor and firepower.
At the other end of the spectrum the outdated models PzI, PzII, Pz35 and Pz38 that were used in numbers in 1941-42 were completely outclassed by it.
The T-34 was superior in mobility as its 500hp engine gave it an excellent power weight ratio. Also its wide tracks minimized ground pressure and allowed movement in soft ground. However its
stability over rough terrain was not better than the German tanks.
T-34 vs PzIII
The main German tank in the period 1941-43 was the PzIII. It weighed roughly 22 tons and was armed (in that period) with a 50mm gun.
The PzIII made up 28% of German tank strength at the start of operation Barbarossa. Roughly 72% of these had the new 50mm gun, the rest the 37mm. These guns could only penetrate the T-34 from the sides at close ranges while the Soviet tank could destroy the PzIII from long distances from all aspects.
By summer ’42 it made up 51% of German tank strength. At that time it had received a longer 50mm gun that could destroy the T-34 from 500m frontally (with special ammunition). It also
received more basic armor (50mm from 30mm) plus 20mm bolted on parts. The extra
armor negated the performance of the F-34 at long ranges.
Despite its theoretical inferiority the PzIII was able to fight against the T-34.
What it lacked in armor and firepower it made up by having a better internal layout, better reliability and optics, a commander’s cupola and radio in every vehicle.
It is not clear whether some PzIII models had a turret basket (different authors support different views).
T-34 vs PzIV
The PzIV was the main German tank in the period 1943-45. It weighed 25 tons and was equipped with a 75m caliber gun. During the war it was upgraded with more armor and a better gun.
The PzIV made up 13% of German tank strength at the start of operation Barbarossa. The model used was equipped with a low velocity 75mm gun effective against infantry but not armored targets. From mid 1942 the PzIV was equipped with the longer 75mm gun KwK 40 that could destroy the T-34 from 1.000m. The basic armor
was also increased to 50mm (from 30mm) plus 30mm bolted on and in 1943 80mm
standard (for the front hull).
The upgraded
PzIV was superior to the T-34 in internal layout, firepower, turret basket,
optics, commander’s cupola, radio in every vehicle and its frontal hull armor
could withstand the F-34 rounds. A Soviet study in 1943 admitted that the Pz IV
was superior to their tank, assigning it a combat value of 1.27 to the T-34’s
1.16 (with the Pz III being the base 1.0).
The T-34/85
that appeared in mid 1944 was a harder opponent due to its new gun but the PzIV
still had an edge in the ‘soft’ factors mentioned above. Moreover the heavier 85mm
rounds limited the number that could be carried to 56 compared to the Pz IV’s
standard load out of 87. The 85 mm rounds were not stored in a safe manner since 16 of the 56
rounds were in the turret This allowed the loader to use them quickly but it
had the downside that a penetration of the turret led to the explosion of the
shells and loss of the tank.
T-34 vs M4 Sherman
The main US tank in 1942-45 was the Sherman. It weighed 30 tons and was armed with a 75mm gun. The late war version M4 76 had a more powerful 76mm high velocity gun.
There are many similarities between the T-34 and the M-4 Sherman. Both tanks were built in huge numbers and they are comparable in weight and gun caliber. Even their updated version T-34/85 and M4 76mm are very close.
As a weapon system however the M4 was superior. It had the same good ‘soft’ qualities as the German tanks (internal layout, optics, radio), It had significantly better stability over rough terrain plus it was very reliable mechanically. In armor and firepower it was the same as the T-34.
Conclusion
The T-34 is the victim of Soviet and German wartime propaganda. The Russians had every reason to build it up as the best tank of WWII. The Germans also overstated its performance in order to explain their defeats.
If the T-34 was as good as propaganda made it out to be then it should have led to great Soviet victories in 1941-42. Instead what we see in that period is the poor performance of Soviet armored formations. In 1943-45 the T-34 was becoming outdated as the Germans used updated versions of the Pz IV and Stug III equipped with the powerful Kwk 40 75mm gun and of course they introduced the Tiger and Panther.
The ‘best tank of WWII’ suffered horrific losses against those tanks and even the updated version T-34/85 could not bridge the gap.
The T-34 looked good on paper but in the battlefield its ‘soft’ flaws led to huge losses. Meanwhile Western tanks like the M4 Sherman and Pz IV may have lacked sloped armor or wide tracks but they were better combat systems overall.
Effect in the design of postwar Soviet tanks
Postwar Soviet tanks like the T-55, T-62, T-64, T-72 and T-80 all followed the same design principles as the T-34:
2. Limited weight which led to good speed performance but put limits on the level of armor protection.
3. Simple and rugged construction which meant that they were capable of being mass produced by Soviet factories but at the expense of crew comfort.
Soviet models from the T-64 onwards tried to deal with the limited internal space by automating the ammo loading operation. However their autoloader was problematic and often led to accidents.
Western models like the M-48, M-60 and Centurion were taller and heavier but they provided their crews with a better environment. They also carried more ammunition (25%-51% more).
On paper the Soviet types looked superior but on the field it was the US and British types that won the battles. During the wars between Israel and the Arabs small numbers of Western made tanks wiped out numerically superior Arab forces equipped with the T-55 and T-62 tanks.
One of the most famous episodes is the Battle of the Golan heights in 1973. The Israeli Centurion tanks of the 7th Brigade faced a huge Syrian force but managed to inflict horrific losses on them as they tried to overcome the tank barrier. The Centurion was much heavier (52t) than the T-55 and T-62 (36-40t) and powerfully armed and armored. It also carried 51% (65 vs 43) more ammo.
That battle was a repeat of WWII when the T-34’s charged the field only to be slaughtered by German tanks from a distance.
The performance of the T-72 which was supposed to be the tank that would win a hot war for the Russians was similar. In the Gulf Wars Iraqi T-72’s were easily destroyed by modern M1 Abrams tanks from great distances. As Tom Clancy put it ‘It was a death trap like everything else the Russians built’.
The T-34 legacy led the Russians to invest in quantity over quality. A mistake that their Allies paid dearly.
Sources: ‘T-34:
Mythical Weapon’ by Michulec and
Zientarzewski, ‘T-34/76 Medium Tank
1941-45’ , ‘T-34/85 Medium Tank 1944-45’ and ‘T-34-85 vs M26 Pershing’ by
Steven J. Zaloga, ‘Tankovy
udar. Sovetskie tanki v boyakh. 1942-1943', Panzertruppen vol1 and vol2 by Jentz, Panther & Its Variants by Spielberger, Evaluation of tanks T-34 and KV by workers of the Aberdeen
testing grounds of the U.S , operationbarbarossa.net ,
‘Accounting for War: Soviet Production, Employment, and the Defense Burden,
1940-1945’, ‘Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis’, Axis History Forum, Wikipedia,
‘Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century’
Pics: Kummersdorf test
from ‘Panther & Its Variants’,
destroyed T-34 pics from ‘T-34: Mythical Weapon’.
