There’s a lot of analysis in the article. Here is the summary at the end:
‘In conclusion, what can be said of the overall influence of FORTITUDE SOUTH on the Normandy campaign? Its major influence came before a single allied soldier set foot in France. FORTITUDE SOUTH reinforced the German predilection to keep a substantial part of their armour in the Pas de Calais or in reserve. Once the landings had taken place the influence of the deception plan, although large in theory, was actually little in practice. It helped deceive the Germans as to the site of the main landing but did not prevent them from moving the bulk of their panzer reserves to meet the landings in Normandy. It fixed the infantry divisions to the Pas de Calais but the allied bombing of the German transport infrastructure would have kept them in place in any event. Strategic deception is rarely decisive and this is true also in the case of FORTITUDE SOUTH. Once the armies were engaged it was allied material superiority that engaged, ground down and finally destroyed the Germans in the West. In battle, deception proved no substitute for brute force’.
I don't have a subscription and the abstract isn't an abstract. What does the paper say? Thanks...
ReplyDeleteThere’s a lot of analysis in the article. Here is the summary at the end:
Delete‘In conclusion, what can be said of the overall influence of FORTITUDE SOUTH on the Normandy campaign? Its major influence came before a single allied soldier set foot in France. FORTITUDE SOUTH reinforced the German predilection to keep a substantial part of their armour in the Pas de Calais or in reserve. Once the landings had taken place the influence of the deception plan, although large in theory, was actually little in practice. It helped deceive the Germans as to the site of the main landing but did not prevent them from moving the bulk of their panzer reserves to meet the landings in Normandy. It fixed the infantry divisions to the Pas de Calais but the allied bombing of the German transport infrastructure would have kept them in place in any event. Strategic deception is rarely decisive and this is true also in the case of FORTITUDE SOUTH. Once the armies were engaged it was allied material superiority that engaged, ground down and finally destroyed the Germans in the West. In battle, deception proved no substitute for brute force’.