What are
they?
1). US
State Department strip cipher
In the late
1930’s the US State Department adopted the M-138-A
strip cipher as its high level crypto system. In 1937 the Japanese were
able to copy the strip set 0-1 and they passed these to the Germans in 1941,
who in turn shared them with the Finns
in 1942. In the same period it seems that the Italians also got hold of
some strips. How bad was the compromise of the State Department’s high level
system?
That question
is hard to answer because there is limited information available and it doesn’t
seem like the Americans were really interested in learning the full extent of
the compromise. Some documents that would shed more light on this affair are
proving very hard to find…
The M-138
strip system was difficult to solve provided it was used properly. The State
Department did not use it properly with the result that in 1943-44 most of the
strip traffic could be read by the Germans and the Finns. I’ll write more about
this in the future.
2). NKVD 5th
Department codebreakers
In 1941 the
NKVD’s codebreaking department was redesignated as the 5th
Department under the efficient administrator Major Ivan Grigoryevich
Shevelev. According to Matt Aid ‘By the
end of World War II, the 5th Directorate controlled the single largest
concentration of mathematicians and linguists in the Soviet Union.
What did
these people do during the war? They couldn’t have spent all their time solving
German low level hand ciphers. How many Axis and other foreign cryptosystems
did they attack? How many could they solve? Did the ‘break’ foreign cipher
machines like the Enigma or the Hagelin systems?
We simply
don’t know. However it seems that a new book on WWII signals intelligence has
been published in Russia recently. Unfortunately I don’t speak/read Russian…
3). Referat
Vauck success
In 1942 the
Germans organized a group tasked with solving
enemy agents codes. This was department Vauck, named after its head dr
Wilhelm Vauck. During the war they definitely solved enemy codes, usually those
that had been physically compromised when the agent was arrested. However they
also had some successes through cryptanalysis. How successful were they during the war? Unfortunately we do not know. The relevant file in the British national archives HW 40/76 ‘Enemy exploitation of SIS and SOE codes and cyphers’ says that postwar files have been retained and my request for the release of the interrogations of dr Vauck has been rejected by the archives staff…
4). Forschungsamt
information
I have
already pointed out that the
Anglo-Americans were able to capture many of the Forschungsamt higher-ups in
1945. Where is the information from their interrogations? Why wasn’t it
released to TICOM authorities?
5). German
Enigma investigations
The Germans
constantly evaluated the security of their Enigma cipher machine. There were
many studies on whether the daily key or parts of it could be retrieved through
cryptanalysis. Those studies are the TICOM DF-190 to DF-190AN files.
I don’t have
these but recently I was given a summary from Randy Rezabek of Ticom Archive. This
file shows that the Germans had investigated several methods of attack on the
Enigma and in many cases had calculated the time needed for a small team to
carry them out. Many were within practical limits.
More research
is needed to evaluate the German methods and the way they influenced their
security measures.
6). Japanese
Purple and Coral cipher machines
In the 1930’s the Japanese Foreign Ministry
started using the
PURPLE cipher machine as its high level system. PURPLE was solved by
American and Soviet codebreakers. Did the Germans have any success with it?
Until recently the answer was no. However it seems there is more to this story.
The Coral machine was used by military attaches and the Anglo-Americans solved it in 1944. In the same year dr Steinberg of the German Army’s signal intelligence agency was transferred to OKW/Chi where he worked on a cipher machine used by the Japanese attaché. Did he manage to solve it?
TICOM report
I-64 ‘Answers by Wm. Buggisch of OKH/Chi
to Questions sent by TICOM’ says
‘B. thinks Steinberg (of 209 fame) solved
some Jap machine traffic which was difficult but not so hard as Enigma. B. thinks it was traffic of the Jap
Military Attache.’
7). Soviet
diplomatic code
The Soviet
Union used a code enciphered with one time pads as its main diplomatic system
during WWII. This system if used correctly is unbreakable.
Were the
Germans able to read parts of this traffic? There are some strange
statements in Allied and German reports…
8). M-209
decoding device
I’m surprised
that no one has figured out how this
machine worked!
Albert Hess? The German general who escaped his prison via glider and was said to have a double? His tombstone reads something like 'it was worth the risk' Rudolph heiss may have been his name, he was even featured on unsolved mysteries. Check it out
ReplyDeleteYou mean Rudolf Hess? Yes that’s definitely an interesting story but here I mentioned some cases of cryptologic history, not general intelligence history.
DeleteMy bad
DeleteFor a thorough analysis of how to break the M209 see the book Cipher Systems - The Protection of Communications by HenryBaker & Fred Piper. It gives a detailed account of statistical methods to break this machine with examples.
ReplyDeleteBenjamin Sidle
bsidle@becrypt.com
"We simply don’t know. However it seems that a new book on WWII signals intelligence has been published in Russia recently."
ReplyDeletePray tell, what is the book called?
Gary
Good question. The book is ‘The cryptographic front of the (Second World) war’ by Butirsky, Larin and Shankin.
Deletehttp://www.gelios-arv.ru/books/978-5-85438-177-2.html
ReplyDeletehttp://www.gelios-arv.ru/books/978-5-85438-220-5.html