Military and intelligence history mostly dealing with World War II.
Saturday, February 24, 2018
Coldspur’s website
I’ve added a
link to Tony Percy’s website coldspur.com
Tuesday, February 20, 2018
Radio War Nerd interview of Yasha Levine
Interview of Yasha
Levine (author of Surveillance
Valley: The Secret Military History of the Internet) by Mark Ames and John
Dolan (The War Nerd).
Monday, February 19, 2018
Candle in the Dark: COMINT and Soviet Industrial Secrets, 1946-1956
The study ‘Candle in the Dark: COMINT and Soviet Industrial Secrets, 1946-1956’ by Carol B.
Davis is available for download from the NSA website.
This version
(unlike the copy at the Cryptologic Museum’s Library) is complete!
Saturday, February 17, 2018
To err is human vol 4
In my essay Rommel’s
microwave link I had mentioned that a German speech cipher system was used
on a microwave link connecting the German high command with Rommel’s HQ in
North Africa.
According to ‘Spread Spectrum Communications Handbook’
vol1:
'In 1935, Telefunken engineers Paul
Kotowski and Kurt Dannehl applied for a German patent on a device for masking
voice signals by combining them with an equally broad-band noise signal
produced by a rotating generator. The receiver in their system had a duplicate
rotating generator, properly synchronized so that its locally produced noise
replica could be used to uncover the voice signal. The U.S. version of this
patent was issued in 1940, and was considered prior art in a later patent on
DSSS communication systems. Certainly, the Kotowski-Dannehl patent exemplifies the
transition from the use of key-stream generators for discrete data encryption
to pseudorandom signal storage for voice or continuous signal encryption.
Several elements of the SS concept are present in this patent, the obvious
missing notion being that of purposeful bandwidth expansion.
The Germans used Kotowski’s concept as
the starting point for developing a more sophisticated capability that was
urgently needed in the early years of World War II. Gottfried Vogt, a
Telefunken engineer under Kotowski, remembers testing a system for analog
speech encryption in 1939. This employed a pair of irregularly slotted or
sawtoothed disks turning at different speeds, for generating a noise-like
signal at the transmitter, to be modulated/multiplied by the voice signal. The
receiver’s matching disks were synchronized by means of two transmitted tones,
one above and one below the encrypted voice band.
This system was used on a
wire link from Germany, through Yugoslavia and Greece, to a very- and/or
ultra-high frequency (VHF/UHF) link across the Mediterranean to General Erwin Rommel’s
forces in Derna, Libya.'
After having
a look at google patents I saw that Vogt was credited with a patent and I thought
that this was the speech cipher system but I was corrected by klausis
krypto kolumne commenter ‘Thomas’, who linked the Kotowski-Dannehl patent.
Thus in Rommel’s
microwave link I’ve added a link and pics to patent US2211132A.
Friday, February 2, 2018
Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluation of Office of War Information ciphers
During WWII
the US Office
of War Information engaged in intelligence gathering and propaganda
activities against the Axis powers.
The
representatives of the OWI used various cipher systems in order to protect
their communications and these systems were examined by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
A summary
report was issued in July 1944 and it found problems with physical security,
classification procedures, stereotyped messages and cipher reuse.
Regarding OWI
ciphers it was noted that ‘Present double
transposition keys have been in use since they were produced by the Signal
Corps in late 1942 and early 1943’ and the recommendation was ‘That immediate supersession of these keys be
accomplished and that provision be made for their more frequent supersession in
the future’.
Source: US National Archives, collection RG
208, Office of Wartime Information: General Records of the Security Officer,
Entry 9. Location: 350/71/17/6, Box 1.
Folder Communications Survey OWI.
Acknowledgements: I have to thank Robert Hanyok for locating
and copying the JCS evaluation.
Thursday, February 1, 2018
Article on Germans signals intelligence operations in occupied Yugoslavia
The ‘Journal
of Intelligence History’ article ‘The
German ‘ultra’: signals intelligence in Yugoslavia 1943–1944’ by Gaj
Trifković has interesting information on the dissemination and use of signals
intelligence by the Germans in their war against the Chetnik and Partisan
resistance movements in WWII.
ABSTRACT
This article deals with the extensive signals surveillance program operated by the Wehrmacht and directed at their most dangerous enemy in the Balkans, the Yugoslav Partisans. This subject has so far received surprisingly little attention in academic circles despite the fact that it was one of the crucial pillars of the entire Axis counter-insurgency effort in Yugoslavia and that it was one of the most successful actions of its kind conducted by the German intelligence. Based largely on previously unpublished primary sources, as well as post-war literature, this article will outline the workings of the program during its heyday in the years 1943–1944 and seek to establish its impact on the battlefield. As such, it will hopefully prove to be useful to both students of wartime events in the Western Balkans and to researchers of intelligence services during the Second World War in general.
ABSTRACT
This article deals with the extensive signals surveillance program operated by the Wehrmacht and directed at their most dangerous enemy in the Balkans, the Yugoslav Partisans. This subject has so far received surprisingly little attention in academic circles despite the fact that it was one of the crucial pillars of the entire Axis counter-insurgency effort in Yugoslavia and that it was one of the most successful actions of its kind conducted by the German intelligence. Based largely on previously unpublished primary sources, as well as post-war literature, this article will outline the workings of the program during its heyday in the years 1943–1944 and seek to establish its impact on the battlefield. As such, it will hopefully prove to be useful to both students of wartime events in the Western Balkans and to researchers of intelligence services during the Second World War in general.
Tuesday, January 30, 2018
Monday, January 29, 2018
Staff Study on OSS Cryptographic Plan - January 1945
Another
document that has information on the OSS crypto systems is ‘Staff Study on OSS Cryptographic Plan’,
available from the US National Archives - collection RG457- Entry 9032 - NR 3280 ‘Staff Study on OSS
Cryptographic Plan’.
The report is
also available from the journal ‘Cryptologia’, vol13, no.3:
SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
SPSIC-6
8
January 1945
MEMORANDUM
for Assistant. Chief of Staff, G-2
Subject:
Staff Study on OSS Cryptographic Plan
The enclosed
staff study is forwarded for your consideration and comment,
For the Chief
Signal Officer:
W, Preston Corderman
Colonel, Signal
Corps
Chiefs Signal Security Branch
1. Incl
Study on OSS
Cryptographic Plan
STAFF
STUDY ON OSS CRYPTOGRAPHIC PLAN
PROBLEM
PRESENTED
1. How may
the need of OSS for a high grade, high speed cryptographic system be satisfied?
FACTS BEARING
ON THE CASE
2. OSS has a
requirement for a high grade, high speed cryptographic system for the encipherment
and decipherment of secret traffic.
3. At the
present time OSS is using the Converter M-134-A (short title SIGMYC) to satisfy
this requirement.
4. Prior to 5
April 1944, eight (8) SIGMYC were issued to OSS.
5. The
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, authorized the issue of twenty-six (26) SIGMYC
to OSS by memorandum for Col. Corderman from Col. Clarke dated 5 April 1944, to
meet the expanding needs of that organization.
6. Since 5
April 1944, twenty-one (21) SIGMYC have been delivered to OSS. That
organization now holds twenty-nine (29) machines; five more are available for
issue.
7. In the
past OSS has used one universal set of rotors with SIGMYC. These rotors were
replaced once.
8. In
September 1944 OSS requested two new sets of rotors, one set to be used in
Europe and the other set in the Far East. Thirty-eight (38) sets of rotors
SIGRHAT (for use in the Far East) have been issued in compliance with that
request.
9.
Twenty-five (25) sets of rotors SIGSAAD (for use in Europe) have also been issued.
10.
Instructional documents associated with SIGMYC are "Operating Instructions
for Converter M-134 and M-134-A (Short title SIGKOC and ‘photographs and
Drawings of Converter M-134-A (short title SIGVYJ). No copies of these
publications are available for issue. This situation was caused by the
destruction of the instructional documents when Converters M-134-A were turned
in by Army holders.
11. Requests
are received for spare parts with each request for the issue of a SIGMYC. The
spare parts list always include rotor stepping solenoids. There are no rotor
stepping solenoids on hand in this agency. Three requests for these items have
not been fulfilled.
12. In accordance
with authorization of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 27 July 1944, one
SIGTOT room circuit was furnished OSS in Washington. Authorization did not
extend to the issuance of tapes for use with this equipment. Additional SIGTOT
circuits have been made available to OSS in Europe. That organization is procuring
additional tape punching equipment to meet the increased demand for tape. OSS
requested the loan of such equipment until they are prepared to fulfill their own
needs for tape. This branch is supplying OSS with sufficient tape until that
organization is self-supporting in this respect.
13. Four (4) SIGCUM
have been issued to OSS with the approval of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
28 April 1944. These machines were sent to OSS in North Africa to replace four
(4) SlGCUM which were loaned to OSS by NATO and subsequently recalled by the
latter organization.
14. Within
the past six (6) months the communications requirements of OSS have markedly
increased. The cryptographic requirements have expanded proportionately. The
rapid expansion is vividly illustrated by the strip cipher requirements of that
organization. In June 1944 SSA requested OSS to furnish a monthly quota of
desired material in order to adjust production schedules here. The monthly
quota of strip cipher systems needed is now larger than the total number of
strip systems issued to OSS over a period of twenty (20) months.
15. It is
believed that the OSS will request the five (5) remaining SIGMYC of the authorized
allotment of twenty-six (26) machines. Instructional documents are not
available for issue with these converters. The reprinting of these documents
presents a major reproduction job.
16. OSS
encounters an ever present maintenance problem since the machines are
constantly breaking down. It is believed that the time is not far distant when
it will be impossible to maintain the machines adequately,
17. In order
to provide new rotors in the future it will be necessary to have rotors
returned from the field by OSS for rewiring. Thus, a rotation process will be
established to meet new demands for rotors which will result in the wearing out
of the rotors within a relatively short time. It is noted that it would take
between one to two years to procure new rotors.
18. OSS is
now trying out a modification of the standard --text deleted -- device, which utilizes -*- --text deleted--. That organization is contemplating an
increase in the distribution of these --text
deleted – to include the standard --text
deleted – held by OSS, thus, permitting inter-communication between the two
machines. The cryptographic principle involved his been approved by the Signal
Security Agency. OSS plans to utilize the -*-
--text deleted-- for secret radio transmissions.
19. The question arises as to what other means
are available. The following items of equipment are considered:
a. SIGTOT
This system
provides adequate security but the scarcity of equipment and the difficultly of
providing sufficient quantities of one-time tape render its use impracticable.
In addition SIGTOT is not at present adapted to multi-holders of a common
system, which is an operational requirement
b. SIGABA
Under present policy, it would be necessary to
assign a crypt team with each machine in order to make them available to OSS.
This presents a problem of securing sufficient personnel which appears
insurmountable at the present time. Furthermore, the use of SIGABA as a
solution to this problem is not generally regarded with favor.
c. SIGCUM
The
communications and cryptographic problems of OSS are developing rapidly in the Far
East where traffic is transmitted largely by radio. Since SIGCUM may not be
employed for secret traffic transmitted by means of radio the use of this
machine would not provide a solution to the problem, Although SIGCUM would be a
satisfactory substitute for SIGMYC in Europe, a revision of the cryptographic
facilities of OSS in that area is not considered feasible at this time.
d. SIGFOY
This
converter provides adequate security to fulfill the need for a high grade
cryptographic system and is well adapted to multiple holders of a common
system. Since it is not a high speed system, it would not fulfill this
requirement.
e. SIGLASE
This system
would provide adequate security and speed to meet the outlined requirements.
However, since SIGLASE is still in the development stage and the expected date
of issue is unknown it is not the immediate answer to the OSS problem.
20. From the
point of view of this branch the problem could be most acceptably solved by
making Army facilities available to OSS. It is realized that the latter organization
would probably not be favorably disposed toward such a solution,
CONCLUSIONS
21. The
continued use of SIGMYC by OSS in the Far East will present maintenance and
distribution problems which will be virtually impossible to solve.
22. A
replacement for SIGMYC is needed.
23. SIGABA,
SIGCUM and SIGTOT are not completely acceptable substitutes.
24. SIGFOY
and SIGLASE would be a solution to the problem but since it will require from
six to nine months to manufacture the SIGLASE, it cannot be considered an
immediate solution.
25. It
appears that the only immediate solution to the problem is for OSS traffic to
be handled by Army cryptographic facilities.
RECOMMENDATIONS
26. That OSS
be requested to utilize Army cryptographic communications facilities where such
exist.
27. That OSS
use its own cryptographic communications facilities where Army facilities do
not exist.
28. That, at
such time as the equipment referred to in paragraph 27 becomes unserviceable,
service be maintained by those Army cryptographic facilities and/or equipments
as may then be available.
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