Thursday, January 8, 2015

Fake history - ‘The imitation game’ trailer review

It’s not often that movies on WWII cryptology and signals intelligence appear on the big screen, probably because the subject matter is too complex for the general audience. A new movie, called ‘The imitation game’ has been released and it has received a lot of favorable reviews in the media. The movie focuses on the legendary mathematician Alan Turing and his efforts to solve the German Enigma cipher machine.


First let’s have a look at the trailer



Hmmm the movie certainly looks good (sets, costumes etc) and the main actors are all well known (Cumberbatch, Knightley, Strong) but the problems start to add up…
1). At 0:21: ‘It’s the greatest encryption device in history and the Germans use it for all communications’.

Ehm, I don’t know what greatest encryption device means but the military Enigma was not revolutionary in any sense. It was simply a clever modification of the commercial version, sold to companies and countries around the world. In fact the Brits had their own Enigma version called Typex. As for the second part the Germans use it for all communications it’s also wrong. The Germans used hand ciphers for low level messages, the Enigma at regiment/division level and also by naval units and airbases and cipher teleprinters for communications between higher commands. So the Enigma did not cover all German communications.  
2). At 0:25 ‘everyone thinks Enigma is unbreakable’

3).  At 1:15 ‘I’m designing a machine that will allow us to break every message, every day, instantly’.

Bullshit. Sorry but there’s no other way to put it…I understand that some parts of Enigma theory need to be ‘dumbed’ down so that the general audience will enjoy the movie but come on! The bombe devices couldn’t break every message, every day and they certainly couldn’t do it instantly. Running ‘cribs’ took time and under the best conditions solutions could be achieved in several hours. Under the worst it could take days, weeks or possibly never…
Even when the Enigma settings were retrieved it wasn’t possible to read the message instantly. Someone had to type the message on the specially modified Typex devices and write down the deciphered text. Without good ‘cribs’ the bombes didn’t work. Simple as that.

3).  At 1:20: ‘They had to create the world’s first computer’
……….The bombes were not general purpose computing devices. Apparently the producers of the film were thinking of the ‘Collosus’ but this was a different device, built by different people, for the solution of a different cipher machine, NOT the Enigma.

4). At 1:29: Fake rivalry between Turing and Denniston.
Historically inaccurate but I guess they had to insert some kind of conflict in the story for the general audience.

5). At 1:50: ‘The Navy thinks that one of us is a Soviet spy’.
Again historically inaccurate. There was a Soviet spy at Bletchley Park, John Cairncross but he was not a cryptanalyst and he didn’t work with Turing.

So in only 2 and a half minutes we’ve seen some serious mistakes. On the other hand maybe I’m nitpicking here.  So how does the actual movie hold up? We’ll get to that in the next post.

Tuesday, January 6, 2015

Unanswered questions of WWII cryptology – progress report

Back in 2013 I wrote down several cases of WWII cryptologic history that require more research. Since then I’ve spent a lot of time and money trying to find new information. Has the effort paid off? Let’s have a look at each case:

1). US State Department strip cipher
I wrote: How bad was the compromise of the State Department’s high level system? That question is hard to answer because there is limited information available and it doesn’t seem like the Americans were really interested in learning the full extent of the compromise. Some documents that would shed more light on this affair are proving very hard to find…

It is clear that Germans, Japanese and Finns were able to solve many alphabet strips both circular and special and thus read State Department messages from embassies in Europe and Asia. The most important intercepted messages seem to have been those from Bern, Switzerland and Chungking, China.

Unfortunately several important reports are still classified by the NSA and we have to wait for the declassification procedure. At the same time I haven’t been able to track down the Carlson-Goldsberry report, detailing the Finnish solution of the State Department strip cipher. This report was written in late 1944 by two US cryptanalysts after interviewing Finnish codebreakers in Sweden. 
Another aspect of this case concerns the messages from the OSS - Office of Strategic Services and OWI - Office of War Information stations in Bern that were also sent via diplomatic channels. It’s not clear why these messages were sent using State department codes and not through their own systems. In this area information is lacking, since the OSS organization doesn’t seem to have officially acknowledged the compromise of their communications during the war.

2). NKVD 5th Department codebreakers
During WWII the Soviet Union invested significant resources in the interception and exploitation of enemy radio traffic. The internal security service NKVD and the Army’s general staff had codebreaking departments with the former recruiting many talented mathematicians. According to author Matthew Aid  ‘By the end of World War II, the 5th Directorate controlled the single largest concentration of mathematicians and linguists in the Soviet Union.’

So far very limited information is available regarding their war time efforts versus foreign codes (not only Axis but also US, UK and those of neutral countries).

 3). Referat Vauck success
In the period 1942-44 the German Army’s signal intelligence agency Inspectorate 7/VI had a separate deparment (Referat 12) assigned with the solution of the encoded messages of Allied spy groups operating in occupied Europe. Head of the department was dr Wilhelm Vauck, so his unit was also called Referat Vauck. In 1944 they were transferred to the OKW radio defense department so their reports can no longer be found in the files of Inspectorate 7/VI.

I had written about this case: How successful were they during the war? Unfortunately we do not know. The relevant file in the British national archives HW 40/76 ‘Enemy exploitation of SIS and SOE codes and cyphers’ says that postwar files have been retained and my request for the release of the interrogations of dr Vauck has been rejected by the archives staff
Thankfully I‘ve been able to track down the monthly reports of Referat 12 for the period April ’42-February ’44 and I will be writing an essay on them.

An interesting discovery, made while I was trying to find information on Referat Vauck, was that OKW/Chi was also solving Allied agents codes during the war (with significant success it seems). Not much is known about this aspect of OKW/Chi operations…

4). Forschungsamt information
Goering’s Forschungsamt was one of the main German codebreaking/intelligence agencies of the period 1939-45, yet a detailed history of that organization still eludes us. This is another case where it’s up to the NSA to declassify the relevant documents, written by Forschungsamt personnel in the 1950’s.

5). German Enigma investigations
Several authors claim that the Germans never suspected that their Enigma cipher machine was solved by the Allies and that they considered it to be unbreakable.

I had written: The Germans constantly evaluated the security of their Enigma cipher machine. There were many studies on whether the daily key or parts of it could be retrieved through cryptanalysis. Those studies are the TICOM DF-190 to DF-190AN files…..More research is needed to evaluate the German methods and the way they influenced their security measures.
Since then I’ve posted information on case ‘Wicher’ (Polish solution of the Enigma) showing that the Germans knew the device had been compromised in the prewar period and in 1943 they got information from the US regarding the solution of their naval version.  So far it’s clear that the German Navy’s codebreakers found a solution for their 4-rotor machine in late ’44 but we don’t know much about the similar work of the Army cryptanalysts. More research is needed in this case.

6). Japanese Purple and Coral cipher machines
Were the Germans able to solve the cipher machines used by the Japanese foreign ministry and by Japanese military attaches?

I wrote: PURPLE was solved by American and Soviet codebreakers. Did the Germans have any success with it? Until recently the answer was no. 
However it seems there is more to this story.

The Coral machine was used by military attaches and the Anglo-Americans solved it in 1944. In the same year dr Steinberg of the German Army’s signal intelligence agency was transferred to OKW/Chi where he worked on a cipher machine used by the Japanese attaché. Did he manage to solve it? 
TICOM report I-64 ‘Answers by Wm. Buggisch of OKH/Chi to Questions sent by TICOM’ says ‘B. thinks Steinberg (of 209 fame) solved some Jap machine traffic which was difficult but not so hard as Enigma. B. thinks it was traffic of the Jap Military Attache.’

There is scattered information that points towards the solution of an important Japanese code or cipher machine in the period 1943/44 but no conclusive evidence. Maybe more information will become available in the future.

7). Soviet diplomatic code
I wrote: The Soviet Union used a code enciphered with one time pads as its main diplomatic system during WWII. This system if used correctly is unbreakable. 

Were the Germans able to read parts of this traffic? There are some strange statements in Allied and German reports…
The recently declassified TICOM report DF-111 ‘Comments on various cryptologic matters’ by Adolf Paschke (head of the linguistic cryptanalysis group in the German foreign ministry’s decryption department) says that in the years 1927-30 parts of the Soviet diplomatic traffic could be read since the additive pads were sometimes used twice if the message was long enough. Paschke had also identified the use of the same additive tables more than once in some links. Regarding wartime traffic he says that they couldn’t solve any since there were no repetitions but in the report he also added cryptically that Russian material of the Forschungsamt and the High Command’s deciphering department OKW/Chi were destroyed in 1943 during a bombing attack on Berlin.

Although the Germans might have not solved any Soviet diplomatic traffic they did succeed in solving Comintern communications.

8). M-209 decoding device
I wrote: I’m surprised that no one has figured out how this machine worked!

I have to say I’m still surprised that this device has not received any attention from historians and/or the media!

Monday, December 22, 2014

Overview of 2014

As the year comes to a close it’s time to look back at some of the top essays that I wrote in 2014, plus the ones that I extensively rewrote using new information.

Cryptology

Compromise of Soviet codes in WWII

British cryptologic security failures in WWII

Decoded US diplomatic messages from 1944

Compromise of US M-209 cipher machine prior to the invasion of Normandy

Naval Enigma compromise and the spy in the United States Department of the Navy

The US AN/GSQ-1 (SIGJIP) speech scrambler

Professor Wolfgang Franz and OKW/Chi’s mathematical research department

German special intelligence, the M-138 strip cipher and unrest in India

Typex cipher machines for the Polish Foreign Ministry

The German intercept stations in Spain

The codebreakers of the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the compromise of US codes prior to Pearl Harbor


The US TELWA code (added new information)

The British War Office Cypher (added new information)
The Soviet K-37 ‘Crystal’ cipher machine (added new information)

Soviet partisan codes and KONA 6 (added new information)
French Hagelin cipher machines (added new information)

The RAF Cypher (added new information)
The British Interdepartmental Cypher (added new information)

The American M-209 cipher machine (added new information)
US Military Strip Ciphers (added new information)

The British railways code (added new information)

Swedish Army codes and Aussenstelle Halden (added new information)

The secret messages of Marshall Tito and General Mihailović (added new information)


T-34 tank


Spies

Abwehr agent Marina Lee and the Norway campaign


Book reviews

New books on Soviet cryptology in WWII

Australian codebreakers of WWII

I was able to find lots of new information in the government archives of the USA, UK, Germany and Finland and I got lucky with some of my freedom of information act requests to the NSA. Again I have to thank the people who helped me by giving me files and information and/or collaborating with me in locating interesting reports. I wouldn’t have been able to find so much without your help! As we say in Greece ‘η ισχύς εν τη ενώσει’.

Is there anything left to cover in 2015? Actually there is. I’m waiting for several TICOM reports to be declassified by the NSA and there also some files from NARA and the UK national archives that I need to locate/copy. Regarding historical cases I need to cover:
1). Τhe compromise of the codes of the Resistance movements in occupied Europe by the Agents section of Inspectorate 7/VI (German Army signals intelligence).

2). The compromise of the DFC - Division Field Code of the US 29th Infantry Division, prior to the Normandy invasion in summer ’44.
3). Find more information on the Polish diplomatic and military attaché codes of WWII (indicator MILITPOLΟGNE)

4). Continue to investigate the compromise of the State Departments strip cipher.
5). The compromise of the communications of General Barnwell R. Legge, US military attaché in Switzerland during WWII.

6). Add new information regarding the compromise of the Bell Labs A-3 speech privacy system.
7). Find more information on Goering’s Forschungsamt.

With a bit of luck I should be able to uncover a great deal of interesting information.

Tuesday, December 9, 2014

Update

I added SRH-349 ‘The Achievements of the Signal Security Agency (SSA) in World War II’ in the notes of French Hagelin cipher machines and information from SRH-361 ‘History of the Signal Security Agency volume two - The general cryptanalytic problems’ in The French War Ministry’s FLD code.

Thursday, November 20, 2014

The British Typex cipher machine

In 1926, the British Government set up an Inter-Departmental Cypher Committee to investigate the possibility of replacing the book systems then used by the armed forces, the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office and the India Office with a cipher machine. It was understood that a cipher machine would be inherently more secure than the codebook system and much faster to use in encoding and decoding messages. Despite spending a considerable amount of money and evaluating various models by 1933 the committee had failed to find a suitable machine. Yet the need for such a device continued to exist and the Royal Air Force decided to independently fund such a project. The person in charge of their programme was Wing Commander Lywood, a member of their Signals Division. Lywood decided to focus on modifying an existing cipher machine and the one chosen was the commercially successful Enigma. Two more rotor positions were added in the scrambler unit and the machine was modified so that it could automatically print the enciphered text. This was done so these machines could be used in the DTN-Defence Teleprinter Network.

The new machine was called Typex (originally RAF Enigma with TypeX attachments). The first experimental model was delivered to the Air Ministry in 1934 and after a period of testing 30 more Mark I Typex machines were produced in 1937. The new model Typex Mark II, demonstrated in 1938, was equipped with two printers for printing the plaintext and ciphertext version of each message. It was this model that was built in large numbers and the first contract for 350 machines was signed in 1938. Typex production was slow during the war with 500 machines built by June 1940, 2,300 by the end of 1942, 4,078 by December 1943 and 5,016 by May 1944. By the summer of 1945 about 11.000 (8.200 Mk II and 3.000 Mk VI) had been built (1).