However I have
to disagree with the following statement:
‘One of Friedman’s reasons for visiting TICOM
was to confirm that the Germans had been unable to break any Allied high-grade
encryption systems during the war. That spring, senior Army officers had asked
why he was so confident that these systems remained invulnerable. Friedman
responded that captured German documents contained no suggestion any major
Allied systems had been broken, only the less sophisticated M-209 device and
even then only when Allied code clerks made mistakes. ‘The overwhelming
evidence’ Friedman concluded, ‘is that they are far behind us and have no
appreciation of solution techniques we now regard as commonplace.’ For him, the
Germans’ inability to penetrate Allied cryptographic systems reflected their
‘supreme confidence’ in Enigma. What Friedman learned from the TICOM effort
confirmed his view that British and American successes in cryptanalysis and
cryptography far exceeded those of the Germans’.
cough Compromise
of US cipher teleprinter in 1944 cough United
States cryptologic security failures in WWII cough
2). From ‘Intelligence
and National Security’: ‘Protecting
secrets: British diplomatic cipher machines in the early Cold War, 1945–1970’.
Regarding Typex
it says that model 22 (with movement of all 5 rotors and two plugboards) was
introduced in 1950 and not during WWII as claimed by some sites:
‘In 1946, the British authorities decided to
further modify Typex to increase its cryptographic strength. The rotors and turnover
mechanism were redesigned so that all rotors would turn as a message was encrypted
and the machine was fitted with a pluggable ‘crossover’ at the entry and exit
to the wiring maze. This new version of Typex was ready for service in
September 1950 and it was predicted that it would provide adequate cipher security
for another 10 years.’
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