A Greek file dated 1938 (1) mentions
the following Army cryptosystems: small unit code 1937, large unit code 1937,
small unit code 1938, mobilization code 1937, cryptographic lexicon 1935.
Tuesday, August 29, 2017
Monday, August 21, 2017
Missing page from TICOM I-137
The TICOM
report I-137 ‘Final report written by Wachtmeister Otto Buggisch of OKH/Chi and
OKW/Chi’ that I recently uploaded was missing page 2.
Thankfully
the NSA FOIA office has sent me the page, thus I have re-uploaded the file.
Missing page:
Tuesday, August 15, 2017
Book review – ‘TICOM: The Hunt for Hitler’s Codebreakers’
Signals
intelligence and codebreaking played an important role in WWII. British and
American codebreakers solved many important Axis crypto systems, such as the
German Enigma machine and the Japanese Navy’s code JN25. These operations
remained hidden from the public till the 1970’s, when several books finally
acknowledged the Allied codebreaking successes.
Since then
countless books have been written about the Allied codebreakers, their
successes and their contribution to the overall war effort.
Information
about the similar successes of the Axis codebreakers is much harder to find
since the relevant material only started to be declassified in the 2000’s.
The material
that has been declassified reveals that at the end of the war in Europe the US
and UK authorities were interested in finding out as much as possible about the
operations and successes of the German codebreaking organizations. For this
reason the TICOM (Target
Intelligence Committee) project was created. The goal was to send small teams
into Germany in order to capture the German codebreakers and their archives.
A new book
has been published that covers the operations and findings of the TICOM teams
sent to Germany at the end of WWII. ‘TICOM:
the Hunt for Hitler’s Codebreakers’ by Randy Rezabek
is available in both paperback and e-book format.
The book starts
in 1944, when the Anglo-Americans expecting the war to end soon had started
planning for the capture of enemy sigint personnel and archives. The joint US-UK effort was codenamed TICOM
and six teams were formed to go into Germany and search for the German signal
intelligence personnel and archives.
The
operations of the individual TICOM teams are covered in the following chapters.
Travelling through a war ravaged Germany they had to improvise and take risks
in order to locate their targets. The teams managed to retrieve important enemy
personnel and files, including the entire codebreaking unit of the German
Foreign Ministry. Other great successes were the capture of a ‘Kurier’ burst-radio communications device
in Northern Germany, multichannel radio-teletype demodulators found buried in a
camp in Rosenheim and the retrieval of the OKW/Chi archive, found in metal
boxes at the bottom of lake Schliersee in Bavaria.
The author
not only describes the operations of the TICOM teams but also explains the organization,
personalities and achievements of the German codebreakers.
The book
contains maps and several rare photographs of personnel and material from that
era. There is also an appendix with an overview of the different codes and
ciphers used in WWII.
Q&A
with Randy Rezabek
The author
was kind enough to answer some of my questions.
1). How did you become interested in
WWII cryptologic history and why did you decide to write a book about the TICOM
operation?
Many years
ago (35+) I was saving in the Navy and was stationed at a Naval Security Group
intercept site running the local photo lab. I had a clearance and learned a bit
through osmosis, but it wasn’t until I read Bamford’s book The Puzzle
Palace that things became clear about what we were up to. I maintained
an interest in things Sigint even though life moved on in different directions.
About 2010 I
was diagnosed with MS and that created physical limitations on many of my
activities, so I focused on TICOM as a pastime that could focus on.
I first
learned about TICOM through another Bamford book Body of Secrets,
also the account in The Ultra Americans by Parrish. I found
the whole topic fascinating but little researched in the literature. Since then
I have acquired a personal library of 150 or so volumes on Signit, intelligence
and military communications.
Since nobody
else had written a book on TICOM I thought that was a worthwhile goal.
2). How hard was it to find
information about the TICOM teams and the information they gathered?
About the
time I got serious about this I started doing follow ups with NSA and NARA. It
was around this time that TICOM documentation started being released. It was a
very slow process, especially with the NSA FOIA requests, they often took
years, and by the time they replied the requested documentation had been
released to NARA anyway. The release of “European Axis Signal Intelligence…”
was a great boon to researchers. In addition to the overview, I compiled a list
of 150 or so TICOM reports that were cited in the footnotes, this gave me a
guide on what to look for. I also hooked up with some other researchers in the
field, such as Ralph Erskine, Frode Weierud and you. I made the acquaintance
with David Kahn, who was a great inspiration, and met and corresponded with
Stephen Budiansky, all have helped me find sources and sharpened my knowledge.
Otherwise it
was a matter of patience watching the slow drip, drip of releases over the
years. NARA was a great help, when I started out there was no use of the Term
TICOM in the descriptors. But by 2012 they had reorganize lot of the catalog
and put the newer TICOM stuff into their own entries.
3). You said in the book that the
reasons why TICOM remained classified into the 21st century is perhaps its
greatest secret. Do you think it was simple bureaucratic inertia or something
else?
At this point
I think it was inertia. After the end of the cold war there was no real need to
keep it secret from a security viewpoint. Human sources were long retired or
dead, technologies and techniques were long superseded, and the use of captured
German intelligence information against the Soviets would be obvious to even
the most clueless observer.. But the law says a secret is a secret until
properly declassified, even if everyone knows about it. And declassification is
a laborious process with little priority: as I say in the book “nobody in the
NSA ever got fired for not revealing a secret.”
4). Are you going to write more books
on the subject?
At this point
I think I have pretty well exhausted the topic. I tried to include as many
details as possible in it to provide a guide to future researchers. If
something comes out in future released that alter the story then I may do a
follow up article or two. However, publishers don’t see enough profit in the
story to bother, that why I had to publish it myself.
Sunday, August 13, 2017
Saturday, August 5, 2017
Update
1). In The
secret messages of Marshall Tito and General Mihailović I added the Journal
of Slavic Military Studies article: ‘The Key
to the Balkans: The Battle for Serbia 1944’ in the sources.
2). In Svetova
Revoluce and the codes of the Czechoslovak resistance I added information
from the report ‘Dopady lúštenia šifrovacieho systému čs. londýnskeho
MNO z rokov 1940-1945 na domáci odboj’ and a short biography of Karol Cigan
(from the essay 'STP cipher of the Czechoslovak in-exile Ministry of Defence in
London during WWII’ by Štefan Porubský).
Wednesday, August 2, 2017
Compromise of Greek military and diplomatic communications in WWII
At the start
of WWII the Kingdom
of Greece, ruled by Ioannis Metaxas (head
of the 4th of
August Regime) followed a neutral foreign policy and tried to avoid taking
part in the conflict. However constant Italian harassment and provocations
(such as the sinking of the
cruiser Elli) and the transfer of Italian army units to Albania made it
clear that war could not be avoided for long.
In October
1940 Italian forces invaded Greece, in the area of Epirus, and
the Greek-Italian
war started. The Greek forces were able to contain the assault and the
Greek counterattack forced the Italians back into Albanian territory. After the
defeat of a major Italian offensive
in spring 1941 the front stabilized inside Albania.
At the time
Britain was overextended with obligations in Europe, Middle East and Asia.
However the British armed forces made a small contribution with an RAF
expeditionary corps. When more British forces started to
arrive in March 1941, their involvement gave Germany an excuse to become
involved in the conflict.
German
forces invaded
Greece in April 1941 and made rapid progress due to the fact that
almost the entire Greek Army was fighting in the Epirus area. The remaining
units and the small British forces transferred to Greece in March-April 1941
were unable to stop them. Then in May 1941 the Germans were also able to defeat
the Greek and British forces that had retreated to the strategic island of Crete.
TICOM I-123
I’ve uploaded
TICOM report I-123 ‘Interrogation
Report on Rudolf Trappe (Civilian) of OKW/Chi’.
Tuesday, August 1, 2017
War By Numbers
Christopher
A. Lawrence of the Dupuy Institute has published the book ‘War by Numbers
Understanding Conventional Combat’.
War by Numbers assesses the nature of
conventional warfare through the analysis of historical combat. Christopher A.
Lawrence (President and Executive Director of The Dupuy Institute) establishes
what we know about conventional combat and why we know it. By demonstrating the
impact a variety of factors have on combat he moves such analysis beyond the
work of Carl von Clausewitz and into modern data and interpretation.
Using vast data sets, Lawrence
examines force ratios, the human factor in case studies from World War II and
beyond, the combat value of superior situational awareness, and the effects of
dispersion, among other elements. Lawrence challenges existing interpretations
of conventional warfare and shows how such combat should be conducted in the
future, simultaneously broadening our understanding of what it means to fight
wars by the numbers.
Table of contents
Preface ix
Acknowledgments xi
Abbreviations xiii
Understanding War 1
Force Ratios
8
Attacker versus Defender
14
Human Factors
16
Measuring Human Factors in Combat:
Italy 1943-1944 19
Measuring Human Factors in Combat:
Ardennes and Kursk 32
Measuring Human Factors in Combat:
Modern Wars 49
Outcome of Battles 60
Exchange Ratios
72
The Combat Value of Superior
Situational Awareness 79
The Combat Value of Surprise 121
The Nature of Lower Levels of
Combat
146
The Effects of Dispersion on
Combat
163
Advance Rates 174
Casualties 181
Urban Legends 206
The Use of Case Studies 265
Modeling Warfare
285
Validation of the TNDM
299
Conclusions
325
Appendix I: Dupuy’s Timeless Verities
of Combat 329
Appendix II: Dupuy’s Combat Advance
Rate Verities 335
Appendix III: Dupuy’s Combat Attrition
Verities 339
Notes 345
Bibliography 369
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