Military and intelligence history mostly dealing with World War II.
Saturday, February 24, 2018
Coldspur’s website
I’ve added a
link to Tony Percy’s website coldspur.com
Tuesday, February 20, 2018
Radio War Nerd interview of Yasha Levine
Interview of Yasha
Levine (author of Surveillance
Valley: The Secret Military History of the Internet) by Mark Ames and John
Dolan (The War Nerd).
Monday, February 19, 2018
Candle in the Dark: COMINT and Soviet Industrial Secrets, 1946-1956
The study ‘Candle in the Dark: COMINT and Soviet Industrial Secrets, 1946-1956’ by Carol B.
Davis is available for download from the NSA website.
This version
(unlike the copy at the Cryptologic Museum’s Library) is complete!
Saturday, February 17, 2018
To err is human vol 4
In my essay Rommel’s
microwave link I had mentioned that a German speech cipher system was used
on a microwave link connecting the German high command with Rommel’s HQ in
North Africa.
According to ‘Spread Spectrum Communications Handbook’
vol1:
'In 1935, Telefunken engineers Paul
Kotowski and Kurt Dannehl applied for a German patent on a device for masking
voice signals by combining them with an equally broad-band noise signal
produced by a rotating generator. The receiver in their system had a duplicate
rotating generator, properly synchronized so that its locally produced noise
replica could be used to uncover the voice signal. The U.S. version of this
patent was issued in 1940, and was considered prior art in a later patent on
DSSS communication systems. Certainly, the Kotowski-Dannehl patent exemplifies the
transition from the use of key-stream generators for discrete data encryption
to pseudorandom signal storage for voice or continuous signal encryption.
Several elements of the SS concept are present in this patent, the obvious
missing notion being that of purposeful bandwidth expansion.
The Germans used Kotowski’s concept as
the starting point for developing a more sophisticated capability that was
urgently needed in the early years of World War II. Gottfried Vogt, a
Telefunken engineer under Kotowski, remembers testing a system for analog
speech encryption in 1939. This employed a pair of irregularly slotted or
sawtoothed disks turning at different speeds, for generating a noise-like
signal at the transmitter, to be modulated/multiplied by the voice signal. The
receiver’s matching disks were synchronized by means of two transmitted tones,
one above and one below the encrypted voice band.
This system was used on a
wire link from Germany, through Yugoslavia and Greece, to a very- and/or
ultra-high frequency (VHF/UHF) link across the Mediterranean to General Erwin Rommel’s
forces in Derna, Libya.'
After having
a look at google patents I saw that Vogt was credited with a patent and I thought
that this was the speech cipher system but I was corrected by klausis
krypto kolumne commenter ‘Thomas’, who linked the Kotowski-Dannehl patent.
Thus in Rommel’s
microwave link I’ve added a link and pics to patent US2211132A.
Friday, February 2, 2018
Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluation of Office of War Information ciphers
During WWII
the US Office
of War Information engaged in intelligence gathering and propaganda
activities against the Axis powers.
The
representatives of the OWI used various cipher systems in order to protect
their communications and these systems were examined by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
A summary
report was issued in July 1944 and it found problems with physical security,
classification procedures, stereotyped messages and cipher reuse.
Regarding OWI
ciphers it was noted that ‘Present double
transposition keys have been in use since they were produced by the Signal
Corps in late 1942 and early 1943’ and the recommendation was ‘That immediate supersession of these keys be
accomplished and that provision be made for their more frequent supersession in
the future’.
Source: US National Archives, collection RG
208, Office of Wartime Information: General Records of the Security Officer,
Entry 9. Location: 350/71/17/6, Box 1.
Folder Communications Survey OWI.
Acknowledgements: I have to thank Robert Hanyok for locating
and copying the JCS evaluation.
Thursday, February 1, 2018
Article on Germans signals intelligence operations in occupied Yugoslavia
The ‘Journal
of Intelligence History’ article ‘The
German ‘ultra’: signals intelligence in Yugoslavia 1943–1944’ by Gaj
Trifković has interesting information on the dissemination and use of signals
intelligence by the Germans in their war against the Chetnik and Partisan
resistance movements in WWII.
ABSTRACT
This article deals with the extensive signals surveillance program operated by the Wehrmacht and directed at their most dangerous enemy in the Balkans, the Yugoslav Partisans. This subject has so far received surprisingly little attention in academic circles despite the fact that it was one of the crucial pillars of the entire Axis counter-insurgency effort in Yugoslavia and that it was one of the most successful actions of its kind conducted by the German intelligence. Based largely on previously unpublished primary sources, as well as post-war literature, this article will outline the workings of the program during its heyday in the years 1943–1944 and seek to establish its impact on the battlefield. As such, it will hopefully prove to be useful to both students of wartime events in the Western Balkans and to researchers of intelligence services during the Second World War in general.
ABSTRACT
This article deals with the extensive signals surveillance program operated by the Wehrmacht and directed at their most dangerous enemy in the Balkans, the Yugoslav Partisans. This subject has so far received surprisingly little attention in academic circles despite the fact that it was one of the crucial pillars of the entire Axis counter-insurgency effort in Yugoslavia and that it was one of the most successful actions of its kind conducted by the German intelligence. Based largely on previously unpublished primary sources, as well as post-war literature, this article will outline the workings of the program during its heyday in the years 1943–1944 and seek to establish its impact on the battlefield. As such, it will hopefully prove to be useful to both students of wartime events in the Western Balkans and to researchers of intelligence services during the Second World War in general.
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