Their most
modern and (in theory) secure system was the M-138-A
strip cipher. Unfortunately for the Americans this system
was compromised and diplomatic messages were read by the Germans, Finns,
Japanese, Italians and Hungarians. The strip
cipher carried the most important diplomatic traffic of the United States
(at least until mid/late 1944) and by reading these messages the Axis powers
gained insights into global US policy.
Germans,
Finns and Japanese cooperated on the solution of the strip cipher. In 1941
the Japanese gave to the Germans alphabet strips and numerical keys that they
had copied from a US consulate in 1939 and these were passed on by the Germans
to their Finnish allies in 1942. Then in 1943 the Finns started sharing their
results with Japan.
Finnish
solution of State Department cryptosystems
During WWII
the Finnish
signal intelligence service worked mostly on Soviet military and NKVD
cryptosystems however they did have a small diplomatic section located in Mikkeli. This department had
about 38 analysts, with the majority working on US codes.
Head of the
department was Mary Grashorn. Other important people were Pentti Aalto
(effective head of the US section) and the experts on the M-138 strip
cipher Karl
Erik Henriksson and Kalevi Loimaranta.
Their main
wartime success was the solution of the State Department’s M-138-A cipher. The
solution of this high level system gave them access to important diplomatic
messages from US embassies in Europe and around the world.
Apart from
purely diplomatic traffic they were also able to read messages of other US
agencies that used State department cryptosystems, such as the OSS
-Office of Strategic Services Bern station, Military
Attaché in Switzerland, Office
of War Information representative in Switzerland, the
Foreign Economic Administration, War Shipping Administration, Office of
Lend-Lease Administration and the War Refugee Board.
Operation
Stella Polaris
In September
1944 Finland signed an armistice with the Soviet Union. The people in charge of
the Finnish signal intelligence service anticipated this move and fearing a
Soviet takeover of the country had taken measures to relocate the radio service
to Sweden. This operation was called Stella Polaris (Polar Star).
In late
September roughly 700 people, comprising members of the intelligence services
and their families were transported by ship to Sweden. The Finns had come to an
agreement with the Swedish intelligence service that their people would be
allowed to stay and in return the Swedes would get the Finnish crypto archives
and their radio equipment. At the same time colonel Hallamaa, head of the
signals intelligence service, gathered funds for the Stella Polaris group by
selling the solved codes in the Finnish archives to the Americans, British and
Japanese.
The Stella
Polaris operation was dependent on secrecy. However the open market for Soviet
codes made the Swedish government uneasy. In the end most of the Finnish
personnel chose to return to Finland, since the feared Soviet takeover did not
materialize.
The Higgs
memorandum
In September
1944 colonel Hallamaa met
with L. Randolph Higgs, an official of the US embassy in Sweden and told him
about their successes with US diplomatic codes and ciphers.
This
information was summarized in a report prepared by Higgs, dated 30 September
1944.
The report
can be found in the US National Archives - collection RG 84 ‘Records of the
Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State’ - ‘US Legation/Embassy
Stockholm, Sweden’ - ‘Top Secret General Records File: 1944’.
Higgs met
with colonel Hallamaa on September 29 and the OSS officials Tikander and Cole
were also present during their discussion.
Hallamaa
stated that he was an administrator, not a cryptanalyst and about 10-12 of his men
worked on US diplomatic codes.
His unit had
solved the US codes Gray, Brown, M-138-A strip cipher and enciphered codebooks
(probably the A1, B1, C1).
The high
level M-138-A system had been solved mostly by taking advantage of operator
mistakes such as sending strip cipher information on other systems that had already
been broken or sending the same message in different strips one of which had
been broken.
The strip
cipher was considered a strong encryption system and had been adopted by the
Finns for some of their traffic.
Important
diplomatic messages from the US embassies in Switzerland, Sweden and Finland
were read by the Finnish codebreakers.
Regarding Bern, Switzerland most of the
messages dealt with intelligence matters:
‘Replying to my request for information
regarding the contents of the messages from our Legation in Bern to the
Department, Col. Hallamaa said the great bulk of them were intelligence
messages dealing with conditions in Germany, France, Italy and the Balkans. He
spoke in complimentary terms about ‘Harrison’s’ information service’.
Regarding
Helsinki, Finland Hallamaa stated that thanks to the decoded diplomatic traffic
they were always informed of current US policy initiatives:
‘Col. Hallamaa said that they always knew
before McClintock arrived at the Foreign Office what he was coming to talk about’.
Hallamaa
revealed a lot of confidential information to the Americans and volunteered to
have some of his experts interviewed.
The interview was conducted on friendly
terms with Higgs stating; ‘Col. Hallamaa
was most pleasant and seemed to be entirely frank and open regarding the
matters discussed’.
Additional
information: In
November 1944 the US cryptanalysts Paavo Carlson of the Army’s Signal
Security Agency and Paul E. Goldsberry of the State
Department’s cipher unit interviewed Finnish officials regarding their work
on US codes. Their report can be found here.
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