WWII Myths - T-34 Best Tank of the war

The Soviet T-34 tank is well known by anyone who has an interest in WWII history. Books, articles, documentaries present it in triumphant terms.  It was superior to everything the Germans had, it had revolutionary sloped armor, unprecedented mobility and was one of the reasons the Soviet side won in the Eastern front.

How realistic are these statements? Was the T-34 really a war winning weapon? How did it compare to German and Western tanks? How did it perform during the war? If we try to answer these questions by looking at actual data then things start to change. Instead of a mechanical marvel we get a poorly designed and built combat system that suffered horrific losses against ‘inferior’ German tanks.

Let’s start with debunking some of the most common statements.

The revolutionary design of the T-34

The T-34 was supposed to be the first tank that employed sloped armor. This characteristic meant that the armor protection was significantly enhanced, compared to straight armor. However French tanks of that period like the SOMUA S35 and the Renault R35 also had sloped armor.

Moreover there were several problems created by the sloped armor in the front, the sides and the back of the vehicle. This choice seriously diminished the internal space of the T-34. Tanks are always crowded on the inside. The T-34 however had a huge problem when it came to internal space.

The limited space not only affected crew performance but turned the T-34 into a deathtrap. A US study from the Korean War (based on the T-34/85 that was roomier than the T-34/76) concluded that due to the limited internal space a penetration by an A/T round usually led to the destruction of the tank and loss of 75% of the crew. In the Sherman the figure was only 18% (1).

German tanks like the Pz III and Pz IV had a conventional hull design but they also used slope in the middle part of their front hull armor. The new Panther tank was the first German tank to have a fully sloped hull front and sloped sides however the armor layout did not limit internal space like in the T-34.

The turret also suffered from a lack of space. It was so cramped that it affected movement.

American experts who examined a T-34 at the Aberdeen testing grounds in 1942 had this to say:

‘The main weakness is that it is very tight. The Americans couldn't understand how our tankers could fit inside during a winter, when they wear sheepskin jackets’

Fuel tanks in the fighting compartment

The T-34 had limited internal space due to the sloped armor in the front, the sides and the back of the vehicle. There were fuel tanks in the engine compartment and at the sides of the hull. The presence of fuel tanks inside the fighting compartment made any penetration of the tank likely to lead to the complete loss of the vehicle.

According to author Steven Zaloga in ‘T-34-85 vs M26 Pershing: Korea 1950’, p23:

‘Armor data provides only part of the picture of a tank's protection. Other factors in assessing the vulnerability of a tank include the internal arrangement of fuel and ammunition. The T-34-85 is a clear example of the trade-off between the benefits and drawbacks of steeply angled protective armor. Although the T-34's sloped sides reduced the likelihood of the tank being penetrated by enemy projectiles, it also led to a decrease in internal hull volume. In the event that the T-34 was penetrated, the projectile was far more likely to produce catastrophic damage among the fuel and ammunition stored in such a small space. The side sponsors of the T-34's fighting compartment in particular contained fuel cells that if penetrated could lead to fire and the destruction of the tank.’

Serious design flaws

Apart from the limited internal space there were two more serious design flaws.

One was the lack of turret basket (a rotating floor that moves as the turret turns) for the loader. This meant that the person loading the shells had to follow the movement of the gun and at the same time keep an eye on the floor so he doesn’t trip on the spent casings.

The other major issue was the two-man turret which forced the commander to also act as the gunner. This drastically limited combat performance as the commander could not focus on leading the tank but instead had to engage targets.

A three-man turret was finally introduced with the T-34/85 in March ’44.

Armor spalling

The armor of the T-34 had a high Brinell rating, meaning it was very hard. This was advantageous in defeating antitank rounds of caliber equal or lower to the armor’s thickness but had the disadvantage that it could lead to spalling. Combined with manufacturing flaws in the construction of the tank this meant that the T-34’s crew was often in danger even when hit by tank rounds that did not penetrate the armor.

The study ‘Review of Soviet ordnance metallurgy’, p3-5 says:

‘The armor components of the T-34 tank, with the exception of the bow casting which was unheat-treated, were heat-treated to very high hardnesses (430-500 Brinell), probably in an attempt to secure maximum resistance to penetration by certain classes of armor-piercing projectiles even at the expense of structural integrity under ballistic attack.’

‘The quality of the armor steels ranged from poor to excellent. Wide variations in production technique were indicated; some rolled armor components were well cross-rolled while others were virtually straightaway rolled………The bow casting of the T-34 tank was very unsound and would have been rejected under American standards.’

‘Shallow penetration, poor fusion, severe undercutting, porosity, and cracking was observed in most of the welds and probably resulted from improper manipulation of electrodes which might not have had suitable operating characteristics….. These obvious defects, together with low strength and pour metallurgical structure of ferritic weld deposits, indicate that the welded joints would have poor resistance to severe shock.’

‘The results obtained from the metallurgical examination of these early world war ii Soviet tanks have been described in some detail since they are exactly the same as have been obtained from all examinations performed since then of Soviet tanks which were recovered in Germany after the end of world war ii, and on Soviet tanks which were captured in Korea during 1950-52. The Ordnance Corps has examined several Soviet JS-II which were found in Germany and several Soviet T-34 tanks from both Germany and Korea.’

'Some of the armor steels have surprisingly high toughness considering the very high hardness levels but many of the armor steels, even the softer ones, are very brittle.’

‘The very high hardness encountered in most Soviet tank armor has caused much unnecessary concern regarding the relative ballistic performance of the hard Soviet armor and the softer American armor. Many people associate high hardness with high resistance to penetration. Although this is true, within limits, in the case of attack of armor by undermatching projectiles (i.e. caliber of shot is less than the tnickness of the armor) particularly at low obliquities of attack, it definitely not true when the armor is attacked by larger caliber shot at higher obliquities of impact’

Automotive performance

Christie suspension

The Christie suspension used on the T-34 had the advantage that it allowed for high speeds on road. Its disadvantages were that it took a lot of internal space and it had poor stability in rough terrain.

A German test of tank pitching motion at the Kummersdorf testing facility (1km undulated track) showed that the T-34 had the worst stability compared to the Pz IV, Tiger, Sherman and Panther (2).

According to the study ‘Engineering analysis of the Russian T34/85 tank’ the main problem was the lack of shock absorbers.(3)

The Christie suspension was a technological dead-end and the Aberdeen evaluation says: ‘The Christie's suspension was tested long time ago by the Americans, and unconditionally rejected’.

It was replaced in postwar Soviet tanks with the torsion bar system, same as the T-34M and T43 prototypes intended to replace the T-34 during the war.
 

Problematic gearbox

Another major problem was the unwieldy gearbox. It had poor reliability and it needed excessive force to change gears, leading to driver fatigue. The study ‘Engineering analysis of the Russian T34/85 tank’ says (4):

'Rough steering due to the use of clutch and brake steering control, and

Difficulty in shifting due to the use of a spur gear clash-shift transmission (no synchronizers, no clutches) and a multi-disc dry clutch, undoubtedly make driving this tank a difficult and very fatiguing job.’

Initially the powerful V-2 engine (500hp) could not be used to the fullest due to the 4-speed gearbox (5). Changing gears required excessive force on behalf of the driver. The T-34 could use the 4th gear only on a paved road, thus the max speed over cross-country was theoretically 25 km/h but in practice it was only 15km/h because changing from 2^nd gear to 3^rd required superhuman strength.

On later modifications there was a 5-speed gearbox which allowed for a cross country speed of 30 km/h. However it seems that even vehicles built late in the war were not guaranteed to have the new 5-speed gearbox. The tanks given to the Polish People's Army in late 1944/early 1945 and those used by the North Korean Army in 1950 had the old 4-speed setup (6).

Powerful gun?

The T-34 had a large caliber gun. The initial version was the L-11 76mm of 30.5 calibers. This was quickly replaced with the F-34 76mm of 42 calibers and the T34/85 had the ZiS S-53 85mm of 54.6 calibers.

The caliber numbers look impressive. After all the main German tank of 1941-43 Pz III had a 50 mm gun and that of 1943-45 Pz IV had 75mm. However Soviet tank guns suffered from low velocity leading to poor penetration and accuracy at long ranges.

For example the initial round velocity (m/s) for the Soviet guns (7) (using the standard A/T round) was:  L-11 - 612, F-34 - 655 (a German test with Pzgr39 ammo showed 625), ZiS S-53 - 792. The comparable German stats (8) were: KwK 38 L/42 - 685, Kwk 39 L/60 - 835, Kwk 40 L/43 - 740, Kwk 40 L/48 - 790, Kwk 42 – 925.

The KwK 40 75mm used by the Pz IV and Stug from mid 1942 had far better penetration performance and accuracy than the F-34 and the Panther’s KwK 42 was also superior to the ZiS S-53 85mm in the same areas.
 
Lack of radio

Initially only the unit commander’s tank had a radio. In the course of the war radio was used more widely but even in 1944 many tanks lacked a radio set. The lack of radio meant that Soviet tank units operated with little coordination.

Visibility problems

German combat reports show that T-34 tanks had serious difficulties in navigating terrain and identifying targets. The problem was that the vision devices made it hard for the driver and the gunner to see what was happening.

This problem was partially addressed during the war.

The T-34 ‘1941 version’ lacked the vision cupola found on German tanks. This equipment gave the commander a 360^o view of his surroundings. Also the optics were of poor quality.

The T-34 ‘1943 version’ had a larger turret and a German style cupola.

The T-34/85, introduced in March ’44, had a new large turret and the German style cupola.

However the quality of Soviet optics combined with the limited visibility from inside the tank affected combat performance. A German unit that used the T-34/76 model ’43 in combat noted (9):

‘The gun sights in Russian tanks are far behind the German designs. The German gunners need to be thoroughly accustomed to the Russian telescopic gunsights. The ability to spot a hit through the gunsight is very limited.’

‘In a Russian tank it is difficult to command a Panzer or a unit and at the same time serve as the gunner Therefore fire direction for the entire Kompanie is hardly possible, and the concentrated effect of the unit’s firepower is lost. The commander's cupola on the T 43 makes it easier to command and fire at the same time; however; vision is very limited to five very small and narrow slits.’

‘Safe driving and sure command of both the T 43 and SU 85 can't be achieved with the hatches closed. We base this statement on our experience that on the first day in combat in the Jassy bridgehead, four Beute-Panzer got stuck in the trench system and couldn't get free with their own power, resulting in the destruction of German defensive weapons during the attempt to retrieve them. The same thing happened on the second day.’

Reliability problems

The T-34 was supposed to be a simple and rugged vehicle that seldom broke down. Authors like to compare it to the more complex German tanks that supposedly broke down often. The concept of the T-34 as a reliable tank is another myth of WWII.

The majority of vehicles in 1941 were lost due to equipment malfunction. The same reliability problems continued during the period 1942-44. The evacuation and relocation of industrial facilities combined with the loss of skilled workers could only lead to the fall of reliability. 

In 1941 T-34 tanks often had to carry a spare transmission strapped on the back to counter equipment failures (10). In 1942 the situation worsened since many vehicles could only cover small distances before breaking down. In the summer of 1942 the following Stalin order was issued to units (11):

‘Our armored forces and their units frequently suffer greater losses through mechanical breakdowns than they do in battle. For example, at Stalingrad Front in six days twelve of our tank brigades lost 326 out of their 400 tanks. Of those about 260 owed to mechanical problems. Many of the tanks were abandoned on the battlefield. Similar instances can be observed on other fronts. Since such a high incidence of mechanical defects is implausible, the Supreme Headquarters sees in it covert sabotage and wrecking by certain elements in the tank crews who try to exploit small mechanical troubles to avoid battle.’

Henceforth, every tank leaving the battlefield for alleged mechanical reasons was to be gone over by technicians, and if sabotage was suspected, the crews were to be put into tank punishment companies or "degraded to the infantry" and put into infantry punishment companies.'

The constant complaints from the front forced the authorities to investigate the problems with T-34 production. In September 1942 a conference was held at the Ural tank factory by the Commissariat of tank industry (12). The conference was headed by Major General Kotin, People’s commissar of the tank industry of the USSR and chief designer of heavy tank ‘Kliment Voroshilov’. In his speech he said:

''Now ... there are a lot of complains about the T-34. You all know the reasons for flaws in the tanks. The first reason –inadequate visibility from the tank; the second reason, and this is the weak link that always accompanies our vehicle in the Army – final drive. And third, the main issue that we have today – insufficient strength of the idler wheel's crank. These issues are the major defects of the T-34 today. Having considered these issues from engineering and technological points of view I would like to discuss another issue, the one that directly resulted solely from our production deficiencies. They are: negligence during production of combat vehicles in the factories, carelessness of assembly and quality control of vehicles. As a result during combat employment our tanks sometimes cannot reach the front lines, or after getting to the territory occupied by the enemy for conducting combat operations, sometimes they are forced to remain on enemy's territory because of some little things... We have to make sure that as a result of this conference all shortcoming will be uncovered and following this conference all corrections in the tank will be implemented in the shortest possible time...

Recently comrade Morozov and I visited comrade Stalin. Comrade Stalin drew our attention to the fact that enemy tanks cover a lot of ground freely, and our machines although are better, but have a disadvantage: after 50 or 80 kilometers march they require repair. What are we talking about? It is because of control gear; also, as comrade Stalin said, because of drive gear, and he compared it with the Pz.III, which is in service with the German army, and which is inferior in armor protection, and in other features, and in crew's layout, and does not have such a fine engine, which the T-34 got, moreover its engine is gasoline, not diesel. But the question аrises – why its drive gear is developed better?

Comrade Stalin gave directives to engineers, to the People's Commissar comrade Zaltsman, to factory's CEOs and ordered them to fix all defects in the shortest time. A special order of the State Defense Committee has been issued on the subject as well as directives of the People's Commissariat of the Tank Industry. Despite all these resolutions have been made by Government and orders of the People's Commissar of the Tank Industry, despite repeated instructions from army units and from Main Directorate of the Armored Forces, which is in charge of combat vehicles operation, nevertheless all of these defects on vehicles are going on... We have to reveal all these flaws, and suggestions have to be made on at this conference how to modify machine component better and faster in order to make the T-34 tank, which is recognized in the army as a good tank, even better fighting machine.''

The situation continued to be problematic even in 1943-44.

There were constant problems with the gearbox and the engine filters. The Aberdeen evaluators noted:

‘On the T-34 the transmission is also very poor. When it was being operated, the cogs completely fell to pieces (on all the cogwheels). A chemical analysis of the cogs on the cogwheels showed that their thermal treatment is very poor and does not in any way meet American standards for such mechanisms.’

‘The deficiency of our diesels is the criminally poor air cleaners on the T-34. The Americans consider that only a saboteur could have constructed such a device’

The same problems were identified in a T-34/85 built in 1945. The US study ‘Engineering analysis of the Russian T34/85 tank’ noted (13):

‘Wholly inadequate engine intake air cleaners could be expected to allow early engine failure due to dust intake and the resulting abrasive wear. Several hundred miles in very dusty operation would probably be accompanied by severe engine power loss.’

The same study says in page 451 about the transmission:

‘The transmission had by American standards already failed, although with extreme care it could have been used further. Teeth ends on all gears were battered as the result of clash shifting. Many pieces of gear teeth had been broken off and were in the transmission oil. The failure is due to inadequate design, since excellent steel was used through the transmission.’

The mental image of the T-34 travelling hundreds of kilometers without stopping is fantasy.

A German unit that used the T-34/76 model ’43 in combat noted (14):

‘Regardless of our limited experience, it can be stated that the Russian tanks are not suitable for long road marches and high speeds. It has turned out that the highest speed that can be achieved is 10 to 12 km/hr. It is also necessary on marches to halt every half hour for at least 15 to 20 minutes to let the machine cool down. Difficulties and breakdowns of the steering clutches have occurred with all the new Beute-Panzer. In difficult terrain, on the march, and during the attack, in which the Panzer must be frequently steered and turned, within a short time the steering clutches overheat and are coated with oil. The result is that the clutches don't grip and the Panzer is no longer manoeuvrable. After they have cooled, the clutches must be rinsed with a lot of fuel.’

Soviet tests on newly built T-34’s (15) showed that in April 1943 only 10.1% could complete a 330km trial and in June ’43 this went down to 7.7%. The percentage stayed below 50% till October 1943 when it rose to 78%, in the next month it dropped to 57% and in the period December ’43 - February ’44 the average was 82%.

Preliminary inspection of tanks built at the Ural tank factory No 183 (largest producer of the T-34) showed that in 1942 only 7% were free of defects, in 1943 14% and in 1944 29.4%. In 1943 the main problem was damage to the gear teeth (16)

The V-2 engine had serious reliability problems (17). Depending on the source in 1941 it supposedly lasted for 100 hours on average (18). This figure went down in 1942 since some T-34’s could not travel more then 30-35 km.

The T-34 tested at the Aberdeen centre was built at the best factory using materials of superior quality but its engine stopped working after 72.5 hours. This was not due to American interference as there was a Soviet mechanic (engineer Matveev) charged with maintaining it. Still it was much better than the standard tanks since it covered a distance of 343km. According to the head of the Armored Directorate of the Red Army N.Fedorenko, the average mileage of the T-34 to overhaul during the war, did not exceed 200 kilometers. This was considered adequate since the T-34’s service life at the front was considerably less. For example in 1942 only 66km. In that sense the T-34 was indeed ‘reliable’ because it was destroyed before it had a chance to break down on its own!

Still there are examples of T-34’s breaking down during assaults even late in the war (19). For instance the 5th Guards Tank army in 1943 lost as much as 31.5% of its tanks during its march to Prokhorovka. In August ’43 the 1st Tank army lost 50% of its tanks due to malfunction. As late as the second half of 1944 tank units tried to replace engines with more than 30 hours of operation before a major attack.

All WWII tanks had a hard time when travelling and they needed repairs and maintenance or they broke down.

There is also the question of standardization. The T-34 was produced at several factories. Each factory produced a slightly different variant. Could spare parts from Nizhny Tagil be used on a T-34 from Gorky? Doubtful.

The cheap T-34

One of the major characteristics of the T-34 was its low cost. This supposedly was the reason the Russians were able to build so many, while the Germans insisted on building expensive and thus limited numbers of tanks. Let’s take a look at these two statements.

Price

The concept of ‘cheap’ or ‘expensive’ has no meaning in a command economy. The reason being that the pricing mechanism is controlled by the government. If Moscow wanted a weapon to cost x amount of roubles it would cost x amount. Command decisions were made at the top and did not take into consideration free market concepts like return on investment, opportunity cost etc etc

The same issues affected, in a lesser way, the German, US and British war economies.

This makes it impossible to directly compare weapon systems by looking at the official prices. In general trying to compare the costs of weapon systems built in different countries under a command economy is very hard and prone to errors. Even using other indicators such as man-hours and input of raw materials can be misleading.

Just to give an example the ‘cheap’ T-34 had an aluminum engine. The Germans with more industrial assets than the SU and significantly higher aluminum production reached the conclusion that they could not provide their own tanks with an aluminum engine. It was simply too costly for them. This shows the different capabilities and priorities that countries have.

A better way is to compare prices of products in the same economy. This shows that the T-34 was much cheaper than the KV-1 and IS-2 tanks.

Also production costs and man-hours went down during the war. In 1941 8.000 man hours were needed to produce one T-34, this was reduced to 3.700 in 1943 (20). Price in rubles went from 430.000 in 1940 to 168.000 in 1944 (21).

Note that the manhours figure for the T-34 probably refers only to the construction of the hull and turret, not a finished tank (22).

Regarding the price, the study ‘Engineering analysis of the Russian T34/85 tank’, p5 says that:

‘it is believed, that the cost at the time of manufacture, converted to USA currency, would exceed 50.000 dollars.’

This was the same price as the M4 Sherman, an overall better vehicle, so it is not clear of how the T-34 was ‘cheaper’ than the competition (23).

 Mass Production

The second major issue is whether the mass production of the T-34 was due to its imaginary low cost.

The reality is that the T-34 was built in huge numbers because the SU had built (with American assistance prewar) huge production facilities. These gigantic facilities in the Urals were the reason for the mass production.

The Germans also took advantage of gigantism when they built the Nibelungenwerk factory in Sankt Valentin, Austria. This greatly expanded Pz IV production.

They also built the ‘expensive’ Panther in huge numbers (for their standards) in the period 1943-45. It was not the ‘cost’ of the Panther that allowed them to do so but the industrial assets assigned to it.

The Americans built staggering numbers of M4 tanks in their tank arsenals, not because the M4 was intrinsically cheap but because gigantic facilities were provided for its construction.

Quantity vs quality

When looking into whether a weapon system is cheap or expensive the price is only one factor. The other one and I think the more important one is its performance. Is it better to build 100 cheap tanks or 50 expensive ones? The price difference might be significant but that about the other costs?

100 cheap tanks will need twice the crews and twice the fuel as the 50 expensive ones. They will also need twice the spare parts. If 50 tanks require 25 supply trucks then the 100 will need 50. You get the idea.

Then there is the aspect of losses. A cheap but poorly designed tank system will suffer more losses than an expensive but well armed and armored one. Machines can be mass produced but what about trained crews? A tank force that has limited crew casualties will have many tank aces and even the rest will be able to perform well in combat. On the other hand a country that builds large numbers of inferior tanks will lose them quickly, together with their crews. This will create a downward spiral as inexperienced crews will make up the majority of crews and thus severely limit the capability of the armored force.

In the period 1941-44 the production difference in AFV’s was 2-1 in favor of the Soviets (slightly higher if we add Lend Lease) but the exchange ratio was 3.5-1 in favor of the Germans. This means that if the Germans could concentrate all their production in the East the Soviets would run out of tanks.

The endless stream of T-34 tanks

Another myth is that there were hordes of T-34’s attacking the German formations. A simple look at the Soviet tank strength at various points in the war shows that the T-34 was not the most important tank. The light tanks T-60 and T-70 and the tank-destroyer SU-76 made up the majority of AFV’s in 1941-42 and even in 1943-45 the T-34 comprised roughly half of the Soviet frontline AFV force. In summer 1941 there were only 967 T-34’s in the total strength of 22.000 tanks. For the rest of the war:

Operational forces
AFV	1-Dec-41	1-May-42	1-Nov-42	1-Jul-43	1-Jan-44	1-Jun-44	1-Jan-45
Tanks
Heavy	212	660	922	893	349	467	976
Medium	322	1,291	2,714	5,492	2,609	3,766	6,059
Light	1,393	2,025	3,542	3,447	1,438	1,147	564
Sum	1,927	3,976	7,178	9,832	4,396	5,380	7,599
SPG
Heavy				104	139	314	504
Medium				174	244	152	758
Light				86	523	1,565	3,399
Sum	0	0	0	364	906	2,031	4,661
Total  AFV	1,927	3,976	7,178	10,196	5,302	7,411	12,260
T-34 % of total	0.17	0.32	0.38	0.54	0.49	0.51	0.49

Source: ‘Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voina 1941-45. Dejstvuyushchaya Armiya’ via Axis History Forum

Production and losses during the war

T-34 production and losses
	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	Total
Production	2,800	12,553	15,812	13,949	12,110	57,224
Losses	2,300	6,600	14,700	13,800	7,500	44,900

Source: ‘Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century’

Just a bit under 45.000 lost during the war! War-winning indeed…

Total Soviet AFV losses in 1941-45 were 96.600. That’s not a typo. Almost one hundred thousand vehicles.

For comparison’s sake a German report found in ’Waffen und Geheimwaffen des deutschen Heeres 1933 - 1945’ (24) lists tank losses in the East from 1941-44 as 15.673 and total AFV losses (tanks, Stug, self-propeled guns etc) as 23.802.

 

Comparison with German and Western tanks

The German models Tiger and Panther were greatly superior to the T-34 in armor and firepower.

At the other end of the spectrum the outdated models PzI, PzII, Pz35 and Pz38 that were used in numbers in 1941-42 were completely outclassed by it.

The T-34 was superior in mobility as its 500hp engine gave it an excellent power weight ratio. Also its wide tracks minimized ground pressure and allowed movement in soft ground. However its stability over rough terrain was not better than the German tanks.
 
T-34 vs PzIII

The main German tank in the period 1941-43 was the PzIII. It weighed roughly 22 tons and was armed (in that period) with a 50mm gun.

The PzIII made up 28% of German tank strength at the start of operation Barbarossa. Roughly 72% of these had the new 50mm gun, the rest the 37mm (25). These guns could only penetrate the T-34 from the sides at close ranges while the Soviet tank could destroy the PzIII from long distances from all aspects.

By summer ’42 it made up 51% of German tank strength. At that time it had received a longer 50mm gun that could destroy the T-34 from 500m frontally (with special ammunition). It also received more basic armor (50mm from 30mm) plus 20mm bolted on parts. The extra armor negated the performance of the F-34 at long ranges.

Despite its theoretical inferiority the PzIII was able to fight against the T-34.

What it lacked in armor and firepower it made up by having a better internal layout, better reliability and optics, a commander’s cupola and radio in every vehicle. Its main advantage versus the T-34 was its superior reliability.

It is not clear whether some PzIII models had a turret basket (different authors support different views).

T-34 vs PzIV

The PzIV was the main German tank in the period 1943-45. It weighed 25 tons and was equipped with a 75m caliber gun. During the war it was upgraded with more armor and a better gun.

The PzIV made up 13% of German tank strength at the start of operation Barbarossa (26). The model used was equipped with a low velocity 75mm gun effective against infantry but not armored targets. From mid 1942 the PzIV was equipped with the longer 75mm gun KwK 40 that could destroy the T-34 from 1.000m. The basic armor was also increased to 50mm (from 30mm) plus 30mm bolted on and in 1943 80mm standard (for the front hull).

The upgraded PzIV was superior to the T-34 in internal layout, firepower, turret basket, optics, commander’s cupola, radio in every vehicle and its frontal hull armor could withstand the F-34 rounds. A Soviet study in 1943 (27) admitted that the Pz IV was superior to their tank, assigning it a combat value of 1.27 to the T-34’s 1.16 (with the Pz III being the base 1.0).

The T-34/85 that appeared in mid 1944 was a harder opponent due to its new gun but the PzIV still had an edge in the ‘soft’ factors mentioned above. Moreover the heavier 85mm rounds limited the number that could be carried to 56 compared to the Pz IV’s standard load out of 87. The 85 mm rounds were not stored in a safe manner (28) since 16 of the 56 rounds were in the turret This allowed the loader to use them quickly but it had the downside that a penetration of the turret led to the explosion of the shells and loss of the tank.

T-34 vs M4 Sherman

The main US tank in 1942-45 was the Sherman. It weighed 30 tons and was armed with a 75mm gun. The late war version M4 76 had a more powerful 76mm high velocity gun.

There are many similarities between the T-34 and the M-4 Sherman. Both tanks were built in huge numbers and they are comparable in weight and gun caliber. Even their updated version T-34/85 and M4 76mm are very close.

As a weapon system however the M4 was superior. It had the same good ‘soft’ qualities as the German tanks (internal layout, optics, radio), It had significantly better stability over rough terrain plus it was very reliable mechanically. In armor and firepower it was the same as the T-34.

The Sherman proved its superiority in the Korean war, when US M4 tanks demolished the North Korean armored units equipped with T-34/85 tanks.

Conclusion

The T-34 is the victim of Soviet and German wartime propaganda. The Russians had every reason to build it up as the best tank of WWII. The Germans also overstated its performance in order to explain their defeats.

If the T-34 was as good as propaganda made it out to be then it should have led to great Soviet victories in 1941-42. Instead what we see in that period is the poor performance of Soviet armored formations. In 1943-45 the T-34 was becoming outdated as the Germans used updated versions of the Pz IV and Stug III equipped with the powerful Kwk 40 75mm gun and of course they introduced the Tiger and Panther.

The ‘best tank of WWII’ suffered horrific losses against those tanks and even the updated version T-34/85 could not bridge the gap. According to a Soviet report (29) in the period summer 1943 - March 1945 the probability of the T-34’s armor being penetrated if hit was from 88-97%, thus any round that managed to hit the tank was practically certain to penetrate the armor.

The T-34 looked good on paper but in the battlefield its ‘soft’ flaws led to huge losses. Meanwhile Western tanks like the M4 Sherman and Pz IV may have lacked sloped armor or wide tracks but they were better combat systems overall.

In the Korean conflict of 1950-53 the T-34 again suffered disproportionate losses against Allied vehicles with comparable capabilities. The opinion of a Royal New Zealand Armoured Corps tanker is worth reading (30):

‘And now, Sir, a few words for your private ear on the T 34. I assume that the tks given by Joe to Mr. Wu are old models. Even so they were grossly overrated in press reports in the early days of the KOREAN Camaign. (A well placed HE shell from a 20 pr will lift the turret off). Only about 4 per Sqn have wrls and their armour is of poor quality. The whole tk is of the crudest workmanship, and breaks down with the greatest ease. (In fairness I must add that this may be due to inexperienced CHINESE crew). They would have to be used in mass, RUSSIAN fashion, to be any treat to a well trained, well equipped Army, as they have been proved somewhat inferior to the SHERMAN. A CENTURION will do to them what a TIGER did to the SHERMAN. They got their initial build up as a scapegoat to cover the natural and understandable, fact that the first American tps over here were raw, frightened boys who were also soft from occupational duties in JAPAN. The T 34, I am convinced, should be de-bunked. It is a workable tk, but NOT a wonder tk’.
 

Effect in the design of postwar Soviet tanks

Postwar Soviet tanks like the T-55, T-62, T-64, T-72 and T-80 all followed the same design principles as the T-34:
  

1.     Very low profile which meant limited internal space and poor gun depression.

2.     Limited weight which led to good speed performance but put limits on the level of armor protection.

3.     Simple and rugged construction which meant that they were capable of being mass produced by Soviet factories but at the expense of crew comfort.

Soviet models from the T-64 onwards tried to deal with the limited internal space by automating the ammo loading operation. However their autoloader was problematic and often led to accidents.

Western models like the M-48, M-60 and Centurion were taller and heavier but they provided their crews with a better environment. They also carried more ammunition (25%-51% more).

On paper the Soviet types looked superior but on the field it was the US and British types that won the battles. During the wars between Israel and the Arabs small numbers of Western made tanks wiped out numerically superior Arab forces equipped with the T-55 and T-62 tanks.

One of the most famous episodes is the Battle of the Golan heights in 1973. The Israeli Centurion tanks of the 7^th Brigade faced a huge Syrian force but managed to inflict horrific losses on them as they tried to overcome the tank barrier. The Centurion was much heavier (52t) than the T-55 and T-62 (36-40t) and powerfully armed and armored. It also carried 51% (65 vs 43) more ammo.

That battle was a repeat of WWII when the T-34’s charged the field only to be slaughtered by German tanks from a distance.

The performance of the T-72 which was supposed to be the tank that would win a hot war for the Russians was similar. In the Gulf Wars Iraqi T-72’s were easily destroyed by modern M1 Abrams tanks from great distances. As Tom Clancy put it ‘It was a death trap like everything else the Russians built’.

The T-34 legacy led the Russians to invest in quantity over quality. A mistake that their Allies paid dearly.

Notes:

(1). ‘T-34-85 vs M26 Pershing’, p75

(2). ‘Panther & Its Variants’, p71

(3). ‘Engineering analysis of the Russian T34/85 tank’, p8

(4). ‘Engineering analysis of the Russian T34/85 tank’, p8

(5). ‘Tankovy udar. Sovetskie tanki v boyakh. 1942-1943’, p392

(6). ‘Engineering analysis of the Russian T34/85 tank’, p143 and T-34: Mythical Weapon’, p349:

‘It was accepted, due to the available information in the subject literature, that the switch to the 5-speed transmission took place in 1943. However, the documents regarding the T- 34-85s delivered during the period end 1944/beginning 1945 (a month after their production) to the Polish forces prove that practically all vehicles had the 4-speed transmission. This applied to tanks produced by the No.183 Factory as much as to the ones produced by the No.112 Factory. The works on the new 5-speed gearbox along with the new main clutch design started in July - August of 1942 and paralleled the development of the T-34S.’

(7). Zaloga and ‘Kursk 1943’, p212

(8). Panzertruppen last pages

(9). ‘Panzer tracts no. 19-2: Beute-panzerkampfwagen’, p98

(10). ‘T-34/76 Medium Tank 1941-45’, p9

(11). ‘Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East’, p363

(12). ‘Неизвестный T-34’ (Unknown T-34), p52

(13). ‘Engineering analysis of the Russian T34/85 tank’, p9

(14). Panzer tracts no. 19-2: Beute-panzerkampfwagen’, p97

(15). ‘Armored Champion: The Top Tanks of World War II’ - chapter 8

(16). ‘Неизвестный T-34’ (Unknown T-34), p54

(17). ‘Tankovy udar. Sovetskie tanki v boyakh. 1942-1943’, p371-2

(18). ‘T-34: Mythical Weapon’, p123

(19). Tanknet forum and ‘T-34: Mythical Weapon’, p161

(20). ‘Accounting for War: Soviet Production, Employment, and the Defense Burden, 1940-1945’, p226

(21). ‘T-34: Mythical Weapon’, p160

(22). ‘Combat vehicles of the Uralvagonzavod: T-34’ by Ustyantsev & Kolmakov via AHF discussion. According to the authors the figure for a complete T-34 in January 1943 was 17.600 labor hours.

(23). Sherman's 1945 prices

(24). ’Waffen und Geheimwaffen des deutschen Heeres 1933 – 1945’, p278

(25). Panzetrtruppen

(26). Panzetrtruppen

(27). ‘T-34-85 vs M26 Pershing’, p10

(28). ‘T-34-85 vs M26 Pershing’, p24

(29). ‘Armored Champion: The Top Tanks of World War II’ - chapter 1

(30). Centurion Tanks in Korea - Report by Lt J Brown RNZAC March 1952 

Sources: ‘T-34: Mythical Weapon’ by Michulec and Zientarzewski, ‘T-34/76 Medium Tank 1941-45’ , ‘T-34/85 Medium Tank 1944-45’ and ‘T-34-85 vs M26 Pershing’ by Steven J. Zaloga, ‘Tankovy udar. Sovetskie tanki v boyakh. 1942-1943’, Panzertruppen vol1 and vol2 by Jentz, Panther & Its Variants by Spielberger, Evaluation of tanks T-34 and KV by workers of the Aberdeen testing grounds of the U.S , operationbarbarossa.net , ‘Accounting for War: Soviet Production, Employment, and the Defense Burden, 1940-1945’, ‘Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis’, Axis History Forum, Wikipedia, ‘Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century’, ‘Engineering analysis of the Russian T34/85 tank’, ‘Panzer tracts no. 19-2: Beute-panzerkampfwagen’, ‘Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East’, ’Waffen und Geheimwaffen des deutschen Heeres 1933 – 1945’, ‘Review of Soviet ordnance metallurgy’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies article: ‘Once Again About the T-34’, ‘Armored Champion: The Top Tanks of World War II’, ‘Неизвестный T-34’ (Unknown T-34)

Pics: T-34 fuel tanks from ‘Engineering analysis of the Russian T34/85 tank’ (p109), Kummersdorf test from ‘Panther & Its Variants’, damaged gear pics from ‘Engineering analysis of the Russian T34/85 tank’ (p263-269), destroyed T-34 pics from ‘T-34: Mythical Weapon’. 

Acknowledgements: I have to thank Boris Kavalerchik for translating General Kotin’s speech.