Military and intelligence history mostly dealing with World War II.
Sunday, July 29, 2018
TICOM DF-174A
The report has information on the Enigma cipher machine, the SG 39 cipher machine and the Enigma modification Lückenfüllerwalze.
Tuesday, July 17, 2018
‘Experiences 1920-1939’
Site governmentattic.com
has uploaded the NSA report ‘Experiences
1920-1939’ by Brigadier John H. Tiltman.
Friday, July 6, 2018
Update
In Allen
Dulles and the compromise of OSS codes in WWII I’ve added the information
from the Higgs
memorandum.
Thursday, July 5, 2018
The Higgs memorandum - Compromise of State Department communications by the Finnish codebreakers in WWII
During WWII
the US State Department used several cryptosystems in order to protect its
radio communications from the Axis powers. For low level messages the
unenciphered Gray and Brown codebooks were used. For important
messages four different codebooks (A1,
B1, C1, D1) enciphered with substitution tables were available.
Their most
modern and (in theory) secure system was the M-138-A
strip cipher. Unfortunately for the Americans this system
was compromised and diplomatic messages were read by the Germans, Finns,
Japanese, Italians and Hungarians. The strip
cipher carried the most important diplomatic traffic of the United States
(at least until mid/late 1944) and by reading these messages the Axis powers
gained insights into global US policy.
Germans,
Finns and Japanese cooperated on the solution of the strip cipher. In 1941
the Japanese gave to the Germans alphabet strips and numerical keys that they
had copied from a US consulate in 1939 and these were passed on by the Germans
to their Finnish allies in 1942. Then in 1943 the Finns started sharing their
results with Japan.
Finnish
solution of State Department cryptosystems
During WWII
the Finnish
signal intelligence service worked mostly on Soviet military and NKVD
cryptosystems however they did have a small diplomatic section located in Mikkeli. This department had
about 38 analysts, with the majority working on US codes.
Head of the
department was Mary Grashorn. Other important people were Pentti Aalto
(effective head of the US section) and the experts on the M-138 strip
cipher Karl
Erik Henriksson and Kalevi Loimaranta.
Their main
wartime success was the solution of the State Department’s M-138-A cipher. The
solution of this high level system gave them access to important diplomatic
messages from US embassies in Europe and around the world.
Apart from
purely diplomatic traffic they were also able to read messages of other US
agencies that used State department cryptosystems, such as the OSS
-Office of Strategic Services Bern station, Military
Attaché in Switzerland, Office
of War Information representative in Switzerland, the
Foreign Economic Administration, War Shipping Administration, Office of
Lend-Lease Administration and the War Refugee Board.
Operation
Stella Polaris
In September
1944 Finland signed an armistice with the Soviet Union. The people in charge of
the Finnish signal intelligence service anticipated this move and fearing a
Soviet takeover of the country had taken measures to relocate the radio service
to Sweden. This operation was called Stella Polaris (Polar Star).
In late
September roughly 700 people, comprising members of the intelligence services
and their families were transported by ship to Sweden. The Finns had come to an
agreement with the Swedish intelligence service that their people would be
allowed to stay and in return the Swedes would get the Finnish crypto archives
and their radio equipment. At the same time colonel Hallamaa, head of the
signals intelligence service, gathered funds for the Stella Polaris group by
selling the solved codes in the Finnish archives to the Americans, British and
Japanese.
The Stella
Polaris operation was dependent on secrecy. However the open market for Soviet
codes made the Swedish government uneasy. In the end most of the Finnish
personnel chose to return to Finland, since the feared Soviet takeover did not
materialize.
The Higgs
memorandum
In September
1944 colonel Hallamaa met
with L. Randolph Higgs, an official of the US embassy in Sweden and told him
about their successes with US diplomatic codes and ciphers.
This
information was summarized in a report prepared by Higgs, dated 30 September
1944.
The report
can be found in the US National Archives - collection RG 84 ‘Records of the
Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State’ - ‘US Legation/Embassy
Stockholm, Sweden’ - ‘Top Secret General Records File: 1944’.
Higgs met
with colonel Hallamaa on September 29 and the OSS officials Tikander and Cole
were also present during their discussion.
Hallamaa
stated that he was an administrator, not a cryptanalyst and about 10-12 of his men
worked on US diplomatic codes.
His unit had
solved the US codes Gray, Brown, M-138-A strip cipher and enciphered codebooks
(probably the A1, B1, C1).
The high
level M-138-A system had been solved mostly by taking advantage of operator
mistakes such as sending strip cipher information on other systems that had already
been broken or sending the same message in different strips one of which had
been broken.
The strip
cipher was considered a strong encryption system and had been adopted by the
Finns for some of their traffic.
Important
diplomatic messages from the US embassies in Switzerland, Sweden and Finland
were read by the Finnish codebreakers.
Regarding Bern, Switzerland most of the
messages dealt with intelligence matters:
‘Replying to my request for information
regarding the contents of the messages from our Legation in Bern to the
Department, Col. Hallamaa said the great bulk of them were intelligence
messages dealing with conditions in Germany, France, Italy and the Balkans. He
spoke in complimentary terms about ‘Harrison’s’ information service’.
Regarding
Helsinki, Finland Hallamaa stated that thanks to the decoded diplomatic traffic
they were always informed of current US policy initiatives:
‘Col. Hallamaa said that they always knew
before McClintock arrived at the Foreign Office what he was coming to talk about’.
Hallamaa
revealed a lot of confidential information to the Americans and volunteered to
have some of his experts interviewed.
The interview was conducted on friendly
terms with Higgs stating; ‘Col. Hallamaa
was most pleasant and seemed to be entirely frank and open regarding the
matters discussed’.
Additional
information: In
November 1944 the US cryptanalysts Paavo Carlson of the Army’s Signal
Security Agency and Paul E. Goldsberry of the State
Department’s cipher unit interviewed Finnish officials regarding their work
on US codes. Their report can be found here.
Wednesday, June 20, 2018
Monday, June 11, 2018
Friday, June 8, 2018
The Tanks of Operation Barbarossa
Boris
Kavalerchik, tank expert and author of the Journal of Slavic Military Studies
article ‘Once
Again About the T-34’ has published a book on ‘The
Tanks of Operation Barbarossa’.

Summary:
When the Germans invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 the Red Army had four times as many tanks as the Wehrmacht and their tanks were seemingly superior, yet the Wehrmacht won the border battles with extraordinary ease the Red Armys tank force was pushed aside and for the most part annihilated. How was this victory achieved, and were the Soviet tanks really as well designed as is often believed? These are the basic questions Boris Kavalerchik answers in this absorbing study of the tanks and the tank tactics of the two armies that confronted each other at the start of the war on the Eastern Front. Drawing on technical and operational documents from Russian archives, many of which were classified until recently and are unknown to Western readers, he compares the strengths and weakness of the tanks and the different ways in which they were used by the opposing armies. His work will be essential reading for military historians who are interested in the development of armoured warfare and in this aspect of the struggle on the Eastern Front.
Q&A with Boris Kavalerchik
The author was kind enough to answer some of my questions.
1) How did
you become interested in WWII history and why did you decide to write a book on
Soviet vs. German tanks during the 1941 campaign?
I've been
reading and collecting books and magazines about all kinds of military hardware
since I was 12 years old. In college, I had to go through military training and
become a tank platoon's commander in reserve, so my knowledge of tanks became
much deeper and more practical than before. After a while I started to realize
that military hardware is nothing without the people who use it, and I began to
pay much more attention to military history.
The Great Patriotic War has always
had special importance for people of the USSR, where I used to live. Many of my
relatives, including my father, fought in that war, and some of them were KIA.
Naturally, I have heard and read a lot about these historic events and become
quite interested in them. Eventually, I co-authored a book about the Soviet
Union and Germany's preparations for WWII, as well as that war's beginning. Tank
warfare played a very important part in determining the outcome of these
battles, so I decided to dedicate a separate study to this subject. That is how
my book came to life.
2) What
new information have you uncovered that differentiates your book from other
similar studies?
In the
USSR, only officially approved historians had access to the state archives.
Moreover, their work had to go through government censorship and could only
support the official point of view on history, which very often was far from
reality. After the collapse of the Soviet Union all archives gradually became
open to regular people who were interested in events from the past.
More and more original archival materials began to be published and even became
available online. As a result, I managed to find a lot of information which was
classified until recently and had been generally unknown, especially to western
readers.
This information allowed me to reach quite different conclusions in
comparison to widely held beliefs about Red Army's tanks during WWII based on
old Soviet propaganda. As a mechanical engineer, I also analyzed and compared
Soviet and German tanks from a purely technical standpoint,
but from rarely used angles which as a rule got neglected. The results struck
me as very unusual and I hope they will be of interest to my book's readers.
3) Do you
think that WWII era armored vehicles truly played a decisive role in combat
operations or has their contribution been exaggerated due to the ‘coolness’
factor?
I think
that a very important role in WWII was played not by armored vehicles
themselves but by armored forces which included not only tanks but motorized
infantry, artillery, combat engineers, anti-tank and anti-aircraft units, and
so on. Moreover, as a rule, armored forces fought successfully only in
combination and cooperation with other services and
branches of the armed forces. Tanks do have the ‘coolness’ factor, so
many people mistakenly take
them for wonder-weapons, capable of independently deciding the outcome of any
battle. In reality, this is not the case. Nevertheless, tanks were a
very significant part of the armed forces of all participants of
WWII.
4) In your
opinion what are the worst mistakes that popular history books make regarding
German and Soviet armored vehicles and the Eastern Front in general?
In my opinion, some authors of popular history books mistakenly judge people of previous generations and their armored vehicles from today's point of view using modern criteria. Every tank, without exception, has both positive and negative aspects. In order to determine them it is necessary to know the purpose and objectives of these tanks, which were not the same in all countries or in all periods of time. So, before criticizing any tank from the past, one should determine why it was designed and built the way it was. After understanding all factors which influenced tank design in a particular time and country, we can judge these combat vehicles much more objectively.
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