All the major
powers of WWII used tanks and especially in North Africa and in Europe they
played an important role in the actual combat operations. Some of these tanks
like the German Tiger were famous for their combat record, while others like
the Soviet T-34 and American M4 Sherman were produced in huge numbers.
However both
during the war and afterwards British tanks were criticized for being inferior.
The design and combat performance of British WWII tanks is a subject that has
received attention by historians and several authors like Correlli
Barnett, David
Fletcher and Peter
Beale are critical of British tanks.
The new book
‘British
Tank Production and the War Economy, 1934-1945’ by Benjamin
Coombs covers the administrative and production history of the British tank
program in WWII and its greatest strength is that it tries to explain why
certain decisions were made and what effects they had regarding production
numbers, tank quality and combat performance.
The book has
the following chapters:
Introduction
1. Government and Industry during
Disarmament and Rearmament
2. Government and Industry during
Wartime
3. General Staff Requirements and
Industrial Capabilities
4. The Tank Workforce and Industrial
Output
5. Overcoming Production Problems and
Delays
6. Influence of North America upon the
British Tank Industry
Conclusion
A great
review is available at amazon.co.uk by user ‘VinceReeves’ so I’ll repeat it here:
‘This is a long-needed objective view
of British tank production during World War II that finally manages to eschew
the hysteria and nonsense that generally attends this subject. Coombs
chronicles the evolution of tank design, and the shifting priorities of
production with authority and objectivity, and demonstrates how much
misunderstanding has attended the controversies over real and perceived quality
issues and inefficient tank production.
Basically, British tank production underwent three stages during the war; an early stage in which tank production was downgraded in favour of more vital air defence work, a second stage in which quality was sacrificed to boost quantity production to rectify numerical deficiencies, and finally a mature third stage in which quality was emphasised, and British tanks became more effective and reliable.
Coombs makes sense of what appear to be irrational decisions to continue the manufacture of obsolete tanks long after they were required - more often than not this was undertaken to keep production facilities and skilled labour within the tank programme so that they would be available when newer tanks were ready for introduction.’
If you are
interested in military history and you want to learn more about the British
tank program then this book is a valuable resource.
For me the
value of the book is that it helps explain German victories in N.Africa in
1941-42. The Germans benefited by fighting against an opponent whose tanks
constantly broke down. In the period 1943-45 the British tanks became more
reliable because a determined effort was made to thoroughly check and fix flaws
and a high priority was assigned to spare parts production.
I guess the ratio of AFV vs aircraft production tells most of the story.
ReplyDeleteFirst Britain:
Year......AFV......Aircraft.......Ratio
1941....4841........20094.........1-4.1
1942....8611........23672.........1-2.7
1943....7476........26263.........1-3.5
I/1944..2476........14607.........1-5.9
Germany
Year......AFV......Aircraft.......Ratio
1941....3790........11776.........1-3.1
1942....6180........15556.........1-2.5
1943...12063........25527.........1-2.1
I/1944..8929........17040.........1-1.9
As we see trying to build combat armor didn't help Germany at all. On the other hand in the eve of D-Day UK walked on its way to giving shit about tanks while building even more aircraft (and especially more and more heavy bombers).
Tanks were not "war winners". Air power was.