WWII Myths – Luftwaffe the tactical airforce

The Luftwaffe was supposed to be a ‘tactical’  airforce .As such it was very good at supporting the German army but could not have a ‘strategic’ effect on operations. If only the Germans had invested in 4-engine bombers they would have won the Battle of Britain ,they would have bombed the Russian factories and won the war easily... At least that’s what I’ve read in books and articles.

Do I agree ? No

In order to decide if the LW was a ‘tactical’ airforce we need to have a look at:

1.     Production of LW aircraft in numbers

2.     Production of LW aircraft in weight

3.     Composition of LW fleet

4.     Comparison with RAF’s Bomber Command

Let’s look at production. Here there is a problem regarding the way we count aircraft. A large number of ‘’fighters’’ were Ju-88 bombers used as night-fighters. The Bf -109 and the Ju-88 were also used as recon planes. So here I’ve added to the wikipedia bomber data the Ju-88 nighfighter and recon plane. Also did the same for the Bf-109 in the fighter table. The end result is :

	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
Bombers	3,244	4,007	5,161	5,854	5,284
Fighters	2,673	3,704	5,109	9,494	23,447
Ground Attack	603	507	1,249	3,266	5,596
Sum	6,520	8,218	11,519	18,614	34,327
% of Bombers	0.50	0.49	0.45	0.31	0.15
% of Fighters	0.41	0.45	0.44	0.51	0.68
% of Ground	0.09	0.06	0.11	0.18	0.16

Looking only at the number it’s obvious that bomber production dominates the other parts of the LW fleet. Even in 1943 when the percentage goes down to roughly one third if we take into account the cost of bomber planes vs fighters ( 2 engines vs 1 , larger and heavier etc) again the bombers are the no1 item.

A better way is to look at the weight of produced aircraft. Since bombers are larger and heavier it is a better indicator of the relative value of  LW production. I’ve used the same data as before but this time I multiply each type of aircraft with its standard weight (in kg,from Wikipedia). It may not be the most scientific way but it’s close enough:

	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
Bombers	27,243,908	35,169,130	46,480,454	55,588,060	52,254,726
Fighters	8,272,749	10,172,210	14,668,675	27,369,448	66,875,267
Ground Attack	2,900,430	2,433,420	5,732,460	13,496,580	19,813,883
Sum	38,417,087	47,774,760	66,881,589	96,454,088	138,943,876
% of Bombers	0.71	0.74	0.69	0.58	0.38
% of Fighters	0.22	0.21	0.22	0.28	0.48
% of Ground	0.08	0.05	0.09	0.14	0.14

 Now let’s have a look at the composition of the LW fleet throughout the war:  

	May-40	June-41	July-42	May-43	May-44	Jan-45
SE Fighters	1,369	1,129	1,364	1,489	1,608	1,937
TE Fighters	367	153	127	152	277	41
Night-fighters	0	205	308	456	874	1,144
Medium Bombers	1,758	1,355	1,881	2,126	1,362	484
LR Bombers		21	71	79	282	44
Ground Attack	467	578	466	852	836	753
Total Combat	3,961	3,441	4,217	5,154	5,239	4,403
Bombers % of Total	0.44	0.40	0.46	0.43	0.31	0.12

The Bomber force makes up ~41% of combat strength in 1941-44. So it is undoubtedly the largest part of the LW.

So the LW was definitely not an airforce that spent the majority of its resources on fighters and ground attack aircraft. Instead it was the Bomber force that ate up most resources.

Now let’s compare with a ‘strategic’ force, the RAF’s Bomber Command.

	May-40	June-41	July-42	May-43	May-44	Jan-45
LW-Medium Bombers	1,760	1,355	1,881	2,126	1,362	484
BC-Medium Bombers	598	576	448	327	123	220
LW-Long Range Bombers		21	71	79	282	44
BC-Long Range Bombers		56	208	912	1,390	1,620
Sum LW	1,760	1,376	1,952	2,205	1,644	528
Sum BC	598	632	656	1,239	1,513	1,840
Total Ratio (LW/BC)	2.94	2.18	2.98	1.78	1.09	0.29
4-engine ratio (BC/LW)	₋	2.67	2.93	11.54	4.93	36.82

What the numbers tell us is obvious. During the period 1939-42 BC has few bombers and only a small part are 4-engine. The majority of its aircraft are comparable or inferior to the standard German types.

So at least for the first half of the war no airforce operating in Europe can be said to be ‘strategic’.

Conclusion: Throughout the war the Kampfgeschwader accounted for the largest part of the LW. For the first half of the war no other nation had as many bombers available. Only in 1944 is the Bomber Force reduced in order to shift resources and pilots to the fighter defenses. Even then a large (for German standards) 4-engine He-177 bomber force is built up.

Compared to the ‘strategic’ Bomber Command the LW had a substantial numerical advantage in the period 1939-42 and bombers with similar or superior capability. Only in 1943-45 do the Brits have sufficient numbers of heavy bombers to classify as a ‘strategic’ force.

Taking into account the information presented so far it is clear that the Luftwaffe was not a tactical airforce in the period 1939-43. Only in ’44-’45 does the Bomber Force become eclipsed by the fighters and ground attack aircraft.

Sources: Strategy for Defeat , The Luftwaffe data book , AIR 22 - ‘’Air Ministry: Periodical Returns, Intelligence Summaries and Bulletins’’ , Wikipedia