Monday, February 27, 2012

German exploitation of Soviet radio-facsimile traffic

Another interesting event during WWII was the interception by the Germans of Soviet radio facsimile traffic. Apparently the SU had a large number of these radio stations and important documents were sent this way.

The agencies that intercepted this traffic were:

1.  The  Army Ordnance, Development and Testing Group, Signal Branch Group IV (Wa Pruef 7/IV)

2.  The Army Signal Intelligence agency’s group VI , (OKH/GdNA Group VI)
I’ve managed to find information from various sources. Here are the relevant parts:

From Foreign Military Studies P-038 ‘German Radio intelligence’, p247


Facsimile transmission by radio was in extensive use by such Russian agencies as the NKVD and the Commissariat for Transportation. A net of about forty to fifty facsimile stations, several of which were in Siberia -- for instance, in Irkutsk, Tashkent, and Vladivostok -- transmitted hand-written communications, typewritten texts, drawings, and weather maps. However, none of the Russian facsimile devices over fell into the hands of the Germans. Nevertheless, the latter did succeed in intercepting Russian facsimile messages with corresponding equipment. Up to 1941 the Russians transmitted messages via facsimile in clear text. Even after the Russians had begun to use cipher machines, the Germans still had no difficulty in finding solutions and recording almost the entire facsimile output until the end of the war.

From IF-123  "Consolidated report on information obtained from the following: Erdmann, Grubler, Hempel, Karrenberg, Schmitz, Suschowk. CSDIC (U.K.) SIR 1717, p13

 
Y-Traffic

69. This referred to the transmission of photographic messages by wireless means. Such traffic was picked up from all over the world, including lines from Moscow to Stockholm; London to Moscow; London to Cairo; New York and Moscow etc. Non-Russian channels did not yield any valuable intelligence as the photos intercepted were normally only of news agency interest. Internal Russian traffic of this nature did ,however, yield technical diagrams and charts which were communicated by wireless methods.
70. Y traffic was picked up in Ref 1c of Gruppe VI. The activity was discontinued in Jan ’45.

Also ‘European Axis signals Intelligence’ vol2 page 87 mentions TICOM report D-58 ‘Description of facsimile intercept recorder’.

Thursday, February 23, 2012

The Abwehr’s assessment of Russian women

If you read the title and expect this post to be critical of the conduct and morals of Russian women, during WWII, you will be disappointed. So read on!

The Abwehr was Germany’s military intelligence service. In the Eastern Front they had a lot of responsibilities like protecting the occupied areas from Soviet agents and saboteurs, combating partisans and generally keeping the population under control.

In order to carry out their mission they built up a large spy network that employed individuals of both sexes and various ethnicities, religions and political convictions.

In Foreign Military Studies report P-122German Counterintelligence activities in occupied Russia 1941-44’ pages 75-82 (available through the fold3 site), there are several paragraphs devoted to the personality traits that made Russian women different from their western counterparts. I found it so interesting that I decided to post the relevant part here:

o. Russian Women

The difficulties encountered by the Germans in working with female Russian agents were far greater than those experienced with male Russians. The Soviet women differed greatly from their Western counterparts in character, customs, and opinions. Some of the character differences in the Russian women were inherent while others were the result of Soviet influence and living conditions in the USSR.

(1) Peculiarities of Russian Women

The principal trait of contemporary Russian women was their independence, which was shown in all aspects of their behavior and especially in their relationships with men, Soviet women participated more actively in political activities than was surmised by the Western world. In the USSR, women often occupied high positions and exerted enormous influence on public and economic life. It was not unusual to find a woman directing a big concern, serving as chairman of an organization like the Society for the Promotion of Aviation and Chemical Defense (Osoaviachim), or as secretary of one of the Communist Party organizations . Moreover, the women in the USSR received training on an equal basis with the men. This developed their self-confidence. The Russian women occupying such high positions had more power over their subordinates than that enjoyed by their Western counterparts. A Soviet woman in high position could discharge an employee and turn him over to the NKVD for imprisonment. In the USSR, it was the official or political position that determined an individual's power, not the sex. Despite the generally demoralizing effect of Communism, Russian women had retained the high moral standards accredited to them. The Soviet system had influenced them to a lesser degree than the men. Russian women kept their word, were less amenable to bribery than the men, detested all excesses, and frowned on work for material gain only. Most Russian women were very strong and of great endurance, and were able to withstand pain as well as hunger, thirst, and cold far better than spiritual privation. Apart from these character traits, they owed their mental formation to the influence of foreign, especially to French, literature. They were influenced by the novels of de Maupassant, which were relatively well known in the USSR. Soviet propaganda also exerted a certain influence, pointing out that the Westerner, educated under capitalism, looked to women as a means to satisfy his carnal desires and neglected completely their personalities.

(2) Recruiting or Russian Female Agents

It was a long time before the Abwehr understood Russian women well enough to be able to employ them profitably. Other methods had to be used than those employed in recruiting Polish, Latvian, French, and Belgian women. The recruiting officer had to show that he was not interested in the prospect as a woman, for she would refuse to collaborate if she became suspicious of his intentions.

(3) Inducements

 The Abwehr personnel often stressed the inequalities of a woman’s position under the Soviet regime. True, she enjoyed equal rights, but she had to work harder and under greater difficulties. Her work under the Soviets was unsuitable and did not correspond to her physical make-up and mental qualifications, besides being injurious to her health. Moreover, the Soviet system disorganized the family. Husband and wife worked hard all day. If they desired advancement, they had to fulfill obligatory public services, attend meetings and lectures, serve on committees, sign manifestos, etc. On returning home, both were too tired to enjoy each other's company. The wife was unable to, educate and influence her children for luck of time, end apart from this, the Communist Putty did not permit any influence deviating from the Party line as set down by Lenin and Stalin. From infancy, every boy was influenced by the Soviet regime; he attended Soviet schools, and later joined Pioneer and Komsomol (Young Communist League) organizations. The case of Pavlik Morozov was always used a convincing example of what happened to children brought up by the Communist Party. Pavlik, the twelve-year old son of a collective farmer, denounced his father to the NKVD. For this betrayal, he was slain by his grandfather. The Soviets, however, erected a statue in Pavlik's memory, calling him a hero for betraying his father. Material inducements influenced women in Russia but not as much as they did elsewhere. Money gave them an opportunity to dress well, to buy cosmetics, and to pretty themselves, things they were unable to do on a large scale before the war.

(4) Tasks Assigned to Russian Female Agents

Set tasks and stereotyped orders were avoided. Every mission, however small, had to be presented idealistically. In every case assurance had to be given that the fulfillment of the mission would not harm the Russian people or be detrimental to their interests. In general, most of the prospects were ready and willing to help overthrow the Communist regime. A task involving some difficulty was presented as a challenge to awaken their sense of rivalry. For example, a woman spy might be told that it was doubtful whether she could outwit her competitor - a grown and experienced man - since she was only a woman. If her rival was a woman, she was told that the other female agent was prettier and smarter. The adversary was always described as an enemy of the people, a provocateur, informer, sadist, etc. …..



……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

In working with Russian female agents, the surest means of gaining their co-operation was to appeal to their minds and to stress the highly ethical nature of their mission. It was far more difficult to compel a Russian woman to accept a mission in which she had to play the role of a prostitute. The same was true of female agents sent out by Soviet intelligence agencies to spy on the Germans. Russian women accepted and carried out such tasks very unwillingly. Prostitutes were very rare and generally of weak character, stupid, rind therefore unfit for intelligence work.

(5) Motives influencing Female Agents

The best agents were those who wore convinced of the necessity of their work. Some female agents worked for the Abwehr to avenge fancied slights, or the death of some relative at the hands of the Soviets. Others volunteered to work for the Germans because Soviet intelligence had been about to conscript their services and assign them to tasks they were unwilling to do. Still others enlisted without knowing the dangers ahead of them. Once they had signed a contract, it was too late. German counter-intelligence agencies seldom forced Russian women to work for them, whereas the Soviets had no such scruples.

(6) Remuneration

Ant form of remuneration or mark of distinction given to a female agent was subject to certain rules. Whatever she received had to be given it, the form of a present. Money was presented in an envelope with a gift -- perfume, soap, silk stockings, etc. Female agents appreciated such attentions. Inexperienced Gorman officers or counterintelligence agents antagonized the women when they showed lack of tact in such matters.

(7) Recreation and Leaves

Recreation and leaves for female agents were complicated and delicate problems. When a male agent was on leave, a close watch had to he kept on him, for at such times he was particularly vulnerable. The question of leave for the female agents presented oven greater difficulties. The best solution to the problem was to organize tours to Germany for both male and female agents. Fairly small groups were made up under the supervision of a German Army specialist carefully selected for the purpose. In Germany, the female agents came in contact with a more cultured and broad-minded way of life. The falseness of Soviet propaganda regarding hunger and deprivations in the 'West 'was readily apparent. The shops, theatres, museums, and places of amusement and instruction furnished those women with so many new impressions that they had no time to think of the rigors of their work. Moreover, life in Germany gave them a goal for the first time in their lives' to live in the West after it was all over. They were confident that the Abwehr would give them good jobs or even support them when for one reason or another they wore no longer able to work as agents.

I wonder if modern Russian women also have the same traits.

Wednesday, February 22, 2012

Update

I re-uploaded TICOM reports I-78, I-194, I-112, I-113, D-60, I-20. The new files have the same quality but are much smaller in size.

Monday, February 20, 2012

WWII Myths – Luftwaffe the tactical airforce

The Luftwaffe was supposed to be a ‘tactical’  airforce .As such it was very good at supporting the German army but could not have a ‘strategic’ effect on operations. If only the Germans had invested in 4-engine bombers they would have won the Battle of Britain ,they would have bombed the Russian factories and won the war easily... At least that’s what I’ve read in books and articles.

Do I agree ? No

In order to decide if the LW was a ‘tactical’ airforce we need to have a look at:

1.     Production of LW aircraft in numbers

2.     Production of LW aircraft in weight

3.     Composition of LW fleet

4.     Comparison with RAF’s Bomber Command

Let’s look at production. Here there is a problem regarding the way we count aircraft. A large number of ‘’fighters’’ were Ju-88 bombers used as night-fighters. The Bf -109 and the Ju-88 were also used as recon planes. So here I’ve added to the wikipedia bomber data the Ju-88 nighfighter and recon plane. Also did the same for the Bf-109 in the fighter table. The end result is :

1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
Bombers
3,244
4,007
5,161
5,854
5,284
Fighters
2,673
3,704
5,109
9,494
23,447
Ground Attack
603
507
1,249
3,266
5,596
Sum
6,520
8,218
11,519
18,614
34,327
% of Bombers
0.50
0.49
0.45
0.31
0.15
% of Fighters
0.41
0.45
0.44
0.51
0.68
% of Ground
0.09
0.06
0.11
0.18
0.16


Looking only at the number it’s obvious that bomber production dominates the other parts of the LW fleet. Even in 1943 when the percentage goes down to roughly one third if we take into account the cost of bomber planes vs fighters ( 2 engines vs 1 , larger and heavier etc) again the bombers are the no1 item.

A better way is to look at the weight of produced aircraft. Since bombers are larger and heavier it is a better indicator of the relative value of  LW production. I’ve used the same data as before but this time I multiply each type of aircraft with its standard weight (in kg,from Wikipedia). It may not be the most scientific way but it’s close enough:


1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
Bombers
27,243,908
35,169,130
46,480,454
55,588,060
52,254,726
Fighters
8,272,749
10,172,210
14,668,675
27,369,448
66,875,267
Ground Attack
2,900,430
2,433,420
5,732,460
13,496,580
19,813,883
Sum
38,417,087
47,774,760
66,881,589
96,454,088
138,943,876
% of Bombers
0.71
0.74
0.69
0.58
0.38
% of Fighters
0.22
0.21
0.22
0.28
0.48
% of Ground
0.08
0.05
0.09
0.14
0.14



 Now let’s have a look at the composition of the LW fleet throughout the war:  

May-40
June-41
July-42
May-43
May-44
Jan-45
SE Fighters
1,369
1,129
1,364
1,489
1,608
1,937
TE Fighters
367
153
127
152
277
41
Night-fighters
0
205
308
456
874
1,144
Medium Bombers
1,758
1,355
1,881
2,126
1,362
484
LR Bombers
21
71
79
282
44
Ground Attack
467
578
466
852
836
753
Total Combat
3,961
3,441
4,217
5,154
5,239
4,403
Bombers % of Total
0.44
0.40
0.46
0.43
0.31
0.12



The Bomber force makes up ~41% of combat strength in 1941-44. So it is undoubtedly the largest part of the LW.

So the LW was definitely not an airforce that spent the majority of its resources on fighters and ground attack aircraft. Instead it was the Bomber force that ate up most resources.

Now let’s compare with a ‘strategic’ force, the RAF’s Bomber Command.


May-40
June-41
July-42
May-43
May-44
Jan-45
LW-Medium Bombers
1,760
1,355
1,881
2,126
1,362
484
BC-Medium Bombers
598
576
448
327
123
220
LW-Long Range Bombers
21
71
79
282
44
BC-Long Range Bombers
56
208
912
1,390
1,620
Sum LW
1,760
1,376
1,952
2,205
1,644
528
Sum BC
598
632
656
1,239
1,513
1,840
Total Ratio (LW/BC)
2.94
2.18
2.98
1.78
1.09
0.29
4-engine ratio (BC/LW)
2.67
2.93
11.54
4.93
36.82



What the numbers tell us is obvious. During the period 1939-42 BC has few bombers and only a small part are 4-engine. The majority of its aircraft are comparable or inferior to the standard German types.

So at least for the first half of the war no airforce operating in Europe can be said to be ‘strategic’.

Conclusion: Throughout the war the Kampfgeschwader accounted for the largest part of the LW. For the first half of the war no other nation had as many bombers available. Only in 1944 is the Bomber Force reduced in order to shift resources and pilots to the fighter defenses. Even then a large (for German standards) 4-engine He-177 bomber force is built up.
Compared to the ‘strategic’ Bomber Command the LW had a substantial numerical advantage in the period 1939-42 and bombers with similar or superior capability. Only in 1943-45 do the Brits have sufficient numbers of heavy bombers to classify as a ‘strategic’ force.

Taking into account the information presented so far it is clear that the Luftwaffe was not a tactical airforce in the period 1939-43. Only in ’44-’45 does the Bomber Force become eclipsed by the fighters and ground attack aircraft.


Sources: Strategy for Defeat , The Luftwaffe data book , AIR 22 - ‘’Air Ministry: Periodical Returns, Intelligence Summaries and Bulletins’’ , Wikipedia