The Intercept has investigated,
together with the Greek newspaper Kathimerini,
the Vodafone
wiretapping scandal of 2004. The article ’A DEATH IN ATHENS Did a Rogue NSA Operation
Cause the Death of a Greek Telecom Employee?’ by James Bamford is very
interesting.
Military and intelligence history mostly dealing with World War II.
Tuesday, September 29, 2015
Tuesday, September 22, 2015
Update
1). I’ve
added a link to “The
historical truth” of Beria and Suvorov about cryptography and radio
intelligence in Compromise
of Soviet codes in WWII.
2). I’ve
added Australian
tanker’s criticism of the T-34 tank and Combat
report of Soviet 10th Tank division - August 1941 in the Index.
3). I’ve
added information in WWII
Myths - T-34 Best Tank of the war. Specifically:
In paragraph Problematic gearbox: ‘However it seems
that even vehicles built late in the war were not guaranteed to have the new
5-speed gearbox. The tanks given to the Polish People's Army in late 1944/early
1945 and those used by the North Korean Army in 1950 had the old 4-speed setup
(6).’
In paragraph Reliability problems: ‘Soviet tests on
newly built T-34’s (14) showed that
in April 1943 only 10.1% could complete a 330km trial and in June ’43 this went
down to 7.7%. The percentage stayed below 50% till October 1943 when it rose to
78%, in the next month it dropped to 57% and in the period December ’43 -
February ’44 the average was 82%.’
In paragraph T-34 vs M4 Sherman: ‘The Sherman proved
its superiority in the Korean war, when US M4 tanks demolished the North Korean
armored units equipped with the T-34/85.’
In paragraph Conclusion: ‘In the Korean conflict of
1950-53 the T-34/85 again suffered disproportionate losses against Allied
vehicles with comparable capabilities. The opinion of a Royal New Zealand
Armoured Corps tanker is worth reading (28):
‘And now, Sir, a few words for your private
ear on the T 34. I assume that the tks given by Joe to Mr. Wu are old models.
Even so they were grossly overrated in press reports in the early days of the
KOREAN Camaign. (A well placed HE shell from a 20 pr will lift the turret off).
Only about 4 per Sqn have wrls and their armour is of poor quality. The whole
tk is of the crudest workmanship, and breaks down with the greatest ease. (In
fairness I must add that this may be due to inexperienced CHINESE crew). They
would have to be used in mass, RUSSIAN fashion, to be any treat to a well
trained, well equipped Army, as they have been proved somewhat inferior to the
SHERMAN. A CENTURION will do to them what a TIGER did to the SHERMAN. They got
their initial build up as a scapegoat to cover the natural and understandable,
fact that the first American tps over here were raw, frightened boys who were
also soft from occupational duties in JAPAN. The T 34, I am convinced, should
be de-bunked. It is a workable tk, but NOT a wonder tk’.
Wednesday, September 16, 2015
Book presentation – ‘Encryptors and Radio Intelligence. Shield and Sword of Information World’
In the 20th century
the widespread use of radio for communications gave governments and military
forces the ability to transmit information across vast distances almost
instantaneously. This new invention however had a big drawback since anyone
with a radio device could intercept this traffic. Thus the use of codes and
ciphers was mandatory if the contents of these messages were to be kept secure
from eavesdroppers.
By Anatoly
Klepov
Have we ever read anything similar in our commanders’ memoirs? Definitely not. The God of War for us is artillery, tanks, planes, and missiles. This very strategic opinion is most probably still valid nowadays. Do we have efficient and concealed (secured) forces management? In 1941 we had none…
As a cryptographer I was shocked by Pushkin words: “It’s better to be on hard labor rather than being wiretapped.” Hundreds of years have pasted and Pushkin remains virtually the only one who publicly declared the state invaded our privacy!
http://aklepov.com/index.php?page=Pushkin-and-the-tsar-s-cryptographer-en
http://aklepov.com/index.php?page=Pushkin-s-service-for-the-State-en
Countries
that neglected to follow this rule, or used weak crypto systems, paid for it in
blood.
In the First
World War the Western Allies were able to gain information of great value by
solving several German Army and Navy codes and in the Eastern front the Germans
were able to defeat the Tsarist Armies mainly by solving their ciphers, reading
their messages and learning of their plans in advance.
During WWII
both sides had their successes. In Britain the codebreakers of Bletchley Park
solved several enemy systems with the most important ones being the
German Enigma and Tunny cipher
machines and the Italian C-38m.
Codebreaking played a role in the Battle of the Atlantic, the North Africa
Campaign and the Normandy invasion. In the United States the Army and Navy
codebreakers solved many Japanese cryptosystems and used this advantage in
battle. The great victory at Midway would probably not have been
possible if the Americans had not solved the Japanese Navy’s JN25 code.
On the other
side of the hill the codebreakers of Germany, Japan, Italy and Finland also
solved many important enemy cryptosystems both military and diplomatic. The
German codebreakers could eavesdrop on the radio-telephone
conversations of Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, they could
decode the messages
of the British and US Navies during their convoy operations in the Atlantic and
together with the Japanese and Finns they could solve State Department messages
(both low and high level) from
embassies around the world.
Today there
is a vast amount of information available on the cryptologic history of Western
countries. Unfortunately the same cannot be said about the history of cryptology
in Russia, both during the Tsarist era and in the Soviet period. During the Soviet
era historians avoided references to codes and ciphers and instead talked about
‘radio-electronic combat’ which dealt with direction finding, traffic analysis
and jamming. After the fall of the Soviet Union Russian researchers have
presented new information on the organization and work of the Tsarist
codebreakers and of the Soviet cryptologic agencies but there are many
unanswered questions and large gaps exist regarding our knowledge of their
operations and achievements. Information
on the codes and ciphers used by the Tsarist and Soviet governments and Armed
Forces is limited and scattered in various books, articles and internet sites.
I have
already covered books published recently that deal with Russian cryptologic
history, such as ‘History of
cryptology’ by Grebennkov Vadim Viktorovich and ‘The cryptographic front’
by Butirsky, Larin and Shankin.
This time Anatoly Klepov, a
professional in the field of communications security has published ‘Encryptors and Radio Intelligence. Shield
and Sword of Information World’, which contains some of his articles
published online at Moskovskij
Komsomolets and writing.com
plus new research.
Although the
book was written for a Russian audience the author has published an interesting
summary in English at aklepov.com:
Do we know a lot about radio
intelligence activities? Very little. We get the knowledge mainly from Western
books. How do Western countries assess the radio intelligence efficiency?
Churchill, Great Britain Prime Minister, supposed that ““Ultra” (project on
German Enigma encryptor decryption – A.K.) was the most important and most
secret source of information.” He also stated that “”Ultra” is the tool that
helped us to win the war.”
John Slessor, Marshal of the Royal Air
Force, shares the same opinion: “”Untra” is ultimately valuable source of
intelligence data that had virtually fantastic effect on the strategy or even
the tactics of the allies.” Dwight David Eisenhower- Supreme Commander of
western allied forces – called the ‘Ultra’ operation as “the decisive factor of
allies’ victory.”Have we ever read anything similar in our commanders’ memoirs? Definitely not. The God of War for us is artillery, tanks, planes, and missiles. This very strategic opinion is most probably still valid nowadays. Do we have efficient and concealed (secured) forces management? In 1941 we had none…
Why have I named my book “Encryptors
and Radio Intelligence. Shield and Sword of Information World”?
Reason 1. War.
I started my military service in radio
intelligence back in 1972. In one year time, during Gulf of Suez crises, I
first realized what real radio war also means that full armies may lose battles
simple because the immediate information from commanders of military divisions
did not arrive to subordinates on time. Yet the most dangerous outcome was the
enemy decrypted or falsified the information.
Without concealed (encrypted)
communications hundreds of tanks and planes turned into scrap metal, whereas
military divisions became unorganized people having no idea what way to go and
where the enemy and allies are.
In general terms, radio intelligence
is not a simple radio channel wiretapping and decryption it also implies
imposing false information on enemy as well as replacing his messages, etc.
Information war determines the military campaign outcome. This is the reason
the opposing forces pay special attention to information wars. They conduct the
war not only on a battlefield but in mass media as well. Press, radio, and TV
are the second front during any large scale conflicts.
Military reporters often send real information from the conflict zones to discover quite a different event overview in the information space. Often press representatives striving to write the truth about war – truth incompatible with the view of world’s mass media agencies – died or perished.
Fortunately, newspapers that send
employees to hot spots start to realize that one has to equip military reporter
the same way as solders on the battlefield – armored jackets and helmets. Why
do paper and digital mass media editorials still do not provide their hot spot
reporters with strong encryption equipment to secure the information they
transmit?Military reporters often send real information from the conflict zones to discover quite a different event overview in the information space. Often press representatives striving to write the truth about war – truth incompatible with the view of world’s mass media agencies – died or perished.
Years later after my military service
and heading ANCORT Company I offered to equip the international hot spot media
representatives with encryption equipment. Free of charge.
However, not a single Mass Media
agency used the unique opportunity to provide their reporters with a strong and
reliable information security system. Why? Going through other wars I realized
that that was no coincident. No one wants true information on military actions
as it may have more disastrous consequences than the war itself. Even the “most
independent” mass media agencies were afraid the messages from their reporters
would contradict the official censorship that in addition had no opportunity to
control the encrypted communications of reporters. Mass Media heads decided not
to provide their reporters with encryption systems despite the fact they left
their employees defenseless against the opposing forces on the other frontline
side. They could not have been unaware the enemies monitored each and very
message transmitted over public communication channels, including the
correspondence of Mass Media representatives!
It is interesting when I switched the
research from military conflicts to hackers’ crimes against the society and
state I discovered a surprising coincidence.
Nowadays international hacker groups
performing e-crime make annually over $400 billion. One of the reasons for this
to be possible is the absence of strong hardware cryptographic security in
global information exchange network, including the Internet and mobile
communications. Another reason is virtually no responsibility for committing
such crimes! It’s extremely uncommon for such criminals – stealing huge amounts
over the Internet – to be caught or penalized. Global Net enables them to
commit such actions from the comfort of their homes even being in the other
part of the world.
I get a feeling that individual
hackers are in fact a complex international organized criminal network aiming
at gaining revenue. Moreover, the sad inferiority of the information storage
and transfer systems used today is not the only thing that makes it even easier
for the criminals to act. Another one is negligence of system administrators
who store system passwords and users’ financial information in the places
hackers can easily get access to. Just ask the affected persons whether they
protected their servers with hardware encryptors. I believe most of them will
not even understand what you are talking about. Barack Obama – the US President
– confirmed this by saying during an information security meeting that 70% of
all US companies use no or extremely weak information security systems.
Now we get a feeling that the
officials and politicians prohibit the use of strong encryption because they
are afraid to review the old laws and lose the actual ability to totally
control the information of the citizens. Hackers worldwide use this bureaucratic
paradox to hack into unprotected networks and cause huge financial damage. This
is the very reason solders and media representatives die during military
conflicts.
However, incorrect use of
cryptographic equipment – especially in large-scale wars – also surely leads to
tragedy. In the book I provide multiple examples from the history and modern
world when the violation of strong encryption equipment use, incorrect
encryption key generation, and violation of rules on connecting to encryption
equipment resulted in decryption of the top secret information therefore
costing millions of military and civilians their lives.
I will give a yet unknown example from
the history of cryptography. Experts are aware that the generation strong
cryptographic keys is fundamental to creation of strong cryptographic
equipment. What was the way the USSR produced encryption keys before 1941?
They used special devices to generate
keys to encryption equipment and one-time pads. The devices resembled modern
Bingo game machine. The machine featured two units running punch tape. Balls
randomly touched the punch tapes generating balanced gamma – random number
sequence that was used to generate encryption key. The strength of such
encryption keys was miserable. In early 1950s that was confirmed by
Vladimir Kozlov – one of the USSR leading cryptologists, associate member of
USSR Academy of Sciences.
It was not a big surprise to know the
imperfect USSR encryption equipment was one of the reasons of tragedy at the
beginning of World War II. The Germans could read even the top secret USSR
telegrams up to 1941. I will go in more details in this book.
Now I recall a case from my experience
when in late 1970s I decrypted messages encrypted with the top secret USSR
cryptographic equipment using simple undulator tape and mathematical compass.
The reason is absolutely the same –
incorrect use of encryption equipment. Radio space always demonstrates all
defaults in encryption equipment production and usage. It acts as test paper
showing all the drawbacks. Unfortunately, some experts are subject to
stereotype that once the equipment passes all lab tests one should not control
its operation when going life. As my experience shows this approach is totally
wrong. Human and technology factors have always existed. These factors may lead
to incorrect use of encryption equipment no matter how advanced it is.
I would like to focus on another case
to further discuss tragedy arising from unprofessional and improper use of such
a powerful force as cryptography. The key conditions for any army to win over
the enemy have always been the information exchange secrecy and speed between
the commanders and various divisions. Moreover, countless number of lives often
depends on encrypted message delivery speed. The ability to deliver secret
information as prompt as possible has always been of great value.
Even centuries ago people considered
urgent information as valuable as gold. If a message courier’s pay was slightly
higher that of a soldier, the pay for express mail was even higher than that a
Paduan University professor would get for a year!
That was the pay for information in
the XVI century already! Now let’s come back to USSR in the XX century – the
century full of wars and conflicts. The country developed encryption system
primarily for politicians and top management of the country. However, before
the war in 1941 top secret information was encrypted with paper encryption
documents. It took a lot of effort and time to encrypt the information in such
a way. It was even more challenging when the encrypted information was
transmitted over poor communication lines.
Unfortunately, the USSR leaders up to
1941 (war start date) failed to realize the importance of “concealed”
(encrypted) armed forces management as the key tool for winning over the enemy.
We may trace this fact in Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Vasilievsky and other
commanders’ memoires of that period. No one of them mentioned a concealed
management of armed forces, including divisions, troops, and so on. You may
come across HF communication used by high command of the USSR army. However,
NKVD after-war research demonstrated the encryption system was not strong and
the encrypted messages probably had been decrypted! I believe this was known
even before the research. That was the reason NKVD appointed its soldiers in
every 100 meter intervals along the HF communication line. It may appear the
most part of information in the war first years were communicated by NKVD
couriers, same as back in the XVI century.
The Paradox of Russia. The tragedy
that repeats time after time, year after year, century after century and the
tragedy that relates to information security should have encouraged the ones
who make decisions on cryptography use to give a try and change the situation,
to learn the lesson from the past mistakes, make modern information world safe.
Ehen…
There won’t be any miracle if we keep
everything in our life unchanged. Modern “digital” civilization won’t change
for the better on its own. Wars and crimes go on in the information world.
Military dictators and criminal geniuses will continue to appear.
This perfectly means world leaders
should think not of expanding networks to collect unprotected information and
not about the ways to control people’s thoughts but rather about a way to
protect the citizens of their states from new threats of virtual world. It is
clear that should the world society not take joint care on global information
security the civilization will suffer from extremely devastating consequences.
XXI century information war has absolutely different logic. The winner will be
not the one who has the most powerful information theft means but the one who
has the strongest security.
You may wonder what radio intelligence
and encryption devices have to do with it. These are the very shield and sword
of information world that bring us victories as well as defeats. Strong
cryptography nowadays is the only efficient shield capable of protecting the
world against any information weapon.
Reason 2. Historical Truth
During my life I have visited 96
countries worldwide where I was lucky to meet and talk to countless people
having unique knowledge on our society and the history of civilization. The
people I know include heads of government and various government organizations,
talented scientists and cultural and religious figures. They knew my main hobby
and thanked me for my work and efforts with priceless and king-like gifts –
permitting me to study archive documents on history of Russia and cryptography.
During one of my multiple foreign business trips I got access to materials on
cryptography works of Pushkin’s contemporary and his fried - a well-known
Russian scientist Pavel L. Schilling von Cannstatt. By the way, Pavel
Schilling’s work as cryptography service head (cipher room) of MFA of Russia
has not been mentioned in Russian public sources before. This peculiar fact
attracted my real interest. Leaping ahead I will say that the history documents
review delivered a great deal of discoveries. Moreover, I was able to look at
known things from a different angel. For instance when I studied Pushkin’s
works I discovered that the Pushkin’s drawing of an unknown man was actually
the picture of his best friend Pavel Schilling. And I am talking about this as
well in my book.
However, the more I wanted to learn
about Schilling’s activities and work the more challenges I faced. I had to
gain various permits and approvals to access historical documents. Even when I
got the permit from Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to review the historical
documents stored in its archive it suddenly turned out that I need another
permit from FSB.
When I finally received this other
permit as well I was informed that most part of archive of the room was under
reconstruction and most materials were unavailable for review. Even those
available documents missed multiple pages – excluded from review. Please note
200 years had passed from the events date!
And now I have a question how did
Alexander Pushkin himself access the archives when writing the Captain’s
Daughter?! The history tells that he had to address the Tsar with request to
work in the Cipher Room archive. During a ball evening Pushkin approached the
Imperator with his request. Nicolas I favored the request. Still we do know that
even with the highest permit MFA officials did not provide Pushkin with access
to all archived documents!
Probably Noblemen were afraid of
critical analysis of the political elite relations with opposing citizens
participating in agitations against the Court and state. The same is true in
relation to Peasant’s War under Emelian Pugachev. However, unlike the
Streletsky Uprising the Peasant’s War had external political aspect in it –
battle of foreign states for influencing the Russian elite even through financing
the elite.
Emelian Pugachev’s links to French
Kind Louis XIV and receipt of financial aid from him is a clear example.
The described events took place 200
years ago. Why do modern officials keep the secrets of Tsar Russia? What are
they afraid of?
Most probably they are afraid of
possible unveiling Pushkin’s life philosophy and his views of State and
individual relations.
Reason 3. True Freedom of Word and
DemocracyAs a cryptographer I was shocked by Pushkin words: “It’s better to be on hard labor rather than being wiretapped.” Hundreds of years have pasted and Pushkin remains virtually the only one who publicly declared the state invaded our privacy!
The reality of the threat is proved by
letter from a different epoch. Dozens years past Pushkin’s death (in early
September 1959) Alexandra – the Russian Impress – wrote to her husband Nikolas
II: “My dear and darling... I wish we had a phone wired directly from your room
to mine… This would be our private wire and we could talk without any worries
of being tapped.” The Impress was concerned that even the Tsar family had no
warranty of privacy!
I learned about another interesting
fact related to privacy effect on country fate from Russian noble writer
Alexander Solzhenitsyn. I met him back in 1995 while helping to organize the
prestigious literature award of Palermo Institute (Italy) for the “In the First
Circle” that also told about the development of USSR first phone encryption
device. Soon I discovered that apart from cryptography we shared interest in history
on freedom of word and democracy in Russia. During our discussion on 1917
revolution and the reasons of Nikolas II’s abdication, Alexander told me: look
for the three latest encrypted telegrams of the Empress to the Tsar and you
will understand the real reasons of abdication.
Note that the most powerful radio
station was located in Tsarskoe Selo. It was mainly designed for Nicolas II to
communicate with the army divisions. However, Alexandra – the Empress –
sometimes used it to communicate with her husband with encrypted messages.
I managed to discover the decrypted
correspondence of the last Russian tsar in the most unexpected place. To my
greatest surprise it was published in a book edited in… UK. I believe the
publishers did not include many of the most valuable and important telegrams
including the messages and letters Solzhenitsyn was talking about. This mystery
will be part of my further history research. However, I managed to learn the
way the correspondence of the tsar family got outside the country.
Ernest Fetterlein – the head of Tsar
Cryptography Service – developed encryptor for the Tsar and empress. After 1917
revolution he migrated to UK together with his colleagues and created a
powerful information decryption service GC&CS in UK intelligence. The
service up to late 1920th decrypted all messages of Soviet
government. Moreover, my history research of tsar encrypted correspondence
enabled me to glance at encrypted correspondence between Nicolas II and German
Kaiser Wilhelm II and learn a lot of interesting details on the customs and
situation of that time.
Let’s return to Pushkin’s words on
State role in family values privacy and privilege. I would like to note that
not a single revolutionary (Herzen, Tolstoy, Gorky, Lenin) countering tsarism
had ever clearly stated that “family privacy should be above all political
freedoms.”
We may say exactly the same about
noble people of the Western civilization. In the history of Europe and USA I
spotted only one person who shared the point of view of Pushkin.
Almost Pushkin’s contemporary – Thomas
Jefferson, one of the US first presidents, author of Declaration of
Independence – believed that “only strong cryptography that cannot be read by
the government” brought the US the real freedom and independence. The two grand
persons on different continents thought the same way.
And I asked myself why over the
centuries have we started to forget the philosophy in Russia and the USA? Where
may we get to with all the limitations and bans on strong cryptography use? Of
course, I was first interested in Russia fate that experienced significant
losses over the last two hundred years just for this very cause. After 1812
when the Russian army celebrated the victory over Napoleon in Paris we note the
ignominious losses: Crimean War, 1905 events, 1914 War. Just take a look, over
many years Russia had no large victories. The West gained control not only over
Russian finances but the political life as well. Due to the cryptography ban
the information on state officials and politicians was absolutely open and
available to western special services. That means they had plenty of
opportunities to compromise and recruit Russian officials.
Reason 4. Cryptography Role in Modern
World
Once without the information shield,
Russia lost the wars due to external control.
Just think, World War I in 1914 –
Russian army could have entered Berlin and finished the war. However it was
defeated thus significantly changing the further world history. The true reason
of catastrophe was the compromised encryption system of Russian army used to
manage and operate the forces. The German army was able to intercept radio
calls between the Russian divisions and had all information about every
dislocation of the enemy. That led to destruction of Tsar Army. But for this
fact the society would have not had any reasons for dissatisfaction that
provoked the Russian 1917 Revolution.
The next page of history is the year
1917. Nicolas II – Russian Imperator – loses access to encrypted communication
with his army and Tsar Selo. This resulted in revolution.
1941 – The very first days of World
War II. The Nazi got hold of large quantity of encryption equipment, manual
encryption documents, and – most important – encryption keys. The encryption
system of the Soviet Army fighting with German intruders was compromised and
virtually ceased to exist. This was the replay of 1914 events. From the very
beginning of 1941 War the Soviet Army had to use plain communication or use
courier delivery. That sadly led to deaths of some 6 million USSR defenders,
huge material loses in the very beginning of the war!
1979 – War in Afghanistan. I will tell
you about the “correct” use of soviet encryption equipment and encryption
documents and the results in the second volume of my book. Our soldiers and
officers in squadrons, battalions, divisions, and even in larger formations had
no strong communication encryption. This resulted in unreasonably high losses.
USSR vanishing in 1991. The USSR
president, similar to the Imperator in 1917, was shut out from encrypted
communication. The wars in Chechnya. I often quote the words of General Troshev
from his book “My War. Notes of Trench General”: “Don’t be penny wise and pound
foolish. We paid in blood for lack of encryptors.” The very same thing happened
during Georgia and Ossetia conflict in 2008. General Khrulev, commander of
Russian 58th Army used satellite phone of a newspaper reporter
to coordinate the troops in the very beginning of campaign. There was no other
way of communication…
It turns out to be that years and
centuries of negligence to information security of the country have led to the
deaths of the best men of Russia, financial and material devastation of the
country. This is when Russia has always been considered as a cryptographic power.
What does prevent us from constantly
making the past mistakes? I have expressed my thoughts on this in articles that
are now a part of the book. The thoughts about the cryptography role in modern
world, information impact on person and the information value, changes it
applies to our society is the common theme of my book.
Reason 5. Future of Civilization
We live today in an absolutely
different world. The humanity has entered the information era where digital and
virtual world is as real as the books, paintings, and pictures. Today the
people are not the only ones who exchange the information. Nowadays robots do
the same. Our real life is filled with more digital devices with every passing
day. These devices include medical ones that can remotely monitor the health.
The devices are more often get
connected to the global information exchange computer networks. Just in a few
years we will not be able to imagine our life without such devices. Well, who
is going to control the ones who control the life of people, our thoughts, and
our information?! Scientific and technology progress speeds up with every year.
Experts already experiment with replacing real memory with imaginary one. This
engages Internet technologies without strong cryptographic security. How much
time do we have left until we get a technology to fully control the mind of any
person – one, five, or ten years?
Will be a person in the near future
able to personally secure himself against hackers and criminals? Won’t someone
decide to take up the opportunity to take under control crowds of people?
Even today when we read Edward
Snowden’s disclosures we note that there exists a global information
interception system and information gets concentrated. Where does all the data
flow to?
If Snowden managed to get hold of a
great deal of important data from the storage, won’t there be anyone else in
the future who will rely on the system vulnerabilities and use the information
for absolutely different purposes and serve evil?
Won’t the outdated perception of
cryptography role in our life lead to an Information Hitler smartly using the
inability of our society to respond to new threats? Won’t we give birth to
Information Anti-Christ with our negligence to personal information security of
a person?
All of us know the word is derivative
of our thoughts. The First Epistle of John reads that in the beginning was the
Word, and the Word was God. The Words are the holy base of human society
existence and development.
Our words and our thoughts stolen from
digital space are accumulated on countless servers worldwide. Who does control
them and – more important – has the ability to change the stored information?
That was the reason Baron Rothschild –
who made fortune over a few days by amending political information – said: “He
who owns the information – owns the world!”
By securing our information against
theft, securing our words against amendments we secure the world against
tragedy.
This is what my book all about. I want
to deliver this very thought no only to the readers but to the power players
who are able so far to make decisions without any influence from virtual space.
Q&A with Anatoly Klepov
The author was kind enough to answer some of my questions
1). Can you give an overview of your background
in the field of communications security?
In 1972 I
started my military service in the Soviet Army, radio intelligence. I worked in
various USSR organizations related to cryptographic equipment production. Since
1990 I’ve been the sole and continuous head of Ancort Company (25 years
already). For more information on the Company history refer to: http://mttgroup.ch/upload/25%20years%20of%20Ancort%20Company.docx
2). You’ve mentioned the Bank of Russia aviso
scandal of the 1990’s. Can you give more details on this case?
I produced
and developed various cryptographic devices. You may read may article on
Central Bank of Russia at http://aklepov.com/index.php?page=The-financial-collapse-of-Russia-en
3). How did you become interested in historical
research, what archives have you researched for your book and articles and what
topics interest you the most.
History has
been a hobby of mine since childhood. I even planned to enter a Historical
Institute. However, my life had different plans. I have always been interested
in the matters related to managing the country and armed forces. Frankly speaking,
Alexander S. Pushkin’s researches have impressed me even more. In my book I
have proven that he was a cryptographer. For more information refer to
http://aklepov.com/index.php?page=Pushkin-and-the-tsar-s-cryptographer-en
http://aklepov.com/index.php?page=Pushkin-s-service-for-the-State-en
I referred to
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives as well as different archives of
the state. My friends from different countries have supplied me with archive
documents. I even purchased articles from foreign archive funds. At the moment
I am interested in archive documents on cryptography at the Tsar age as well as
creation of cryptographic equipment before 1941 war and equipment for calls
wiretapping that was used during Tsar Russia and NKVD age.
4). What is the current state of cryptologic
historiography in Russia? Do you expect that a history of Soviet signals
intelligence will be released anytime soon? Is the Russian public interested in
the history of cryptology?
Unfortunately,
the number of documents on USSR cryptography history is still limited. In most
cases it’s the historians who have no experience in cryptographic equipment
development or in radio intelligence. Therefore, they provide a lot of general
conclusions (mostly testimonials) without shedding light on the real things. I
am not surprised as cryptography was under control of NKVD and KGB. The said
agencies also controlled Mass Media forbidding to publish anything about
mistakes of theirs. Of course, the field was a top secret one.
We do have
numerous publications on World War II. Nonetheless, we fail to find objective
data on the way the secured communication really functioned during the war. I
also mean communications between the army, police, and squadrons. Secured –
encrypted – communication is the core of Armed Forces management. Without the
said communication Army turns into a group of people and pile of metal as it
happened back in 1914, 1941, as well as during the wars in Chechnya.
5). As I understand it this is the first book in
a series. What topics will you cover in the next books you publish?
I don’t think
there is great interest to cryptography history in Russia. This also relates to
other fields of knowledge. Everyone has plunged into social networks as
Facebook and the like. Therefore, my "Encryptors and Radio
Intelligence. Shield and Sword of Information World" book is actually
the very first that shades some light on real situation of cryptography in the
USSR. We may not write on Russia cryptographic systems as this information is
still secret. I was surprised to know that one developed an encryptor for tanks
that was too big to fit into a tank. However, it did comply with all security
requirements. Of course, this encryptor has never been adopted.
In my next
publications I would like to get a better understanding of Tsar Russia
cryptography system as of up to 1917 as well as the real reason Tsar Nicholas
II abdicated, study the encrypted communication of Tsar and the Empress
Alexandra, recover the encrypted communication of Nicholas II with Wilhelm II
and encrypted communications of Nicholas II with the King of Great Britain and
president of France. I am especially interested in encrypted communication
between the Tsar Nicholas II and Minister Witte. I would also like to define
the wiretapping system in Tsar Russia, the ones responsible and the way the
system was organized. My further researches will tightly related to defining
specific organizations responsible for radio intelligence in Germany, as well
as for call and telex wiretapping, and the ones related to Holocaust organization.
Vatican encryption system interests me strongly as well. I am also interested
in the impact the encryption systems had on political events during
inquisitions and Crusades.
There are plenty of
materials that need to be systematized and organized. I believe I will manage
to have time to implement these plans.
Tuesday, September 15, 2015
More information on the T-34 tank
The book ‘Armored
Champion: The Top Tanks of World War II’ has in chapter 1 a table showing the results
of a Soviet study regarding the performance of the T-34 tank’s armor versus
enemy rounds. The table shows the probability of penetration if hit and
it is very interesting to note that till early 1943 the percentages are roughly
50-50. However from summer ’43 till March ’45 the percentage goes up to 88-97%,
thus any round that hits the tank is almost certainly going to penetrate.
This is very interesting information, as it proves the vulnerability of the T-34 to the new German 75mm guns introduced in 1942-43, so I’ve included it in WWII Myths - T-34 Best Tank of the war and The German response against the Soviet T-34 and KV tanks.
This is very interesting information, as it proves the vulnerability of the T-34 to the new German 75mm guns introduced in 1942-43, so I’ve included it in WWII Myths - T-34 Best Tank of the war and The German response against the Soviet T-34 and KV tanks.
Wednesday, September 9, 2015
Book review - The triumph of Zygalski's sheets: the Polish Enigma in the early 1940
The solution
of the German
Enigma cipher machine by the codebreakers of Bletchley Park and the effect
that this had on World War II became public knowledge in the 1970’s, with the
publication of books like ‘The Ultra
Secret’. Since then hardly a year goes by without a new book or movie
coming out and claiming that the
British codebreakers basically won WWII all on their own. Unfortunately the
work of the Polish codebreakers has not received the same recognition, even
though they were the first to solve Enigma messages in the 1930’s.
The author has used Zygalski’s personal diary in order to reconstruct his work in Poland and then France plus he has included rare photographs from the archive of Anna Zygalska-Cannon.
The book covers Zygalski’s work for the Polish cipher bureau in the 1930’s, their evacuation to France in 1939, the solution of current Enigma traffic in 1940 (together with the British codebreakers) and his work for the signal intelligence service of Vichy France at PC Cadix. The last two chapters cover his escape to the UK (due to the German occupation of Vichy in late 1942), his assignment to the Polish radio intelligence unit near Stanmore and his postwar academic career at the University of Surrey.
In the interwar
period Poland had to face the hostility of a weakened Germany and a rising
Soviet Union. The Polish military authorities knew that they had to keep a
close eye their dangerous neighbors, so they built up an efficient codebreaking
service, called Biuro
Szyfrów. The Polish codebreakers played an important role during the
Polish-Soviet War of 1919–21 by solving the ciphers used by the Red Army and
learning of the enemy plans in advance.
Against
Germany the department faced a serious problem due to the introduction of the
Enigma machine in the late 1920’s. The solution of this device required
scientific research undertaken by mathematicians and for this reason the
department hired Marian
Rejewski, Henryk
Zygalski and Jerzy
Różycki. Using material provided by the French intelligence service, the
three of them were able to solve the Enigma in the early 1930’s.
Enigma Press has published a new book on Henryk
Zygalski, called ‘The triumph of
Zygalski's sheets: the Polish Enigma in the early 1940’ by Zdzisław J.
Kapera.
The author has used Zygalski’s personal diary in order to reconstruct his work in Poland and then France plus he has included rare photographs from the archive of Anna Zygalska-Cannon.
The book covers Zygalski’s work for the Polish cipher bureau in the 1930’s, their evacuation to France in 1939, the solution of current Enigma traffic in 1940 (together with the British codebreakers) and his work for the signal intelligence service of Vichy France at PC Cadix. The last two chapters cover his escape to the UK (due to the German occupation of Vichy in late 1942), his assignment to the Polish radio intelligence unit near Stanmore and his postwar academic career at the University of Surrey.
The author
has given particular attention to Zygalski’s cryptanalytic technique for the
solution of Enigma traffic (Zygalski sheets) and
he has also taken a look into why the intelligence gained from the Enigma did
not play an important role during the fighting in Norway and France.
Overall this
is a valuable contribution to Enigma historiography.
Q&A
with Zdzisław J. Kapera
The author
was kind enough to answer some of my questions.
1). Can
you give a summary of Enigma Press and the books you’ve published?
The
Enigma Press is a scholarly publisher from Cracow - Mogilany. The Enigma
Bulletin is one of series/journals printed irregularly and in limited number of
copies maximum 150. Contents of the Enigma Bulletin you can find at the
end of my book. We have also a Polish series of pamphlets on the Enigma story,
but only two issues appeared, one being an introduction to the machine and the
second is a brief biography of Rejewski.
2). In the
book you say that you consider Zygalski a personal hero. Can you expand on that
and also explain what new information you were able to discover while
researching this book?
I have
always been thinking that besides Rejewski Zygalski should be presented in the full
light. His sheets saved possibility to read Enigma after changes in January
1939. The British were unable to use them despite producing the full set of
sheets (60 necessary copies) in November and December 1939. In my book I
reconstructed from all available sources the turn of events in autumn and
winter 1939/1940. I used the Polish, French and British sources together and
compared them for the first time. Turing learned from Zygalski in mid
January 1940 and the British also had an opportunity to read more and more.
Without the period January to May 15, 1940 the British would start reading
regularly Enigma many months later. Even if Enigma did not save Norway and
France in this crucial period the British were able to put foundations for
ULTRA.
3). What
is the current state of cryptologic historiography in Poland? Is there renewed
interest in the accomplishments of the Polish codebreakers?
Very few
people are now interested in the Enigma story as sources are very scattered. We
expect that young historian Lukasz Ulatowski will write a history of the Polish
Cipher Bureau in the 1920 and 1930s.
4). What
other topics do you plan to research for future books?
I am now
working on the dangerous moment, the spring of 1940, when the reading the
Enigma would be nearly exposed. Stupidity of some military committee of the
Polish Government in Exile because of useless political revenge would help the
Germans to discover reading Enigma. I plan to publish a pamphlet on the escape
of the Polish cryptanalysts from the Vichy Cadix radio intelligence center and
on the efforts of the Germans to protect Enigma against the WICHER
operation.
Tuesday, September 1, 2015
New reports released by the NSA
Even though
most TICOM reports
have been released by the NSA and GCHQ, some are still classified. It seems
that (finally…) this is beginning to change since I just received TICOM I-89 ‘Report
by Prof Dr. H Rohrbach of Pers Z S on American strip cipher’.
This was a
report prepared in August 1945 by the mathematician dr Hans Rohrbach. During WWII Rohrbach
was one of the top cryptanalysts of the German Foreign Ministry’s decryption
department Pers Z. His major success was the solution of the M-138-A strip
cipher system used by the US State Department for its
most important messages.
The report details the mathematical method of solution
and the use of a special device, called the ‘Automaton‘, that could quickly decode the messages once the
alphabet strips and keylists had been reconstructed.
When i requested this report in 2013 the NSA’s response
was: ’We have completed our search for
records responsive to your request. We located item 1 of your request. That
document was reviewed in 2006 and was witheld in full. The document requires a
new review to determine whether any of it can be released at this time.‘
Based on this response i was expecting that I-89 would
contain fascinating details about the work of the German codebreakers.
Unfortunately after going through the report it’s clear that it is the same
report submitted by Rohrbach to the FIAT
Review of German Science in 1948 and also published in the journal Cryptologia
in 1979.
My other
request to the NSA was for page 92 of the Special Research
History SRH-366 'History of
Army Strip Cipher devices'. Some of you may have noticed that it is missing a page.
In any case here it is:
Again it
doesn’t seem to contain groundbreaking information. What can I say, you win
some you lose some….