German evaluation of captured Soviet tanks

During WWII the German armed forces were always short of equipment, especially trucks and combat vehicles. In order to deal with this problem they made extensive use of captured French, Italian, Soviet and British vehicles.

Foreign tracked vehicles and tanks were refurbished, brought up to German standards when possible (for example by installing a commander’s cupola in tanks) and used mainly in auxiliary roles by security divisions or as tank tractors by combat units.

My source on the German use of captured Soviet tanks and their technical evaluation is ‘Panzer tracts no. 19-2: Beute-panzerkampfwagen’ by Thomas Jentz and Werner Regenberg.

T-26 and BT tanks in German service

The success of operation Barbarossa led to the encirclement of many Soviet formations and huge numbers of Soviet tanks were left abandoned in the fields. The Germans made a serious effort to collect some of them and put them to use.

Just after the start of ‘Barbarossa’ the Army High Command – OKH ordered that the supply staffs (Feld-zeugstaebe) were to be reinforced for the purpose of seizing enemy tanks. The following Kommandos were created: Ob.Pz.Stab Nord in Insterburg, Ob.Pz.Stab Mitte in Warsaw, Ob.Pz.Stab Sud in Cracow and Ob.Pz.Stab Rumanien in Bucharest. At the same time the Sicherungs-Divisionen (rear area security divisions) were ordered to organize captured tank platoons.

By September 1941 some vehicles were sent to security divisions, including 10-12t ‘Christie’ and amphibious ‘schwimmpanzer’.

The reliability of the T-26 tanks was not satisfactory. Security Division 221 reported in October ’41: ‘The Pz.Kpfw.Zug created by the division is no longer operational. One Panzer is completely burnt out due to an engine fire. Both of the other Panzers have engine and transmission problems. Repetitive repairs were unsuccessful. The Panzers always broke down after being driven several hundred meters on good roads. As reported by technical personnel, both of the engines in the Panzers are unusable because they were incorrectly run in.’

The commander of the Panzersug.Sich Regt 3 in Army Group North noted: ‘The Russ.kampfwagen completed at the Waffenwerkstatt (Arsenal) Riga all broke down due to mechanical failures.’

The BT tank also came under criticism: ‘B. T. (Christi): The main cause of failure is a transmission that is too weak in combination with a strong engine that should provide the tank with high speed, but is over-stressed when driven off road where the lower gears must be used for longer periods. In addition, as in the T 26, problems continuously arise that are due to entire design and poor materials, such as failure of the electrical system, stoppages in fuel delivery, breaks in the oil circulation lines, etc.’

One T-34 worth 40 bottles of alcohol

On 30 July 1943 the OKH/GenStdh/GenQu/Abt.III/Gr.V communicated a program for the retrieval of enemy vehicles.

Units that retrieved a fully operational T-34 would get as reward two self propelled A/T guns or if the units was up to strength three ‘maultier’ trucks. Infantry and assault units would receive two 75mm Pak 40 guns with towing vehicles.

The simple infantryman had other reasons to risk his life for a T-34. As the report said: ‘OKH also has established special distribution of market wares as a premium for recovering a non-operational Pz.Kpfw. T-34 (40 bottles of alcohol), for a complete engine, transmission, gun sight, or radio set (6 bottles), and for a complete gun, radiator, starter etc. (1 to 3 bottles).’

KV tanks in Tiger units

The Kliment Voroshilov (KV) tank was used by the Soviets in limited numbers but its heavy armor and 76mm gun commanded respect in the battlefield.

Its German equivalent was the famous Tiger tank. These two enemies actually joined forces. The Germans used captured KV tanks for towing their Tigers since the KV was one of the few vehicles that could tow the heavy Tigers.

A German report of September 1943 says: ‘Based on previous experience in recovering Panzers, OKH has decided that Beute-Pz.Kpfw. KW I are to be used as Bergepanzer. When still present the weapons, the turret, and the gun are to be left on to increase the traction weight and also to be used in defense of the Berge/commando. Use of these KW I as Bergepanzer is decisive because of the shortage of equally heavy and suitable German towing vehicles for recovering heavy Panzers. Also, it is forbidden to divert armed KW I issued as Bergepanzer to combat tasks.’

T-34 and SU-85 in German service

Small numbers of T-34 tanks were used by several security and field units. These were used for anti-partisan operations or as tank destroyers.

The SS Panzer-grenadier Division ‘Das Reich’ used the T-34 in combat in 1943. This unit received in May 1943 25 T-34’s in need of repairs. These were overhauled at the ‘SS T-34 Instandsetzungsbetrieb Tuebke’ locomotive plant.

The strength reports show that in 11^th May  there was only 1 T-34 operational but in July 1^st 16 out of 25 were operational.

Another unit that used the T-34 model 1943 (hexagonal turret and commander’s cupola) and Su-85 was the 2 Kompanie/Panzerjaeger-Abteilung-128. Their report of June ’44 has interesting information on the strengths and weaknesses of these vehicles.

Apparently automotive performance was poor:

‘Regardless of our limited experience, it can be stated that the Russian tanks are not suitable for long road marches and high speeds. It has turned out that the highest speed that can be achieved is 10 to 12 km/hr. It is also necessary on marches to halt every half hour for at least 15 to 20 minutes to let the machine cool down. Difficulties and breakdowns of the steering clutches have occurred with all the new Beute-Panzer. In difficult terrain, on the march, and during the attack, in which the Panzer must be frequently steered and turned, within a short time the steering clutches overheat and are coated with oil. The result is that the clutches don't grip and the Panzer is no longer manoeuvrable. After they have cooled, the clutches must be rinsed with a lot of fuel.’

And as in all T-34’s visibility was a problem:

 ‘The gun sights in Russian tanks are far behind the German designs. The German gunners need to be thoroughly accustomed to the Russian telescopic gunsights. The ability to spot a hit through the gunsight is very limited.’

‘In a Russian tank it is difficult to command a Panzer or a unit and at the same time serve as the gunner Therefore fire direction for the entire Kompanie is hardly possible, and the concentrated effect of the unit’s firepower is lost. The commander's cupola on the T 43 makes it easier to command and fire at the same time; however; vision is very limited to five very small and narrow slits.’

‘Safe driving and sure command of both the T 43 and SU 85 can't be achieved with the hatches closed. We base this statement on our experience that on the first day in combat in the Jassy bridgehead, four Beute-Panzer got stuck in the trench system and couldn't get free with their own power, resulting in the destruction of German defensive weapons during the attempt to retrieve them. The same thing happened on the second day.’

However the gun was considered good and the unit could operate well in a tank destroyer role:

‘Our experience is that the capabilities of the 7.62 cm Kw.K. are good. Thorough adjustment of the weapons and careful aiming ensure high accuracy even at long ranges. With their low rate of fire, the weapons are accurate and have few stoppages.’

‘Based on all these facts, the Kompanie concludes that the success of using captured tanks as a Panzer is questionable. The results of the last days in combat in the Jassy bridgehead have shown that their employment as a Panzerjaeger appears suitable.’

Soviet lack of reliability or German bias?

The German reports presented so far point to significant reliability problems for the Soviet vehicles. The comments on the T-26 and BT are overwhelmingly negative. Even the mythic T-34 comes under criticism. Are these statements credible or are they a result of German bias?

First of all we need to remember that the vehicles used by the Germans were retrieved from the battlefield so they would not be in pristine condition. Moreover the Germans were not trained in servicing them nor did they have a source for spare parts.

The units that operated these vehicles were also not first rate and inexperienced drivers could damage the vehicles.

Still the problems mentioned in German reports match those described in American evaluations of the T-34 (problems with transmission, electrical system, engine etc).

If these problems affected the majority of Soviet vehicles then the German victories in the East are easier to explain…

Tank overhaul TV series

What will they think up next!

Panther restoration

Sherman restoration

Centurion restoration

Ferdinand restoration

Update

I added the following part in the Losses paragraph of Tank strength and losses – Eastern Front:

[Note that there are the following ‘issues’ with the German report:

1).The losses for 1942 include December 1941. According to Foreign Military Studies P-059 ‘Tank Losses’ by Generalmajor Burkhart Mueiler-Hillebrand total losses on all fronts for December 1941 comes to 525 Tanks and SPG’s but not all were lost in the East since at the same time there was heavy fighting in N.Africa during the British operation ’Crusader’. This could increase the 1941 percentage significantly.

2). February 1943 total losses show a huge spike at 2.069 vehicles. It seems reasonable to assume that these are vehicles heavily damaged/destroyed in late 1942 but officially written off in 1943. This would take the 1943 percentage down by a few points while raising the 1942 percentage.

3). For 1944 it says ‘December incomplete’. According to FMS P-059 total losses during the month were 677 Tanks, SPG’s and self-propelled artillery. A lot would be against the Western Allies during the Battle of the Bulge. In any case the number is so small that it can only raise the percentage by a few points.]

Also added the following table in Production:

	1940/41	1942	1943	1944
le.SPW - 250	1.030	1.337	2.895	1.701
m.SPW - 251	868	1.190	4.258	7.785
Sum	1.898	2.527	7.153	9.486

Book review - Kursk 1943: A Statistical analysis

The battle of Kursk in 1943 has always fascinated historians. It has been called the greatest tank battle of WWII, the deathride of the Panzers, the battle that sealed the Soviet victory etc etc. After the summer victories of 1942 the Germans had suffered a great defeat in Stalingrad and they were barely able to extract their units from the Caucasus back to the Ukraine in early 1943. In the summer of 1943 the whole world watched as the new German offensive aimed to destroy the Soviet forces in the Kursk salient and cripple the Red army.

Both Germany and the Soviet Union had concentrated huge forces for this battle, including their most advanced tanks and armored vehicles. Initially the Germans made a breakthrough but they did not achieve their goals and when the Soviets counterattacked, in the north and south of Kursk with fresh forces, the offensive was cancelled.

The outcome of the battle was presented by Soviet historians as a great victory with crushing losses for the German side. According to the popular version the fast T-34 tank was able to defeat the heavy Tigers by ramming them or maneuvering to their flanks. Prokhorovka was supposed to be the grave of German armor.

How realistic are these statements? Unfortunately both German and Russian sources agree that the popular version was completely made up.

Several books have appeared that completely destroy the Kursk myth but the first one to exhaustively debunk the myth was ‘Kursk 1943: A Statistical analysis’ by Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson.

This book looks at all the important aspects of the battle such as the assembly of forces, strength and loss statistics, performance of tanks, operational plans, what if scenarios. The greatest strength of the book lies in the use of official German records for all the statistics concerning the German forces.

German sources are used for German strength and loss statistics and Soviet sources for the Soviet numbers. This is the only way to ensure reliability since using Soviet numbers for German losses (and vice versa) leads to exaggerations.

The authors first explain the strategic situation in the East and then devote chapters for the forces that took part, their structure and strength, the performance of tanks, the airwar over Kursk, the outcome of the battle and possible alternatives for Germany.

Although Kursk was not a German victory losses between German and Soviet units were roughly 3-1 in favor of the Germans. German tank losses were not heavy nor was Prokhorovka a Soviet victory.

Some important aspects of the battle are dealt with in detail since they have been misrepresented in postwar accounts:

 1). German strength: Soviet sources, repeated by Western authors, gave inflated accounts of the German strength at about 900.000 men, 2.700-3.200 tanks and assault guns and 2.800 planes.

The real numbers were roughly 780.000 men, 2.500 tanks/SPG’s and 1.800 planes. The manpower statistic refers to iststarke (actual strength) which includes all men that are part of the unit's composition. Men on leave or temporarily detached to other units are included. Also men sick or wounded are included if they are assumed to return to service within eight weeks. Thus, despite its name, this strength category does not give the actual number of men available for service with the unit at the given time.

So obviously the true strength at the front was less than that. In comparison the Soviets had in the Central, Voronezh and Steppe fronts 1.900.000 men , 5.128 tanks/SPG’s and 3,549 planes (17^th Air Army and Long Range Bomber Command included).

2). Overall losses: A Soviet General Staff study of the Kursk operation says that ‘in the defensive battles of Kursk from 5 through 15 July 1943 enormous losses in personnel and equipment were inflicted upon the Germans. During the period of their offensive, the German Kursk-Orel and Belgorod-Kharkov groupings lost a total of 70.000 men killed and wounded, and 2.952 tanks, 195 self-propelled guns, 844 field guns, 1,392 aircraft, with more than 5.000 motor vehicles damaged or destroyed’. Similar figures have been given in various books published postwar.

The correct figures were 55.000 men (killed, missing, wounded) and 300 tanks/SPG’s which can be compared with 177.000 men and 1.600 tanks/SPG’s for the Soviet side.

3). Prokhorovka: According to the ‘official version’ the forces that clashed in Prokhorovka on 12 July 1943 had about 1.200-1.500 tanks (most accounts give 800 Soviet vs 400 German or 800 Soviet vs 700 German). This supposedly was the ‘largest tank battle of the war’ and resulted in heavy losses for the Soviet side but also the crippling of the German tank units (400 Soviet vs 320 German).

The reality was very different. Depending on how one defines the battle of Prokhorovka there were about 294 German and 616 Soviet vehicles or a maximum of 429 German and 870 Soviet vehicles. Losses were overwhelmingly in favor of the Germans with 334 Soviet vehicles destroyed versus at most 54 German tanks and assault guns. In fact the ratio should be higher since the authors state that ‘more German units are included in this calculation than actually took part in the Prokhorovka battle, while not all Soviet units are included’. [A recent article by Zamulin in the Journal of Slavic Military Studies:’ Prokhorovka: The Origins and Evolution of a Myth’ gives the following numbers: in the Prokhorovka area 516 Soviet vs 206 vehicles of II SS Panzer Corps plus in the South 150 Soviet vs 100 German of III Panzer Corps].

Prokhorovka was not the deathride of the Panzers but rather the deathride of the 5^th Guards Tank Army!

4) The Panther tank at Kursk: The Panther tank was introduced in the Battle of Kursk and suffered from mechanical breakdowns (mainly faulty fuel pumps) due to having been rushed into service (however according to a German report 60% of the mechanical problems could be fixed easily). These problems were fixed in later versions.

However the battle of Kursk was not a complete failure for the Panther since it proved its worth as a tank killer. Up to 15 July the XLVIII Panzer Corps claimed 559 enemy tanks with 269 claimed by Panther units. Although these are German claims and not verified kills what matters is the ratio between Panther units and other vehicles. The range that these kills were achieved was also impressive since on average the distance was 1.500-2.000 meters.

5). Possible alternatives: Instead of attacking at Kursk in July there were two possible alternatives

a). an attack before the Soviets had a chance to consolidate

b). a mobile defense in the Ukraine.

The authors explore both possibilities. In the first case it is true that the postponement of the operation till July gave the Soviets the opportunity to fortify the area and move new units there. However the Germans also built up their strength and most importantly introduced weapon systems that were superior to the Soviet equivalents (Pz IV and Stug III with the 75mm KwK 40 gun plus Panther and Tiger tanks). For example on 10 April ’43 they had 982 of these vehicles but on 30 June that number had gone up to 2.095.

The second choice is more complicated. On the one hand Army Group South was the only Group in the East that had a large number of mobile units and thus could, in theory, engage in a mobile defense. On the other hand this would involve surrendering ground to the Soviets. German generals might not be alarmed by such a decision but Hitler did not want to give up ground and he had good reasons to support his position. The Ukraine had areas with vast coal and steel deposits (Donets Basin) and losing them would not only hurt the German war effort but also greatly improve the output of Soviet armaments. Moreover a successful offensive operation was needed for political reasons as the German Allies were beginning to look for ways to exit the war.  

6). Importance of the battle: The battle of Kursk has been presented as the second most important victory after Stalingrad. In reality for both Germans and Soviets it did not have long lasting effects.

German manpower losses suffered during operation Citadel were only 3% of the total for 1943 while the similar percentage for the Soviets was 2.3%. Both sides were able to replace these losses.

German tank losses have been called excessive and General Guderian says in his memoirs: ‘By the failure of Citadel we had suffered a decisive defeat. The armored formations, reformed and re-equipped with so much effort, had lost heavily both in men and in equipment and would now be unemployable for a long time to come.’ This is obviously wrong since the Panzer units did not suffer heavy casualties. Total losses were roughly 300 tanks and SPG’s and they were not hard to replace since in July 1943 511 tanks and 306 SPG’s left German factories. The German mobile formations were not ‘unemployable for a long time to come’ on the contrary they were used against the Soviet counterattacks in the Ukraine.

Conclusion

This book not only debunks one of the enduring myths of WWII but is filled with interesting statistics and has an outstanding analysis of the long term factors affecting the German and Soviet forces.

At the same time it is an indictment of the poor state of WWII historical research. The only thing needed to debunk the Kursk myth was to go through the original German reports and unfortunately the vast majority of ‘professional’ historians were unwilling (or unable) to do so...

More on the T-34

The T-34 was one of the legendary tanks of WWII. When it appeared in 1941 its combination of firepower, armor and mobility shocked the Germans. However the real performance of the tank was different from the myth that was created for it by Soviet propaganda and German exaggerations.

I have covered the main points in my piece WWII Myths - T-34 Best Tank of the war but I decided to include here some interesting information from various sources.

Ability to maneuver on soft ground

The T-34 had wide tracks which gave it a ground pressure (kg/cm²) of 0.64 for the T-34/76 (assuming 26 tons) and 0.87 for the T-34/85 (at 32 tons). Low ground pressure meant good maneuverability on soft ground (at low speeds) but for many authors it meant that the T-34 could never become stuck in mud. The truth is that the T-34 had the same problems with mud as all other vehicles in the Eastern front.

From ‘Panzer Operations: The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941-1945’, p192

‘The Das Reich SS Panzer-grenadier Division turned north, advanced on Belgorod, captured the city, and linked up with Grossdeutschland, which had now thrust beyond Tomarovka. Between these two points two German infantry divisions slowly struggled through the mud in their effort to reach the western bank of river. When our counteroffensive had begun there was still some snow on ground, but just before the Armeeabteilung reached the upper course of Donets a sudden rise in temperature created a severe muddy condition. All vehicles except those on the only hard-surfaced road in the area, leading Kharkov to Kursk, became helpless. Our infantry could still slog forty but heavy weapons and artillery were delayed and finally moved up only great effort. Even the T-34s of the Russian rear guards had become embedded to such an extent that we could not retrieve them until warm weather.’

Raus is referring to Manstein’s counterattack in the Ukraine in early 1943.

Reliability

Interesting information on the T-34’s reliability (or lack thereof) during the Kamenets-Podolsky operation (Hube's Pocket) of March-April 1944 is available from ‘Tank Rider: Into the Reich with the Red Army’

From page 64

‘We were happy when tanks from our Brigade's tank regiment caught up with our battalion and we moved on as tank riders. We had just one objective — to capture Kamenets-Podolsk. Running a bit ahead, I would say that it took the Brigade two or three days to arrive at the town. Both people and tanks were tired; the vehicles couldn't take such stress either. Tanks stopped more and more often because of small technical breakdowns, especially broken tracks. Of course we tank riders assisted in tank repairs, so as not to fall behind the battalion.’

From page 77

‘We did not have many tanks left, and even those that remained had already used up their engine lifetime and were constantly breaking down. The tank that I was on with my soldiers also broke down. After a day-long stop in a village (we were already in the Western Ukraine), our tank stopped and would not move on. The battalion commander ordered us to stay with the tank and wait for it to be repaired. A day passed by and in the morning the tank crew told us that the breakdown was serious and we were stuck for a long time. I decided not to wait for the completion of the repairs, but to catch up with the battalion on foot.’

From page 79

‘After a brief rest the battalion received an order to advance and set up defences on the bank of Strypa river in the village of Dobropolie. Further to the west was the town of Bulach, where German reinforcements were starting to arrive. The Brigade was not capable of executing offensive operations. Its personnel was almost gone, almost all equipment was out of action. Out of 450 to 500 tanks of the 4th Tank Army at the beginning of the operation, the entire army only had around 60 vehicles, all with some kind of breakdown.’

The 5-speed gearbox controversy

Initially the T-34 had a 4-speed gearbox. The 4th gear could be used only on a paved road, thus the max cross-country speed was theoretically 25 km/h but in practice it was only 15km/h because changing from 2^nd gear to 3^rd required superhuman strength.

On later modifications there was a 5-speed gearbox which allowed for a cross country speed of 30 km/h. This equipment supposedly became standard from 1943 onwards.

However it seems that the T-34/85 tanks that were given to the Polish forces in late 1944/early 1945 still had the 4-speed gearbox. ‘T-34: Mythical Weapon’ by Michulec and Zientarzewski says in page 349:

‘It was accepted, due to the available information in the subject literature, that the switch to the 5-speed transmission took place in 1943. However, the documents regarding the T- 34-85s delivered during the period end 1944/beginning 1945 (a month after their production) to the Polish forces prove that practically all vehicles had the 4-speed transmission. This applied to tanks produced by the No.183 Factory as much as to the ones produced by the No.112 Factory. The works on the new 5-speed gearbox along with the new main clutch design started in July - August of 1942 and paralleled the development of the T-34S.’

Tank strength and losses – Eastern Front

After examining the manpower and aircraft strength and loss statistics in the Eastern front it’s time to take a look at the tank situation.

Both sides built large numbers of tracked armored vehicles and their armored divisions spearheaded major operations. All history books mention the hordes of T-34 tanks attacking German positions and the Tiger and Panther tanks fighting against superior forces. However the truth is that the war in the East was an infantry war. Armored units were always a minority. Even so it is important to have accurate numbers about both sides.

Production

Production statistics are available from  Waffen und Geheimwaffen des deutschen Heeres 1933 – 1945’, vol2:

German AFV production
Types	1941	1942	1943	1944
Tank	3,166	4,269	6,240	8,888
SPG	570	1,753	4,517	8,696
SPA	0	36	1,471	2,081
Total	3,736	6,058	12,228	19,665

In addition to these numbers the Germans built more than 20.000 APC’s (armored personnel carriers) of the Sdfkz 250-251 types. The Soviet Union did not produce a similar vehicle but received through Lend Lease over 3.000 US halftracks and British Bren Carriers.
 

 

	1940/41	1942	1943	1944
le.SPW - 250	1,030	1,337	2,895	1,701
m.SPW - 251	868	1,190	4,258	7,785
Sum	1,898	2,527	7,153	9,486

Soviet AFV production
Types	1941	1942	1943	1944
Tank	5,971	24,043	19,811	15,801
Heavy	1,353	2,533	656	2,252
Medium	2,800	12,553	15,812	13,949
Light	1,907	9,553	3,343	0
SPG	0	26	2,678	8,955
SPA	0	25	1,369	3,003
Total	5,971	24,094	23,858	27,759

Soviet production numbers are impressive (note that ‘Accounting for War: Soviet Production, Employment, and the Defence Burden, 1940-1945’ has slightly higher numbers for the SU- 1941/6.590, 1942/24.719, 1943/24.006, 1944/28.983). but they are focused on only a handful of types (T-60/70, T-34, KV/IS). As the war went on the light tanks proved to be poorly suited for frontline duties and even the T-34 lost its theoretical superiority over the German tanks. In addition to these numbers the SU received roughly 11.000 AFV’s through Lend Lease.

Strength at the front

Data for the German side comes from several sources including: Panzertruppen, Sturmgeschutz & Its Variants, Kursk 1943: A statistical analysis and AHF threads (here and here). Unfortunately it is very difficult to find reliable data for the number of self-propelled A/T guns in the East, so I include estimates with a question mark.

German strength EF
Type	22-Jun-41	June-42	July-43	May-44
Tanks	3,600	2,400	2,500	~1,500
StuG/StuH	272	~400	1,000	~1,500
SP A/T and Artillery	135	?200?	?800?	?1,200?
Sum	4,007	3,000	4,300	4,200

In the East the Germans manage to keep their AFV strength constant at roughly 4.000 with the exception of summer ’42. However the numbers show an emphasis on SPG’s in the period 1943-44.

Data for the Soviets comes from this AHF thread [Source given is ‘Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voina 1941-45. Dejstvuyushchaya Armiya’]. These numbers do not include the STAVKA reserve. In the summer of 1941 there were about 12.000 tanks in the Western military districts. For the rest of the war:

Soviet AFV strength at the front
	Year 1941	Year 1942		Year 1943	Year 1944		Year 1945
AFV	1-Dec-41	1-May-42	1-Nov-42	1-Jul-43	1-Jan-44	1-Jun-44	1-Jan-45
Tanks
Heavy	212	660	922	893	349	467	976
Medium	322	1,291	2,714	5,492	2,609	3,766	6,059
Light	1,393	2,025	3,542	3,447	1,438	1,147	564
Sum	1,927	3,976	7,178	9,832	4,396	5,380	7,599
SPG
Heavy				104	139	314	504
Medium				174	244	152	758
Light				86	523	1,565	3,399
Sum	0	0	0	364	906	2,031	4,661
Total  AFV	1,927	3,976	7,178	10,196	5,302	7,411	12,260

There is no doubt that the Soviet forces had a significant numerical advantage over the Germans. This is natural since the Germans had to also fight against the Anglo-Americans while the SU could concentrate all of its resources against Germany.

Regarding AFV types it is interesting to note the role played by the light tanks T-60/70 and SU-76 SPG throughout the war. Most authors do not mention them at all.

Losses

Data for the Soviet side comes from Krivosheev’s ‘Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century’.

		Soviet AFV Losses
	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1941-45
Types
Tank
Heavy	900	1,200	1,300	900	900	5,200
Medium	2,300	6,600	14,700	13,800	7,500	44,900
Light	17,300	7,200	6,400	2,300	300	33,500
SPG	0	100	1,100	6,800	5,000	13,000
Total	20,500	15,100	23,500	23,800	13,700	96,600

The Soviets build lots of tanks but they also lose staggering numbers.

For the German side I have several reports that give total losses (here and here) but only one report from AHF that states losses in the East.

German AFV losses Eastern Front
	1941	1942	1943	1944	Total
Tanks	2,403	3,195	5,637	4,438	15,673
Stug	85	219	1,459	3,468	5,231
SP A/T guns	27	91	1,111	1,669	2,898
Total	2,515	3,505	8,207	9,575	23,802

A direct comparison between the two sides shows the Soviet Union losing 3.5 vehicles, in the period 1941-44, for every German AFV. This analysis however is flawed since AFV’s were also destroyed by towed A/T guns, hand held weapons, artillery, mines and airpower.

Despite that I do believe that tank for tank the German vehicles were better and that the T-34 was a poor weapon system.

Another way to look at losses is to calculate what percentage of production they represent.

Losses as % of AFV production
Germany	1941	1942	1943	1944
Production	3,736	6,058	12,228	19,665
Losses	2,515	3,505	8,207	9,575
%	0.67	0.58	0.67	0.49
SU
Production	5,971	24,094	23,858	27,759
Losses	20,500	15,100	23,500	23,800
%	3.43	0.63	0.98	0.86

I think the numbers speak for themselves. Without Anglo-American interference the Soviet losses in 1943-44 are unsustainable.
 

[Note that there are the following ‘issues’ with the German report:

1).The losses for 1942 include December 1941. According to Foreign Military Studies P-059 ‘Tank Losses’ by Generalmajor Burkhart Mueiler-Hillebrand total losses on all fronts for December 1941 comes to 525 Tanks and SPG’s but not all were lost in the East since at the same time there was heavy fighting in N.Africa during the British operation ’Crusader’. This could increase the 1941 percentage significantly.

2). February 1943 total losses show a huge spike at 2.069 vehicles. It seems reasonable to assume that these are vehicles heavily damaged/destroyed in late 1942 but officially written off in 1943. This would take the 1943 percentage down by a few points while raising the 1942 percentage.

3). For 1944 it says ‘December incomplete’. According to FMS P-059 total losses during the month were 677 Tanks, SPG’s and self-propelled artillery. A lot would be against the Western Allies during the Battle of the Bulge. In any case the number is so small that it can only raise the percentage by a few points.]

Some comments

1). The production difference in AFV’s for 1941-44 is 2-1 in favor of the Soviets (slightly higher if we add Lend Lease) but the exchange ratio is 3.5-1 in favor of the Germans. This means that if the Germans could concentrate all their production in the East the Soviets would run out of tanks.

2). Soviet forces benefit from Lend Lease supplies of tanks and other vehicles while the Germans had no such source of free vehicles but instead had to supply tanks and SPG’s to their allies and trade partners. Also in 1943-44 German production is affected by the Combined Bomber offensive, while the SU can utilize Lend Lease supplies of machinery and raw materials.

3). I often see the argument that the Soviet war economy out produced the German one. This is ‘proven’ by comparing either tank production between the two countries or total tank and SPG production. Things change if we have a look at each category separately. In the period 1941-44 we have:

Tanks: 3-1 advantage for the SU,

SPG’s and SP artillery: 1.2-1 advantage for the Germans,

Infantry vehicles (halftracks): …. SU produced zero while Germany built tens of thousands of Sdkfz 250/251. So who out produced whom?

4). Looking at tank types we see that the Germans constantly upgraded their fleet:

In 1941 they invaded with roughly 3.600 tanks of which only ~40% belong to the modern Pz III and PZ IV types. From these the Pz III had only 30mm frontal armor (some had extra 30mm bolted on) and roughly 28% had the outdated 37mm gun, the rest the 50mm L42. The Pz IV was armed with a low velocity 75mm gun ineffective against tanks and its armor was only 30mm (a small number had 50mm)

The new versions introduced in 1942 had updated guns and armor. The Pz III received the long 50mm L/60 and additional armor (50mm basic and 20mm bolted on). The Pz IV got the long 75mm KwK40 L/43 that had excellent antitank performance and its armor was increased to 50mm basic plus 30mm bolted on. In the summer of ’42 the Pz III and Pz IV comprise ~67% of German tank strength and out of these 45% have the new tank guns. The new guns meant that the German tanks could destroy the T-34 frontally (the L/60 at less than 500m the L/43 from over 1km) and the extra armor (assuming they had the bolted on part) protected them from the 76mm F-34 (using the standard A/T round) at ranges over 500m (for the Pz III hull and turret front) or point blank range (for the Pz IV front hull).

In the summer of 1943 the improved PzIV (KwK40 L/48 and 80mm standard armor plus sideskirts) together with the new Tiger and Panther tanks make up 49% of German tank strength. With these vehicles the Germans pulled ahead in tank warfare. This was acknowledged by a Soviet study conducted after the battle of Kursk. This showed that German and Soviet vehicles had the following combat values compared to the PzIII: Pz III -1.0, T-34- 1.16, Pz IV-1.27, PzV- 2.27 .

In 1944 the Germans rely exclusively on the PzIV, Tiger and Panther tanks. They had a rough 1-1 ratio between Pz IV and Panther in their tank units but this was not felt in the East during the summer battles as the best mobile divisions were in France.

Meanwhile the SU uses the same tank throughout the war, with the only important difference being a new turret and gun in 1944 (T34/85). The superiority of the upgunned German tanks and the new Panther and Tiger forced the Soviets to finally upgrade the T-34. However the T34-85 continued to have the same hull armor and its gun, although of a large caliber, had the same A/T performance as the Pz IV’s KwK40. The new 85mm ammo was heavier and only 56 rounds were carried (compared to 77 for the 76mm version). The T-34 was also the last main tank to get a 3-man turret.