Christos military and intelligence corner











Military and intelligence history mostly dealing with World War II.

Thursday, May 30, 2013

Nuke the world

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Have you ever wondered what would happen to Moscow if it was hit with a Trident D5 nuclear missile? How about a Tsar Bomba exploding over ...
2 comments:
Tuesday, May 28, 2013

Axis History Forum mug

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Today a coffee mug arrived in the mail. It’s a gift from my friends at Axis History Forum for contributing to their site. Thanks guys! ...
1 comment:
Monday, May 27, 2013

German vs Allied losses – Italian front

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One of the books I reviewed recently was the single volume history of the Italian campaign ‘ A Hard Way to Make a War: The Allied Campaign i...
9 comments:
Thursday, May 23, 2013

WWII Myths – The German war economy was mismanaged

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This is quite a difficult subject to fully analyze. The idea that the Germans mismanaged their war economy is one of the most enduring myths...
14 comments:
Monday, May 20, 2013

British report on military and diplomatic Polish codes

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After checking my files for my essay on the reliability of TICOM reports i rediscovered a British report giving an overview of Polish cod...
Sunday, May 19, 2013

More information on the Japanese codebreakers of WWII

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The book ‘ Mathematics and War ’ has a small chapter on the Japanese codebreakers of WWII by Setsuo Fukutomi . The author was one of these...
Saturday, May 18, 2013

Solution of Dutch Hagelin cipher machine by US codebreakers

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An interesting report of the Signal Security Agency is available from the wwiiarchives.net site. The title is ‘A n Insecure Use of the Ha...
Wednesday, May 15, 2013

Dienstelle Klatt – A case of Soviet deception

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In their war against the Soviet Union the Germans were in need of reliable information on Soviet military capabilities and decisions. Howeve...
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Christos T.
A simple economist with an unhealthy interest in military and intelligence history.
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