Christos military and intelligence corner

German exploitation of Soviet radio-facsimile traffic

2012-02-27T00:48:00.001-08:00

Another interesting event during WWII was the interception by the Germans of Soviet radio facsimile traffic. Apparently the SU had a large number of these radio stations and important documents were sent this way.

The agencies that intercepted this traffic were:

1. The Army Ordnance, Development and Testing Group, Signal Branch Group IV (Wa Pruef 7/IV)

2. The Army Signal Intelligence agency’s group VI , (OKH/GdNA Group VI)

I’ve managed to find information from various sources. Here are the relevant parts:

From Foreign Military Studies P-038 ‘German Radio intelligence’, p247

Facsimile transmission by radio was in extensive use by such Russian agencies as the NKVD and the Commissariat for Transportation. A net of about forty to fifty facsimile stations, several of which were in Siberia -- for instance, in Irkutsk, Tashkent, and Vladivostok -- transmitted hand-written communications, typewritten texts, drawings, and weather maps. However, none of the Russian facsimile devices over fell into the hands of the Germans. Nevertheless, the latter did succeed in intercepting Russian facsimile messages with corresponding equipment. Up to 1941 the Russians transmitted messages via facsimile in clear text. Even after the Russians had begun to use cipher machines, the Germans still had no difficulty in finding solutions and recording almost the entire facsimile output until the end of the war.

From IF-123 "Consolidated report on information obtained from the following: Erdmann, Grubler, Hempel, Karrenberg, Schmitz, Suschowk. CSDIC (U.K.) SIR 1717, p13

Y-Traffic

69. This referred to the transmission of photographic messages by wireless means. Such traffic was picked up from all over the world, including lines from Moscow to Stockholm; London to Moscow; London to Cairo; New York and Moscow etc. Non-Russian channels did not yield any valuable intelligence as the photos intercepted were normally only of news agency interest. Internal Russian traffic of this nature did ,however, yield technical diagrams and charts which were communicated by wireless methods.

70. Y traffic was picked up in Ref 1c of Gruppe VI. The activity was discontinued in Jan ’45.

Also ‘European Axis signals Intelligence’ vol2 page 87 mentions TICOM report D-58 ‘Description of facsimile intercept recorder’

The Abwehr’s assessment of Russian women

2012-02-23T00:02:00.000-08:00

If you read the title and expect this post to be critical of the conduct and morals of Russian women, during WWII, you will be disappointed. So read on!

The Abwehr was Germany’s military intelligence service. In the Eastern Front they had a lot of responsibilities like protecting the occupied areas from Soviet agents and saboteurs, combating partisans and generally keeping the population under control.

In order to carry out their mission they built up a large spy network that employed individuals of both sexes and various ethnicities, religions and political convictions.

In Foreign Military Studies report P-122 ‘German Counterintelligence activities in occupied Russia 1941-44’ pages 75-82 (available through the fold3 site), there are several paragraphs devoted to the personality traits that made Russian women different from their western counterparts. I found it so interesting that I decided to post the relevant part here:

o. Russian Women

The difficulties encountered by the Germans in working with female Russian agents were far greater than those experienced with male Russians. The Soviet women differed greatly from their Western counterparts in character, customs, and opinions. Some of the character differences in the Russian women were inherent while others were the result of Soviet influence and living conditions in the USSR.

(1) Peculiarities of Russian Women

The principal trait of contemporary Russian women was their independence, which was shown in all aspects of their behavior and especially in their relationships with men, Soviet women participated more actively in political activities than was surmised by the Western world. In the USSR, women often occupied high positions and exerted enormous influence on public and economic life. It was not unusual to find a woman directing a big concern, serving as chairman of an organization like the Society for the Promotion of Aviation and Chemical Defense (Osoaviachim), or as secretary of one of the Communist Party organizations . Moreover, the women in the USSR received training on an equal basis with the men. This developed their self-confidence. The Russian women occupying such high positions had more power over their subordinates than that enjoyed by their Western counterparts. A Soviet woman in high position could discharge an employee and turn him over to the NKVD for imprisonment. In the USSR, it was the official or political position that determined an individual's power, not the sex. Despite the generally demoralizing effect of Communism, Russian women had retained the high moral standards accredited to them. The Soviet system had influenced them to a lesser degree than the men. Russian women kept their word, were less amenable to bribery than the men, detested all excesses, and frowned on work for material gain only. Most Russian women were very strong and of great endurance, and were able to withstand pain as well as hunger, thirst, and cold far better than spiritual privation. Apart from these character traits, they owed their mental formation to the influence of foreign, especially to French, literature. They were influenced by the novels of de Maupassant, which were relatively well known in the USSR. Soviet propaganda also exerted a certain influence, pointing out that the Westerner, educated under capitalism, looked to women as a means to satisfy his carnal desires and neglected completely their personalities.

(2) Recruiting or Russian Female Agents

It was a long time before the Abwehr understood Russian women well enough to be able to employ them profitably. Other methods had to be used than those employed in recruiting Polish, Latvian, French, and Belgian women. The recruiting officer had to show that he was not interested in the prospect as a woman, for she would refuse to collaborate if she became suspicious of his intentions.

(3) Inducements

The Abwehr personnel often stressed the inequalities of a woman’s position under the Soviet regime. True, she enjoyed equal rights, but she had to work harder and under greater difficulties. Her work under the Soviets was unsuitable and did not correspond to her physical make-up and mental qualifications, besides being injurious to her health. Moreover, the Soviet system disorganized the family. Husband and wife worked hard all day. If they desired advancement, they had to fulfill obligatory public services, attend meetings and lectures, serve on committees, sign manifestos, etc. On returning home, both were too tired to enjoy each other's company. The wife was unable to, educate and influence her children for luck of time, end apart from this, the Communist Putty did not permit any influence deviating from the Party line as set down by Lenin and Stalin. From infancy, every boy was influenced by the Soviet regime; he attended Soviet schools, and later joined Pioneer and Komsomol (Young Communist League) organizations. The case of Pavlik Morozov was always used a convincing example of what happened to children brought up by the Communist Party. Pavlik, the twelve-year old son of a collective farmer, denounced his father to the NKVD. For this betrayal, he was slain by his grandfather. The Soviets, however, erected a statue in Pavlik's memory, calling him a hero for betraying his father. Material inducements influenced women in Russia but not as much as they did elsewhere. Money gave them an opportunity to dress well, to buy cosmetics, and to pretty themselves, things they were unable to do on a large scale before the war.

(4) Tasks Assigned to Russian Female Agents

Set tasks and stereotyped orders were avoided. Every mission, however small, had to be presented idealistically. In every case assurance had to be given that the fulfillment of the mission would not harm the Russian people or be detrimental to their interests. In general, most of the prospects were ready and willing to help overthrow the Communist regime. A task involving some difficulty was presented as a challenge to awaken their sense of rivalry. For example, a woman spy might be told that it was doubtful whether she could outwit her competitor - a grown and experienced man - since she was only a woman. If her rival was a woman, she was told that the other female agent was prettier and smarter. The adversary was always described as an enemy of the people, a provocateur, informer, sadist, etc. …..

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

In working with Russian female agents, the surest means of gaining their co-operation was to appeal to their minds and to stress the highly ethical nature of their mission. It was far more difficult to compel a Russian woman to accept a mission in which she had to play the role of a prostitute. The same was true of female agents sent out by Soviet intelligence agencies to spy on the Germans. Russian women accepted and carried out such tasks very unwillingly. Prostitutes were very rare and generally of weak character, stupid, rind therefore unfit for intelligence work.

(5) Motives influencing Female Agents

The best agents were those who wore convinced of the necessity of their work. Some female agents worked for the Abwehr to avenge fancied slights, or the death of some relative at the hands of the Soviets. Others volunteered to work for the Germans because Soviet intelligence had been about to conscript their services and assign them to tasks they were unwilling to do. Still others enlisted without knowing the dangers ahead of them. Once they had signed a contract, it was too late. German counter-intelligence agencies seldom forced Russian women to work for them, whereas the Soviets had no such scruples.

(6) Remuneration

Ant form of remuneration or mark of distinction given to a female agent was subject to certain rules. Whatever she received had to be given it, the form of a present. Money was presented in an envelope with a gift -- perfume, soap, silk stockings, etc. Female agents appreciated such attentions. Inexperienced Gorman officers or counterintelligence agents antagonized the women when they showed lack of tact in such matters.

(7) Recreation and Leaves

Recreation and leaves for female agents were complicated and delicate problems. When a male agent was on leave, a close watch had to he kept on him, for at such times he was particularly vulnerable. The question of leave for the female agents presented oven greater difficulties. The best solution to the problem was to organize tours to Germany for both male and female agents. Fairly small groups were made up under the supervision of a German Army specialist carefully selected for the purpose. In Germany, the female agents came in contact with a more cultured and broad-minded way of life. The falseness of Soviet propaganda regarding hunger and deprivations in the 'West 'was readily apparent. The shops, theatres, museums, and places of amusement and instruction furnished those women with so many new impressions that they had no time to think of the rigors of their work. Moreover, life in Germany gave them a goal for the first time in their lives' to live in the West after it was all over. They were confident that the Abwehr would give them good jobs or even support them when for one reason or another they wore no longer able to work as agents.

I wonder if modern Russian women also have the same traits.

Update

2012-02-22T09:02:00.000-08:00

I re-uploaded TICOM reports I-78, I-194, I-112, I-113, D-60, I-20. The new files have the same quality but are much smaller in size.

WWII Myths – Luftwaffe the tactical airforce

2012-02-20T00:52:00.000-08:00

The Luftwaffe was supposed to be a ‘tactical’ airforce .As such it was very good at supporting the German army but could not have a ‘strategic’ effect on operations. If only the Germans had invested in 4-engine bombers they would have won the Battle of Britain ,they would have bombed the Russian factories and won the war easily... At least that’s what I’ve read in books and articles.

Do I agree ? No

In order to decide if the LW was a ‘tactical’ airforce we need to have a look at:

1. Production of LW aircraft in numbers

2. Production of LW aircraft in weight

3. Composition of LW fleet

4. Comparison with RAF’s Bomber Command

Let’s look at production. Here there is a problem regarding the way we count aircraft. A large number of ‘’fighters’’ were Ju-88 bombers used as night-fighters. The Bf -109 and the Ju-88 were also used as recon planes. So here I’ve added to the wikipedia bomber data the Ju-88 nighfighter and recon plane. Also did the same for the Bf-109 in the fighter table. The end result is :

	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
Bombers	3,244	4,007	5,161	5,854	5,284
Fighters	2,673	3,704	5,109	9,494	23,447
Ground Attack	603	507	1,249	3,266	5,596
Sum	6,520	8,218	11,519	18,614	34,327
% of Bombers	0.50	0.49	0.45	0.31	0.15
% of Fighters	0.41	0.45	0.44	0.51	0.68
% of Ground	0.09	0.06	0.11	0.18	0.16

Looking only at the number it’s obvious that bomber production dominates the other parts of the LW fleet. Even in 1943 when the percentage goes down to roughly one third if we take into account the cost of bomber planes vs fighters ( 2 engines vs 1 , larger and heavier etc) again the bombers are the no1 item.

A better way is to look at the weight of produced aircraft. Since bombers are larger and heavier it is a better indicator of the relative value of LW production. I’ve used the same data as before but this time I multiply each type of aircraft with its standard weight (in kg,from Wikipedia). It may not be the most scientific way but it’s close enough:

	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
Bombers	27,243,908	35,169,130	46,480,454	55,588,060	52,254,726
Fighters	8,272,749	10,172,210	14,668,675	27,369,448	66,875,267
Ground Attack	2,900,430	2,433,420	5,732,460	13,496,580	19,813,883
Sum	38,417,087	47,774,760	66,881,589	96,454,088	138,943,876
% of Bombers	0.71	0.74	0.69	0.58	0.38
% of Fighters	0.22	0.21	0.22	0.28	0.48
% of Ground	0.08	0.05	0.09	0.14	0.14

Now let’s have a look at the composition of the LW fleet throughout the war:

	May-40	June-41	July-42	May-43	May-44	Jan-45
SE Fighters	1,369	1,129	1,364	1,489	1,608	1,937
TE Fighters	367	153	127	152	277	41
Night-fighters	0	205	308	456	874	1,144
Medium Bombers	1,758	1,355	1,881	2,126	1,362	484
LR Bombers		21	71	79	282	44
Ground Attack	467	578	466	852	836	753
Total Combat	3,961	3,441	4,217	5,154	5,239	4,403
Bombers % of Total	0.44	0.40	0.46	0.43	0.31	0.12

The Bomber force makes up ~41% of combat strength in 1941-44. So it is undoubtedly the largest part of the LW.

So the LW was definitely not an airforce that spent the majority of its resources on fighters and ground attack aircraft. Instead it was the Bomber force that ate up most resources.

Now let’s compare with a ‘strategic’ force, the RAF’s Bomber Command.

	May-40	June-41	July-42	May-43	May-44	Jan-45
LW-Medium Bombers	1,760	1,355	1,881	2,126	1,362	484
BC-Medium Bombers	598	576	448	327	123	220
LW-Long Range Bombers		21	71	79	282	44
BC-Long Range Bombers		56	208	912	1,390	1,620
Sum LW	1,760	1,376	1,952	2,205	1,644	528
Sum BC	598	632	656	1,239	1,513	1,840
Total Ratio (LW/BC)	2.94	2.18	2.98	1.78	1.09	0.29
4-engine ratio (BC/LW)	₋	2.67	2.93	11.54	4.93	36.82

What the numbers tell us is obvious. During the period 1939-42 BC has few bombers and only a small part are 4-engine. The majority of its aircraft are comparable or inferior to the standard German types.

So at least for the first half of the war no airforce operating in Europe can be said to be ‘strategic’.

Conclusion: Throughout the war the Kampfgeschwader accounted for the largest part of the LW. For the first half of the war no other nation had as many bombers available. Only in 1944 is the Bomber Force reduced in order to shift resources and pilots to the fighter defenses. Even then a large (for German standards) 4-engine He-177 bomber force is built up.

Compared to the ‘strategic’ Bomber Command the LW had a substantial numerical advantage in the period 1939-42 and bombers with similar or superior capability. Only in 1943-45 do the Brits have sufficient numbers of heavy bombers to classify as a ‘strategic’ force.

Taking into account the information presented so far it is clear that the Luftwaffe was not a tactical airforce in the period 1939-43. Only in ’44-’45 does the Bomber Force become eclipsed by the fighters and ground attack aircraft.

Sources: Strategy for Defeat , The Luftwaffe data book , AIR 22 - ‘’Air Ministry: Periodical Returns, Intelligence Summaries and Bulletins’’ , Wikipedia

Update

2012-02-17T00:53:00.000-08:00

I uploaded file ADM 1/27186 – ‘Review of security of naval codes and cyphers 1939-1945’. It mentions in great detail the code systems used by the RN, prior and during the war and the success that the German B-Dienst had against each one. Very interesting file! (139 pages, 48Mb)

Update

2012-02-14T23:49:00.000-08:00

I have added personalities of the OKW Radio defence Corps in article A who’s who of German Signals Intelligence.

Oberleutnant Schubert and Soviet 5-figure codes

2012-02-13T00:11:00.000-08:00

Horst Schubert was an Oberleutnant in the German army’s signal intelligence agency OKH/In 7/VI. He joined the agency in 1941 and worked on Soviet army codes till March 1943. Then he worked on Soviet partisan codes till late ‘43 .At that time he became head of the Russian section. [Source: EASI vol4,p115]

In his interrogation TICOM I-15 (available in the TICOM folder) he shares some interesting information on the Soviet 5-figure code:

Q. What ciphers above division did you work on?

A. A five figure book which was re-encoded on a one-time pad.

Q. Did you have any success with this?

A. In the Finnish campaign the book was captured and the Russians used the one time pads over again. Because of this we had considerable success. Recently the Russians used the pads correctly, and only very few messages were read, these through re-encodements. Hollerith machines were used in attempts to break this cipher.

This makes Schubert the 10th person who explicitly mentions German success with Soviet high level codes in postwar interrogations.

The Russian FISH story - more clues?

2012-02-12T01:19:00.000-08:00

So far I’ve uncovered a lot of details regarding the use of radioteletype by the Soviet Union in the 1930’s and 40’s. However there are still gaps in our knowledge. What is the history of this equipment? Was it built in the SU or imported from another country?

File DF-296 ‘’Communications equipment in the USSR - Part A: Wireless communications equipment’’ is a translation of a German document written in July 1941. It describes several radio sets used by the SU at that time. I have to thank Randy Rezabek of TICOM Archive for sending me the NARA aid which mentioned this file.

Now I’m not a technician so I can’t be sure if/how this equipment is connected to the Russian Fish story but two references stick out since they mention teleprinters:

Notes : A1: Undamped unmodulated telegraphy , A3: Telephony .

As always I have uploaded the file. If you have more information please share!

Update

2012-02-09T09:53:00.001-08:00

Time for some more interesting files :

TICOM I-115 - 'Further Interrogation of Oberstlt METTIG of OKW/Chi on the German Wireless Security Service (Funkuberwachung)'

CSDIC/CMF/SD 80 - 'First Detailed Interrogation Report on LENTZ, Waldemar, and KURFESS, Hans'

Both have been uploaded to the Ticom folder.The latter file has information on the Rote Kapelle , Soviet agents 'Otto'/Leopold Trepper and 'Fritz'/Victor Sokolov (and not Anatoli Gurevitch as i thought earlier !), the Sonderkommando Pannwitz and the agents section of OKH - In 7/VI.

Battle of Britain 1940 - Strength reports and What If scenarios

2012-02-06T00:21:00.000-08:00

After the fall of France the Germans expected the British government to sue for peace. Unfortunately for them that did not happen. The only way forward for Hitler was to bomb Britain into submission .The Battle of Britain pitted the RAF against the Luftwaffe.

Numerically the Germans had the advantage. Their frontline combat strength in May was ~4,000 planes compared to ~1,800 for the RAF (Fighter,Bomber and Coastal Commands),[Source: AIR 22]. Things however changed after the Battle of France, as the LW lost a lot of planes in May.

According to report AIR 40/1207 on 29 June their total number of Bomber, Fighter and Ground attack aircraft was 3,552 . The RAF had ~1,600 in Fighter, Bomber and Coastal Commands on 2 July . Ratio of 2.2 to 1.

It was the RAF’s Fighter Command which was going to bear the brunt of the offensive and here things were better in terms of ratios. File AIR 40/1207 (available in the Ticom folder) gives for the LW on 29 June 1,464 single and twin engine fighters versus the RAF’s 816 . However if we look only at SE fighters we have LW - 1,107 vs RAF – 672. A superiority of 1.65 to 1.

Keep in mind that not all the LW fighters were in the West.

The Battle of Britain officially lasted from 10 July to 31 October 1940. Here I’ve also included the strength returns for May and June but unfortunately I don’t have the figures for October.

Types	2-May-40		2-Jun-40		2-Jul-40		2-Aug-40		2-Sep-40
	Est	Serv	Est	Serv	Est	Serv	Est	Serv	Est	Serv

Spitfire	264	129	272	181	304	243	328	245	328	208
Hurricane	272	168	184	102	368	282	540	341	638	405
Blenheim	96	68	112	80	112	68	96	57	96	57
Defiant					32	25	32	21	32	24
Gladiator									8	7


Total	632	365	568	363	816	618	996	664	1,102	701

Est= Establishment , Serv= Serviceable , Source: AIR 22 - Air Ministry: Periodical Returns, Intelligence Summaries and Bulletins (available in the Ticom folder)

What do the numbers tell us? First of all the fighting in France was responsible for a reduction in the strength of FC . By July however production of new aircraft has raised FC strength by 44%. Despite the losses from the German fighters strength continues to rise in August and September.

The twin heroes for the British side are the Spitfire and the Hurricane fighters. Numerically it is the Hurricane that contributes more to FC but movies and books focus on the Spit.

Compared to the Bf-109 used by the Luftwaffe only the Spit is equal in performance. Each aircraft has its strong and weak side. The Bf-109 is better armed (20mm guns) and performs better in climb and dive maneuvers. The Spit is better in turn combat. Both are short ranged.

Looking at the numbers it is easy to see why the Germans failed. In order to defeat the RAF they would need a much larger fighter force. What-if scenarios that claim the Germans lost because they started bombing cities instead of airports are overlooking this fundamental problem.

By 7 September the LW fighter strength is 1,037 (S.E.-831, T.E.-206) [Source: Sturmvogel} versus 1,102 for the RAF .Game over!

It should be mentioned that by the end of the campaign both sides were running low on trained pilots. Unfortunately I don’t have data on this aspect.

The Brits have radar, AA defenses and fighter strength comparable to that of the Germans. They are also able to retrieve their shot down pilots and put them back to service. German pilots who parachute are captured and detained. The odds were simply impossible for the German side.

When the situation was reversed, it took the Allies years and a crushing numerical superiority in order to defeat the Luftwaffe in Western Europe.

Update

2012-02-04T00:08:00.000-08:00

I uploaded file HW 34/2 - RSS(I) Note: The Funkabwehr. This is an account of the German monitoring organisation, including a comparison with RSS, its British counterpart, dated February 1946.

and TICOM I-143 'Report on the Interrogation of Five Leading Germans at Nuremburg on 27th September 1945'

Also added the Funkabwehrdienst der Ordnungspolizei in article A who’s who of German Signals Intelligence .

Intercepted conversations - Bell Labs A-3 Speech scrambler and German codebreakers

2012-02-02T00:08:00.000-08:00

One of the most interesting codebreaking successes for the German side ,during WWII ,was the solution of the American A-3 speech scrambling device. This system was used in the radio-telephone link between Washington-London throughout the war. Up to summer 1943 it was the only speech privacy system employed on this link. From then on the new SIGSALY device entered service and carried the top secret conversations.

The efforts of Post Office engineer Kurt Vetterlein have been mentioned in numerous books, so that part of the story is well known. However there was also another team under the Army Ordnance, Development and Testing Group, Signal Branch - Wa Pruef 7 which successfully solved the A-3 system.

As far as I know the work of this second team has not been mentioned in any book or article.

Time to take a closer look at the work of both teams and the intelligence they got from the A-3 system:

The A-3 device

First let’s start with an overview of the Bell Telephone Laboratories A-3 device. It was a speech privacy system used during the 1930’s which utilized speech inversion .Its security was limited against a determined opponent that could devote scientific personnel and equipment for the task of decoding it.

Still it was the only system available at the time so it was used for high communications during the war. British and American officials on both sides of the Atlantic used it for discussions on economic and military matters.

The most well known intercepted discussions were between the leaders of the Anglo-American alliance, Roosevelt and Churchill. It seems that in at least one case their conversations gave the Germans vital clues on impending military actions.

The Post Office effort:

The Post office - Deutsche Reichspost was the organization responsible for telephone, telegraph and wireless communications in Germany. The Reichspostminister from 1937 to 1945 was Wilhelm Ohnesorge , a convinced National Socialist with close ties to Hitler.

Ohnesorge was interested in the new radio technologies and was willing to fund research in decoding the A-3 device. How he came to know of the existence and use of this machine is not mentioned in any of the books I’ve read.

The unit that handled this operation was the Forschungsstelle der Reichspost ( Research Post of the Reichspost ).

After the initial decision was made, two factors made things relatively easy for the Post Office people. First was the fact that the Post Office already owned an A-3 device. The second factor was their gifted engineer Kurt Vetterlein who headed the effort to decode the A-3.

After researching the A-3’s operating procedure ,Vetterlein and his team were able to build equipment that decoded the conversations in real-time. The equipment and the team were moved to Noordwijk in Holland where the reception was excellent. Conversations were decoded from late 1941 till late 1944.

The transcripts were sent by teletype to the Sicherheitsdienst (security service of the SS ). Then these were forwarded to Himmler, Hitler and other personalities of the Third Reich.

The threat of British commando raids forced the German team to move inland to a more secure location close to Eindhoven and in 1944 because of the advancing Allied armies they returned to Germany.

Interesting details regarding the intercepted material are given by Dr Hans Wilhelm Thost, a journalist and employee of the SD.

Thost had a strange history. In 1935 he was the London correspondent of the Völkischer Beobachter, the newspaper of the National Socialist Party. In October of that year he was ordered to leave the country. What was the reason for his expulsion? It seems that Thost may have taken part in unlawful activities like espionage .

Whatever the case he was one of the people who translated the incoming A-3 material and his interrogation TICOM I-190 ‚‘’Extracts from report on interrogation of Dr Hans Wilhelm Thost’’ is very interesting.

According to him the Post Office minister Ohnesorge distrusted the military and did not want to give them the transcripts of the intercepted communications. That was the reason for the Reichs Post-SD connection.

Thost says that the address for Washington was Republic 2020.In his interrogation he lists the memorable calls as follows :

a). Between War Office ,London and British Army staff ,Washington. Most of the time the caller was Brigadier Leslie Dawes and in London Brigadier Owen Young. The discussions concerned British orders of American military equipment. Cover words were used for the items (‘grapefruits ,‘pineapples‘)

b).Between the Ministry of War Transport, London and British Shipping Mission, Washington. Talks concerned the allocation of shipping space. Theatres of war were referred to by cover name. (‘Arthur’s place’ , ‘John’s place’)

c). Ministry of War Transport, London and representative of same organization in Washington. Talks concerned the allocation of tanker shipping space. Thost says that there was a serious shortage of tanker ships.

d).Concerning political and diplomatic matters.

Cases include :British Embassy, Washington to Foreign Office , London , Dutch Government, London to its representative in Washington , in one or two cases Soviet ambassador Maisky to Soviet ambassador in Washington .Also conversations between Eden in Washington and Churchill in London.

e). Concerning economic matters.(Foreign Economic Administration , United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration – UNRRA)

The most interesting calls were of course those between Roosevelt and Churchill. Their conversation of 29 July 1943 alerted the Germans to the impending Italian surrender and allowed them to take swift measures against the Italian army. Other top level people were also recorded : General Mark Clark , Lord Halifax , Averell Harriman and Harry Hopkins.

Walter Schellenberg ,head of SD foreign intelligence was the recipient of the transcripts and in his memoirs he mentions one of the Roosevelt-Churchill talks :

Early in 1944 we hit a bull's eye by tapping a telephone conversation between Roosevelt and Churchill which was overheard and deciphered by the giant German listening post in Holland. Though the conversation was scrambled, we unscrambled it by means of a highly complicated apparatus. It lasted almost five minutes, and disclosed a crescendo of military activity in Britain, thereby corroborating the many reports of impending invasion. Had the two statesmen known that the enemy was listening to their conversation, Roosevelt would hardly have been likely to say good-bye to Churchill with the words, 'Well, we will do our best—now I will go fishing.'

The Post Office operation was undoubtedly a great success but it was not the only effort against the A-3 device.

The Army directed its own separate operation through the Army Ordnance, Development and Testing Group, Signal Branch Group IV - Waffenpruefung Abteilung 7/IV.

Alfred Muche and the 5B machine

Now I said earlier that all the books on codebreaking mention the Vetterlein-Post office story. However that is only 50% of the puzzle.

In TICOM report I-213 ,recently declassified by the NSA , a German engineer named Muche working for the Army Ordnance, Development and Testing Group, Signal Branch Group IV Section E (Wa Pruef 7 /IVe) ,describes his own successful effort versus the A-3 scrambler.

The WaPruef 7/IV agency was involved in special tasks during the war. They analyzed and decoded Soviet speech scramblers and built equipment that intercepted and printed Allied multichannel radioteletype traffic. Section E, headed by Dr Loetze, did research in speech privacy systems.

Muche was an engineer with Section E . His life story is as follows : from 1927-37 he worked for Heliowatt Werke and in 1937 moved to WaPruef 7/IVe. For the period up to 1940 he studied domestic and foreign speech privacy systems.

At the end of 1940 or the beginning of 1941 his department started the study of the encrypted transatlantic telephone link. Under Muche’s direction single sideband receivers were built and the traffic recorded at ‘Nordwyk,Holland’ [This was the same area that the Post Office used for their interception facility]. In order to build the receivers he got assistance from Prof Koomans of the Dutch PTT (Staatsbedrijf der Posterijen, Telegrafie en Telefonie)

After studying the recordings with specialized equipment the Section E party found out that ‘the speech spectrum was being split into 5 bands, inverted and translated ’ …. ‘it was found that the cipher controlling the switching repeated cyclically after 36 sections.’

Since the operating procedure of the A-3 had been solved a descrambling machine known as 5B was built. The equipment was moved from Nordwyk to Ludwigsfelde (near Berlin) in late 1942. Ludwigsfelde housed a large army intercept station.

According to Muche the 5B machine became operational in the summer of ’43 and one of the conversations between Roosevelt and Churchill foreshadowed the Sicily landings and allowed the Germans to withdraw their forces with minimal losses.

Unfortunately for the Germans the 5B machine was destroyed by aerial bombardment in late 1943. Muche then spent 8 months building an improved version and completed that task in the summer of 1944. The machine continued to intercept and decode the traffic till ’45 when the unit was forced to move. He did not know what happened to the machine at the end of the war. For his efforts he was given the Kriegsverdienstkreuz and a Speer reward of 10.000 marks.

Regarding the equipment he used the following companies are mentioned :

1. AEG-parts for the SSB receivers

2. Siemens - ring modulators

3. AEG - ‘‘star‘‘ modulators

4. Filters for the 5B machine - Dr Vierling ( of the Feuerstein laboratory)

5. Speech analysis equipment – Breusing Tonsystem, Berlin

Muche was just as successful as Vetterlein but until now his story was not known. Although the army’s effort wasted resources, by duplicating the Post Office operation, it was nevertheless successful and provided valuable information during the war.

Conclusion

By eavesdropping on the Allied conversations the Germans got military, diplomatic and economic intelligence. In at least one case ( Italian surrender) the information they received allowed them to take swift military action and preempt the Allied plans. That event alone justified the resources spent on the A-3 both by the Post Office and the Army.

The intercepted communications between Roosevelt and Churchill are an embarrassing episode in the signals intelligence war. However the Allies knew the A-3 system was vulnerable and the SIGSALY machine which replaced it was a quantum leap in terms of security.

Thanks to SIGSALY the Allies had absolute security from mid ’43 onwards .Still the story of the A-3 scambler and the German efforts against it is an interesting chapter in the history of communications security.

Sources: European Axis Signals Intelligence , NSA website , ‘’Hitler’s Spies’’ , TICOM I-190 , TICOM I-213 , ‘’Nazis in pre-war London’’ , ‘’The memoirs of Hitler’s spymaster’’ , Wikipedia .

I have uploaded both TICOM reports.

Normandy 1944 – What-if scenarios and the Fortitude deception

2012-01-29T23:55:00.000-08:00

An interesting question that pops up on the internet is if the Germans could have defeated the Allied landings in Normandy. People like to talk about deception plans, Hitler sleeping until noon, Rommel not having command of the Panzer divisions etc etc etc .These discussions are very simplistic and come to the conclusion that if only Hitler hadn’t done x or y things would be different. They also seem to forget that apart from Normandy there were also the Southern landings.

I think that by simply looking at the strength of German and Allied forces in Normandy on 6 June ’44 we can come to a definite conclusion regarding the outcome of that battle.

Source for the map: British intelligence in the Second World War vol3 part2

The German units as seen on the map are :

243 ID : 11,529

709 ID : 12,320

716 ID : 7,771

711 ID : 7,242

352 ID : 12,734 – 10 StuG III assault guns

91 : 7,500

21 Pz Div : 16,297 – 112 Pz IV tanks

Also in the area was Flak –Sturm-Regiment 1 equipped with 8.8cm flak guns : ~ 3.000

Plus various small units : ~ 4,000

Total strength : ~ 82,000

Armored vehicles : 122

Mobile units close by are :

12 SS : 20,516 – 164 AFV

Pz Lehr : 14,699 – 237 AFV

However these units did not fight on the first day of the invasion.

[Source: Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness ,p28]

Now regarding Allied strength user RighTO90 has posted the hard numbers on Axis History forum.

Total strength : 150.000

Armored vehicles : 922

Those numbers are for 6 June only.

In the entire western theatre the Germans had about 2,000 tank and Stug vehicles [Source: Panzertruppen vol 2 1943-1945 , Sturmgeschutz & Its Variants ].

The Germans managed to get more than 922 AFV’s to Normandy on 29 June ’44 ( accumulated AFV strength committed: 1,124),[Source: Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness ,p414]

So what is there to discuss? I haven’t even mentioned the Allied domination of the air and the sea. There is no way that the German forces could have defeated the invasion.

Now another argument is that if the Germans hadn’t been deceived by Allied deception plans they would have concentrated their forces in Normandy and won the battle. I don’t understand that scenario. If the Germans concentrated all their forces in one place, before the invasion, the Allies would attack in another.

A smarter version of this is that the Germans could have won if they had quickly moved all their forces to Normandy, especially their mighty reserve held in the 15^th Army area in anticipation of the real invasion. This ‘’reserve’’ was supposedly not used thanks to a hugely successful deception campaign. A detailed look into this affair requires a separate essay so here i will just briefly mention some facts:

All these mythical reserve forces disappear if one looks at the actual German divisions in the area. Out of the four operational mobile divisions in the West (21Pz ,12 SS , 2^nd Pz , Pz Lehr) three were close to Normandy and only one near Calais ( 2^nd Pz) . That unit was also ordered to Normandy on 9 June ’44.

The Flak Korps was a mobile unit with powerful armament that had four regiments. Three were in the Somme Estuary and one in Normandy. On 6 June the other three were also ordered to Normandy.

Obviously the Germans were tricked by the Allies to hold their forces back...

The mighty reserve that would have allegedly thrown the Allies to the sea was actually made of the divisions behind the northern coast of France. These were the 84, 85,326,331 and 182 divisions. The last two were not operational as they were refitting /reforming. The rest had 28,363 men. That’s not the end of the argument as the other units of 15^th Army could theoretically contribute mobile groups to Normandy but I’ve never seen anyone even try to calculate if/how that could have happened. My advice to people who think that the allies won through deception is buy these books: Normandy 1944 , D-day deception .

Another argument is that the Germans had a million troops in the West and the Allies only landed 150.000 in Normandy so they should have won. However the total strength of the German forces on an entire continent has no meaning when we look at a specific area. Unfortunately the Germans had not yet discovered Star Trek type teleporters so they would have to find a way to move their forces from one area to the other. The only way was by foot, by truck and by rail. Military units can move simple soldiers by foot but their heavy equipment cannot move itself .German units in the West were woefully short of trucks so that option was limited ,[Source:Feeding Mars: The Role of Logistics in the German Defeat in Normandy, 1944].And for some reason the Allies thought it would be a good idea to bomb the French rail network. Strange people those Allies...

So where am i getting at? There’s no point in discussing what-if scenarios in cases when the disparity of forces is too great. The Allies won thanks to their own efforts not due to Hitler’s mistakes or Rommel’s or mystical deception plans.

Update

2012-01-28T05:11:00.000-08:00

I uploaded files :

HW 40/180 ‘’PERS Z-S, the Diplomatic Decryption Bureau of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs: reports and POW interrogations’’ ( 44 Mb , 124 pages )

HW 40/181 ‘’PERS Z-S, the Diplomatic Decryption Bureau of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs: reports and POW interrogations’’ ( 37 Mb , 113 pages )

The following TICOM reports can be found in them :

HW 40/180 : I-27 , I-22 , I-1

HW 40/181 : I-208 , D-78 , D-53 , I-103 , D-16 , I-63

Compromise of Soviet Diplomatic code – more clues ?

2012-01-24T02:59:00.000-08:00

In this post I had a look at the possible compromise of Soviet Kod26 during WWII.

Recently I stumbled on to more information:

From ‘’The Secret History of MI6’’ by Keith Jeffery , p500 :

One early, and perhaps disturbing, result of this was the news from SIM officers in October that their cryptographic section had previously broken the 'diplomatic cyphers' of United States military attaches, the 'Russian confidential cypher', and those of Turkey , Yugoslavia, Greece, Portugal, Egypt, Brazil and Belgium. The results had been 'passed to Germans and Hungarians' who could 'now presumably decypher all above cyphers'.

SIM was the Italian Army’s Intelligence Agency – Servizio Informazioni Militari .Was the ‘’Russian Confidential Cypher’’ the Soviet diplomatic Code? How could the Italians have solved it ? They were not known for their cryptanalytic capabilities. Did they take photos of the code book and tables like in the case of the American ‘’Black’’ code ?

From ‘’Deadly Illusions’’ by Costello and Tsarev , p399-400 :

Among other important items of intelligence in SENIOR'S report relayed by KENT was the possibility that the Germans would resort to unconventional forms of warfare. It also gave the precise whereabouts of the Fuehrer's headquarters on the Eastern Front and significant information about important leaks in Allied communications:

.... The Germans possess the USSR's diplomatic cypher, which was captured in Petsamo, however, the cypher has reportedly not yet yielded to the extent that there is an opportunity to decypher any large volume of Soviet documents....

This was one of the messages sent in November 1941 by the ‘’Senior’’ network of the Rote Kapelle , operating in Berlin.

So what can we conclude from this information ?

The Germans had captured diplomatic code 26 in the Petsamo consulate in summer 1941 , however in order to decode messages they would need to strip the additive pads .These were only used once so the system was unbreakable.

is it possible that by having the codebook and receiving photos of the additive book from the Italians the Germans managed to decode Soviet diplomatic traffic ?

Update

2012-01-23T08:08:00.000-08:00

I uploaded file GERMAN ANALYSIS OF CONVERTER M-209 - POW INTERROGATIONS ,found in NARA (NR 3946 ZEMA13 15123A)

Update

2012-01-22T05:19:00.000-08:00

I uploaded file CSDIC SIR 1717 - Consolidated report on information obtained from the following PW : Erdmann , Grubler , Hempel , Karrenberg , Schmitz , Suschowk in the Ticom folder .

German codebreakers vs Enigma

2012-01-21T01:46:00.000-08:00

During WWII the commercial Enigma cipher machine was used by the Croat State of Ante Pavelic and the Armed forces and Diplomatic corps of Switzerland. In both cases the Germans were interested in knowing the content of the messages.

For Croatia it was the need to keep a close eye on an ally in the Balkans. Switzerland on the other hand was a neutral state but since many agents and diplomatic missions operated on Swiss soil it was only natural that the Germans would want to learn its secrets.

The Croat Enigma was used by both military and civilian authorities, so it was attacked by the Army signals intelligence agency Inspectorate 7/VI and by OKW/Chi. In both cases solution rested on knowing the wiring of the rotors plus cribs (known plaintext in the cipher text).Things were easy as the Croats did not change the ringstellung often . (Ringstellung:The ring setting, the position of the rotor wiring, relative to the alphabet rings ,Source: Rijmenants, Dirk(2010) 'Enigma Message Procedures Used by the Heer,Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine',Cryptologia)

The Swiss Enigma was harder to break as the wiring of the wheels was changed upon receiving the machines. The military traffic could not be decoded due to few messages. The diplomatic traffic however was decoded successfully by OKW/Chi and the Forschungsamt.

Let’s take a look at the available information :

Croat Enigma :

From EASI vol4 -Army High Command Signal Intelligence Service ,p171-2

When the German government established the puppet government of Croatia in 1941, the Croats were given the commercial model of the Enigma for use by their Army and Secret Police. The traffic of these units was read by the Balkan section currently without any delay.

From TICOM I-92 ‘’Final Interrogation of Wachtmeister Otto Buggisch’’ , p2-3

2. Solution of Croat Enigma. This was not an outstanding cryptanalytic achievement. The machine used was the K model, with three wheels and no stecker. The machines were made for the Croats by the firm of KROSKY and KRUGER, Berlin, which gave the wirings promptly to OKW/WNV in about 1941 or 1942. A single key was used throughout the entire Croat Army and area, and this consisted only of a list of 100 settings for a period of a month. As far as Buggisch knew the Ringstellung stayed always at AAA, and the wheel order at 1, 2, 3. Just to make sure, the Germans paid for one of the first keys used, and with this decoded traffic were able to establish stereotypes and solve almost 100% from the first.

The solutions were done entirely by hand with wiring charts, assuming a pet beginning (one third of all messages began with "MINORS") and assuming the left hand wheels and Umkehrwalz unmoving (only one notch per wheel as in the commercial model). The Croats also had pet indicators and so would furnish depths in case this method did not work. The setting was indicated directly by a two digit number unenciphered, so that the settings wore solved almost as fast as they came, and the traffic read currently from then on. Buggisch did not recall the contents in detail. 90% of it was uninteresting; there were some interesting messages about actions against Tito

Buggisch said the Germans had considered equipping the Croats With the military Enigma, as they did for HUNGARY, ROUMANIA , FINLAND and ITALY (and JAPAN, he thinks) in about 1942. However, they decided acainst this as they believed the corrupt CROATS would go right on selling the keys to British agents, while they, the GERMANS, would have to pay as well instead of solving free. (The possibility of a BRITISH solution obviously did not occur to Buggisch during this discussion of the K model.)

Swiss Enigma :

From EASI vol 4 -Army High Command Signal Intelligence Service , p163

80. Work on Swiss, Spanish , Portuguese ,Brazilian traffic - From 1941-1944 –the French section of In 7VI had subsections for Swiss, Spanish, Portuguese, and Brazilian traffic. As Kuehn stated, however, the volume of traffic was always extremely small and unimportant .Buggisch, one of the chief cryptanalysts of In 7/VI, worked with Kunze of the Foreign Office on the solution of the Swiss Enigma (the Commercial Enigma) although they worked out a theoretical solution of the machine, the theory was never applied at In 7/VI to Swiss traffic because the volume did not warrant the effort.Moreover, easy solution of the traffic was precluded by the fact that the Swiss did their own wiring of the Enigma wheels and changed these frequently.

This refers to the Enigma used by the Swiss army. For the diplomatic version :

From EASI vol2 – Notes on German high level cryptology and cryptanalysis ,p76 :

39. Swiss Enigma rotor wirings were solved by cribs; other Enigmas were compromised - The Swiss diplomatic Enigma ("K' type) was read regularly, probably by the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW/Chi), although Dr. Huettenhain, who revealed this solution, did not state definitely that it was his agency which accomplished it. The Swiss changed their Enigma rotor wirings every three months, but the changes were not effected on the Berne-Washington link at the time they were made on the Berne-London link. As a result duplicate messages sent by the Swiss to Washington and to London during the periods of changeover provided the "break' necessary: to learn the new wirings.

The Croat enigma, used for both diplomatic and military traffic, was read regularly by Inspectorate 7/VI (In 7/VI). This was no credit to the cryptanalysts involved, however, as their problem was particularly easy:

(1) they had obtained the rotor wirings from Konski and Krueger (Berlin) who made the rotors;

(2) there was no end-plate plugging involved;

(3) the rotor orders were not changed by the Croats;

(4) the "ringstellungen' (devices enabling the notches and alignment indicator letters to be "slid' in relation to the rotors) remained fixed; and

(5) there were only 100 initial rotor alignments used by the Croats each month.

An excellent treatise on Enigma ("K’’ type) solution was found in the files of the Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section (Pers Z S). It involved obtaining many messages in depth, reading these messages by solving the successive (monoalphabetic) columns of superimposed text, and then applying the resultant cribs to recovering the wirings of the rotors.These methods are well-known to Anglo-American cryptanalysts.

From EASI vol7 - Goering’s Research Bureau ,p87 :

Swiss Systems.

Swiss Enigma Machine. Paetzel stated that the Swiss Enigma was formerly broken for a while, but only when it was Improperly used. The same internal settings were used for a long time. After the inner settings changed we did not have any more solution. At first we reconstructed the wheels from cribs and from the fact that the inner settings remained the same. In his 1941 Report Dr Brandes of Pen ZS mentions solution of the Swiss Enigma. Apparently the FA furnished Peps ZS with a partial solution which Dr Kunze was able to complete.Thereafter there was an exchange of keys between the two agencies.

From EASI vol3 - Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces , p68 :

Switzerland:

There was apparently a separate desk for Swiss traffic headed by First Lt. Kunze. Traffic enciphered on the Swiss Enigma vas regularly read. Huettenhain said that the wiring was changed every three months, but the changes at Washington were not made at the same time as those in London. Cribs thus provided by the Washington Traffic for the London traffic made it possible to solve the London wirings.

From EASI vol6 - The Foreign Office cryptanalytic section ,p32 :

Switzerland. Generally speaking, all Swiss diplomatic systems were read except the Enigma cipher machine. That, too, was read for a time in 1941. The codes were chiefly three-letter books, usually bi-lingual, enciphered with a series of substitution tables. New wirings of the Enigma were solved by cribs every three months. Subsequent messages were recovered from message texts.

The American and British codebreaking agencies also attacked the Swiss Enigma using the same methods as the Germans. It seems however that the results did not justify the effort as the content of the messages was not interesting:

By the fall of 1943, American cryptanalysts were reading Swiss Enigma traffic on the Berne-Washington circuit, and by 1945 they had general access to all circuits. The intelligence product, however, was modest. Traffic usually dealt with trade, prisoners of war, the repatriation of internees, and Swiss protection of 'enemy' interests in belligerent states. While appreciating the opportunity to monitor Swiss imports for evidence that goods were transshipped to Axis countries, American intelligence ultimately concluded that 'the intelligence value of most messages in Swiss systems is low'.

[Source: Alvarez, David(1997) 'No immunity: Signals intelligence and the European neutrals, 1939-45',Intelligence and National Security ]

Update

2012-01-20T01:28:00.000-08:00

I added new information in article A who's who of German signals intelligence. Specifically the German meteorological service and the Postal Ministry.

Soviet speech scrambers

2012-01-16T23:21:00.000-08:00

Apart from codebooks and ciphers machines the major powers of WWII also used speech privacy systems to protect their sensitive radiotelephone communications.

The American A-3 device, built by Bell Telephone Laboratories , was used for the link London-Washington. Unfortunately for the Allies it was solved by two German teams .One working for the Army Ordnance, Development and Testing Group, Signal Branch – Wa Pruef 7 and the other working for the Post Office.

The successor of A-3 was the SIGSALY device which offered absolute security. The drawback was the huge size of the equipment .According to the NSA website it weighed 55 tons !

The Germans used devices similar to the A-3 but did not consider them secure (for obvious reasons). Michael Pröse mentions the Siemens & Halske ’’Kleiner Leitungsverzerrer GK III’’ [Source: Pröse dissertation ,p172] .During the war they tried to develop a secure system but did not go beyond prototypes.

The Soviet government was also concerned about the security of its voice communications. According to an article in Agentura in the late 30’s they developed a scrambling device called EU-2 which used speech inversion. A more secure system was developed by ’42, the Cobol-P.

German Signals intelligence units in the East intercepted those radiotelephone conversations and according to Karrenberg scientists at Wa Pruef 7 were able to solve them at will up to 1943. It seems to me that this Soviet device, which the Germans called X, must have been the EU-2 or one of its modifications.

In 1944 however a new scrambling device was introduced which proved unbreakable. The Germans called this X². Again by comparing with the Agentura article it seems they were referring to the Cobol-P. By the end of the war however their research had identified the principle of the Soviet device and they may have reconstructed some conversations.

Time to take a closer look at all this information.

From EASI vol2 – p73,

37.Early Russian ciphony was solved by analysis of spectrograms

Radio telephone conversations between Moscow, Leningrad; Irkutsk, Alma Ata and Tcheljabinks, involving Russian Army and People's Commissariats, up until 1943, were enciphered by two simple methods which were said to be easily solvable by German engineers at the Army Ordnance, Development and Testing Group, Signal Branch.(Wa Pruef 7), according to Corporal Karrenberg, of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command (OKH/GdNA) .These two methods of Russian enciphering were:

a. Inversion, employing superimposed modulation of several audio frequencies; and,

b. Distortion, by artificial raising of amplitudes of speech harmonics.

German scientists were able to solve these two simple enciphering methods by recording the enciphered speech, making spectrograms from the recordings, and analyzing them .Evidently the voice engineers could see the results of the inversion and distortion, on careful inspection, and could readily identify the frequencies and methods used for encipherment. They tried it: only a few times, according to Karrenberg, but were successful at will. At the beginning of 1944, however, the simple enciphering methods were dropped by the Russians, radio telephone traffic networks themselves were changed, and no further entry was gained by the Germans. Dr. Buggisch of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command, Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) studied spectrograms of this later unsolved Moscow-Madrid radiophone traffic at the Army Ordnance, Development and Testing Group, Signal Branch Laboratories (Wa Pruef 7) where he became convinced that Russian ciphony then involved time scrambling, with the length of the individual time segments being 10 milliseconds each, and a synchronizing pulse occurring every .6 second. The number of "pickup heads" used by the Russians to obtain this time, scrambling was reported in one interrogation to be three and, in another to be four. German engineers were unable to learn any more than this from the spectrograms. They could reconstruct fragments of speech, they thought, but "the validity of the solution did not satisfy Dr. Huettenhain's critical sense," when shown to him. Dr. Huettenhain, who consulted with Dr. Buggisch, believed that some form of one-time strip might have been used to key the time transposition, as he could find no: period whatever in the encipherments.

From EASI vol4,p44

The four independent Stationary Intercept Companies assigned to work on the eastern front had the following assignments. To Feste 11 was assigned coverage of high-frequency traffic on the Red Army and the NKVD. Originally, this Feste was located at Winniza, latterly at Kiev. The other two Feste, 7 and 8, concentrated an special Russian traffic. Feste 7 was the Russian Baudot reception station at Minsk. In 1942-43 it was moved to Loetzen where it became part of Section 4 or the HLS Ost and continued to intercept Russian Baudot traffic. Feste 8 was the former Army intercept station at Koenigsberg. After 1942, this station concentrated on Russian wireless telephone traffic called by the Germans Russian X-traffic. Attempts were made to pick up this traffic by equipment developed by Army Ordnance, Signal Equipment Testing Laboratory (Waffenpruefung, abbreviated Wa Fruef 7). The channels monitored ran east of Moscow; the traffic was mainly economic. From 1942 to 1944, this traffic was successfully recorded; but after 1944 the Russians scrambled their wireless telephone traffic, and after unsuccessful efforts to intercept this scrambled type had been made, the monitoring was dropped.

From TICOM I-213 ''Report on interrogation of Alfred Muche'' ,p3

Russian Systems.

17. MUCHE himself never worked on Russian systems but he stated that they were first recorded and worked on in 1944 by a party headed by LOTZE. In February 1945 MUCHE was visited in hospital by LOTZE who told him that the Russian system had been broken and that basically it was a TIGERSTEDT system ( =TDS), with wobble inversion. MUCHE could not remember, or was never told, the number of TIGERSTEDT heads involved; he thought it might have been seven. He did not know the period of the TIGERSTEDT key, or even if it had one.

Exploding telephone poles in the Eastern front

2012-01-14T00:18:00.000-08:00

One of the systems employed by the German forces for their telephone/teletype communications was the drehkreuz lines. When used together with frequency carrier equipment they carried a large number of voice and teletype channels.

However in the Eastern front there was a serious problem for German wire communications. The Soviet partisan movement attacked the telephone poles daily, especially in the area of Army Group Centre.

In order to protect their communications the Germans used strong points , pursuit detachments and telephone poles filled with explosives. Once someone tried to cut them down the explosives went off.

The last measure had the expected result but only for a while. The partisans overcame the problem by forcing villagers who lived nearby to cut the poles.

Source: Foreign Military studies : P-132 ’’Signals Communications in the East – German experiences in Russia’’ – 1954 ,p219-20 (available in the fold3 site)

British Air Forces in France - May 1940

2012-01-11T23:51:00.000-08:00

In May 1940 the following RAF forces were stationed in France :

BAFF - British Air Forces in France :

AASF - Advanced Air Striking Force: a bomber force within range of German industrial targets

RAF component: whose mission was to provide reconnaissance and fighter cover to the British expeditionary force.

Their numerical strength (serviceable aircraft available) :

AASF : Bombers -126

Fighters - 28

RAF component: Bombers - 55

Fighters - 57

Army cooperation - 76

Total : establishment - 408

serviceable – 342

Although the numbers seem small it is actually a significant contribution from the RAF. The BAFF is 38% of serviceable RAF combat aircraft.

The problem for the RAF is that it is simply too small to fight on even terms with the Luftwaffe in the Battle of France.

Source : AIR 22/32 ‘’War Room Daily Strength Returns’’

Update

2012-01-11T12:12:00.000-08:00

I uploaded file RAF Strength 1939-45 ( Fighter,Bomber,Coastal Commands) in the TICOM folder .It contains pics of strength returns for said Commands for January, May and September of each year during 1939-45.

I also included Fighter Command returns for June, July and August 1940 ( Battle of Britain).

Source is AIR 22 ‘’Air Ministry: Periodical Returns, Intelligence Summaries and Bulletins’’

Another clue of German success with Purple ?

2012-01-09T11:39:00.000-08:00

Looking around in my reports I noticed something interesting :

From TICOM I-64 "Answers by Wm. Buggisch of OKH/Chi to Questions sent by TICOM’’ , p3

3. Liaison with the Japanese

Use of the "Verbindung" led B. promptly into along discussion of Jap systems in particular and diplomatic systems in general, but when we finally pinned him down to crypt relations he said he did not know about OKW--but had never heard of any-- and as for OKH he was sure that there had never been any Japs around in the flesh or any liaison he knew of. The previous discussion of systems got onto some interesting ground.

B. thinks Steinberg (of 209 fame) solved some Jap machine traffic which was difficult but not so hard as Enigma. B. thinks it was traffic of the Jap Military Attache. HUETTENHAIN told B. that the Japs were using Enigma in their traffic to TOKYO--or so B. remembers. Later he said Enigma was used almost 100% on all diplomatic links at the end of the war, and we checked him back and asked if he did not mean that the Germans used Enigma to TOKYO, not the Japs. He said he thought it was both, again from hearsay. HUETTENHAIN had al told B that the diplomatic traffic was Enigma with some element of the key, Stecker he thought, changed from message to message.

The Japanese may have been using the Enigma T but certainly not on all of their links. This version also lacked a steckerboard so Huettenhain’s alleged comment seems odd.

Is Buggisch’s testimony another clue of possible German success with the Purple cipher machine? Was that the machine that Steinberg solved?

WWII Myths – Weak Panzer Divisions after 1940

2012-01-05T23:58:00.000-08:00

This myth is mentioned by Guderian, the famed Panzer General in his memoirs :

After the campaign Hitler ordered a considerable increase in the number of panzer and motorized infantry divisions. The number of panzer divisions was soon doubled, through this involved a halving of the tank strength of each division. Thus the German army, though doubling its nominal strength in armored divisions, did not acquire double the number of tanks, which was after all what counted.

Source: Panzer Leader, p138

So the idea is that in order to create more mobile divisions, quickly, the stupid Hitler ordered half the tanks to be taken from the existing units thus weakening them.

From Panzertruppen vol 1 1933-1942 :

France May 1940

Number of Panzer Divisions: 10

Number of Panzer Regiments: 16 – All units have two except 6,7,8,9 Panzer divisions.

Number of tanks with Panzer Divisions: 2,582 – 258 per div

Operation Barbarossa 1941

Number of Panzer Divisions: 17

Number of Panzer Regiments : 17 – One per Division

Number of tanks with Panzer Divisions: 3,266 – 192 per div

Total AFV strength for Barbarossa was : 3,266 tanks in Pz Div plus 250 stugIII plus 135 Panzerjager I plus 340? tanks in four Panzer Abteilung = ~ 4,000

So what happened was that indeed units lost a Panzer regiment but this did not necessarily mean that strength was affected by 50% . If we look at the compositions of the tank force the difference is even more striking.

In France tanks that are incapable of frontline service (the Pz I and Pz II) constitute 57% of the tank force.

In operation Barbarossa the same types constitute only 27%.

In summer 1941 Germany has not only more Panzer divisions than she did a year ago but they are vastly better equipped. The only downside, compared to 1940, is that each unit has 25% less tanks.

Verdict:

Guderian was exaggerating . Because he was a legendary soldier he gets off with a warning.

Last minute compromise of operation Dragoon

2012-01-03T23:48:00.000-08:00

In summer 1944 the Western Allies invaded France. The first operation was codenamed Overlord and took place on 6 June ’44 in the Normandy area.

Operation Dragoon followed on 15^th August ’44 in the South of France.

In my post on French Hagelin cipher machines , there was a statement by cryptanalyst Buggisch of the Army’s Signal Intelligence agency Inspectorate 7/VI , [Ticom I-92,p3] : ‘’ ……. Buggisch spoke especially of the successful solution of C36 in 1943, on de GAULLE traffic to CORSICA. He also said that the Southern France landings were largely given away as to date and strength of force by broken C36 traffic.’’

Buggisch was telling the truth. From HW 40/7 ‘’ German Naval Intelligence successes against Allied cyphers, prefixed by a general survey of German Sigint’’ , p29 :

In the Mediterranean area the Germans continued to derive a certain amount of information from low grade French traffic. On 11th August, 1944 a German Army B reports seen in Special Intelligence quoting a Free French signal, thought to be made in Hagelin, which gave details of the allocation of shipping space for the eminent Allied landing in Southern France. The time lag in issue was only about 10 hours, and on the basis of this B-report the German Admiral commanding South coast of France was warned on 14th August of the probability of a landing in his area in the near future .

Update

2012-01-03T10:12:00.000-08:00

I added some new information in article : German success with high level codes of the Big Three .

Specifically info on the Soviet Army’s OKK code and NKVD 4-figure

Soviet 5-figure codes

2012-01-01T23:40:00.000-08:00

The highest level code used by the Soviet military was the 5-figure codebook enciphered with Blocknot (book where each page had a random sequence of numbers, organized in numbered rows and columns).

There were two main categories of Blocknots :

1. The Individual in which each table of random numbers was used only once (at least that was the theory).

2. The General in which each page of the Blocknot was valid for one day. The security of the additive sequence rested on the choice of different starting points for each message.

German success with the 5-figure code is mentioned by the following people :

1. Huettenhain ,chief cryptanalyst of OKW/Chi

2. Mettig , Head of In. 7/VI from November 1941 to June 1943; Second in command of OKW/Chi from December 1943 to April 1945.

3. Lingen ,high ranking officer of Luftwaffe signals intelligence

4. Fenner , chief at Division B of OKW/Chi (Cryptanalysis).

5. Dettman , head of cryptanalysis at Intercept Control Station East (HLS Ost); later head of the Russian section of Army Signal Intelligence.

6. Marquart , cryptanalyst of Army Signal Intelligence .From 1944 head of hand cipher research.

7. Buggisch ,cryptanalyst of Army Signal Intelligence (Inspectorate 7/VI)

8. Werther , cryptanalyst of Luftwaffe signals intelligence. Expert on Soviet codes.

9. Gerlach , probably signals officer (not clarified in the FMS report)

I’m going to write a detailed essay about all this in the future but for know I’d like to give the general details on the Soviet codes . The most detailed source is Ticom report DF-112 (available in the Ticom folder) written by Alexis Dettmann .He calls all these code-systems ‘’operational and tactical code of the supreme command of the RKKA for army and airforce’’. Traffic was heavy during the Soviet-Finnish war and from summer ’41 onwards ( ~ 300 messages per day).

From pages 184-6 and 190-2 :

1. Original designation unknown. Used from Aug'39 to Dec'40 .General additive mostly used. When 3 messages used same additive it was read in part, later completely.

2. 011-A .Used from Jan'41 to Oct'41.Read before capture. Captured June'41. 15%-25% read.

3. 023-A. Used from Oct'41 to Mar'42. Captured after put into use. Success when same sequence was reused .Often as many as 60 messages per day ( 20% ) . Individual additive sometimes used incorrectly.

4. 045-A. Used from Mar'42 to Mar'43. Initially broken so fragments could be read. Then captured summer'42.Success similar to 0-23A.Increased use of one-time pad (individual blocknot) .Readability decreasing.

5. 062-A.Used from Mar'43 to Mar'44. Captured after put into use. Success similar to 0-23A.Increased use of one-time pad .Readability decreasing.

6. 091-A.Used from Mar'44 to May'45 (at least).Captured after put into use. Ever decreasing success. Rare use of general additive. Enciphered indicators.

General comments:

The continuity of success from 1939/40 to 1944 is impressive. Each successive code was broken and in addition a copy was captured, which meant that when the additive was stripped all sequences could be translated into words.

Success was achieved not only against the General pads but also against the Individual ones. According to Marquart the Russian cipher clerks reused the last pages when supplies were running low.

Was the success rate good or bad? Dettman gives no figure for the first code .For codes 2 and 3 he gives 15-25% and for 4 and 5 says similar but decreasing. The last one, 091-A, seems to have been rarely read. Most of the sources mention great success in the period 1941-Spring ’43. Mettig also mentions the solution of the 5-figure code after spring ’43 as one of the major achievements of the Army Signal Intelligence Agency. Given traffic of 300 msg per day and a percentage of 10%-20% we get 30-60 high level messages per day and 900-1.800 per month. Lingen says 1,000 were intercepted and in some cases up to 300 decoded each day during ’41-’43.Perhaps he is referring to the combined output of OKH,OKL and OKW.

For comparison’s sake the Allies considered the breaking of the Tunny teleprinter as one of their greatest cryptanalytic achievements. The success rate: ~5% from 4^th quarter ’42 to 3^d quarter ’44 and 8% overall. [Source: General Report on Tunny ]

Still the low percentages were tolerated since the decodes contained high level information.

However there is a general trend of diminishing results. Initially the Russians use almost exclusively General pads but in 1944/45 they use Individual pads for almost all the messages. That is not the only security measure hindering the Germans. According to Mettig in spring ’43 the traffic is ‘’split by Front’’ and external indicators are enciphered. Also it seems that initially the 5-digit groups forming the additive sequence were taken from the pad in only one way ( left to right and top to bottom) but later they could be taken in any number of ways. These difficulties forced the Germans to make extensive use of Hollerith/IBM equipment for cryptanalysis.

Both Lingen and Dettman state that cryptanalysis gave the Germans valuable information about the concentration of enemy forces. Lingen mentions specifically about the 5-figure code: ‘’They contained complete lists of losses of men and material, the combination of several scattered and virtually annihilated divisions. In them was reported the status of the troop units, supply, regroupings of units of all branches and impending actions’’. [Source: Ticom DF-292 ,p39].

The solution of the highest level Soviet code was an impressive achievement which has not been recognized by historians.

Did the Soviet authorities learn of the German success? Was that the reason for the increased use of Individual pads? Or was the use of General pads an anomaly caused by problems in printing and distributing the Individual pads during the war?

Another more interesting question is what success (if any) did the Russian codebreakers have with German high level codes? So far there is no information of possible cryptanalytic success with the Enigma and the cipher teleprinters.

A more detailed essay will follow with information from a large number of Ticom reports.

Update

2011-12-30T00:37:00.000-08:00

Time for a holiday treat ! File HW 40/186 ''Activities of the Reichsluftfahrtministerium Forschungsamt (Research Bureau of the Air Ministry), mostly from POW reports'' has been uploaded to the Ticom folder.(110 pages - 40Mb)

Soviet Diplomatic Code 26 and the elusive Dr Roeder

2011-12-27T23:47:00.000-08:00

The Soviet Union used one-time pad to encipher its diplomatic codebooks after 1927. What prompted them to do so? In that year the British government raided the Arcos company that acted as a front for Soviet espionage. The information released by the British government must have convinced the Soviet authorities that their codes were being read (which was true).

From that time on Soviet diplomatic messages used OTP which if used properly is theoretically unbreakable.

During the war however there were problems in printing the large number of random pads and someone decided to reuse those already printed in more than one link . This allowed the Americans to solve some messages sent during the period 1942 -48.

But what about the Germans ? Did they have any success with Soviet diplomatic codes?

Let's take a look at the European Axis Signal Intelligence volumes :

From EASI vol6 - The Foreign Office cryptanalytic section , p31

y. Russia. Work on Russian diplomatic systems does not seem to have been a Pers Z S commitment. Dr. Kunze made it clear that Russian systems had been read up until 1927, but that no success had been achieved after that time. Presumptively he had reference to the introduction of one-time pads. Lt. Colonel Mettig of Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) stated that "after a certain date" (which he could not remember), no Russian diplomatic traffic was attempted, either by his agency or Pers Z S.

This paragraph creates more questions. If the Pers Z did not work on Soviet diplomatic traffic who did ? The only other organizations that tackled diplomatic traffic were OKW/Chi and the Forschungsamt.

From EASI vol7 - Goering’s Research Bureau , p84

Russian Systems.

Diplomatic Code and Additive.

Sauerbier mentions a few people who were engaged in a fruitless attack on Russian diplomatic traffic. This attack culminated in the belief that the system was a code with a non-repeating additive. (I-162.)

From EASI vol3 - Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces , p63

f. Russia. The Russian desk was under Professor Nowopaschenny. Wendland, the head of the practical cryptanalysis section, (Section V) was also interested in Russian. It is known that, as early as 1934, Nowopaschenny was connected with the Cipher Section, and was interested at that early date In Russian problems. At that time, Russian military traffic was being worked on. During the war, the Russian section was small, and it seems to have been able to accomplish nothing. Mettig stated definitely that Russian diplomatic traffic was enciphered with a one-time pad and was never read. Traffic was intercepted from time to time and tested, but the desk never had any luck.The Foreign Office People said that up to the time of Stalingrad the Army read a Russian diplomatic system based on a one-time pad.They were probably mistaken. The system read vas almost certainly a military system. We know that such a system was read. A diplomatic system would not have been handled by the Army.

The military one-time pad read in 1942 was of course the 5-figure code used by the Soviet High Command and not a diplomatic system.

If the Germans had no success with Soviet diplomatic codes during the war how can we explain the following message by Oliver Kirby :

[Source: Robert Louis Benson and Cecil J. Phillips, History of Venona (Ft. George G. Meade: Center for Cryptologic History, 1995)]

The diplomatic code 26 was one of the codebooks captured by the Finns at the Soviet Consulate at Petsamo on 22 June 1941.The other books were the NKVD Pobeda code , a GRU codebook and a Naval GRU codebook [Source: ‘’Venona’’ p4 by Nigel West].These were shared with the Germans and Japanese.

Strangely there is no mention of these books in the European Axis Signals Intelligence volumes. In volume 8 p77 two Russian systems are mentioned as being physically compromised ,during the war, but no further details are given…

I’ve tried to find information on dr Roeder but I have been unable to locate any person by that name working at Pers Z. Another possibility is that Roeder worked for another German agency. There was a Roeder, head of group VI of OKH/GdNA but in his interrogation it is mentioned that he was captured by Allied troops in the South of Germany. Kirby was in the North.

Were the Germans able to read Soviet diplomatic messages? Cryptologia article ‘’The road to German Diplomatic ciphers’’ by Michael van der Meulen mentions that Paschke of the Pers Z in his memoirs clearly states that Soviet diplomatic messages were read. The book in question is ‘’ Das Chiffrier und Fernmeldewesen im Auswärtigen Amt’’,Bonn-1957.

According to EASI vol6 ‘’While junior in grade to Schauffler, Dr.Paschke during the latter years of the war became, with Schauffler, the joint head of Pers Z S. So he should know…

There are three possibilities on how they could have done so :

1).The one-time tables were reused. This was the basis of the American Venona breakthrough. The Germans were able to read Soviet military messages enciphered with one-time pad thanks to reuse of the tables. Perhaps they did something similar with diplomatic traffic.

2).The success was achieved not against the one-time pad but against the emergency enciphering procedure. This was a simpler way to encipher messages when there was no supply of OTP. The Japanese read messages on this system from embassies/consulates in Seoul, Dairen, Australia, Harbin, Hakodate [Source: JMA/SAC 77 plus others found in HW 40/29]

3).They were able to reconstruct the one-time pad algorithm. The Anglo-Americans were able to discover the algorithm used by the German Foreign Ministry in creating their ‘’random’’ additive tables in late ’44 and messages were decoded in 1945. Did the Germans have similar success? A major effort to identify the OTP algorithm was carried out during the war by the Army’s Signal intelligence agency but it yielded no results .[Source: Ticom I-205 ‘’Detailed interrogation report of former Regierungsbaurat Johannes Anton Marquart of OKH/Gen.d.NA’’

I believe that there is more to this story than has been presented so far. Unfortunately we are at the mercy of the NSA and GCHQ .If/when they release new material then we will know more.