tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3335175720102608134.post9214384461319314996..comments2024-01-18T00:59:52.237-08:00Comments on Christos military and intelligence corner: Bletchley Park vs Berlin – The North African SeesawChristos T.http://www.blogger.com/profile/04246906263926130737noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3335175720102608134.post-66389707077445774722012-05-15T07:27:57.180-07:002012-05-15T07:27:57.180-07:00i).Agreed but like i said before i can't resea...i).Agreed but like i said before i can't research this subject for a decade and then write a book. My goal is in very little space to cover all the important facts. Especially those that challenge the accepted view of events.<br />ii). The problem is that there were severe limits in what the forward Allied units could achieve on their own due to the widespread use of cipher machines by the Germans. On the other hand that does not mean that Seebohm's people were always correct. They were however able to achieve more due to poor British cipher security.<br />iii). You are an expert on operation Crusader not me. The reports i have are all of a general nature they dont say on 4 January 41 we read 6 messages from 8th army HQ etcChristos T.https://www.blogger.com/profile/04246906263926130737noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3335175720102608134.post-87066442162504780302012-05-15T03:45:08.414-07:002012-05-15T03:45:08.414-07:00i) Agree - but I think looking in isolation at the...i) Agree - but I think looking in isolation at the success of sigint without consideration of the operational impact is a bit academic.<br />ii) I think this is an important element of the story - and we can then circle back to the point I was making about the unknown impact of Commonwealth Y-Services. The presence and use of Enigma at regimental level and above does not imply that Y-Services were unable to read messages at regimental level and above. Which then brings us back to the question of what they read, and how good they were, and what impact that had. I know your view is that ULTRA is overhyped, and the Axis performance understated (correct me if I got this wrong). But could the reverse not be true for Seebohm and the Y-Service on the Commonwealth side?<br />iii) But we are talking about analysis of German intel (as a whole, not just sigint) in advance of the battle here, not the success or failure of the battle itself. I think this is a pertinent question in relation to this post, and the reply that many factors affected victory and defeat does not answer it.<br /><br />All the best<br /><br />AndreasAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3335175720102608134.post-55025437599326636852012-05-15T02:46:36.070-07:002012-05-15T02:46:36.070-07:00Ok let's see:
i). Building the enemy's OOB...Ok let's see:<br />i). Building the enemy's OOB was the main function of intelligence units. If you are talking about an impact on daily operations it is mentioned in some reports that it was possible to defend against bombing attacks by reading the codes that gave away the target<br />ii). Messages in all armies go through specific codes based on clasification. For example secret would go by Enigma, confidential by hand cipher etc.<br />As you said in combat operations some messages would be sent by the fastest way possible,even in the clear. That doesn't change the fact that the Enigma was the basis of German communications. By the same logic the M-209 was sometimes used up to army level in 1943-5. Does that mean that the Germans can be said to have penetrated Allied top level communications in that period?<br />iii). I think you missed this paragraph :<br /> 'First of all both sides were able to get some information about each other’s strengths and dispositions from various sources ( aerial photo-reconnaissance ,spies , army recon units , low level codes ,traffic analysis and D/F ). Also both sides made mistakes and miscalculations from the intelligence they got. But more importantly there were many more factors influencing victory and defeat than merely signals intelligence.'Christos T.https://www.blogger.com/profile/04246906263926130737noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3335175720102608134.post-33310606322294791292012-05-15T01:43:21.996-07:002012-05-15T01:43:21.996-07:00i) There's still no discernible operational im...i) There's still no discernible operational impact to me. Fact of the matter remains that the RAF/SAAF had almost complete air superiority from day one of the offensive. Also, don't overestimate signals - a lot of knowledge was based on good old-fashioned photo recce. Clearly they combined these two. See e.g. here: http://crusaderproject.wordpress.com/2011/03/23/luftwaffe-appreciation-of-raf-strength-in-north-africa-20-november-1941/<br /><br />ii) I seriously doubt that in the heat of battle every call was put through Enigma. Do you have evidence for that? Time critical messages were almost certainly broadcast in clear, in my view, with limited coding. There is evidence of interception that supports that view. See comment below this post: http://crusaderproject.wordpress.com/2010/11/01/some-days-in-the-war-of-101-special-wireless-section/ In any case, this still means that orders from Regiment to Batallion/Abteilung were in clear.<br /><br />iii) That's rather my point. :)<br /><br />iv) I know.<br /><br />All the best<br /><br />AndreasAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3335175720102608134.post-20489712896562604182012-05-15T00:06:56.011-07:002012-05-15T00:06:56.011-07:00If i had to mention every detail I’d write a book ...If i had to mention every detail I’d write a book not a blog post. Let me answer quickly:<br />i).I don’t know specific details about the airbases that were monitored through these codes because they are not mentioned in the Ticom reports I have. Perhaps a post war review of RAF signals security has that info. There is such a file but I don’t have it. <br />What was the operational impact? The Luftwaffe’s signal intelligence units were able to keep track of British formations, their organization and their operations by reading the RAF cypher, the low level SYKO code and by intercepting plaintext radiotelephone transmissions.<br />ii).The problem is that the Germans used the Enigma from regiment upwards. That limits the operations of these units only for low level traffic. On the other hand NFAK 621 could solve both British division level codes and the WOC used at army level. A difference of an order of magnitude.<br />iii).Just decoding messages doesn’t mean that you know what your opponent is going to do .In chess does the enemy hide his pieces? No but you still don’t know what he is going to do. Furthermore most of the traffic did not go through radio. Only a part of the radio traffic could be intercepted, only a part of the intercepted traffic could be decoded, only a part of the decoded traffic had any good intel. Then there are perceptions and misconceptions of the enemy… <br />Iv). Was used by both sides. If you want more details check Ferris, ‘Intelligence and strategy: selected essays’Christos T.https://www.blogger.com/profile/04246906263926130737noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3335175720102608134.post-41906691234017769412012-05-14T14:00:07.940-07:002012-05-14T14:00:07.940-07:00I believe that there are a lot of things missing t...I believe that there are a lot of things missing that would be required to fully understand and compare. <br /><br />(i) The actual operational impact of Axis intercepts. That most RAF messages could be deciphered in 5-10 days is of course good work. But did it matter, or was this too late? What kind of messages were intercepted? For example, were bases in Egypt wired in, and therefore interception safe?<br /><br />(ii) The successes (or otherwise) of the Commonwealth Y-Service. At the tactical level the Germans also transmitted in the clear - things work both ways.<br /><br />(iii) The total failure of German intelligence to foresee and then accept that CRUSADER was happening to them in November 1941 (and in fact its reliance on the German Foreign Office mission under von Neurath to provide them with proof of it being a major offensive), and the failure of Operation SOMMERNACHTSTRAUM. If the intercepts were so good, how could either of these two things happen?<br /><br />(iv) The role of radio deception.<br /><br />Just more food for thought.<br /><br />All the best<br /><br />AndreasAnonymousnoreply@blogger.com