tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3335175720102608134.post8125626817604933637..comments2024-01-18T00:59:52.237-08:00Comments on Christos military and intelligence corner: German intelligence on operation OverlordChristos T.http://www.blogger.com/profile/04246906263926130737noreply@blogger.comBlogger12125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3335175720102608134.post-71453804773239849722018-02-10T22:53:47.773-08:002018-02-10T22:53:47.773-08:00http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.gr/2011/10/norm...http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.gr/2011/10/normandy-1944-allied-estimates-of.html<br /><br />http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.gr/2012/01/normandy-1944-what-if-scenarios-and.htmlChristos T.https://www.blogger.com/profile/04246906263926130737noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3335175720102608134.post-57681881842888814892018-02-10T12:32:16.977-08:002018-02-10T12:32:16.977-08:00What if the deployment of the armored divisions ha...What if the deployment of the armored divisions had less to do with where the Nazis thought the Allies would land and more to do with being a compromise by Hitler to assuage the demands of Rommel and Rundstedt? The former thought rapid armored counter-attacks to the beach were the key to defeating the invasion, so you give him the tanks to do it. The latter thought infantry at the wall, defense in depth, and then a mobile reserve force held back for counter attacks was the answer. If Calais is more heavily fortified and difficult terrain for tanks beyond the beaches, then it reduces the 'need' for more tanks there as well. <br /><br />There is certainly a 'where are they going to land' element to deployment decisions, but the Allies logistical capability meant they could land at many different places so the Nazis had to spread out to address the threat of alternative sites. Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08230057509611216564noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3335175720102608134.post-53120165982389974302015-02-14T05:25:15.324-08:002015-02-14T05:25:15.324-08:00The first commenter makes the usual post war asser...The first commenter makes the usual post war assertion that the german intelligence and code breaking effort was(similar comments often used to say as well " insignificant and") not coordinated. Of course this point of view did not take account of the recently declassified info hence it now looks like a degree of spin post war. (ok - all german code breaks were deliberate british plants - got it)<br /><br />I would like to ask for the evidence of who was coordinating the use of all this intel because there was really no point in gathering it unless all concerned compared notes. <br /><br /> There is such a lot of information that is must have been assembled and compared even unofficially by junior officers. But if the germans did change their disposition towards Normandy what was the forum for the decision and what information was actually used ? (joke - axis history?) How did Hitler receive and use intel?<br /><br />Regarding dispositions, interesting that 2nd Pz was in Normandy by d + 7 or so - all in with 4 out of 4 combat ready divisions. Regarding pas de Calais, come on they could not strip their rear and send all the infantry units to Normandy.<br /><br />gmbcf1https://www.blogger.com/profile/12133237051104180211noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3335175720102608134.post-24787134669399666432015-01-05T12:16:55.831-08:002015-01-05T12:16:55.831-08:00Concerning mobile forces it is clear that the 3 ar...Concerning mobile forces it is clear that the 3 armored divisions close to Normandy were superior to the one north of the Seine. The rest available were scattered around France (and Belgium) but they were not fully operational. Regarding the Flak corps the situation was reversed but the one regiment in Normandy had recently been sent there to reinforce the defenses. The smaller units mentioned in ‘British intelligence in the Second world war’ were moved in May to Normandy and from a quick look at ‘Normandy 1944’ I don’t see similar moves in other areas. Obviously the Germans tried to hedge their bets by making sure that threatened areas received a mix of mobile and infantry units capable of taking action. However it is also clear from their positioning that Normandy and the Somme estuary were covered by the best forces.Christos T.https://www.blogger.com/profile/04246906263926130737noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3335175720102608134.post-855580881449347302015-01-05T11:12:02.073-08:002015-01-05T11:12:02.073-08:00Great article. As one of the strongest points of y...Great article. As one of the strongest points of your theory is the German reinforcement of Normandy area in April / May 44, a decisive proof could be the reinforcements (or lack of) in other areas. Do you have any data on them?Fabrizio Vianellohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04566056256115509256noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3335175720102608134.post-46330158314772763852014-06-19T18:25:00.729-07:002014-06-19T18:25:00.729-07:00Great discussion. My 96 yo dad headed a casualty ...Great discussion. My 96 yo dad headed a casualty handling team on an LST at Omaha beach. He was there to launch the first wave and continued shuttling wounded back to Weymouth for about 3 months afterwards. His memoirs are a fascinating read. I am currently reading Atkinson's account of the d-day and couldn't help but think the Germans must have known a lot. An interesting tidbit... my dad, an Lt., knew that it was about to start when he got shipments of antibiotics and whole blood (which has a short shelf life).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3335175720102608134.post-56931319347372686092014-02-24T09:24:56.341-08:002014-02-24T09:24:56.341-08:00You can find a lengthy discussion on the success o...You can find a lengthy discussion on the success or failure of the disinformation operation at Axis History Forum. It is a complicated subject and the fear of a second Allied landing definitely held German units away from Normandy. These were the 84, 85,326,331 and 182 infantry divisions. The last two were not operational as they were refitting /reforming. The rest had 28,363 men. <br />Whether these units could have changed the outcome of the battle is i think easy to answer. As for infantry units being a ‘strategic counter attack force’, that is not correct. In theory infantry units could have allowed the mobile divisions to be pulled back and used in a breakthrough role. In theory….<br />Christos T.https://www.blogger.com/profile/04246906263926130737noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3335175720102608134.post-51983640630813281882014-02-24T06:45:42.979-08:002014-02-24T06:45:42.979-08:00Interesting article and debate. On the subject of ...Interesting article and debate. On the subject of deployment of German Forces. There has grown up a myth that the majority of German Armoured forces were located N of the Seine. In fact evidence for a range of German sources (e.g. Foreign Military studies reports) makes clear that the best equipped Armoured Divisions in France were held closet to Normandy -i.e. Panzer Lehr, Hitler Jugend and 21st Panzer Division <br /><br />However it is also true that the German 5th Army N of the Seine was better manned and equipped than the 7th Army and also the area was better fortified than Normandy. <br /><br />Operation Fortitude was thus successful as a deception operation because even for nearly 7 weeks after D Day German High command attention was on Pas de Calais and they would not release key Infantry divisions to move to Normandy. Absence of these Infantry divisions in Normandy prevented the formation of a strategic counter attack force. <br /><br />Hope this helps <br /><br /> <br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Ian Mitchellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01835973853974179684noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3335175720102608134.post-34520490138144567462014-01-29T15:49:56.608-08:002014-01-29T15:49:56.608-08:0021 panzer 12 ss and pz lehr were not war weary uni...21 panzer 12 ss and pz lehr were not war weary units at all - the latter 2 were probably the best 2 in franceAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3335175720102608134.post-77981641611938738902013-09-26T01:54:40.825-07:002013-09-26T01:54:40.825-07:00‘The vast majority of first rate divisions were he...‘The vast majority of first rate divisions were held for defense in depth to the north of the Seine,’<br /><br />Maybe in a parallel dimension this was true. In our world however it was the exact opposite. Out of the 4 four operational panzer divisions 3 were close to Normandy not Calais. <br /><br />There is no reason to make up elaborate theories when we know the location, strength and equipment situation of every unit in the West. Read ‘Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness’.<br /><br />‘the complete order of battle of the NS in the west was completely documented prior to D-day’<br /><br />Exactly so stop believing in fairytales and look at the facts. This isn’t nuclear physics or quantum mechanics. <br />Christos T.https://www.blogger.com/profile/04246906263926130737noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3335175720102608134.post-75376393787254596142013-09-25T22:31:10.060-07:002013-09-25T22:31:10.060-07:00The main difficulty in all this is that there were...The main difficulty in all this is that there were five separate intelligence factions within the NS apparatus, and no single source from which synthesis, estimates and verification were possible. This organizational defect makes all these snippets of information seem meaningful only in hindsight. In fact, there was no apparatus in the German intelligence community tasked with gathering all the pieces together.<br /><br />The lack of coherence in analysis AT THAT TIME, indirect contrast to the closed loop intelligence network established by the British, suggests rather more strongly the random nature of the German troop movements, whereby each separate instance has its 'cause' in the more mundane minutia of military operations such as re-assembly and training of war weary units, and the measured distribution of (sub-standard and/or non-mechanized) costal defense forces of any quality in Brittany.<br /><br />The vast majority of first rate divisions were held for defense in depth to the north of the Seine, viz, Pas de Calis region, as confirmed by Lorenz intercepts during that time....the complete order of battle of the NS in the west was completely documented prior to D-day. Step back and take a look at the big picture.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3335175720102608134.post-38492536904918585542012-06-25T12:26:47.701-07:002012-06-25T12:26:47.701-07:00Excellent work. I am glad I stumbled across your ...Excellent work. I am glad I stumbled across your website.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com