Wednesday, November 30, 2011

Codes used by the Major Allied powers

Obviously this list is not complete but I believe it is correct .I’ve used every source I could find from TiCOM reports to Wikipedia.



USA

Diplomatic:    Gray,Brown ,A1,C1 , M138A , SIGFOY ,SIGABA(small number?) and from 1944 CCM ,SIGTOT

Military attaché :  Military Intelligence code , War Department Confidential Code , M-138A


Armed Forces :  Strip ciphers M-94 and M-138 , Division Field Code , Slidex , Bomber Code , War Department Telegraph Code


Cipher machines : SIGABA , SIGCUM, M-209 (Hagelin C-38), SIGFOY (Enigma type) , CCM

OSS : various hand ciphers , M-138

Ciphony devices : A3 , Sigsaly



Soviet Union


Diplomatic : Main system one time pad

Armed Forces :  2,3,4 figure codes of various types , 5-figure book enciphered by Bloknot (numerical additive).Two main types of additive books : Individual (one time pad) , Circular (each page valid for 1 day).

Cipher machines : M100/101 teleprinters , K37 ( modified Hagelin B211)


Ciphony devices : EU-2 , Соболь (Sable)


Britain 

Diplomatic: Cypher M , Inter-departmental Cypher , Dominions Office confidential code, Colonial office confidential code, India office cipher ‘S’, India office code ‘Q’ , R code , Government Telegraph Code


Army – Air Force:  War Office Cypher , RAF Cypher  , Inter-Service Cypher , Inter-departmental Cypher , Codex, Slidex,  Bomber Code , Syko , Rekoh


Naval : Naval Cypher , Naval Code , Administrative Code , Fleet Code , Merchant Navy Code , Merchant Ships Code , Small Ships Basic Code , Independently routed ships , Naval Shore Code


Cipher machines :  Typex , CCM , Rockex , 5-UCO

Monday, November 28, 2011

Economic Intelligence by the Forschungsamt

The Forschungsamt was one of the principal German intelligence agencies in the period 1933-45.It was created by Goering in 1933 to provide the Nazi party with reliable intelligence on domestic and foreign affairs.

It’s main focus was on intercepting plaintext post , radio and teletype traffic and eavesdropping on telephone conversation but it also had a large decoding department.

One of the main efforts of the FA was in economic intelligence. The part devoted to economic intelligence was department 12 of Group V ( Evaluation).

Department 12 was divided in three sections :

1.     12A – Germany’s national economic problems.

2.     12B – Economic conditions of other countries.

3.     12C – Compilation and analysis of information concerning domestic raw materials ,markets and prices.


Source : Consolidated Interrogation report SAIC/SIR/7 – 19 July 1945

Obviously the information collected from unencoded and encoded traffic was important in guiding German economic and trade policy, especially as Goering was also in charge of the four year plan.
A hint of this is given by report :
’Headquarters Seventh Army ,MU 500 , CSDIC,G-2 , APO 758 – German Air ministry Research Office ‘’ , 29 Jan ‘45
Main source  : Guenther Lothar
………………………………………………………………………………………
The economic Dept is the largest of all FORSCHUNGSAMT sections. Here a staff of experts of various branches of industry sort and evaluate information pertaining  to the activities of the world market, production of all possible goods, statistics, etc. Of particular interest, was, of course, the armament industry in the United States and  England. Stock exchange rumors and  fluctuations in foreign countries  were also very closely watched  and collected to enable quick and advantageous decisions to be made for buying and  selling.
Statistics of industrial interest gathered by this Dept were also sometimes disseminated to certain German industrial institutions.

The codes of foreign banking establishments were also targeted.
TICOM report I-162 ''Report on interrogation of Kurt Saurbier of RLM/Forschungsamt held on 31 August 1945'' gives more information :

From p3 :
7. Commercial Codes :
Several enciphered versions of standard codes were solved, but S. did not consider any of the results of importance. Traffic between TURKEY and SWEDEN was attacked particularly and solved, but yielded none of the expected information on shipping possibilities.A major effort of the section was the solution in 1944 of the code used by INTABANK, the International Bank at BASLE. The code used was an old Bank of England code which had been solved in 1941. The pages were shuffled, and an encipherment added, but solution was achieved by the use of cribs and common form messages, of which the best was a statement of the daily exchange rates between various countries.
The detail of the encipherment was as follows: the basic system was bigram substitution from a table different for each link and changing each 3 months. The text was divided into segments of three or four groups, and the plain text bigrams for encipherment were prearranged pairs, as 1 and 15, 2 and 14 , 6 and 10 etc. Very long depths and near depths were produced on closely similar number values, and this was the entry. The whole solution took about 6 months, starting with 1942-3 traffic and working up to 1944. The interception of the traffic was not systematised at any time, and S. did not believe more than 50%, of all the traffic was read as a result of the solution .
I have also written before on the Soviet economic traffic intercepted during the war , allowing the Germans to evaluate parts of the Soviet economy.
So in the area of economic intelligence the FA certainly had it’s successes!

Saturday, November 26, 2011

More information on French high level code

The high level code used by the French armed forces in 1940 has been mentioned here and here.

More information is given by Wilhelm Fenner ,Chief at Division B of OKW/Chi (Cryptanalysis) in DF187B – ‘’The Cryptanalytic successes of OKW/Chi after 1938’’  , p7 :

Even before the military action with France began , the military systems of French higher staffs were solved.This was a 4 or 5-figure code that was systematically transposed (tableau carve) .In the cryptograms a few parallel passages (repetitions) were discovered .The interval between these passages was constant and must therefore correspond to the width of the transposition box as cryptanalytic studies have shown.If I am not mistaken the keys (Loesungen ?  ? ? )  ? ? the box itself were taken from the same code book. Despite all the cunning of this cryptographic system, the occurrence of short  parallel passages proved fatal. By the aid of these deciphered messages tabs could be kept on the French Army far back into the homeland.

Wednesday, November 23, 2011

Fatal mistake by the Czechoslovak resistance movement

After the occupation of Czechoslovakia by German troops ,the Czech government of Benes fled to London and through its intelligence service started running agents networks in that country.The Germans managed to read encoded messages of these nets and  gain vital information.One of these messages contained the names and addresses of a lot of Czech agents.Why would a message like that be sent over the radio? It definitely was a fatal mistake on the part of the Czech secret service.



From European Axis Signals Intelligence vol 4 - Army High Command Signal Intelligence Service , p177


91. Work on Czech Agents' Traffic - The Vauck section worked on Agents' traffic of the Czechoslovak Resistance Movement. Mettig believed that the breaking in 1942/43 of two links running to England made possible the arrest of British agents in Czechoslovakia. The greatest success was achieved by intercepting the wireless communications of the Czech Resistance Movement in London. This was the only case in which Mettig is certain that it was possible for the Vauck section to break into an agent network by purely cryptanalytic means, and this was largely through breaches of security on the part of the Czech chief. After the system had been broken, the book for enciphering was found and the key recovered. In September 1942, the Czechs were about to go over to a new system but were foolish enough to name in the old system the book to be used for enciphering in the new system. Contents of messages solved on this link were nearly always concerned with reports on the political situation and activities of the Czech Resistance Movement, and were so important that for a long time the W/T traffic was allowed to continue unhindered.



A similar (but not identical ) version is given by Wilhelm Fenner ,Chief at Division B of OKW/Chi (Cryptanalysis).

From Ticom I-200 ‘’Interrogation of Min Rat Wilhelm Fenner of OKW/Chi’’ ,p9:

Czech Agents.

During the war, they only read Czech agents/ traffic when the keys had been compromised. They had read about 20 messages in 1943-1944, which were on a Ceasar received from the SD through the Abwehr ; he could not remember any details of the system involved. He thought that one of the agents must have been captured, and that the network continued to use the compromised keys. They never intercepted any messages, but received copies and keys with the SD stamp. He remembered that one message had given a long list of the names and addresses of Czech  agents. He did not know of any Czech diplomatic traffic intercepted during the war.

Tuesday, November 22, 2011

Luftwaffe strength by Front 1941-45


Source is ‘’The Luftwaffe Data Book’’ by Alfred Price



Luftwaffe East

Jun-41
Jul-42
May-43
May-44
Jan-45

Fighters
782
659
454
390
383
Long Range Fighters
78
70
52

Night-fighters
0
0
9
104
94

Medium Bombers
893
829
509
427
101
Long Range Bombers

Ground Attack
474
336
574
650
601

Night Harasment
0
0
0
276
225

Coastal
27
22
38
30
57

Recon
Short Range
325
90
91
126
215

Long Range
303
350
313
198
253

Transport
212
440
93
182
151

Combat
2,227
1,894
1,598
1,847
1,404
Total
3,094
2,796
2,133
2,383
2,080































East : Luft 1,6,4



Luftwaffe North

Jun-41
Jul-42
May-43
May-44
Jan-45

Fighters
52
119
137
62
104
Long Range Fighters
12
12
12
16
41

Night-fighters
0
0
0
0
10

Medium Bombers
96
108
41
0
115
Long Range Bombers
0
0
0
10
0

Ground Attack
42
43
0
28
0

Night Harasment
0
0
0
24
33

Coastal
65
55
100
68
30

Recon
Short Range
10
4
0
0
9

Long Range
23
31
38
42
31

Transport
16
24
45
44
50

Combat
202
282
190
116
270
Total
316
396
373
294
423

































North : Luft 5









Luftwaffe Med

Jun-41
Jul-42
May-43
May-44
Jan-45

Fighters
34
154
349
168
0
Long Range Fighters
25
42
88
16
0

Night-fighters
0
30
30
28
0

Medium Bombers
172
330
412
67
0
Long Range Bombers

Ground Attack
62
87
92
51
0

Night Harasment
0
0
0
66
23

Coastal
23
36
50
74
0

Recon
Short Range
9
2
26
35
29

Long Range
32
65
33
45
16

Transport
178
180
173
151
0

Combat
293
643
971
330
0
Total
535
926
1,253
701
68































Med : Luft 2,Sud Ost





Luftwaffe West

Jun-41
Jul-42
May-43
May-44
Jan-45

Fighters
229
274
250
168
1,094
Long Range Fighters
38
0
0
53
0

Night-fighters
0
0
0
103
0

Medium Bombers
194
175
157
390
268
Long Range Bombers
21
50
1
96
0

Ground Attack
0
0
118
73
152

Night Harasment
0
0
0
0
111

Coastal
26
0
39
16
0

Recon
Short Range
0
20
56
63
66

Long Range
19
39
35
53
0

Transport
0
0
6
64
111

Combat
482
499
526
883
1,514
Total
527
558
662
1,079
1,802































West : Luft 3







Luftwaffe Reich/Mitte

Jun-41
Jul-42
May-43
May-44
Jan-45

Fighters
32
158
299
820
356
Long Range Fighters
0
0
0
192
0

Night-fighters
205
278
417
639
1,040

Medium Bombers
0
439
1,007
478
0
Long Range Bombers
0
21
78
176
44

Ground Attack
0
0
68
34
0

Night Harasment
0
0
0
0
0

Coastal
0
0
0
0
25

Recon
Short Range
0
0
12
4
0

Long Range
0
0
9
19
9

Transport
0
104
319
446
0

Combat
237
896
1,869
2,339
1,440
Total
237
1,000
2,209
2,808
1,474






























I assign planes according to function not type.What does that mean? A Bf109 in a ground attack unit is added to Ground Attack. A Fw190 in ground attack is also added to that category. A Ju-88 in a fighter unit is counted as a fighter not a bomber.Night harassment refers to older types not suited for day operations (Ju87 ,Hs126 ,CR 42 and other obscure types).Short range recon = 1 engine ,Long range recon = 2 engines.