Monday, October 31, 2011
According to Oliver Kirby NSA oral history : ...and they used a lot of US equipment .That's how we figured out which was which.
He's talking about the networks that were monitored.
Expect an update....
Saturday, October 29, 2011
Wednesday, October 26, 2011
FIFTH INTERROGATION 2/10/46
Monday, October 24, 2011
Sunday, October 23, 2011
Wednesday, October 19, 2011
Tuesday, October 18, 2011
Wednesday, October 12, 2011
I’ve written about the TICOM team that found a German army intercept unit in Rosenheim in May 1945.That unit belonged to the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command – OKH/GdNA Group VI. The German team plus the equipment they used to intercept Soviet communications , were sent to Bletchley Park and put to use by the Allies.
Relocation of armament plants;
Coal and iron ore production figures;
Raw material and fuel requirements for industrial plants;
Tank and gun production figures;
Transportation facilities and problems;
Railway, inland shipping, and air communications;
Food distribution and rationing measures;
Manpower, labor allocation, and other relevant matters.
Five two-lined sets
Baku and Kuybyshev were separate Baudot stations as well as control stations.
The reports do not necessarily agree on all the details.For example according to Dettman (chief cryptologist on Russian systems) the reception at the Loetzen facility was poor but Roeder (chief of the branch) claimed it was excellent.Roeder said that most of the traffic was Soviet 5-figure and some 5-letter traffic (plus a lot of clear text on economic matters) which was not solved but Dettman says 50% was read.Maybe they are referring to different time periods as indeed after November 1944 Soviet Army 5-figure traffic could not be solved.
Friday, October 7, 2011
The following is a summary of information so far received on German attempts to break into the British Typex machine, based on P/W interrogations carried out during and subsequent to the war. It is divided into (a) the North African interrogations, (b) information gathered after the end of the war, and (c) an attempt to sum up the evidence for and against the possibility of German successes.
Answers to GCCS questionnaire
7) What were the most common Allied addresses in the more secret BJ’s? Did American authorities appear frequently in the addresses?
On the whole I feel a thorough investigation would be a good thing but I don’t see who could do it.However it may be possible to shoot down the Wagner story after further discussion here and further interviews with POW’s .It is quite possible that Haunhorst was merely shown how the Typex machine worked and it would be interesting to know whether he actually saw an English message decoded.
Despite their efforts the Brits were not able to identify the mysterious ‘’Wagner’’ during the war or after.Their inquiries however concentrated on the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command - OKH/GdnA .After the war they interrogated Mettig who was in charge of the Army Agency from Nov '41 to Jun '43 :
Statements by PW Obstlt Mettig on Typex
So instead of resolving the Typex affair Mettig made things worse.Now the British had three people claiming Typex was read ,one of whom was the man in charge of the Army Signals Intelligence Agency.Further investigations singled out the top mathematicians of OKH/GdNA Doering and Pietsch plus Menzer of OKW/Chi:
I suspect that there is a third part for the Typex investigation.Unless it’s released questions will remain.A small piece of information regarding the efforts of OKH codebreakers versus Typex is available however from Ticom D-83 which based on captured documents says :